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 i 
 
Abstract 
 
Successful delivery of public service depends on how the relationships are forged by the 
actors (organizations) involved in service provision in a given socioeconomic and political 
context. By applying Agency Theory to the accountability features of service transaction 
and Activity Theory as a tool to define relationships, I have demonstrated that the public 
sector (District Governments) exhibits a more liberal attitude towards relationships with 
community based organizations (Water Users’ Committees) in the provision of rural 
drinking water, while being more formal in relationships with the technical service 
providers (NGOs). The resolution of the dilemma regarding whether to choose trust-based 
or more formal contractual relationships with community and service providers in service 
provision, depends on how effectively the public sector builds their capacity to monitor, 
supervise and enforce the terms of the service provision relationship. The study of the 
application of accountability features in the service delivery transaction helps us to 
understand how a government organization structures its relationships with community 
organizations and with others, by using either a social or a market approach. The 
research also reveals that it is difficult to assign accountability in the collaborative network 
type of service provision, particularly for the provision of public goods and services, which 
demands a greater level of formal accountability to legitimise the functioning of the 
government.   
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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Nepal, with a 26,494,504 population and 147,181 sq. km area (CBS, Nepal, 2011) is a 
landlocked country surrounded by India from the east, south and west, and by China from 
the north. Socially Nepal is very diverse, inhabited by more than 100 castes and ethnic 
groups (Dahal, D.R. 2012). Geographically, it is also diverse, ranging from the world’s 
tallest peak, Mount Everest (8,848 m) in the north, to the Terai plain in the south.  
 
Nepal has made impressive progress in development over the last two decades despite 
political turmoil. This is evidenced through the progressive change in its Human 
Development Index (HDI) from 0.234 in 1980 to 0.463 in 2012 (Health 0.774 from 0.444, 
Education 0.358 from 0.126, and Income 0.359 from 0.256) (UNDP 2013). However, 
Nepal is still far behind in HDI with its ranking of 157 in 186 nations (UNDP 2013) and in 
the corruption index it is at 116 out of 1771. Nepal has received foreign aid since 1950. 
Although the share of external aid is declining the country still depends largely on it, as it 
constituted 22% of the total national budget in the fiscal year 2013/142.  
 
                                                
1  Source: Transparency International http://www.transparency.org/country#NPL accessed on 19 May 2014 
2  “Grant receipt in fiscal year 2012/13 is estimated to rise by 15.1 per cent as compared to previous fiscal 
year reaching a total of Rs. 46.98 billion”-
http://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/EcoSurvey_20130905024213.pdf accessed on 5 December 
2013. 
 
 
2 
A conflict lasting over a decade (1995 to 2005) has greatly affected the nation building 
process of Nepal.  It left a large proportion of the population internally displaced3 and 
more than 10,000 people dead4. Although the government has been changed five times5 
after the successful holding of the first Constituent Assembly election on 10 April 2008, it 
failed to deliver the Constitution of the Nation in the stipulated time frame. The second 
Constituent Assembly was held on 19 November 2013 where the two political parties, 
Nepalese Congress (NC) and Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML), emerged as leading parties 
and formed the coalition government with other small parties. The Communist Party of 
Nepal (CPN) Maoist, which had received the largest number of votes in the first 
Constituent Assembly, has fallen behind. 
 
The country’s political landscape has changed rapidly over the last twenty years, from the 
unitary Panchayat system (1960) to multiparty democratic rule under a constitutional 
monarchy (1990) and then to a democratic federal republic system (2007). However, the 
basic governing structure (central, district and local governance) has remained more or 
less the same despite some structural reform introduced in early 1990s. Even during the 
conflict period, though public service delivery structures were greatly disturbed, destroyed 
or damaged, they were not completely rooted out. Successive governments of the past 
and present still depend on the same old government structure, e.g. the same civil service 
system, central and local government structures, national planning and public finance 
system and procedure etc.  
 
                                                
3  The number of internally displaced people according to the Government of Nepal (GoN) is 70,425 people; 
OCHA is 50,000 to 70,000 people; UNHCR is 200,000 people; and UNDP – 80,000 people. Source:  
http://www.inseconline.org/pics/1289800165.pdf accessed on 13 January 2014 
4    INSEC (2005), www.insec.org.np accessed on 13 January 2014. 
5  Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, of the CPN Maoist-led coalition resigned in May 2009. Prime Minister 
Madhav Kumar Nepal’s UML-led coalition government was formed and resigned in February 2011. This 
was followed by the same UML-led coalition by Prime Minister Jhala Nath Khanal which was toppled in 
August 2011. After this, a CPN Maoist-led coalition again formed a government under Prime Minister 
Baburam Bhattarai. The failure by the political parties to draft the constitution eventually led to the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, afresh political mandate was sought. For the purposes of 
transition, the then Chief Justice Khilraj Regmi was made the chairman of the caretaker government until 
the second Constituent Assembly was held on 19 November 2013. 
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Owing to longstanding inherited institutional constraints, the government has 
acknowledged the weak institutional capacity of the development administration, service 
delivery institutions, and monitoring entities, and consequently, poor service delivery (MoF 
2013b, p. 4). Realizing these challenges, the government seems to be committed to 
improving the service delivery provision through some important initiatives such as the 
Chief Secretary of the Government of Nepal being appointed as the chairperson of the 
Central Monitoring Committee at the Prime Minister’s Office Cabinet. This committee’s 
task is to make public service delivery simple, easy, and transparent (NPC 2013, p. 8).  
 
Many believe that the promulgation of a new constitution will address issues that directly 
affect the public in general, including public sector governance and public service delivery. 
This research has attempted to untangle some of the issues related to service provision at 
the sub-national level of the country. 
1.2 Motivation 
My career in both the public and the private sector, within the country and abroad, but 
mostly in developing countries over the last thirty years, has compelled me to seek an 
answer to the question as to why governments, particularly that of Nepal, fail to deliver on 
their promises to citizens as they are meant to. This has motivated me to go deeper into 
the realm of public service provision in order to understand the ‘who?’, ‘what?’ and ‘how?’: 
who are involved in public service delivery? What do they deliver? How do they deliver it? 
As a development practitioner, I have used organizational development (OD) approaches 
to improve the government’s public service delivery system, especially at sub-national 
level working with the Municipalities and District Development Committees in Nepal. 
These institutions at sub-national level are the backbone of decentralization and rural 
development, and thus command around 9% of the total national budget (MoF, 2013b). 
 
 
4 
My quest to examine and understand the subject of public service provision motivated me 
to undertake this research. 
 
Two motivating factors prompted me to undertake this research study. The first was the 
need to understand the theoretical aspect of public service provision contained in the 
literature of development; and the second was the need to relate the practical implications 
of my work, based on my own personal experience, in order to have a greater 
understanding of public service provision as a development discourse in the context of 
Nepal, where substantial public funds (including donor external support) are channelled 
through local government in order to support community development.  
1.3 Statement of research problem 
Weakness in delivering public services can be put down to governance failure in 
developing countries, but it can be equally the case in the context of developed countries 
(APS Group 20116). It is a matter of how, in a given socioeconomic context, a particular 
country chooses to have its public services designed, developed and delivered. Nepal, 
being one of the least developed countries, has faced severe challenges in resource 
mobilization in order to generate adequate funds to finance its public services. However, it 
is not always a question of lack of funds, but a lack of institutional effectiveness in the 
interaction of state, private and social sectors in resource mobilization for service 
provision. There are many instances where both central and local government7 failed to 
use available funds for service improvement and delivery. For instance, DDCs were able 
to spend only 76.90 percent of the allocated budget whereas Municipalities had spent only 
47.45 percent (MoF 2014a, p. 41). 
                                                
6  ASP Group Scotland, 2011; Commission on the Future Delivery of Public Services, 
www.publicservicescommission.org accessed on 23 Jan 2014. 
7  In Nepal, the local governments are also known as local bodies although they are constitutionally 
established autonomous bodies. Throughout this thesis I preferred to use the term “local government” 
instead of “local bodies”, in order to make the meaning easy to understand by readers, because they are 
elected bodies. 
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District Development Committees (DDCs)8 at the sub-national level are the devolved 
government organs of the state, previously under the Decentralization Act in 1982 and 
now under the Local Self-governance Act 1999. They are considered the main institutional 
vehicles for development in Nepal. A DDC has both political and developmental roles. 
During the conflict with the Maoist movement, 1995 to 2005, DDCs could not function 
effectively. DDCs have been operating without elected officials since 2002 as the 
incumbent national government could not hold the local elections. Since then centrally 
deputed civil servants have run the local governments. 
 
In terms of development, a broad range of powers, duties, and responsibilities are 
devolved on to DDCs. They are entrusted to regulate, finance, coordinate, monitor and 
evaluate district development programmes in the areas of education, social welfare, 
health, roads, forestry, agriculture, drinking water, sanitation, environment, markets, food 
security etc. (LSGA 1999). However, their performance in the past generally, and 
specifically during the conflict and in the post conflict period, has been dismal (Dhungel et 
al. 2011). 
 
Now the situation has changed: policies, plans and programmes are better set, more 
stable government is in place, (but still in transition, its main responsibility being to draft 
the new constitution, and receive the nation’s approval for it), and the pace of 
development has picked up. Donors are giving their support, and the economy is 
recovering with the help of remittances. Despite all this, the pace of development is more 
modest than people’s expectations, especially after the political change. There are many 
issues, but only those pertinent to this research are presented here.  
                                                
8  There are 75 District Development Committees (or Districts) in Nepal. They are the intermediary 
organizations between the central government and the lower tier of local governments, such as the 58 
municipalities and 3,915 Village Development Committees. In 2014, the number of municipalities was 
increased to 191 whereas the number of Village Development Committees was reduced to 3,276. Source: 
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development, Nepal. 
http://www.mofald.gov.np/userfiles/docs_337.jpg. 
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The policy regarding the roles, duties, functions, structure and powers of the local 
governments and the institutional environment to enable this are well established. It is not 
clear why, having a very conducive institutional framework, local governments, particularly 
DDCs, have not been able to deliver the basic essential services such as education, 
health, sanitation, drinking water, and roads. 
 
Each year, the government disburses quite substantial public funds through the Ministry of 
Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD) to 75 DDCs, 58 Municipalities and 
3,915 VDCs (MoF 2014a)9. There are also plenty of ‘off budget’ funds (36% of total 
foreign aid) channelled through various I/NGOs to the districts, including Village 
Development Committees. 
 
The donor dimension has been crucial in the development of Nepal since 1950. Nepal still 
receives substantial external support from donors (MoF 2014a, p.30) 10  but their 
fragmented and uncoordinated approach remains an issue that has a cascading effect 
from central government down to district to municipalities and VDCs. This has directly 
affected service delivery at the district level where two or more organizations are involved 
(e.g. WSSDOs11 and DDCs in rural drinking water service delivery).  
 
Donors, particularly INGO-supported projects, are reluctant to work in partnership with 
DDCs because of governance issues such as corruption, and bureaucratic obstacles. 
                                                
9  For the fiscal year 2013/14, NPR 46 billion (approx. GBP 326 million) were allocated to the Ministry of 
Federal Affairs and Local Development, which is 9% of the total national budget of NPR 517 billion 
(approx. GBP 3.6 billion). In the fiscal year 2010/122, local governments spent 17% of the total capital 
grant; in the fiscal year 2011/12, it was 21%; and in fiscal year 2012/13 it is 13%. For the current fiscal 
year it is estimated of 11% (MoF 2014a). 
10  Foreign grants in the fiscal year 2010/11 accounted for 18.7% of total government income. In the fiscal 
year 2011/12 it was 14.2%, in the fiscal year 2012/13 it was 10.6% and the current fiscal year estimate is 
16.2%. 
11  WSSDO denotes Water Supply and Sanitation Division Office in each district under the Department of 
Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS) of the Ministry of Physical Planning and Works. These line agency 
offices are the sectoral arms of the government to implement drinking water and sanitation activities in the 
districts. 
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These INGO-supported projects are mainly directed towards local level community 
development, but are rarely coordinated with DDCs’ planning and programming systems. 
Neither DDCs nor donors seem concerned about the harmonization and the 
mainstreaming of the programme through the national system. 
 
Sectoral line agencies’ programme and budgets, also supported by donors, frequently 
collide with DDCs’ programme budgets. This has caused resource fragmentation in 
project cycle management, as those involved compete with each other, rather than 
collaborate in planning, programming and budgeting. Sometimes communities are 
confused by the different incentive systems used for the same objective, as with rural 
drinking water where WSSDOs and DDCs are involved. 
 
The strong presence of NGOs in the districts show there are adequate social 
intermediaries to support programme implementation and resource mobilization. INGOs 
are using them extensively, but DDCs are hardly using them in the community support 
programme. NGOs tend to avoid collaborating with government and DDCs in particular, 
unless the projects are funded by donor support but implemented through DDCs.  
 
DDCs have used users’ committees extensively in service development within the local 
infrastructure. The conceptual approach is well accepted in policies, plans, acts and rules, 
but the performance of DDCs on this has been problematic, for example where such 
service provision has failed to comply with certain financial and accountability standards 
(OAG 2014). 
  
The government has been trying to make the local bodies more accountable towards their 
constituencies (downward) rather than to their parent ministry (upward) through the LSGA 
1999, and other means, such as forming the High Level Decentralization Implementation 
Monitoring Committee to monitor the Decentralization Implementation Plan (DASU 2003), 
 
 
8 
and the Local Bodies Fiscal Commission12 etc.  However, no such accounting practice 
and framework are in place, with the exception of community participation in small 
projects, and this has also become controversial due to the excessive direct involvement 
of local government in procurement work instead of making the user committee do this 
(OAG 2014).  
 
Currently, DDCs are delivering their services either through community participation or by 
doing it themselves. The projects and programmes supported by the external donors’ 
support through the national government system, but anchored at DDC level, are yet to be 
fully adopted by the DDC system13. In the absence of a proper accountable service 
delivery mechanism in such projects, DDCs have often failed to perform well.  
 
The problem to be investigated by my research can therefore be stated as follows: 
 
The central government has transferred substantial funds to the local governments every 
year for local service provision, but DDCs, despite their strong institutional basis, have still 
failed to use those funds and other resources received from the community and donors for 
the optimal service delivery outcomes, that is in other words ‘value for money’ (DFID 
2011).  
 
This statement prompts a thorough review of the existing service delivery system of DDCs 
and the influencing factors in its surrounding environment. 
 
Against this background, this research makes an attempt to understand and explore the 
relationships and institutional roles that shape the organizational behaviour in service 
                                                
12  For detail refer to the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development’s website: 
http://www.mofald.gov.np/index.php?lang=en 
13  These types of projects and programmes do have a separate project implementation unit within the DDCs, 
but the officials, mostly headed by the central government’s bureaucrats and local level staff working in 
these projects or programmes, are accountable to their parent departments and ministries rather than to 
DDCs and the people at local level. 
 
 
9 
delivery, by applying accountability framework in the ‘rural drinking water’ sector of the 
selected districts of Nepal.  
1.4 Objective 
Public service provision is the main function of any incumbent government, irrespective of 
the developed or developing nature of the country. Many organizations and individuals 
may be involved as a network in this process. From this point we will refer to them as 
“actors" (Callon 1999, Latour 1999) and “organizations”, these terms being used 
interchangeably according to context. Despite their different origins, philosophy and 
purpose, they form an institutional force to accomplish this common task by assuming 
different and various roles. 
 
The main objective of this research work is to look into what types of relationship the 
actors involved in service provision have from an accountability perspective. This will be 
further examined from the organizational and institutional point of view. The theoretical 
premise of this study is in the domain of public management and governance, and the 
analytical framework for analysis and interpretation is based on “Agency Theory” and 
“Activity Theory”. 
1.5 Subject of research  
The subject of this research is the relationship between three actors involved in rural 
drinking water service provision. These are the District Development Committees (DDCs), 
Drinking Water Users’ Committees (WUCs), and the technical service providers (SPs). 
DDCs as local authorities (or governments) have assumed the responsibility to make 
drinking water provision, such as providing matching funds, and offer oversight on behalf 
of the government. WUCs represent the self-help community and are beneficiaries of the 
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services, taking the main responsibility for drinking water scheme implementation, 
including the control of the funds received from the DDCs. They have raised their 
matching contribution and made decisions regarding the construction and operation of 
these schemes. Non-governmental organizations (or private firms) are the technical 
service providers hired by DDCs to assist WUCs in social mobilization and the planning 
and construction of drinking water schemes. Basically, the service providers have worked 
as consultants on behalf of DDCs to provide technical support to WUCs. Their role is 
more about facilitating, rather than direct implementation, of the drinking water schemes. 
1.6 Research questions  
In the given problem situation, as postulated above, the key questions of this study are 
two: 
• What type of accountability features characterise the public service delivery 
transaction? 
• What types of relationship behaviour do the organizations (DDC, WUC and SP) 
involved in service provision exhibit? 
 
These key questions further lead to sub-questions, which could be both the by-product 
outcomes of the research and provide the testing of the methodological application of 
theoretical tools. These are: 
• What are the implications of the different theoretical concepts of public service 
relationship? 
• What are the respective potentials and limitations of existing service delivery 
approaches?  
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1.7 Relevance of the research 
This research is highly relevant to the present Nepalese context; especially now that 
Nepal is embarking on a new political system, when state restructuring and the form of 
governance issues are being debated. It is possible that these issues might be resolved 
by the Constituent Assembly by the time this research is completed. However, in the new 
form of governance, public service provision would become the central stage of politico-
administrative and development issues. The existing governance structure will be 
overhauled and realigned according to the new federal structure where the roles of the 
central, state and local governments would redefine the public service delivery 
approaches. This process will also entail asking what kind of policy might be pursued to 
engage both private and social sector in service provision. The restructuring of the civil 
service could be another issue for reform and realignment. It could be difficult to tell what 
kind of structure will emerge; statutory power and authority will be shared and devolved to 
the lowest level of administrative and development units. 
 
The findings of this study could be helpful in terms of redefining the participation of the 
public, third and private sectors in service provision, especially at the sub-national level, 
and in understanding the organizational and institutional characteristics of these service 
providers, which currently seem unexplored from the public service delivery point of view 
in the context of Nepal. 
 
For academia, this research may contribute further to understanding public service 
provision, particularly from the organization and relationship perspective, by applying 
‘Activity Theory’ and ‘Agency Theory’. These two theories premise the theoretical ground 
for micro- and macro-level analysis respectively.  
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1.8 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured in the following manner. 
 
Chapter One – provides the background of the study along with a brief description of 
Nepal as a country. To steer the research towards the right direction, the problems of 
research are stated, followed by focusing on the research objectives, research questions, 
and the relevance of the research. At the end of this chapter, the structure of the thesis is 
provided. 
 
Chapter Two – reviews the literature related to public service delivery. It is divided into 
four sections. The first section offers the premise for theoretical interpretation, and for 
deliberation of the question of public service delivery. It draws several theoretical 
approaches towards the study such as New Public Management, Public Governance and 
Third Sector. These approaches deal with managerialism, contractualism, and 
performance measurement, along with organizational partnership, collaboration and social 
capital perspectives, in the context of public service delivery. The second section defines 
public service and accountability. It deliberates service provision framework and 
accountability, and the mode of the service transaction relationship. The third section 
discusses the types of organizations from the strategic, structural and relationship 
perspectives, but keeping accountability in view; and the fourth section deliberates their 
attributes in service delivery where it touches upon the theoretical contradiction in 
organizational service delivery. 
  
Chapter Three – deals with the Nepalese context. It has two sections. The first section 
talks about public service delivery in the Nepalese context, in terms of its politico-
administrative background and its historical evolution, administrative reforms, 
decentralization, governance, and public management. The second section sets the 
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background of the drinking water sector of Nepal by discussing institutional arrangements 
such as the legal environment, policy, service provision approaches and the financing of 
services. While discussing this, the actors involved in service provision, like District 
Development Committees, Water Users’ Committees and other service providers such as 
NGOs, will be touched upon in order to understand their roles in public service provision. 
 
Chapter Four – is dedicated to explaining the research design and methodology, where 
conceptual and analytical frameworks are constructed to pave the path for the use of 
appropriate research methodology and instruments, data gathering, and analysis tools; 
and also discussed here is the limitation of the study from the methodological point of 
view. It defines accountability in the public service delivery context. ‘Agency Theory’ is 
used to assess the service provider relationship from the accountability perspective and 
‘Activity Theory’ is applied to meta-analysis of service provision from the actors’ 
(organizational and institutional) perspective with respect to their relationship in service 
provision. 
 
Chapter Five – is a discussion on the findings of the research based on the analysis of 
data and the information gathered from the primary and secondary sources. The findings 
here focus on the accountability features in service transaction, and the organizational 
perception of DDCs and of Service Provider NGOs towards service provision. There is a 
narrative of meetings held with research participants. It also contains a review of 
agreements and contract documents between DDCs and WUCs, and between DDCs and 
Service provider NGOs. Based on all these, the service provision relationships of DDCs 
with WUCs and Service Provider NGOs have been defined, and finally the effect of 
organizational structure, strategy and financing on service provision has also been 
discussed.  
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Chapter Six – has deliberated the problems, issues and observations that emerged from 
the findings of this research, and their relation to the greater understanding of public 
service provision from different perspectives. This includes a discussion of the factors 
affecting accountability from the institutional point of view, theoretical implications, and 
debates, and finally how all these affect the drinking water service provision in the context 
of Nepal.  
 
Chapter Seven – concludes the whole research by a brief discussion about the research 
questions addressed by this research, including public service and its accountability in 
general, which is the main theme of this research, and the implication of this for the 
country-specific accountability context of Nepal in public service delivery, with particular 
reference to the rural drinking water. And finally, the chapter briefly discusses the future 
research agenda and limitations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2  Literature Review 
This chapter is divided into three sections; theoretical premise, public service provision 
and accountability, and organisations and service delivery. 
2.1 Theoretical premises 
This section discusses the emergence of New Public Management as a service delivery 
approach, and places it in the context of the discourse of public governance, inclusive of 
the rise of the ‘third sector’ in public service delivery. Hence various theoretical 
approaches to pin down NPM and its practices, applied around the world in different 
countries, are touched upon to understand its genealogy and the service delivery 
challenges generated. The section explores the pros and cons of the models, approaches 
or paradigms used in public services and finally attempts to engage with the relational 
complexity of service provision from the organizational relations perspective. 
2.1.1 New Public Management (NPM) 
2.1.1.1 The Origin of NPM 
New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991; Polidano, 1999; Pollitt, C. 1990) has been 
perhaps the most widely discussed and contested issue in public policy and public 
administration over the last thirty years, on account of its extensive application, impact, 
and its adversarial relation to pre-existing state-centred or Weberian discourses of public 
administration.  
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NPM language: available literature indicates that NPM has not been well recognized as a 
discipline of its own like public administration, but as an approach in the knowledge of 
public service delivery discourse. Therefore, the terms “NPM Style” or “NPM Type” have 
been extensively used in literature (Polidano, 1999; Gerry, 2001, p. 447; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011; McCourt, 2001, p. 116; Haque, M.S.; Kelly, J. and Rubin, I. S., p. 584). 
 
Gruening (2001, p. 1) reinforced this notion by saying that “Although the special mix of 
characteristics of NPM is new, it does not represent a paradigm change”. He (Gruening 
2001, p. 18) has rationalised this argument based on examining the fourteen theoretical 
approaches against the twenty-four attributes of NPM. These theories are: classical public 
administration, neoclassical public administration, public choice, the Austrian school, 
principal-agent, property rights, transaction costs, new public administration, 
constitutionalism, communitarianism, discourse, policy analysis, rational public 
management and organic public management. 
 
NPM has dominated the public administration reform agenda in the OECD countries from 
the late 1970s (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1993; Ridley, 1996). The economic and fiscal crisis 
due to ineffective fiscal measures adopted by the governments of many, both developed 
and developing, countries in the 1980s had prompted them to adopt a new public 
management system (Hood 1991, Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. 1992; Osborne, S. 2010; 
Schick 1996, Zifcak 1997, Pollitt 1993, Hughes 2003) to meet the crisis. However, 
Minogue (1998) sees other factors besides financial pressure as driving NPM – the 
demand for quality service delivery by the public as customers rather than recipients, as 
well as an ideological predisposition to reduce the role of the State in society. 
 
From 1990, NPM was at the forefront of a global drive to reform the public sector through 
sponsorship of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
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World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), particularly as part of the 
financial rescue plan known as ‘Structural Adjustment’ (Larbi 1999, pp.16-18), to mitigate 
the economic crisis of the member countries. This support came with the precondition of 
reform to the public sector and governance, by making them adopt market oriented 
policies by reducing the governments’ involvement in state affairs to a minimum, but in a 
responsible manner (Larbi 1999, Sandfort and Milward 2007). As a result, public 
administrative reform and governance gained a higher profile in aid discourse, and many 
bilateral donors mainstreamed the new public management and governance improvement 
in their aid strategies (DFID 1997).  
 
One can conclude that the drivers of NPM were an economic and fiscal crisis in both 
developed and developing countries during 1970s and 1980s, a need to meet public 
demand for better public services, and a need for an intervening emphasis on good 
governance in the 1990s (Batley and Larbi 2004, pp. 38 - 39).  
2.1.1.2 The theoretical domain of NPM 
The embracing of ‘neoliberal’ ideas in policy making, the change in the political context, 
the development of information technology and the growing role of international 
management consultants are other driving factors (Larbi 1999) behind NPM, apart from 
fiscal crisis, although some of the named trends were themselves caused or accelerated 
by the economic and fiscal crisis. 
 
Gruening (2001) takes this from the human behavioural perspective, applying two 
theoretical domains as the origin of NPM that influenced the behaviour of the people 
working in government. These theories are ‘public choice theory’ and ‘managerialism’, 
and many other prominent academicians also support this view (Aucoin 1990, pp. 115; 
Dunsire 1995, pp. 21 - 29; Lueder 1996, pp. 93; Naschold et al. 1995, pp. 1 - 8; Reichard 
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1996, p. 245; Schedler 1995, p. 155). Public choice theory advocates for pursuing the 
self-interest within the public benefits by bureaucrats e.g. budget maximization in 
bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971), while managerialism, which is driven by efficiency and 
performance based incentives, motivates the behaviour of public managers. There is 
often a contradiction in public service discourse as to whether government staff work as 
bureaucrats or public managers. 
  
Perhaps the most useful theoretical interpretation of NPM comes from Batley and Larbi 
(2004, pp. 32-38) who see two major theoretical approaches to public management. 
These are i) neo-classical rationalism that emphasises the limited case for government 
intervention, and ii) theories on organizational approaches for government intervention. 
The former advocates the limited role of government intervention in case of market failure. 
To address this, the government does not need to assume the entire responsibility for 
service provision, but the service(s) can be unbundled into different parts, and only vital 
sectors may require public intervention.  
 
The second theoretical premise is that the organization of government intervention is 
rationalized through ‘public choice’, ‘new institutionalism’, ‘principal-agent’, ‘transaction 
cost economics’, and ‘property rights’ theories. The each of these theories has their own 
reasoning and arguments for NPM. Public choice theory (Niskanen 1987) was seen as 
having to overcome stagnant administrative bureaucracy, and prompted reforms such as 
contracting out, privatization and performance management in public services. New 
institutionalism shapes the rules and norms concerning the structures of authority, 
contracts, organizations and property rights, which are pertaining to service provision.  
 
Likewise, ‘Principal-Agent theory’ (Miller 2005, Gailmard 2012) establishes the service 
provision relationship between the government as a principal, and the service provider as 
an agent, where the agent is obliged to provide services directly to citizens or through 
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government. However, this relationship between two organizations remains problematic 
when the agents fail to perform and to inform the principal, and the principal is unable to 
control the agents. This theory draws heavily on ‘contractualism’, to explain how contracts 
are framed, implemented and evaluated for better service provision. In recent years, this 
model has been widely used to build and strengthen accountability in service provision, 
particularly by using social network theory (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
 
‘Transaction cost theory’ (Williamson 1981) dealt with institutions and the market, where 
the argument is that as long as the external transaction costs (between two organizations) 
are higher than the internal transaction costs (within the organization), the organization 
will grow. If the internal transaction costs are higher than the external costs the 
organization will seek alternative service provision, such as outsourcing. For service 
provision, the government carefully assesses whether it is the service provided by the 
government agency itself which yields better economic transactions, or that provided 
through private or social sector in favour of public benefit, which also entails saving on the 
government treasury. In a way, this theory deals with the economic and financial 
efficiency in service provision, which is greatly advocated by NPM.  
 
The ‘property rights theory’ is based on the ‘residual control’ of properties as economic (or 
financial) incentives to owners in business transactions. The underpinning characteristic 
of this theory is that the ‘Principal-Agent’ model has often failed to have a complete 
contractual arrangement (due to bounded rationality) whereas property rights theory 
allocates the control of rights in a contractual relationship when contracts are incomplete 
(Mahoney 2004, pp.  128 – 132). The understanding here is that the residual control 
generates residual benefits, like a bonus or a pay increase in private organizations. This 
may not be normally the case in public organizations, where the government itself owns 
most of the assets in the public sector. Because of residual control, there could be a 
controversy as to how residual benefits could be obtained and distributed. However, in 
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public goods delivery, how the rights of the goods are asserted in business transactions 
between government and private sector or social sector determines how successfully the 
services are delivered to the public in general. 
 
Drawing from various sources, the most common features of NPM are i) decentralization 
characteristics – either in the form of an organization or a management structure which is 
less hierarchical; ii) differentiation of the government’s function – policy and 
implementation, steering vs. rowing, agencification; iii) market orientation – competition, 
performance management, contracting out, customer driven; iv) managerialism – result-
oriented, lean management (Hood, 1991; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Pollitt 1993, Ferlie et 
al. 1996, Borins, 1994; Osborne, D. and Gaebler 1992; Pollitt and Bourchkaert 2004). 
Among these features, the NPM doctrine shows a very strong association with market 
orientation and managerialism in public sector reform, with less, or downsized, 
government (Polidano 1999, Haque, M.S. 2009). 
 
Finally, NPM may be associated with different concepts or principles, but NPM itself could 
not emerge or stand alone as a theory with its own paradigm, despite relating very closely 
to economics, politics and organizational domains. Hence, the NPM, amid these various 
theoretical disciplines, can be understood most simply as the public sector reform process 
that interacts with the market (economy), and where public policy gets involved in 
resource allocation decision (politics), and this happens through an inter- or intra- 
organizational system (organization). If one combines all these (economy, politics and 
organization) together, then it becomes an institutional phenomenon. However, for NPM, 
these conditioning theories, as discussed earlier, embed managerialism that becomes the 
core aspect of service provision in public service delivery.  
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The successive discussions have tried to interpret NPM from ‘managerialism’, 
‘contractualism’ and then from ‘performance measurement’ perspectives because these 
are the major elements that drive the NPM process.  
2.1.1.3 NPM and managerialism 
Public Administration is a discipline of public policy formulation and implementation 
(Osborne, S. 2010, p. 10), which has its roots in political science epistemology. It has 
been overcome by the managerial approach (Polidano 1999) over the last two decades in 
the quest for efficiency and effectiveness in public service. Hence, the traditional 
bureaucracy is replaced by ‘managerialism’ in the functioning of the state by 
decentralizing more managerial power to the lowest level of the politico-administrative 
hierarchal structure for public service delivery. In other words, ‘performance 
measurement’ has become one of the key decentralized management tools of NPM to 
achieve higher outputs in public services. 
 
Minogue (1998, p. 17) is of the opinion that the influential model of NPM promised to 
reform public service with efficiency and accountability together, and these reforms should 
be critically examined to judge the extent to which these promises have been delivered 
through the management process. 
 
Lane (1994, p. 139) says on management efficiency that – “The transition from a public 
administration approach to a public management approach appears to be the proper 
move in relation to increasing demands for efficiency in the public sector. The rise of the 
management perspective reflects the growing saliency of market values for the public 
sector”. The traditional model of organization and delivery of public services, based on the 
principles of bureaucratic hierarchy, planning, centralization, control and self-sufficiency is 
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apparently being replaced by market-based public service management (Stewart and 
Walsh 1992, Walsh 1995), or “enterprise” culture (Mascarenhas 1993). 
 
Ideas of New Public Management (NPM), focusing on administrative decentralization and 
delegation of authority, managerial autonomy and flexibility and performance 
measurement, have inspired public sector reforms in numerous countries (Aucoin 1990, 
Hood 1991, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The logic of managerialism that is of ‘more 
steering in big issues and less steering in small issues’ stresses output-based 
accountability forms that prioritize effective and efficient service delivery above input and 
process-based methods that focus on means and procedures (Dudau and McAllister 
2010). 
 
Basically, the ultimate objective of NPM is to gain efficiency in service provision. This can 
be achieved by adjusting the internal organizational system, and by various management 
reform initiatives, in order to interact with the market and other externalities. There are 
many of these, but some vital ones, based on available literature within organizational 
management theory, are: 
• Adoption of a performance measurement framework to receive greater outputs; 
• Transformation of organizations from huge hierarchical structures into small, lean, 
flat ones, in specialized units; 
• Use of contractual arrangement to procure services for internal organizational 
needs, e.g. human resources, stationery, utilities etc. requirements; 
• Use of contractual arrangement for providing public services on behalf of 
government to the public in general; 
• Promotion of competition in the procurement of services and materials in the 
market through open tendering and bidding. 
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Among many, there are two central elements of NPM where managerialism prescribes 
‘contracting out’ and ‘performance measurement’. The former appeals to ‘contractualism’, 
and the latter can be an inclusive element of the former. The following sub-section briefly 
discusses  ‘contractualism’ as part of NPM. This is because contractualism has turned out 
to be the main mechanism in service provision both within and outside the organizational 
system of public institutions. 
2.1.1.4 NPM and contractualism 
Contractualism attracts the idea of a social contract under the social theory14 but, equally, 
the body of legal theory (Adler, M. D. et al. 2015) in broader terms. It draws on the 
concept of morality. According to Scanlon (1998, p. 153) – 
“An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that 
no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general 
agreement”. 
Ashford and Mulgan (2012) have explained Scanlon's version of contractualism by saying 
that it contains “an account both of (i) the authority of moral standards and of (ii) what 
constitutes rightness and wrongness”. They (Asford and Mulgan) further argue that the 
first is the substantive value that is realized by moral behaviour of “mutual recognition”, 
while the second is “wrongness”, which is unjustifiable and such actions cannot be 
justified to others.  
 
Gauthier (1986) believes moral values derive from principles. According to him (Gauthier) 
this is the principle of rational choice, where the choices are made on an agreed basis of 
cooperation, which is mutually advantageous for self-interested agents to engage in. By 
contrast, any form of contractualism is grounded on the equal moral status of persons. It 
                                                
14  There are many understandings and applications, but for NPM conditioning the ‘Structure and Agency’ and 
the ‘Social Contract’ theories would fit best. 
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interprets this moral status as based on their capacity for rational autonomous agency. 
According to contractualism, morality consists in what would result if we were to make 
binding agreements from a point of view that respects our equal moral importance as 
rational autonomous agents.  
 
Coming from broader social terms to a more concrete legal term, as in common law15 
legal systems, a contract is an agreement having a lawful object entered into voluntarily 
by two or more parties, each of whom intend to create one or more legal obligations 
between them. The elements of a contract are an ‘offer’ and its ‘acceptance’ by 
‘competent persons having legal capacity’ who exchange ‘considerations’ to create 
‘mutuality of obligation’. It can be further elaborated by saying that the contract may be 
made with the proof of some or all of these elements in writing, entirely orally or by 
conduct. It (the contract) is a legally enforceable promise and the promise can be used as 
a legal synonym for the contract16. 
 
Hence, “the term ‘contractualism’ can be used in a broad sense to indicate the view that 
morality is based on contract or agreement…” (Scanlon 1998), but despite its 
epistemological root in social contract theory, its metaphoric application in the delivery of 
public services is tricky because of various actors getting involved in different forms with 
different purposes. Whether it is implied in the contractual relations between government 
and community that are governed by social values, or the relations between government 
and private firms that are governed by market values, the one basic commonality is that it 
is founded on moral values (morality) or the authority of moral standards on ‘mutual 
recognition’ (Ashford and Mulgan 2012). However, in the case of public affairs, this mutual 
recognition is enforceable to secure the contractual outcomes through formal legal 
means. 
                                                
15  Lloyd Duhaime. "Common Law Legal Definition". duhaime.org. 
16  http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/contract.html  
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In reality, in its application, contractualism has limitations, especially when there is a need 
to establish political accountability, when the purchaser’s (public institutions) capacity is 
weak or when the policy outcome is difficult to measure (Minogue, M. 2000, pp. 282 − 283). Lane (2000) further puts this at an organizational civil service level where the 
public contracting depends upon the quality of the contracts that take place between 
CEOs, and the capacity of government to choose ‘good’ CEOs. He (Lane) believes that 
the powerful CEO is a necessary concomitant to the introduction of NPM, but at the same 
time he points out two major potential weaknesses in public sector contracting. These are, 
firstly, that it is difficult to achieve optimal outcomes for the public as to what is agreed 
between the government and the CEO, and secondly that there is no organizational 
regime that can rule out reneging (Matheson 2001, pp. 116 – 117). 
 
Polidano (2001, p. 58) exemplifies this constraint further by saying that “Contractual 
mechanisms of accountability would have little practical impact because they would 
remain trapped within the formal realm. They would simply be disregarded.” 
 
On the implementation of contractualism, Mingus (2007, p. 12) is of the opinion that a 
contracting-out or a contracting-in approach (i.e., contractualism) has been minimally 
implemented in Canada, but evidence does exist that contractualism has been used 
successfully (Nancy et al. 2006). Mingus admitted that Canada might be less useful as an 
example of contractualism if it is compared with New Zealand or Australia, despite political 
rhetoric and numerous public sector reform efforts in Canada. He also argued that the 
“contracts have been a tool used to evade transparency” (2007, p. 12). 
 
The case of developing countries regarding contractualism may be different however. 
Batley and Larbi (2004, p. 51) believe that developing countries could not implement 
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contracts due to their weak markets and poor government capacity to enforce contracts 
due to corruption and other institutional regulatory factors. 
2.1.1.5 NPM and performance measurement 
Upadhaya et al. (2014) argue that performance measurement is the process of collecting, 
analysing and/or reporting information regarding the performance of an individual, group, 
organization, system or component. They further assert that it involves studying 
processes and strategies within organizations, in order to see whether the outputs are in 
line with what was intended or should have been achieved. 
 
Performance measurement in the context of service provision, according to Neely et al. 
(2002, p. XIII) is “the process of quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of past 
actions”. This notion is more concerned with technical understanding in measuring the 
effectiveness of the results, and is being transposed into the organizational context by 
Moullin (2002, p. 188; 2007, p. 181), and according to him, performance measurement is 
“the process of evaluating how well organizations are managed and the value they deliver 
for customers and other stakeholders”.  
 
In the context of NPM, performance measurement as a management tool is directly linked 
to efficiency gains (Minogue 2001, p. 7). Its application has become more extensive 
because it can be applied in multiple ways (quantity, quality, time, cost) to measure 
outputs; and intensive as well, because more management functions are included – not 
just monitoring, but also decision-making, controlling and even providing accountability 
(Bouckaert 1996, p. 234). 
 
Performance indicators, standards or benchmarks have been the key measuring 
milestones to measure the performance of public services within and/or outside public 
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organizations. For example, setting the performance indicators of employees, standards 
or benchmarking of patient waiting lists and times, school exam results, crime rates, 
university research ratings, all these have increasingly linked to resource distribution in 
the UK, and other countries where NPM has been applied (Canada, France, the 
Netherlands, the Nordic states, the USA) (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, pp. 106 - 107). It 
makes individuals and organizations result- and objective-oriented rather than following 
rules (McCourt 2001, p. 109), and thus represents a shift to output control from 
bureaucratic control. 
2.1.1.6 Application of NPM 
Successful implementation of NPM depends on many preconditions. Polidano, Hulme, 
Minogue (1998, p. 279) believe that “…an exceptionally high degree of political backing 
for reform in these countries (Britain, Australia and New Zealand) during the 1980s and 
1990s” had enabled the successful implementation of NPM. This could be taken as 
implying that only developed democracies based on the rule of law and a Weberian state 
can successfully implement NPM, and that this depends on institutional preconditions at a 
societal level. However, Gebre (2006, p. 61) in the Ethiopian case, admitted that the “… 
successful implementation of public service delivery reform in Ethiopia largely lies in the 
specific organizational conditions, seems true. On the other hand political commitment 
and accountability…. are not essentially shaping the outcome of the reform 
implementation in the organizations”. 
 
Batley and Larbi (2004, pp. 44 - 53) examine the application of NPM through 
organizational arrangements (decentralization and agency) and market type mechanisms 
(contracting out and user fee). Countries which have applied organizational changes in 
civil service structural reforms, such as the UK and New Zealand, both have used the 
agencification model, as has Australia to a lesser extent. According to Batley and Larbi, 
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African countries such as Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia had also 
reformed their government structure along similar lines. Administrative reform through the 
adoption of management practice was sought by applying performance-oriented 
management systems where performance service contracts were used. This was found 
used in Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Senegal, Ghana, Pakistan and India, apart from the OECD 
countries, including Australia, New Zealand and France (Batley and Larbi 2004). 
 
Regarding the market type mechanism, contracting out or outsourcing is considered a key 
feature of service delivery under NPM. Considering the sector or service characteristics 
(Mcloughlin and Batley 2012a) in a given local condition, many countries have adopted 
this tool in variations such as service contracts, management contracts, leases, and 
concessions, ultimately leading to privatization. The UK’s local government extensively 
outsources garbage collection, cleaning jobs, legal and IT services to third parties; and in 
developing countries like in India, Mexico, Thailand, Zimbabwe and South Africa some 
health care services are found contracted out. Contracting out of road maintenance work 
in Brazil, management contracts applied in electricity supply in Gambia, Gabon, Rwanda 
and a long term leasing arrangement of Port Kelang in Malaysia (Batley and Larbi 2004, 
pp. 49 - 52) are some examples in the application of NPM in various forms.  
 
User fees or charges have been used widely in both developed and developing countries 
for drinking water supply, electricity supply, solid waste management and even in some 
cases for health care and education services. However, Batley and Larbi (2004) argue 
that the introduction of user charges has brought its own problems, like corruption, 
mismanagement of revenue, and denial of basic utility services, especially to the poor, 
resulting in people drinking dirty water, causing cholera and diarrhoea. There has also 
been a drop in patient visits to hospitals because of high medical fees. 
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Clarke and Wood (2001, pp. 87 - 88), on the application of NPM to civil service reform in 
Tanzania (1989) and Uganda (1992), admitted that there “(NPM) has been most 
successful where it (in Tanzania and Uganda) involved introducing result-oriented 
management, performance budgeting and delegation of control and decision-making 
within the public service”. They also confirmed that civil service reform should be tailored 
to local conditions and should proceed at a realistic pace. However, they concluded their 
comments on this reform by saying that “Private sector capacity to undertake contracting 
in both countries remains limited, and within government there is limited capacity to 
manage contracts and to carry out regulation effectively”. McCourt (2001, p. 122) also 
sees that the implementation part of MPM is problematic in developing countries 
especially from the contracting-out perspective.  
 
In the US, early NPM reforms were dominated by the creation of an entrepreneurial and 
user-oriented culture within public organizations that was concerned with the replacement 
of public services by private ones (Savas 1987), and was much influenced by the 
organizational excellence approach of Peters and Waterman (1982). Later the focus was 
shifted to reinventing government within the context of a plural state, as envisaged by 
Osborne, D. and Gaebler (1992).  
 
According to Samaratunge, et al. (2008), countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh implemented NPM each in their own way, reflecting political 
history, party politics, macroeconomic considerations, state traditions and the roles of 
international development agencies and civil society, and it was found that political 
commitment and leadership were the most influential factors in these countries’ decision 
to adopt NPM. Singapore and Malaysia became successful with their reform initiatives 
due to strong political leadership. These two countries have implemented a relatively 
comprehensive reform package, whereas, in contrast, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh were 
selective regarding reforms in ways that most suited the short-term interests of the ruling 
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elites. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh introduced structural changes into their public 
administration systems without taking major initiatives to introduce rule-based government 
or the necessary institutional infrastructure to support NPM practices. They 
(Samaratunge, et al. 2008) also argue that countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, 
where strong leadership and appropriate accountability systems are not in place, could 
not expect successful outcomes from NPM reforms. 
 
According to Armstrong (2013, p. 151), drawing on Australian experience, “Innovations in 
the public sector in Australia introduced over the past 20 years have changed the face of 
government”. He further elaborated New Public Management (NPM) as “the umbrella 
term for many of these innovations ... introduced changes in philosophy and practices 
such as ‘steering not rowing’, ‘purchaser-provider splits’, ‘amalgamations’, 
‘corporatization’, ‘performance management’, ‘competition’ and with them, ‘new forms of 
governance and accountability’”. 
 
Although many governments were quick to introduce NPM reforms, international agencies 
could be less enthusiastic. Geri (2001, pp. 453 - 454) investigated six UN agencies – the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the Universal Postal Union 
(UPU), and found that “none of these UN specialized agencies is implementing a 
comprehensive set of NPM reforms. All six of the organizations included in the study are 
under pressure to implement organizational changes intended to improve their efficiency 
and effectiveness and to improve their relationship with member states and other key 
stakeholders”. 
 
Polidano et al. (1998, pp. 285 - 286) argue that “The question of the ‘appropriateness’ of 
the new public management in developing countries is a complex one” and add, citing 
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Holmes (1992) and Evans (1995), “There is a school of thought, which argues that Third 
World governments suffer not from an excess of bureaucracy, as advocates of the new 
public management might claim, but insufficiency”. Drawing an analogy with the British 
administrative history, they (Polidano et al. 1998) assume that the governments of the 
developing countries are at the Northcote-Trevelyan stage of Britain rather than the ‘next 
steps’, and thus the delegation of authority is premature, with the danger that giving 
greater managerial discretion offers more opportunity for corruption. They (Polidano et at. 
1998) further their argument by asking the question whether the NPM reforms in 
developing countries brought efficiency in public services as expected or simply led to 
more corruption and abuse of managerial discretion. 
 
According to Minogue (1998, pp. 33 - 34) the lessons learnt in NPM are that the reforms 
brought by NPM are more rhetoric than substance in developing countries, because of 
their immature market, local economic systems and political cultures. Despite this he 
argued that both market-type mechanisms and user-oriented initiatives could play a part 
in improving their public services. Minogue thinks that there is ample scope for 
institutional experiment, particularly in relation to local governance; and he believes that it 
is possible to gain both efficiency and accountability in public service delivery. 
2.1.1.7 NPM and its limitations 
NPM is a contested approach to public service, both regarding its application (Osborne, 
S.P. 2010) on the part of public policy implementation, and regarding public service 
delivery when compared with Public Administration.  
 
Despite its adoption of market mechanisms for efficient alternatives in service delivery, 
instilling management autonomy, better incentives to public managers, and holding 
managers directly accountable, and moreover transforming the public administration from 
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a ‘bureaucratic’ culture into an ‘entrepreneurial’ culture, NPM is criticised for its ambiguity 
regarding efficiency, blurred accountability due to managerial autonomy, and conflict in 
public organization because of competition (Minogue (2001, p. 8). 
 
According to Dawson and Dargie (1999) NPM is a contradictory discourse and its 
interpretation is contingent upon distinct persona, the audience, including ideological, 
managerial and research-oriented personae. In reality, it is a sub-school of public 
administration that has been limited in its impact by the lack of a real theoretical base and 
conceptual rigour (Frederickson and Smith, 2003). Its application has geographical 
variation and so in its reform contents. The Anglo-American, Australian and some 
Scandinavian countries have done well with NPM, whereas, at the same time, PA 
continues to dominate elsewhere (Kickert 1997 and Hood 1995). Since the theoretical 
ground and discipline of NPM is unconfirmed, the benefits of NPM are partial and 
contested (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011); and finally the most cautious line - the NPM is a 
disaster waiting to happen (Hood and Jackson 1992) and is a failed paradigm (Farnham 
and Horton, 1996). 
 
Hence, although NPM has motivated numerous public sector reforms, it was, by the early 
2000s, past its peak (Hughes 2003), or even ‘dead’ (Dunleavy et al. 2005, 2006). 
 
The heaviest criticisms of NPM concern its fragmented nature, intra-organizational focus 
(Rhodes 1997) and its use of out-dated private-sector techniques for public policy 
implementation and service delivery, and finally that it has failed “to capture the complex 
reality of the design, delivery and management of public services in the twenty-first 
century” (Osborne S.P. 2010, pp. 4 - 5).  
 
The argument is that public service provision has become increasingly complex, as many 
actors with their different goals, objectives and structures have become involved. NPM 
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tends to be unidirectional (state or market) rather than reflecting the involvement of a 
variety of non-state actors and beneficiaries in service provision. Thus, while the 
application of NPM undoubtedly helped in gaining efficiency in public service provision, it 
has been less likely to deliver effectiveness (Klijn and Teisman 2000, p. 86).  
 
To mitigate these deficiencies of NPM, many scholars have advocated a broader 
understanding. This understanding includes ‘Public Governance’ (Kennett, Peters, Moore 
and Hartley, Kooiman, Hughes, Osborne, McLaughlin, Chew, Pestoff, Brandsen, Kettl, 
Martin, Klijn and Osborne, S.P. 2010); ‘Public Value’ (Bozeman 2007, Meynhardt 2009, 
O’Flynn 2007); and ‘Collaborative Public Management’ (Geddes 2012) perspectives. This 
may require differentiating ‘Service Management’ from ‘Production Management’ in public 
services depending on the potential role of end-users as co-producers of services 
(Radnor and Osborne, S. P. 2013, p. 227).  
 
Against this background, the next sub-section deliberates on the implications of the 
governance approach in public service provision. 
2.1.2 New Public Governance (NPG) 
It has been argued that NPM has limited scope to address the growing demand for public 
service provision owing to its narrow managerialist focus on greater efficiency rather than 
on public value or greater participation of stakeholders. Its functionality is thus constrained 
in the pluralistic public service landscape. As a result, alternative discourses of 
governance have been considered regarding public services, which are based on “inter-
organizational theory, organizational sociology and network theory” – Conteh (2013, p. 
503). 
On the theoretical distinction, Ewalt (2001, p. 8) writes, citing Peters and Pierre (1998) – 
 
 
34 
“The (mostly European) literature on governance and the increasingly 
international scholarship on New Public Management (NPM) describe two 
models of public service that reflect a ‘reinvented’ form of government, which 
is better managed and which takes its objectives not from democratic theory 
but from market economics (Stoker, 1998). While some use the terms 
interchangeably (for example, Hood, 1991), most of the research makes 
distinctions between the two. Essentially, governance is a political theory while 
NPM is an organizational theory”.  
Peter and Pierre (1998, p. 232) further assert that governance is about the process, while 
NPM is about the outcomes. 
 
Scholars are still hesitant to confirm NPG as an established theory, paradigm or 
alternative model to NPM.  Osborne, S. P. (2010a, p. 2) describes NPG as “It is neither 
that normative nor that prescriptive”. He has presented the core elements of NPG, in 
contrast to PA and NPM, below.  
Table 1: Elements of NPG, PA and NPM 
Paradigm / 
key 
elements 
Theoretical 
roots 
Nature 
of the 
state 
Focus Emphasis Resource 
allocatio
n 
mechani
sm 
Nature 
of the 
servic
e 
syste
m 
Value 
base 
Public 
Administrati
on 
Political 
science and 
public policy 
Unitary The 
political 
system 
Policy 
creation and 
implementati
on 
Hierarchy Closed Public 
sector 
ethos 
New Public 
Manageme
nt 
Rational / 
Public 
choice 
theory and 
managemen
t studies 
Regulato
ry 
The 
organiz
ation 
Management 
of 
organization
al resources 
and 
performance 
The 
market 
and 
classical 
or neo-
classical 
contracts 
Open 
rational 
Efficiency 
of 
competitio
n and the 
market-
place 
New Public 
Governanc
e 
Institutional 
and network 
theory 
Plural 
and 
pluralist 
The 
organiz
ation in 
its 
environ
ment 
Negotiation 
of values, 
meaning and 
relationships 
Networks 
and 
relational 
contracts 
Open 
closed 
Dispersed 
and 
contested. 
Source: Extracted from Osborne, S. P. (ed.) (2010, p.10) “The New Public Governance?” 
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According to Rhodes (2007, p.1246) “governance is broader than government”, where the 
meaning of ‘government’ is narrowly defined as the formal institutions of the state (Stoker 
1998, p.1). Esmark (2009, p.368) explains governance through a metaphoric way, using 
structure (hierarchy, market and network) and actors (state, market-private sector and civil 
society) as frames. Although Esmark deliberates governance through various means such 
as governance through sovereignty, law, money and truth, he misses out governance 
through accountability. Stoker (1998, p. 18) puts forward five propositions regarding 
governance which are also subscribed to by Rhodes (2007) by and large. These present 
the element of governance in a controversial perspective for NPM. According to him 
(Stoker) governance is a complex set of institutions and actors. It has blurring of 
boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues, power 
dependency, relationships between institutions for collective action, autonomy of self-
governing networks of actors and recognizes the capacity to get things done, and finally it 
sees government as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide. The 
pluralistic, networking, dispersive, and boundary blurring features of governance give 
contesting fronts to the NPM’s closed managerialism approach.  
 
At the same time, Stoker (1998, p. 19) also warns that each proposition is associated with 
a certain dilemma, according to him - 
“There is a divorce between the complex reality of decision-making associated 
with governance and the normative codes used to explain and justify 
government. The blurring of responsibilities can lead to blame avoidance or 
scapegoating. Power dependence exacerbates the problem of unintended 
consequences for government. The emergence of self-governing networks 
raises difficulties over accountability. Even where governments operate in a 
flexible way to steer collective action governance failure may occur”. 
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For the failure of governance in collective action, Stoker (1989, p. 23 - 24) argues that it 
occurs due to accountability deficit because of the dissatisfaction of those who are out of 
the network, and the fact that those who are in the network are driven by the self-interest 
of their members rather than a wider concern with the public interest. 
 
Summing up, it is more likely that governance features are more benign to policy network 
where public policy implementation involves massive stakeholders, and public service 
delivery is the outcome of public policy decisions. Hence, the transformation of policy into 
practice attracts a different kind of institutional arrangement, where the organizational 
boundary crossing requires various forms of organizational relationship to be forged for 
effective service delivery. Two prominent mechanisms for organizational relationships, 
‘partnership’ and ‘collaboration’, are considered within the frame of NPG for discussion 
here. 
2.1.2.1 NPG and partnership 
Partnership in legal or business terms denotes an arrangement whereby risks are, in 
agreed terms, shared between or among parties involved in a business transaction. In 
other words, this is an arrangement in which parties agree to cooperate to advance their 
mutual interests. Parties could be individuals, businesses, interest-based organizations, 
schools, governments, or varied combinations thereof. The OECD (1990, p. 18) defined 
partnership in more liberal terms as: 
 “Systems of formalised co-operation, grounded in legally binding 
arrangements or informal understandings, co-operative working relationships, 
and mutually adopted plans among a number of institutions. They involve 
agreements on policy and programme objectives and the sharing of 
responsibility, resources, risks and benefits over a specified period of time.” 
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Montouri and Conti (1995) take this definition in an expansive manner by including not 
only relationships with vendors, limited partnerships, business alliances, but also an 
emphasis on teamwork, a new spirit of seeking out opportunities for collaborative 
networking, and ultimately to create human relationships, that is bringing people together 
in mutually beneficial relationships. 
 
According to McQuaid (2010, p. 127) “partnership” remains a varied and ambiguous 
concept. He advocates partnership from the perspective of greater interagency 
cooperation, whereby government departments, agencies, private companies and the 
third sector form a strategic alliance (two or more together) having a common strategy 
and aims and sharing risks and resources, and achieving mutual benefits and synergy 
(McQuaid 2010, p. 129). They pool resources to attain synergy, complementing each 
other by getting “more than a sum of its parts”. He argues that partnership improves 
efficiency by eliminating duplication of effort, bringing all partners into the decision-making 
process, and letting organizations articulate the interests of their constituencies. Some 
key factors for a successful partnership, according to McQuaid (2010) are clearly defined 
strategies, targets, strong commitments to shared objectives, and transparent operating 
systems, including strong strategic leadership to drive the partnership, instilling 
confidence in all partners, building and fostering trust among partners etc. 
 
However, partnership also suffers in terms of conflict over goals and objectives due to the 
involvement of many partners with poorly defined aims and objectives. Some partners 
may have hidden agendas or disagreements over operational strategy, or be difficult to 
hold accountable, as more than one party is involved in service provision. There may be a 
lack of organizational capacity to fulfil partnership commitments. How this could be done 
in community participation would become a matter of interest in this research. 
 
 
38 
2.1.2.2 NPG and Public Private Partnership 
A more narrowly defined partnership concept in public service delivery is the popular 
concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), which comes in various forms including 
private finance (UN 2008, HMT 2008). It is characterised by tightness of the 
organizational linkages between the two actors, or more precisely, long term contracts for 
public infrastructure projects (Hodge and Greve 2008, p. 93) (Greve and Hodge 2010, p. 
149). However, these authors disregard other forms of PPP such as build-own-transfer 
(BOT), build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT), sale and lease back; and they are silent on 
management contract, lease, and concession. The main distinguishing characteristics 
between these two “PPP” and “not to be PPP” types are whether the products or services 
are jointly developed or not, and whether the risks, costs and resources associated with 
the production of these products and services are shared or not.  
 
Bovaird (2004) interprets the partnership based on the ten governance principles. He 
further asserts that PPP can be formed based on ‘transactional contractual relationships’ 
and/or ‘collaborative partnerships’. Gauging the partnership from the accountability 
principle, under contractual relationship, according to him (Bovaird 2004, p. 210 - 11), “the 
contractor must account to the purchaser in line with all performance reporting procedures 
agreed in the contract…” and under collaborative partnerships “partners must be prepared 
to account to each other for their actions and performance on all issues… and must be 
prepared to account to other stakeholders for the overall performance of the partnership”.  
 
Apparently, the former type of partnership attracts NPM attributes, while the latter type 
embeds a collaborative relationship. Perhaps the latter type is more applicable in the UK 
context where the PPP is defined as: 
 “… arrangements typified by joint working between the public and private 
sectors. In their broadest sense, they can cover all types of collaboration 
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across the private-public sector interface involving collaborative working 
together and risk sharing to deliver policies, services and infrastructure” (HMT 
2008, p. 18).  
Evidence regarding the success of PPP is mixed (Athena 2012). Private financing PPPs 
are seen as relatively successful, but long-term infrastructure contract-type PPP 
arrangements generate mixed reactions, particularly regarding the question of value for 
money. Hodge and Greve (2008, pp. 105 - 106) further argue that the PPP as a policy has 
been delivered but its effectiveness remains in doubt. 
 
From the point of view of governance, PPP is not participative, especially when the 
contracts are framed in its different stages – needs assessment, prioritization, design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation – where users are not typically involved in the 
process. The contract process itself is so complex that scope for public or stakeholders’ 
participation is limited, and the process is not transparent; deals are kept secret and only 
opened to concerned lead agencies, bankers and lawyers, those involved in the 
contractual arrangements. The other challenges are the multiple roles of government 
where the roles range from policy advocacy to economic development, stewardship of 
public funds, election of representatives for decision-making, and planning, contract 
regulating and enforcement. Managing partners who have different or opposing strategic 
agendas and interests, or capacity constraints on both parties, and the ill intentions of 
private organizations over transactions are other governance challenges. Since PPP is a 
long-term contractual relationship, it is difficult to evaluate the results of the projects, and 
to capture the transaction costs to compare between various partnership projects or 
compare these projects with the traditional government service delivery projects (Hodge 
and Greve 2008).  
 
The OECD (2012) sees PPP as a challenge in public governance. The questions are 
whether the government can afford the projects financially, and from such projects 
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improve the value for money; whether the risks can be appropriately transferred between 
the partners, and whether the public sector (government) has contract negotiation skills or 
not. The United Nations (UN 2008, p. 8 - 9) acknowledge most of these challenges are 
due to the lack of proper institutions, processes and procedures to deliver PPP projects. It 
(UN) further asserts the need of a strong PPP system in the public sector where public 
managers have the skills to forge partnerships, manage networks, and conduct 
negotiations; and have contract management and risk analysis skills. 
2.1.2.3 NPG and the collaborative approach 
Collaboration demands a high level of trust compared to partnership. According to Keast 
and Mandell (2013, p. 1): 
“Collaboration is part of a continuum of joint working relationships that are 
defined by the intensity of the relationship, communication flows and 
distribution of power between the participants, length of relationship and level 
of risk and reward.” 
Collaboration as seen by Keast and Mandell differs from cooperation and coordination in 
terms of connection, communication pattern, goal formulation, resource and power 
sharing, commitment and accountability, time frame and risk taking behaviour and reward 
system. As far as accountability is concerned, with ‘cooperation’ it remains within the 
organization whilst in ‘coordination’ it remains with the parent organization; whereas in 
‘collaboration’ the network holds accountability first, and then the community and the 
parent organization (see Figure 1).  
 
From an accountability perspective, one can argue that a collaborative relationship is 
premised on shared accountability among the network members, and demands high 
compactness in trust, communication, information, goal and power sharing, and finally this 
relationship is associated with high risks but at the same time it offers greater rewards.  
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Figure 1: Characteristics of 3 Cs (Keast and Mandell, 2013) 
Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
• Loose connections, loose 
trust 
• Tacit information sharing 
• Ad hoc communication flows 
• Independent goals 
• Adapting to each other, or 
accommodating others’ 
actions and goals 
• Power remains with 
organizations 
• Resources remain with 
organizations 
• Commitment and 
accountability to own 
organization 
• Relational timeframe short 
• Low risk/low reward 
• Medium connections, work-
based trust 
• Structured communication 
flows, formalised project-
based information sharing 
• Joint policies, programmes 
and aligned resources 
• Semi-interdependent goals 
• Power remains with parent 
organizations 
• Commitment and 
accountability to parent 
organisation and project 
• Relational timeframe 
medium-based on prior 
projects 
• Dense interdependent 
connections, high trust 
• Frequent communication 
• Tactical information sharing 
• Systems change 
• Collective resources 
• Negotiated shared goals 
• Power is shared between 
organizations 
• Commitment and 
accountability to network 
first then community and 
parent organization 
• Relational timeframe - long 
term (3 years) 
• High risk/high reward 
Source: Adapted from Australian Research Alliance for Children and Youth. 
 
A ‘collaborative advantage’ (Huxham and Macdonald 1992) refers to the advantageous 
situation by which a number of agencies working in partnership achieve more than they 
might do separately. When agencies working in partnership reach a certain synergy of 
operations, strategies and mindsets, the whole produces better outcomes than any single 
one in isolation (Dudau and McAllister 2010a). They (Dudau and McAllister) also see that 
collaboration is threatened when it fails to overcome resistance to diversity (e.g., gender, 
profession, working style, religion, values, beliefs), both within and across organizational 
and professional boundaries. 
 
Agreement on aims, trust building (initiating and sustaining), managing cultural diversity 
and knowledge transfer, are the key conceptual frameworks for the theory of collaborative 
advantage proposed by Huxham and Vangen (2010, pp. 163 - 184). However, this 
collaborative advantage cannot be attained when power sharing between partners is 
imbalanced, or membership structures are ambiguous and too complex to manage aims, 
trust and cultural diversity (Huxham and Vangen 2010, pp. 178 - 179). 
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John Wanna (2008, p.8) advocates three types of drivers of collaboration, which are more 
or less similar to those favouring the emergence of NPM. These are external drivers that 
include globalization, world trade, the market, international connectedness, knowledge of 
other cultures, information technology, terrorism, security, community demand, and social 
change. Internal drivers are those that deal with the governmental system, entailing 
political demands for public officials to be responsive to the community, policy reach and 
accessibility, flexibility in the budgeting system, outcomes and performance result 
orientation.  
 
Contract provision for collaboration with external providers, relation management, and 
capacity building of public agencies to garner collaboration are other drivers. And, finally, 
volitional factors related to political strategies for shared goals and understanding of 
problems of community for collaboration should be included. All this entails building 
consensus and coalition for demand and developing new policy agendas. 
 
Perhaps the most defining explanation of collaboration comes from Geddes, although this 
is still in favour of public management, but from a collaborative dimension. According to 
him: 
“‘Collaborative public management’ (CPM) is a concept that describes the 
process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to 
solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. 
The aim is to achieve common goals utilizing boundary crossing as a positive 
mechanism to encourage reciprocity and the active engagement of citizens.” 
(Geddes 2012, p. 948) 
Geddes distinguishes NPM and CPM on the following management dimensions:  
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Table 2: A typology of management dimensions of NPM and CPM 
Dimension New Public Management (NPM) Collaborative Public Management 
(CPM) 
Performance Managerial 
Outputs 
Organizational/individual objectives 
Indicators/incentives 
Network 
Outcomes 
Cross cutting 
Renegotiable objectives 
Accountability Contracts with individual and managers Shared with stakeholders 
Community 
engagement 
Customer 
Manager defined service standards 
Citizen 
Active public engagement to define 
choice 
Values Corporate culture 
Entrepreneurial 
Visionary 
Responsiveness 
Risk managing 
Mutuality 
Reciprocity 
Innovative 
Legitimacy 
Empowerment 
Risk taking 
Leadership Merit appointed 
Transformational 
Conservative 
Natural 
Facilitative 
Participative 
Employee 
relations 
Hard HRM 
Performance pay 
Task specialization 
Staff development 
Soft HRM 
Multi-task jobs 
Leaderless teams/practitioner 
networks 
Cross-sector careers 
Organizational learning 
Management 
tasks 
Performance manager 
Strategic planning 
Contracting 
Culture management-mission, vision 
Core business 
Income generation 
Network/process manager 
Mobilizing 
Synthesizing 
Decision-making Rational 
Managerial 
Separation of policy and 
implementation 
Evidence based 
Joint stakeholders 
Integrated policy implementation and 
evaluation 
Structure Market 
Decentralised 
Multiple agencies 
Outsourcing 
Principal/agent 
Network 
Pluralistic 
Multiple agencies 
Inter-agency 
Preamble supported boundaries 
Process Contracting/privatization 
Cost centres/audit 
Quality management 
 
Covenants/compacts 
Commissioning 
Pooled budget 
Integrated technology 
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Change Cultural 
Top-down process 
Rapid and far reaching anticipation 
Experimental 
Bottom-up 
Continuous improvement 
Source: Adapted from Geddes, L. (2012) ‘In Search of Collaborative Public Management’, Public 
Management Review, 14:7, 947-966. 
 
One can see that NPM operates in a closed system while CPM operates in an open 
system. NPM’s emphasis is on an organizational approach, while CPM goes beyond the 
institutional boundary. As with the collaborative approach, it (CPM) addresses basic 
governance characteristics such as citizen and stakeholders’ participation, legitimacy, 
policy integration, pluralism, and change from bottom-up. Besides this, interestingly, the 
CPM model incorporates many social capital elements such as reciprocity, trust building, 
relationship and networking. However, would all this explicitly explain whether a 
collaboration is like a partnership of equals, or subsidiary or submissive? Some answers 
are given here, but still far too few to comprehend this fully.  
 
Osborne (2010b, pp. 413 - 425) opined that NPG is a debatable theme in public services, 
which could be a model to embrace both public policy (PA) and public service delivery 
(NPM), but still needs further research to establish it as the “state of art” in public services. 
He poses seven questions to qualify NPG, and these are related to - 
• Basic unit of analysis to be used in the exploration of public policy implementation 
and public service delivery; 
• Best-suited organizational architecture to deliver public services in plural state; 
• Sustainable public service systems; 
• Values that underpin public policy implementation and service delivery; 
• Skills required for relational performance; 
• Nature of accountability in fragmented plural and pluralist systems. 
 
Owing to its characteristics, the most problematic aspects of NPG from the organizational 
perspective in public service delivery are its expansiveness and its tendency towards 
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boundary spanning and boundary maintenance (Osborne, 2010), which is complex and 
messy (O’Flynn 2008, p. 192). Like NPG, collaboration can also be considered an ideal 
for aspiration (Head 2004). The issue of collaboration in public services is addressed in 
the next sub-section, but from the third sector perspective.  
2.1.3 The Third Sector 
The rise of the ‘third sector’ (in short TS) was phenomenal (Salamon 1994) during the late 
1900s (Najam 2000) and early 2000s. It is taking its own place and pace in public service 
provision. It is also embracing the greater societal role in development and the nation 
building process, although within their blurred boundaries (Billis 2010ab, Gidron 2013, 
Rees et al. 2012). This is because its history, roots and the intellectual development of 
this field of study have been given different names by different cultures and research 
traditions. On these there is no agreement as yet (Wagner 2012). Upon reviewing the 
historical organizational types, Kim (2011, pp. 642 - 643) defined the third sector “as 
organized efforts of voicing and solving social problems and conflicts, which should be 
measured primarily by citizens’ voluntary participation”. 
 
The meaning of TS is multifaceted, complex and multi-disciplinary (Gidron 2013), and its 
forms and applications vary from country to country. Broadly speaking, Third Sector 
Organizations (TSOs) can be discerned from their mission objectives as whether they opt 
for ‘policy’ or for ‘service provision’. Billis (2010a, pp. 48-55) explored TS from the 
organizational perspective, thus framing it as TSO. According to Cornforth and Spear 
(2010, p.75) an ideal type of Third Sector Organization is the membership association run 
by its members and volunteers. It draws its resources primarily from membership fees and 
voluntary donations of time and money. The governing body is elected by the membership 
of the organization. Their mission is to serve society and community rather than seeking 
profit.  
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To arrive at the distinctive characteristics of TSO, Billis (2010a) compared the core 
elements of the public sector, the private sector and the third sector in terms of their 
ownership, governance, operational priorities, human resources, and other resources. 
 
Compared to Geddes’s CPM (2012) and Osborne’s NPG (2010), Billis’s TSO (2010a) 
tends to be more focused on social organizations in terms of its ownership type, 
associational nature and resource generation. Table 3 distinctly shows three sectors that 
have different elements of accountability and motivation; the private sector is concerned 
with the market, the public sector with public service and choice, and the third sector with 
committed mission.   
Table 3: Ideal type of sectors and accountability 
Core elements Private sector 
principles 
Public sector 
principles 
Third sector 
principles 
Ownership Shareholders Citizens Members 
Governance Share ownership size Public elections Private elections 
Operational priorities Market forces and 
individual choice 
Public service and 
collective choice 
Commitment about 
distinctive mission  
Distinctive human 
resources 
Paid employees in 
managerially controlled 
Firm 
Paid public servants 
in legally backed 
Bureau 
Members and 
volunteers in 
Association 
Distinctive other 
resources 
Sales, fees Taxes Dues, donations and 
legacies 
Source: Extracted from David Billis (2010a, p. 55) 
 
This is because of their inherent distinctive and conflicting principles (Billis 2010a, p.56). 
These differences in their organizational and institutional bases can lead them into 
adversarial, conflicting and contested situations. By using Set Theory, Billis has identified 
the ‘hybrid zones’, (the combination of private-public-third sector) where he argued that 
hybrid TSOs might fulfil some requirements. However, the issues on the line and source 
of accountability (single or multiple, or how to build common accountability, and the 
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danger that this may lead to nobody being accountable), the staff arrangement (paid vs. 
volunteer), and distinctive organizational principles (rules of the game) all have left the 
ideas open for discussion in the third sector realms. 
 
Rees, Mullins and Bovaird (2012) are optimistic about the greater participation of TS 
(based on the UK experience) in collaborative partnership forms for public service 
delivery. Their argument is that partnerships for collaboration can work well, even in 
competitive (market) conditions, through network governance, both horizontally (in 
between TSOs) and vertically (with public and private sector officials and contractors). 
They further argue that many TSOs flourish better when working with other organisations 
through a more consensual approach because of their organizational values, instead of 
working in hierarchical, and especially contractual, arrangements, or through mergers. 
 
Jupp (2008) 17  gives a first hand account of the experience of the third sector’s 
collaboration in public services in the UK. According to him, the sector in the UK is vibrant 
and growing. The number of charities registered has increased, and so have the social 
enterprises and their turnover (£ 27 billion), and employment. The government (UK) has 
increasingly recognized the importance of this and sought more appropriate policies for 
TS. He (Jupp, 2008, p.176) also acknowledges that collaboration with TS is not problem- 
or risk-free; but “by giving greater emphasis to flexible, arm’s length funding … better 
engaging with emerging civic organizations and social enterprises, and by not 
underestimating the challenges of cultural change, sustainable collaborations can become 
an embedded part of the work of government in the future”. 
 
In developing countries, however, such effective complementary relationships between 
state and civil organizations may be weak due to intense social hostilities, political 
instability, widespread poverty, state repression, fiscal indigence or international 
                                                
17 Ben Jupp was the director of the Office of the Third Sector of the UK Government. 
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dependence. In such situations, the relationships between the states and the civil 
organizations are likely to be not collaborative but adversarial, displacing, competitive and 
substitute or subsidiary (White and Robinson 1998, p. 102).  
 
Amid this very wide meaning of the term ‘Third Sector’, more differentiated meanings 
must be explored for better comprehension, under the headings of: non-profit sector, civil 
society, NGO, and community and users in the successive deliberation. 
2.1.3.1 The non-profit sector 
The purpose of the non-profit sector is to improve and enrich society by creating social 
wealth rather than material wealth. It is sometimes referred to as civil society, the third 
sector, the voluntary and community sector, the charity sector18, and the social sector and 
so on so forth. The terms used are confusing, but the common understanding is that the 
sector exists to make a difference to society rather than to make financial profits through 
various functions: service, advocacy, expression, community building, and value guardian 
(Salamon 2012).  
 
To distinguish this, in the US what is often called the non-profit organizations are 
charitable organizations which are separated from other types of tax-exempt 
organizations, based on their purpose. Charitable organizations must benefit the broad 
public interest, not just the interests of their members19.  
 
Here is another version of the taxonomy of this sector from a tax and economy point of 
view. The non-profit organizations, contrary to their name, can be highly profitable 
organizations (Weisbord 1988), but this depends on how they generate their resources 
                                                
18  For more understanding on social charitable nonprofit organizations see 
http://knowhownonprofit.org/basics/what-is-non-profit accessed on 21 March 2014. 
19  To understand American views on the non-profit sector from the revenue tax perspective see 
http://www.independentsector.org/nonprofit#sthash.nf3qhto3.dpuf accessed on 18 March 2014. 
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(grant, subsidy, fees, services), finance their activities and distribute their profits. That is, 
the profit for themselves as owners and associates, or for another social cause that is 
intended for tax exemption and other subsidies. In the US, like in many other countries, 
the tax law defines “non-profits” as organizations for charitable or mutual benefit 
purposes. 
 
According to Weisbrod (1988) there are three types of non-profit organizations, i.e. 
private, collective, and trust. Non-profit private organizations are self-serving. They do not 
reap the profit for themselves, but they may be instruments for generating profits for their 
constituents, such as private firms, or for their members such as trade associations, 
country clubs, labour unions, farmers’ cooperatives, and chambers of commerce. 
Collective non-profit organizations provide benefits to individuals and groups outside of 
the organization. They operate in the public interest, and the focus of their activities could 
be medical research, museums, wildlife sanctuaries, environmental protection, or aid to 
the homeless. Many of their services overlap with the services provided by the 
government agencies. The "trust" types of organizations provide goods and services in 
competition with the private sector. The goods or services they produce are difficult to 
categorize. Blood banks, nursing homes, day care centres, and hospitals are examples of 
this category of organization. Collective and trust organizations enjoy several other 
benefits apart from their exemption from corporate income tax and property tax, such as 
having no duty to pay the minimum wage to their employees, or social security 
contributions and unemployment compensation.  
 
In practice, a great number of permutations of non-profit organizations exist. Non-profits 
can operate alone or in combination with both for-profit and government agencies. A for-
profit organization may establish a non-profit subsidiary and a non-profit may establish a 
for-profit subsidiary. They may operate a joint venture. Such combinations are capable of 
enhancing the profit of the proprietary partner in a number of ways (Weisbrod 1988). 
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2.1.3.2 Civil Society 
Wagner (2012, p.299) argued that ‘third sector’ and ‘civil society’ are two different but 
mutually enhancing research paradigms. According to him, the former addresses the 
decentralization of public administration, and the latter entails the delegation of power 
from citizens to the state. This expression gives a kind of nomenclature where, “third 
sector” is associated with service delivery and civil society with taking part in public policy 
formulation and implementation through government. Does this entail mainly the 
advocacy role of civil society or more than this? However, this argument is not that easy. 
It is hard to differentiate, in the case of a civil society that still embraces a wide range of 
public service provision works. Other scholars further support this boundary blurring 
definition. 
 
Theoretically, White and Robinson (1998, p. 229) believe that the term “civil society” in 
development discourse is confusing because of the ambiguous theoretical heritage of the 
term itself. They further say:  
“… actual civil societies are complex associational universes encompassing a 
wide diversity of organizational forms and institutional motivations. They 
contain repression as well as democracy, conflict as well as cooperation, vice 
as well as virtue; they can be motivated by sectional greed as much as by 
social interest. Thus, any attempt to compress the idea of civil society into a 
homogeneous and virtuous stereotype is doomed to failure”.  
This is, however, a very general expression of civil society, without clarifying whether civil 
society has a policy advocacy, implementation or service delivery role, or a mix of all three 
either while working alone, or with government and the private sector. 
 
The flourishing of civil society may be variously explained in both developed and 
developing countries. White and Robinson (1998. p. 228) identify three sets of pressures 
for growth. These are (i) the spontaneous effort of organized citizens to create an 
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independent space that is outside the control of the state as a means of escaping political 
oppression or improving their own living conditions; (ii) external assistance provided by 
international agencies, private voluntary organizations and national aid donors, which 
have boosted the resources available to indigenous non-profit organizations; and (iii) 
governments which have fostered the growth of the voluntary sector by contracting out 
public services and by increasing the involvement of churches and non-governmental 
organizations in official development programmes. Perhaps discussion of the definition of 
NGOs will give some better understanding over this confusion!  
2.1.3.3 NGOs 
By general definition the NGO is no different from any other social and associational 
organizations (Shigetomi 2002, Salamon and Anhier 1994, Najam 2000, Pestoff and 
Brandsen 2010). It can be a non-profit, voluntary, independent, charitable, philanthropic, 
associational, or third sector organization (Najam 2000). NGOs are self-governing 
independent bodies, voluntary in nature, and tend to engage both their supporters and 
constituency on the basis of values or some shared interests or concerns, and have public 
benefit purposes (Fisher 1997, Salamon et al. 2000, Vakil 1997, and Kilby 2006). 
 
According to Srinivas (2009, pp. 614-616) the term NGO is often used “indiscriminately, 
obscuring the heterogeneity in practice of the organizations signified”. The term was first 
used in 1945 by the United Nations to specify the role of consultants in UN activities that 
were not those of national governments (Lewis 2001). The international aid regime, 
particularly the UN Millennium Declaration, became the key driving factor to increase its 
(NGOs) size, scope, volume and influence within the sphere of international development 
in developing countries (Fowler, 2000) that eventually overshadowed the earlier forms of 
organizations such as voluntary organizations, community development programmes, and 
cooperatives by organizations referred to as NGOs (Hailey 1999, Lewis 2005).  
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Looking at NGOs through the sectoral organizational lens, they exhibit distinctive 
organizational features (Brett 2000, Lewis 2003, Fisher 1994, Najam 1996 and Uphoff 
1993) based on their unique voluntary communitarian ethos. These organizations share 
and function through “commitment of their workers, volunteers, and members, and not 
primarily through financial remuneration based on profit making” (Lewis 2003, p. 328).  
 
Srinivas (2009) argued that the sectoral typification ignores the organizational 
heterogeneity that blurred the distinction between the membership-based organizations 
and non-membership based organizations or externally assisted intermediary 
organizations and self-generating start-ups (Avina 1993). The nature of the associational 
diversity of NGOs, as organizational forms for social change operating at multiple levels of 
society, offers various alternative choices for the arrangement of the public good. These 
range from “local organizing, community-level organizations that hire professionally 
trained staff when needed” to “professionally staffed NGOs organizing communities in 
response to available grants” (Srinivas 2009, p. 623). What he (Srinivas) called the former 
approach describes local organizing NGOs that offer political responses to government 
policy, using the public sphere to debate different notions of public goods, and the latter 
one describes the professional organizing NGOs that use local communities as a means 
of distributing specific resources from governments, outside funders, or both. 
 
While looking at their (NGOs) relationship with the public sector, Najam (2000) 
conceptualized that NGOs can have four types of relationship with government, what he 
called the “Four-C’s” relational frame, from the combination of means and ends. These 
are “Cooperation”, “Confrontation”, “Complementarity” and “Co-option” (Figure 2). For 
example, when government agencies and NGOs share similar policy goals and similar 
strategies a cooperation relationship can be established. But Coston (1998) sees 
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cooperation and collaboration as two different forms of relationship between NGO and 
government. 
Figure 2: The Four-C's of NGO-Government Relations 
  Goals (Ends) 
  Similar Dissimilar 
Preferred Strategic 
(Means) 
Similar Cooperation Co-option 
Dissimilar Complementarity Confrontation 
 
Source: Extracted from Adil Najam (2000, p. 383) 
 
Collaboration makes NGOs merely the implementing bodies (not in equality), while 
cooperation is a loose relationship. His view on collaboration contrasts with the Keast and 
Mandell (2013) view, where the collaboration seeks more joint endeavours in many 
aspects of the relationship, such as shared goals, resources, and information and a high 
level of trust. However, Najam thinks that power asymmetry between NGOs and 
government has less to do with collaboration or cooperation as long as both ends and 
means are synchronized and non-threatened. This notion partly supports the views of 
Huxham and Macdonald (1992) (such as a partnership in the synergy of operations, 
strategies and mindset), but how the trust, which is one of the main features of the 
collaborative approach, would be built up in Najam’s cooperation model is not clear.  
 
Furthering the Four-C’s model (Najam), confrontation or conflict has been just the 
opposite of cooperation. It means that the policy goals and the strategic means to achieve 
them are dissimilar, divergent and adversarial. This often happens in the situation when 
NGOs pursue policy reform agendas that go against the government’s interests. When 
governmental organizations and NGOs have divergent strategies, but convergent goals, 
the relationship is described as Complementarity. This relation could be either in a 
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partnership or contractual form (Young, 1999). But Najam (2000, p. 387) rejects this 
notion on the ground that the flow of resources in Young’s version is one way, i.e. from 
the government to NGOs, but for him (Najam) it is more about sharing similar goals than 
means. He (Najam) believes the means can be independently and differently pursued as 
long as the purpose is to achieve a shared end. It is just not like the procurement of 
resources, but the provision of services.  
  
In a co-option relationship, governmental and non-governmental organizations share 
similar means, but choose different goals. Due to goal difference the power asymmetry 
comes into play to define the relationship; which, according to Najam, is conflicting, as 
one has to influence others to align the goals. 
 
For the purpose of this discussion, the NGOs, as part of civil society, alias the not-for-
profit sector, or third sector, can be differentiated more by their functional role than their 
associational pattern. The question is whether their own concerns play a greater role than 
others’ concerns when they act as intermediary organizations.  
2.1.3.4 Community and users 
The emergence of users’ committees (or groups or associations) is a quite widespread 
phenomenon in developing countries. It refers to a self-help community association where 
the users’ participation (as members and beneficiaries) is very high. They are involved in 
the design, production, consumption and maintenance of services. Self-help groups are 
often associated with micro-finance (Rutherford, S. 1999, p. 9) (Christen, R.P. et al. 2005, 
p. 106), but can be found in any sector, such as livelihood and income generation for 
example. Their presence is very strong in rural areas in developing countries. They are 
not intermediaries like NGOs, but are the beneficiaries of their own enterprises, and their 
involvement in public services is ever increasing. Theoretically, they survive on their own 
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without external support. But quite often they do receive government grants and other 
support (donations) to develop and sustain their services.  
 
Community participation in public services is made either in an associational form (such 
as NGOs, CBOs or professional organizations), or directly as being the users or 
consumers of the services. The latter (users or consumers) can get registered with the 
government to obtain the legal entity of being associational to get the government 
support. INLOGOV (2012) is pursuing a new public service delivery model, particularly 
from the local government perspective, as they (local government) are the first line of 
elected public governments at the sub-national level closed to the public and 
communities.  
 
The model concept draws heavily from the co-production theme of social capital values 
(trust, reciprocity, respect) (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1990, Putnam 1995, Carney 1998, 
Flora 1998, Ostrom 1998, Scoones 1998 and Uphoff 2000, Stephens et al. 2008). This 
model embraces the need for a stronger relationship with communities and individual 
service users by changing the behaviour through building trust and capacity in service 
provision.  
 
According to Bovaird and Loeffler (2012, p. 1)): 
“The movement to user and community co-production is built upon increasing 
realization of one of the key characteristics of services in the public and 
private sectors – that the production and consumption of many services are 
inseparable.”   
Pestoff and Brandsen (2010, p. 227) describe ‘Co-production’ as “one of several 
mechanisms that can be used to increase the influence of citizens over the services that 
are delivered to them”. Although the model they discuss is drawn from UK experience, it 
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gives important insights into service provision which can be more generally applied, since 
there is great funding pressure in the UK on both central and local government. According 
to INLOGOV the “‘new model of public services’ brings together a number of the key 
themes and constructs” (Staite 2013) in public service provision. Its co-production 
characteristic resembles the structure and functioning of the self-help community level’s 
user groups (or committees) in Nepal. 
 
One thing certain about this model is that it clearly emphasizes the involvement of citizens 
and users directly in service provision, i.e. production, with both public and private 
institutions. 
2.2 Public service provision and accountability 
In the previous section public service delivery was considered from different theoretical 
perspectives, reflecting recent and emerging trends and paradigm shifts. In this section, 
accountability in public services is discussed from the governance perspective, in terms of 
defining accountability, how it is structured in public services and through what means and 
organizational relationships it is affected. 
2.2.1 What is a public service?  
A public good is a good that is non-excludable and non-rivalrous, which means individuals 
cannot be excluded from use, and where use by one individual does not reduce 
availability to others20. For instance, fresh air, knowledge, national defence, police, public 
libraries, public health, refuse collection, flood control systems, environmental protection, 
street lighting, and transportation. A slightly different definition of public services may be 
derived from focusing on their non-for-profit rationale and delivery:  
                                                
20  For current definitions of public goods see any mainstream microeconomics textbook, e.g.: Hal R. Varian, 
Microeconomic Analysis ISBN 0-393-95735-7; Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green, Microeconomic Theory 
ISBN 0-19-507340-1; or Gravelle & Rees, Microeconomics ISBN 0-582-40487-8. 
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 “A commodity or service that is provided without profit to all members of a 
society, either by the government or by a private individual or organization” - 
Oxford dictionaries (p. 4).21 
However, the excessive use of public goods may result in negative externalities affecting 
all users; for example air pollution and traffic congestion. Public goods problems are often 
closely related to the "free-rider" syndrome, in which people do not pay for the goods that 
may continue to be accessible, which leads to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 
1962), where the consumption of a shared resource by individuals acting in their individual 
and immediate self-interest diminishes or even destroys the original resource. Public 
goods may thus be under-produced, overused or degraded. Public goods can be subject 
to restrictions to accessibility, which would then be considered as club goods or private 
goods; and the exclusion mechanisms used could be copyright, patents, congestion 
pricing, and pay television (in the UK).  
 
For the present purpose it is more practicable to define public services as the services 
which are funded with public money. These can be delivered by the state or on behalf of 
the state by voluntary, community or private organizations (Funding Central)22. Although 
public goods and services differ from country to country, as in what form and to what 
extent these goods and services are produced and provided by the government and its 
subsidiaries, there are some basic goods and services such as health, education, 
security, waste management, drinking water, job creation, that may be being considered 
as public goods. In a welfare state, the government takes greater responsibility to make 
the provision of such goods for the welfare of the public either directly or through the 
private or social sectors. 
                                                
21  http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/public-good 
22  Funding Central is a free resource for charities, voluntary organisations and social enterprises based in 
England funded by the Cabinet Office, Office for Civil Society www.fundingcentral.org.uk Accessed on 3 
March 2014 
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2.2.2 Accountability 
According to Stapenhurst and O’Brien (p. 1): 
“The notion of accountability is an amorphous concept that is difficult to define 
in precise terms”.  
Accountability cannot occur in a void. It requires a relationship between living actors in 
society. Therefore accountability is also called “the DNA of civilised societies” (Zadek 
2007, p. 1). This relationship defines the performance of tasks or functions of an individual 
or a body, which are subject to the oversight of another individual or body seeking 
information and the justification of the actions of the former. According to Boven et al. 
(2008) accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, where the actor has 
an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct; the forum can ask questions and 
pass judgment, and the actor face consequences. Hondeghem (1998, p. 132) clarifies 
further by saying that “Public accountability rests both on giving an account and on being 
held to account”. 
 
A more comprehensive definition comes again from Stapenhurst and O’Brien (p. 1): 
 “… accountability exists when there is a relationship where an individual or 
body, and the performance of tasks or functions by that individual or body, are 
subject to another’s oversight, direction or request that they provide 
information or justification for their actions”.  
They emphasize that the concept of accountability has two distinct features, i.e. 
answerability and enforcement: 
“Answerability refers to the obligation of the government, its agencies and 
public officials to provide information about their decisions and actions, and to 
justify them to the public and those institutions of accountability tasked with 
providing oversight. Enforcement suggests that the public, or the institution 
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responsible for accountability, can sanction the offending party or remedy the 
contravening behaviour. As such, different institutions of accountability might 
be responsible for either or both of these stages”. (Stapenhurst and O’Brien, 
p.1). 
Further on accountability, Baez (2011, p. 3) has said: 
 “Accountability is indeed a broad concept that covers and permeates a vast 
array of relationships involving power and decision making authority across 
sectors and organizational strata of society and government”.  
He further puts this relationship in the form of principal–agent perspective (Baez 2011, p. 
6) by saying that: 
“… a process within a principal-agent relationship through which the behaviour 
and performance of the agent is evaluated against predetermined standards 
by the principal and where misdeeds are sanctioned.”  
According to UN (2011)23: 
“Accountability is the obligation of … and … to be answerable for all decisions 
made and actions taken by … and to be responsible for honouring 
commitments, without qualification or exception”. 
Likewise accountability is “… required or expected to justify actions or decisions; 
responsible”24; it is “an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for 
one's actions”25, and it can be “the state of being accountable, liable, or answerable”.26 In 
the words of Edwards and Hulme (2013, p. 9), accountability is “the means by which 
individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held 
responsible for their actions”.  
                                                
23  UN (2011) Accountability frameworks in the United Nations system, Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations, 
Geneva 2011. 
24  http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/accountable, accessed on 5 January 2014 
25  http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accountability, accessed on 5 January 2014 
26  http://www.thefreedictionary.com/accountability, accessed on 5 January 2014 
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Accountability can be classified into different types: structural and sectoral. Structural 
accountability may be any of the following: political, social, horizontal, vertical, diagonal 
(WB), upward, downward and outward (Goetz and Gaventa 2001, O’Neil et al. 2007, 
DFID 2008).  
 
Bovens (2005, pp. 13 - 17) talks about four major bases of accountability. These bases 
are the nature of the forum, actor, conduct, and obligation. Under each stream, he further 
classifies the types of accountability. Although all these bases provide some forms of 
premise for accountability, particularly the ‘forum’ and the ‘actor’ offer an appropriate basis 
for the present study. This is because the District Development Committees of Nepal are 
considered as the forums (principals) where the service providers and water users’ 
committees are considered the actors (agents).  
 
Accountability thus involves the giving and taking of an account between at least two 
individuals and/or bodies. To verify this account, more precisely to formalize the account, 
an audit needs to be carried out by an independent body. This could be an internal or 
external body (constitutionally established or through ordinance). Therefore, without 
accounts, an audit cannot be carried out, and without audit the purpose of an account 
could not be established, and would become meaningless. This relationship of ‘account’ 
and ‘audit’ helps us to understand how accountability exists or is being structured in 
various organizations in different institutional settings, because these two entities 
‘account’ and ‘audit’ serve as a means for accountability. 
 
In a public service provision context, the accountability relationship is contingent upon the 
role assumed by the government in different situations (socio-political and economic), 
particularly how the state takes care of its citizens through adopting various types of 
service delivery models, and the organizational arrangements (Romsek 2014) of service 
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providers (private, public and third sector). Aligning the roles of “right holder” and “duty 
bearer” in public service provision is paradoxical in the given service provision situation, 
as to how the relationship is forged among the actors and who is accountable to whom for 
what. More will be discussed on this in the successive sub-sections. 
2.2.3 Service provision framework and accountability 
Service provision encompasses the basic accountability framework following the core 
theme of the World Bank’s (2004a) service delivery model. This model has been found 
widely deliberated in the literature of (public) service delivery (Brown & Potoski 2004, 
Midgely 2008, and Commins 2007). The framework presents the service delivery 
transaction relationship between/among the sectoral actors; the state, providers and 
citizens/clients by applying the accountability features as shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Accountability Relationship Framework for service delivery 
 
Source: Adapted from WB (2004a) 
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The simple assumption made here is that the government purchases the services from 
providers who in turn deliver those purchased services to citizens as clients. If the 
delivered services are not according to the requirements (or as of the standards and 
specifications) of the clients, then the clients, being citizens, make their voice heard by the 
state to ensure that the services be delivered as demanded. This is referred to as the long 
route of accountability (WB 2004a). 
 
Here the service delivery relationships between ‘policy makers’ (as agents) and ‘citizens’ 
(as principals) are termed ‘voice’, implying a political mechanism to influence political 
outcomes through election, advocacy, campaigning and other formal or informal means 
(WB 2004a). The accountability relationship features (WB 2004a) such as the delegation 
of responsibility to perform tasks, and the approval of public funds by citizens (through 
parliament) to policymakers, are about pursuing collective objectives and the mobilizing of 
public funds to meet those objectives for the welfare of citizens. Citizens may be assumed 
to have a right to know how funds are being spent on their behalf. Policymakers may be 
held to account by citizens for their performance, and their effectiveness in pursuing 
collective goals, and may be sanctioned accordingly through voting or public criticism. 
This may be termed ‘political accountability’ in that it involves the political rights of 
citizens, and answerability to the public by the government. 
 
Through bureaucratic decisions these policies are translated into short-term, mid-term and 
long-term plans and programmes for implementation. The government, with or through 
service providers (who may be private, public or social organizations), implements those 
programmes in the form of public services for people. The World Bank (2004a) has used 
the term ‘compact’ for the service delivery relationship between ‘policymakers’ and 
‘service providers’. It says that a compact is not always like a contract that is specific and 
legally enforceable, rather it is a broad agreement for a long-term relationship. Here the 
features of the accountability relational framework are clear; the policymakers delegate 
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powers and responsibility, along with resources, to the service providers for collective 
objectives and outcomes. Accordingly, policymakers expect performance from service 
providers and they verify such performance through information (reporting, monitoring, 
assessment, evaluation) submitted by the providers, and accordingly devise or act on 
whether to offer sanctions or rewards for performance. The World Bank assumes the 
service providers come from two streams; one from within the government system such 
as front line staff and agencies and others from the third sector or private entities. 
 
One of the main issues in service delivery is how to motivate government-owned or 
parastatal bodies and their front line staff either through incentive schemes or by 
management improvement practices which aim to maintain the ‘intra-organizational 
(internal) accountability’. However, motivating external third parties through outsourcing, 
partnership, and collaboration is equally complex, due to their different organizational and 
institutional characteristics. Depending on the nature of the service provision relationship, 
it may attract ‘inter organizational accountability’27 because two or more organizations 
(public sector and private or third sector) enter into a service delivery relationship where 
the organizations involved bear ultimate responsibility for fulfilment of the tasks 
concerned, one as a principal and the other as an agent. 
 
The short route of accountability (WB, 2004a) is where the service provider is directly 
linked to people as clients (or users or consumers) through a market mechanism, and 
where the market decides quantity, quality, duration and price of services. This third 
transaction relationship, which the World Bank has termed, is ‘client power’. Here the 
citizens as clients enter into a direct relationship with service providers, by expressing 
their choice for services, assuming that the market offers various choices in a competitive 
                                                
27  One can assume that ‘intra-organization’ could be considered bureaucratic accountability in public 
organizations and management accountability in private organizations. 
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manner. Since market forces determine this relationship, the accountability relationship 
can be termed as ‘market or consumer accountability’. 
 
Service delivery in both situations, short or long routes, fails when any of these 
relationships break down. This could be either due to government failure or market failure, 
or both. How to overcome such failures has been well elaborated by the World Bank 
(2004a, pp. 46 - 63).  
 
However, Samji (2008) argues that service delivery failure also occurs due to the poor 
information network to strengthen the accountability relationship. According to her, 
citizens and clients must be empowered with information about their rights by increasing 
their voice to policy makers, and expressing their choices on services to service providers. 
In this way service providers become more responsive. It is easier to address the needs 
of clients when they are well informed about the clients’ requirements, and accordingly 
they devise an effective management structure to respond to the clients’ demands, and 
inform the policymakers about their performance. At the same time, policymakers need 
information to make an informed decision on how service delivery can be made, with a 
better incentive structure to have a compact relationship with service providers. What 
implications could be due to asymmetric information that contributes to the failure of 
service provision can be clearly understood from her (Samji’s) deliberation. 
 
The accountability relationship is complicated not only by the different sectoral 
characteristics of services (McLoughlin and Batley, 2012a) and by the socioeconomic 
context, but also by the fact that actors may alternate between, or fulfil simultaneously, the 
roles of service provider, purchaser and consumer. 
 
For example, in the case of Nepal, the government can be either a service provider or a 
service purchaser for the public; and the community can either be a provider, a purchaser 
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or a user itself. In the drinking water sector, the government used to be a service provider. 
It delivered services either directly or through its parastatal body (e.g. Nepal Water Supply 
Corporation) in Nepal. Now the role of the government is being shifted towards policy 
making and overseeing while the government-established Water Corporation and its 
branch officers are converted into two separate entities - independent Boards as asset 
owners and private companies like KUKL28 as service providers in the urban areas. In 
rural areas, water users’ committees manage the system, assuming both roles – providers 
and users.  
 
The complexity of the accountability issue that arises due to the actors’ roles and their 
relationship to service provision may be clarified by applying agency theory (the Principal 
– Agent model) in the inter-organizational context.  
 
As we see, these three relationship modes in the service delivery loop, ‘voice’, ‘compact’ 
and ‘service’, have been ascribed to ‘political’, ‘organizational’ and ‘market’ types of 
accountability in service provision respectively. This research will take an organizational 
relational approach but within the broader political-economy environment in service 
delivery. 
2.2.4 Service transaction relationship and accountability 
The service provision relationship mode (Mcloughlin and Batley 2012b)29 in public service 
is deliberated here, because it helps to understand what kind of service delivery 
transactions are being employed in. This part deals with the subject from two 
perspectives, the ‘nature of the relationship’ and the ‘means for the relationship’, which 
                                                
28  Kathmandu Upatyaka Khanepani Limited (KUKL) (in English – Kathmandu Valley Drinking Water Limited) 
was the first institutional reform initiated in Nepal to manage the drinking water supply and wastewater 
system of Kathmandu valley’s three major cities in 2005. Efforts are being made to replicate this reform in 
other cities of Nepal. For more detail on KUKL refer http://www.kathmanduwater.org/home/index.php 
29  Mcloughlin and Batley have suggested seven modes of service provision, in regard to non-state actors in a 
broad sense, but mostly with regard to NGOs. These are: contracting out, performance based financing, 
decentralized state provision, non-state provision, co-production, state regulation and stewardship, and 
subsidy through vouchers. 
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refers to the means (or tools) used by the actors involved in service provision. Transaction 
cost theory (Cheung 1987, Commons 2013, Douma and Schreuder 2012, Klaes 2008, 
Niehans 1987, Williamson 1981) provides a basis for the decision-making process on 
whether to source the function internally or externally through a market transaction. 
However, this market regulated decision-making behaviour (transaction cost) approach 
adopts a narrow focus and may ignore externalities and social costs (Elsner et. al. 2006, 
Ramazzotti et al. 2012, Berger 2012, Besley and Ghatak, 2007).  
 
The available literature opens up a discussion regarding the possibilities for combining all 
types of relationships that can be forged between the organizations involved in public 
service provision, but indicates that some relationships tend to entail particular means as 
preferred or conditioned by the market and institutional forms. Figure 4 depicts 
organizations, their relationships and means of service provision and delivery.  
Figure 4: Sector Organizations, Relationships and Means 
 
Source: Framed by the researcher based on available literature on public service provision. 
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The solid line denotes the strong links as what type of service delivery relationships are 
used by the organizations and the means applied to forge such relationships, and the 
dotted line represents the weak or less intensified relationships and means. 
 
Public organizations can make use of all three types of relationships: ‘contracting out’ 
(McCourt 2001, Batley and Larbi 2004, Mingus 2007), ‘collaboration’ (Geddes 2012, 
Osborne SP 2010a, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) and ‘co-production’ (Cahn 2008, 
Stephens et al. 2008), and so they can use all three types of means: ‘legal safeguard’, 
‘MoU/agreement’ and ‘mutually consented understanding’. For instance, private 
organizations can have ‘contracting out’ type relationships that are strongly regulated by 
the ‘legal safeguard’ but can also enter into the ‘collaborative’ and ‘co-production’ 
relationships with public and social organizations, which are guided by the 
‘MoU/agreement’ and ‘mutual understanding’, but can also draw up legal provisions. 
Social organizations prefer to have ‘collaborative’ and ‘co-production’ type relationships 
with public and social organizations, but they also accept a contractual arrangement, 
mainly with the public organizations.  
 
Therefore, it is imperative to discuss the means which enable the compact relationship for 
service provision agreed between the public and non-public organizations. This is 
because each means reflects the particular service transaction characteristics in the given 
service context. 
2.2.4.1 Contracting 
Contracting out or outsourcing is central to the discourse of NPM, a standard practice in 
private business and widely applied in public service, especially since the 1980s. 
Contracting out can be competitive or single source or in other forms depending on local 
legislation and regulatory frameworks.  
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Through these regulatory frameworks, states or local governments purchase services for 
their citizens. Most of the possible forms of private sector participation, such as service 
contracts, management contracts, BOT, BOOT, leases and concessions (Batley and Larbi 
2004) in public service provision are variations on the contracting approach, the variations 
reflecting differences in the inherent nature of responsibility, risk taking behaviour, reward 
systems, the scale, volume and cost of services. 
 
Although some might consider the involvement of social organizations, particularly NGOs, 
in external contract arrangements as compromising their ethos (Lorgen 2002, p. 303), 
such contracting relationships in the competitive service market have often been essential 
for their survival. 
 
In principle, this form of service transaction warrants the inclusion of formal legal terms in 
the contents of the contractual relationship to secure public services. The poor 
organizational capacity of government agencies in developing countries to structure, 
implement, monitor, and enforce contracts is often a weakness in this form of transaction 
(Batley 2011, Kettle 2010). The decision to go for contracting-out on competitive bidding 
depends to some extent on the maturity of the service providers’ market. It can be done 
even in a monopolistic market, if the service purchaser or regulator (or state) can enter 
into formal contracts with the service providers i.e. producers or suppliers.  
 
In developing countries, many INGOs or donors have used a Business Development 
Service (BDS) intervention approach to develop such service provider markets by 
providing some incentives (higher cost for their services and spending money on capacity 
building e.g. sending abroad for training and exposure etc.), after which those service 
providers enter the development market through competition when the market is relatively 
mature enough to absorb them. Alternatively, donors and INGOs may induct some of 
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them as service providers through non-competitive arrangement (agreement, 
memorandum of understanding or just on verbal understanding, negotiation). Hence this 
type of service transaction relationship appears to be more of a quasi-formal relationship 
with less legal complication or even without any at all. Some have argued that this type of 
relationship is guided by a ‘transformational approach’ (Jha et al. 2009) where the 
relationship is guided by social transformation objectives rather than economic ones, and 
characterize the financial transaction as a “business contract”. 
 
Since contracting out involves binding legal provisions, it safeguards the resources and 
results, if the contract document is carefully structured. It also offers better governance 
features because the contract document can become a reliable tool for transparency, 
monitoring and evaluation of both the performance and outcome of the works that are 
contracted out. It clearly establishes the principal-agent relationship for accountability. 
Being cemented, the relationship becomes explicitly expressed in written form, as the 
contents of the contract; it is then easy for an organization to conduct public and social 
audits for accountability purposes. However, a contractual relationship is less 
participative. In fact, the principal determines everything which the agents will perform as 
per their contractual obligations. The principal can even ask the agents to conduct many 
important tasks, like a public audit and the monitoring of the performance of service 
providers, tasks which are appropriate to, and supposed to be conducted by, the principal 
itself.  
2.2.4.2 Collaboration 
Keast and Mandell (2013) have clearly differentiated between cooperation, coordination 
and collaboration. Geddes (2012) has described typologies of collaborative public 
management, which share some similar of the collaborative features identified by Keast 
and Mandell, such as collective pool resources, trustful relationship, network sharing, risk 
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taking. But they are more or less silent on whether such a relationship attracts formal legal 
safeguards or not in service transaction. However, Romzek (2014, p. 312) interprets this 
relationship from a broader perspective. According to her, this could be a contractual 
arrangement formally organized in networks according to the memorandum of 
understanding (MoU), and one that is loosely structured, depending on the 
interdependence of service providers. The literature on collaboration (Osborne SP 2010, 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, and Bills 2010a) does not explain it more distinctly in formal 
legal terms, although cooperation and coordination are also implied even in a loose form 
of legal application. As a general rule, it is found that social organizations get involved 
with the government in service provision agreements by means of a less formal 
relationship in terms of their legal interpretation and their compliance. The terms 
‘cooperation’ and ‘coordination’ (Najam 2000) imply shared strategic aims rather than a 
legal obligation (although these are not mutually exclusive).   
 
Co-operation between the UK government (including local government) and third sector 
organizations seems typically to involve both collaborative understanding and a firm 
contract, which may or may not be competitive (Smith and Smyth 2010, p. 275). Rigg and 
O’Mahony (2013) cite O’Leary and Bingham (2007) on collaborative public management 
as: 
 “… a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multi-
organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily 
solved by single organizations. Collectively means to co-labour, to co-operate 
to achieve common goals, working across boundaries in multi-sector 
relationships. Cooperation is based on the value of reciprocity.” 
Therefore it may be assumed that these forms of relationships, which are less legalistic, 
less competitive, and less formal but based on mutual trust and reciprocity, will exhibit 
collaborative features (although in various degrees). This recalls social capital theory 
(trust, reciprocity) but at the same time it draws on institutional theory (values, rules, 
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norms, purpose) (Osborne 2010, Scott 2004, and Kraft 2007) and policy network features 
(multi sectoral and stakeholder analysis, and support) (Geddes 2012). Interestingly, 
O’Leary and Bingham (2007) elaborate a multi-sector dimension of collaboration whereby 
organizations with different objectives and interests may come together for a common 
goal.  
 
Although Romzek (2014) admits the broader application of the means of relationship 
includes both the formal contractual and the loosely structured MoU type, increasingly the 
means to formalize this (collaborative) relationship has been found through a simple 
‘memorandum of understanding’, and/or documented ‘agreement’. This is one in which 
the obligations of the parties involved are mentioned, but without subjecting them to 
prevailing contractual regulations (national or international), and with no more formalities 
than a simple understanding. The relevant governance literature (Billis 2010a, Osborne 
S.P. 2010a, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, and O’Toole and Meier 2011) regarding public 
service uses the words like ‘network’ and ‘collaboration’ interchangeably. However, the 
word ‘network’ is more susceptible to use in the policy formulation context, and 
‘collaboration’ in the context of policy implementation. 
 
From the governance perspective, the collaborative relationship is likely to be open and 
participatory in nature, particularly in resource sharing and in pursuing a collective 
objective.  But it may often suffer from mistrust and lack of strategic operational clarity. 
Since the relationship is built on subjective understanding and trust, which is normally 
formalized with a memorandum of understanding (MoU), or a non-legal binding 
agreement, there is a danger it may end up with legal disputes over implementation if it is 
not properly settled. Collaboration encourages network governance in service provision, 
and accordingly the joint responsibility of all actors. But in a collaborative relationship, is 
there any scope for holding joint accountability, or can the accountability be shared 
among the actors involved? Or does collaboration also entail a formal contractual 
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relationship? This may ask for more enquiries in the inter-organizational relationships of 
the actors in service delivery. 
2.2.4.3 Co-production 
Semantic blurring can enable a term to have simultaneously quite different connotations, 
so that clarification is essential whenever the term is applied in a given context, e.g. co-
production. Co-production is associated with the third sector (Presoff 2011), user 
communities (Bovaird and Loeffler 2011), Co-governance (Ackerman 2011), and with Co-
management (Brown et al. 2011). Before defining co-production from a management and 
economics perspective, it is better first to know what production is. Production is the act of 
creating outputs, a good or service that has value and contributes to the utility of 
individuals (Kotler et al. 2006).  
 
Following this definition (Kotler et al.), a ‘co-production’ is the joint act of processing, 
creating, or transforming tangible and intangible inputs into goods or services that have 
utility or exchange values. Put simply, joint resource inputs produce joint outputs. These 
resources can be of money, time, human, materials, land, ideas, management, legal 
service, information and IT, etc. How these input elements are being shared by the parties 
involved define the co-production relationship with its associated risks. The co-production 
literature (Durose et al. 2013) suggests that this relationship is sought due to resource 
constraint on the part of the public treasury, the perceived limitation of traditional service 
models, and changes in public expectations and in technological innovation. For these 
reasons, states are more inclined to adopt the co-production 30  approach in service 
delivery (INLOGOV 2012, Stephens et al. 2008).  
 
                                                
30  The co-production of public services has been defined in various ways - e.g. "Co-production means 
delivering public services in an equal and reciprocal relationship between professionals, people using 
services, their families and their neighbors" (New Economics Foundation) or "the public sector and citizens 
making better use of each other's assets and resources to achieve better outcomes and improved 
efficiency" (Governance International)-Wikipedia. 
 
 
73 
However, the meaning of ‘co-production’ in service provision has another side too, which 
NEF (2008) refers to as the ‘core economy’, also known as the “non-market economy”. 
According to NEF, the “family, neighbourhood, community are the Core Economy”. The 
argument forwarded for this type of co-production for service delivery is that market and 
centralized bureaucracies are unable to deliver public services, because market logic 
applies only to narrow deliverables and misses out a crucial dimension of public services 
(NEF 2008, p. 8). Hence the consumer model, that is to say the traditional unidirectional 
doctor-patient relationship, now requires equal reciprocity. That is to say, how much a 
patient needs a doctor, a doctor also needs a patient equally for a successful service 
delivery. Without the patient’s support the doctor cannot deliver a service (Stephens et al. 
2008). 
 
As understood by NEF (2008, p. 1), co-production thus refers to the partnership between 
the monetary economy (public, private, non-profit sectors) and the core economy (home, 
family, neighbourhood, community, civil society), and this partnership tends to have less 
formality or legalism and more mutual understanding and commitment to a common 
cause and purposes. Like in a collaborative approach, the root of this co-production 
relationship is also heavily explored in studies of the social capital domain (Bourdieu 
1986, Coleman 1990, Putnam 1995, Carney 1998, Flora 1998, Ostrom 1998, Scoones 
1998, Uphoff 2000, Stephens et al. 2008, and Boyle and Harris 2009) where mutual trust, 
reciprocity and social value guide the relationship.  
 
This type of relationship, which is also based upon mutual understanding, is less clear 
whether it involves a contractual arrangement or not. It is participatory by nature where 
two or more partners are involved in service provision based on mutual benefits and 
reciprocity. However, it is difficult to express these in legal terminology, unless the 
partners involved develop mutually agreed self-regulatory norms and a code of practice. 
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Transparency in this relationship can be ensured through mutual understanding, but any 
wrongdoing cannot be remedied through legal measures. 
2.3 Organizations and service delivery 
Under this section, the service delivery is discussed from the organizational forms, their 
structure, strategy, relationship, and attributes to public service provision. It also observes 
critically the relationships forged by the sectoral organizations in service delivery from the 
accountability, inter and intra-organizational perspectives.  
2.3.1 Strategy, structure and relationship 
This sub-section examines the service provision of three sectors, public, private and 
social, from the perspective of organization, management, and their relationship in public 
service provision. All of them may work separately or jointly (two or three together) in the 
financing, production and distribution of public services, so there exists the possibility of 
all types of combinations in the supply chain of service delivery.  
 
The public sector consists of all types of government structures, e.g. departments, 
agencies, front line offices and staff, public enterprises and quasi non-governmental 
organizations (QUANGOs) and devolved mechanisms at the different levels of local 
government. The private sector is straightforward. Its entities are legally registered and it 
operates for profits in the market, and consists of both firms and individuals. The third 
sector includes I/NGOs and volunteer, civil society and community organizations, all 
basically guided by social values. 
 
The organization of these three sectors can be measured against three major 
organizational elements. Though this view is therefore predominantly taken from the 
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public order perspective, it can also illuminate how they perform in service delivery, since 
the public service market falls under the realm of public governance. These elements are: 
• Strategy 
• Structure 
• Relationships 
 
The basic logic used here is that the organizational strategy and structure (internal 
system) contribute to define the service delivery relationship of the actors (with the 
external environment) as shown in Figure 5.  
Figure 5: Structure, Strategy and Relation 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Richard Batley 2011, Adil Najam 2000, and H. Mintzberg 1990… 
 
Many scholars believe that the organizational structure follows the strategy. Chandler 
(1962) states that, “unless structure follows strategy, inefficiency results”; Mintzberg 
(1990) emphasised that “… structure follows strategy as the left foot follows the right”, and 
Johnson et al. (1990, p. 437) argue that “organizing for success is about an organization 
configuration” which is built on three related strands ‘structures’, ‘processes’ and 
‘relationships’.  
Structure 
Strategy 
Relationship 
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A similar view is held by Najam (2000) but from a different angle. Unlike structure and 
strategy, he defines the relationship between NGOs and government in terms of ‘strategy’ 
and ‘goals’, that is, between the means and the ends. 
 
Batley (2011, p. 307), while observing NGOs’ relationship with the government, is of the 
opinion that “by combining the analyses of structure and strategy, we are better able to 
explain the effect of relationships”. 
 
Miles et al. (1978) argue that to be successful, the strategy should adjust the relationship 
between the organization and the environment, taking international structures into 
account.  Although these are old notions, they are nevertheless derived from the market 
perspective. They (Miles et al.) further argue that the successful organization must adapt 
itself to the environment by maintaining an effective alignment between structure and 
strategies. For this, they (Miles et al. 1978) have proposed a strategic typology for 
organizations that classifies the organizations as defenders (low cost defenders and 
differentiated defenders) (Olson et al. 2005), analysers, prospectors, and reactors. They 
argue that the defender, prospector and analyser types of organization are proactive 
towards their environments, although responding in different ways. 
 
From the public sector perspective, Andrews et al. (2009) argue that the prospecting type 
of organizations tend to be associated with decentralization, the defending type 
organisations with centralization, and the reacting organizations will have neither pattern 
of power distribution. According to them (Andreas et al.), organizations having both 
‘prospecting’ and ‘defending’ features have appropriate processes, which is lacking in the 
‘reactive’ type of organization, for pursuing either strategy coherently. 
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In the public service context, the organization’s relationship with the environment, and its 
organizational adaptation are the most interesting enquiries that concern an inter-
organization relational system in terms of service provision (Cropper et al. 2010). Romzek 
and LeRoux (2012) see inter-organization relations from a network perspective, when 
they argue that the organizational actors face the challenge of balancing their separate 
missions and their autonomy, strategic priorities, and service delivery protocols. 
2.3.2 Public organizations 
Farnham and Horton (1996, p. 26) say, “Public Organizations are created by government 
for a primarily political purpose”. Therefore, following the constitutional premise upon 
which a government’s duties are based, the public organization derives its legitimacy from 
the people. The government’s strategic orientation, choices, or decisions are ascribed to 
the public service ethos (Gaster and Squires 2003, Horton 2008, Rayner et al. 2011) or 
“public-ness” (Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994) (Antonsen and Beck, 2002), although 
such a strategy is also shaped by the political mandate of the ruling party (in democratic 
countries). In all, in some, or in a combination of these structural arrangements, the 
government achieves service provision either directly through self-production, or via the 
private and social sectors (Romzek 2004).  
 
Structurally, the public organizations have comparatively permanent structures with 
consistent and coherent goals, policies, and strategies (Andrews et al. 2009), a budget 
(Nartisa et al. 2012), open policies (Ring and Perry 1985, p. 279) and secured resource 
commitment. In contrast to this, Ring and Perry (1985, p. 277) argue that public sector 
organizations are ambiguous about their policy and strategy due to multiple and often 
competing objectives (structurally differentiated, e.g. central, federal, local) compared to 
private sector organizations that operate within the framework of a limited number of 
relatively stable goals and thus have relatively better strategic focus. The strategic 
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decision-making of public organizations is constrained by structural factors such as civil 
service reform, change in bureaucracy, wide stakeholder consultation and the formation of 
coalition in policy-making (Ring and Perry, 1985). Rainey et al. (1976) further substantiate 
the existence of these constraints by arguing that public organizations suffer from the 
environmental constraints of the market (such as market limited exposure, legal and 
formal constraints, political influence). They also labour under environmental transaction 
constraints (such as coerciveness, public scrutiny (oversight and accountability); and 
under internal structure and process constraints (like objective and evaluation criteria, 
goal conflict, multiple and diverse objectives, hierarchical structure, incentives).  
 
Boyne and Walker (2004, p. 231) argue that public organizations are adaptive, and 
change their structure as per the strategic contents (strategic stance, i.e. prospector, 
defender, or reactor; and strategic actions, i.e. markets, services, revenues, external 
relationships, and international characteristics) 31  to suit the pattern of public service 
provision to be chosen for implementation. This choice will be from several organizational 
alternatives, e.g. PPP (Besley and Ghatak 2007, p. 128).  
2.3.3 Private organizations 
The functioning of private organizations is straightforward. The market shapes the 
structure and strategy of private organizations. According to Miles et al. (1978, p. 550): 
“… there are essentially three strategic types of organizations: Defenders, 
Analysers, and Prospectors; each has its own strategy for relating to its 
chosen market(s), and each has a particular configuration of technology, 
structure, and process that is consisted with its market strategy”.  
                                                
31  According to Boyne, George A. and Walker, Richard M. (2004) “Strategic Stance” denotes the extent to 
which an organization is a prospector, defender, or reactor; and “Strategic Actions” denote the relative 
emphasis placed by the organization on changes in markets, services, revenues, external relationships, 
and international characteristics. 
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This has propelled the notion that there is a whole range of various types of private 
organizations, but with a common purpose (i.e. to serve clients to make a profit) in the 
markets. That fits in with the idea that it is possible, by adjusting their organizational form 
to align with an appropriate market strategy, these organizations can provide all kinds of 
services (Farnham and Horton 1996, p. 28).  
 
This reminds us of Adam Smith’s dictum of two centuries ago (1776) that “it is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own self-interest”. The principle of self-interest is the fundamental 
driving force of private sector organizations, in which individuals (and organizations) 
maximize their self-interest by serving their customers. This metaphor is similar to the 
“public choice theory” (Niskanen 1994) of the public sector, where a bureaucracy 
maximises its own self-interest in public expenditure growth. Maximising self-interest can 
therefore be regarded as benevolent in the economic sphere, while it can be considered 
undesirable in the personal one (bureaucracy). 
 
In the service market, private organizations normally enter into the service transaction 
relationship with public organizations in a formal contractual way, mostly through PPP or 
PSP frames. Such relationships for private organizations are guided by profit 
maximization efforts. All this gives a different organizational perspective of private 
organizations towards public service from the incentive point of view. Their profit motive 
interest clashes with the public value motive of public organizations. How private 
organizations act in the public service market depends on how successful public 
organizations are in devising an incentive structure, which will attract the private sector 
without compromising the quality, quantity, price and delivery time of services.  
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2.3.4 Social organizations 
Non-profit is the main characteristic of social organizations, which distinguishes them from 
private organizations. These voluntary, non-profit organizations have emerged to fill the 
service provision gaps which have arisen due to the failure of both government and 
market (Besley and Ghatak 2007, p128). It is difficult to gauge all social organizations on 
this scale as many organizations raise their income or build their capital through markets.  
 
Structurally, social organizations vary widely, both sectorally (health, education, water, 
governance, civil right, humanitarian aid, etc.), geographically (local - CBOs, national - 
NGOs32, global-INGOs), legally (association, trust, charity33, society, user committee, 
consumer association, cooperative, microfinance, etc.) and in terms of size (from those 
with only a few staff to global networks). The amount of variety differs greatly from country 
to country (Shigetomi 2002).  
 
Batley (2011, p. 318) argues that the resource dependence of social organizations, 
particularly the intermediary-type NGOs makes them structurally vulnerable in terms of 
their ability to sustain themselves in development markets. For their survival, they must be 
proactive and must exercise their strategic choice to respond to the external environment. 
According to him (Batley 2011), in order to maintain their relationship with the public and 
other organizations, they must adjust and readjust their strategy, avoiding confrontation 
and adopting a collaborative approach. This is based on a repeated pattern of informal 
relationships built on mutual trust. Isett and Provan (2005, p. 163) have termed this 
process “familiarity breeds”. However, Isett and Provan argue that this informal trustful 
relationship could exist side by side with a formal contractual relationship with the public 
organizations, which is unlikely in the case of the private sector. 
 
                                                
32  On the characteristics of NGOs, www.usip.org, accessed on 12 January 2014. 
33  Defining charity from the UK perspective, http://www.charitychoice.co.uk/terms-and-conditions, accessed 
on 15 January 2014. 
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The relationships of social organizations with public organizations are different because 
they are not formed in market settings (Isett and Provan 2005). Instead, they prefer to 
have a consensual approach rather than hierarchical relations established through the 
contractual arrangement (Rees, Mullins and Bovaird 2012). Witesman and Fernandez 
(2013, p. 708) argue that social organizations also enter into contractual relationships but 
the “non-profit organizations appear to enjoy a variety of trust-related advantages over 
their for-profit rivals in the contracting process”. However, owing to the structural 
variations of organization in the non-profit sector, “such relationships are very vague and 
complex, involving many players such as donors and, in some instances, beneficiaries” 
(Besley and Ghatak, 2007). Moreover, given the variation in the type of relationship built, 
such as resource dependency, familiarity breeding or traded trusts, it would be interesting 
to understand the kind of accountability each type fosters in service delivery relationships 
between social organizations and public organizations in the light of this. 
 
In the case of failure or non-alignment of the organization (structure) in its transactions 
with the environment (external relations) (Rainey et al. 1976), what would be the 
distinctive outcomes for public, private, or social organizations? Presumably, the first 
(public) would survive and continue functioning despite poor performance (Farnham and 
Horton 1996, p. 33), the second (private) perhaps become extinct completely from the 
market, while the third (social) would survive and even thrive if its resource dependency is 
of a self-reliant type.  
2.4 Organizational attributes and service delivery 
In a democratic state the people give a mandate to the government to govern them, and, 
by the same token, the government is accountable to the citizens for its work in their 
name. This simple principle leads to complex institutional patterns in practice, which in 
turn have been subject of complex theoretical consideration.   
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Following their respective epistemological roots; three meta-theoretical domains, the 
politico-bureaucratic, and those of the market and of social capital may be seen as 
influencing public service provision at the institutional (macro), organizational (meso) and 
their relationship (micro) level.  
 
In public service provision, the government interacts with two other sectors, social and 
private. This interaction induces theoretical hybridity such as political economy, social and 
the public value ethos. These theories underpin service provision relationships at the 
micro-level, and explain how organizations involved in service delivery can come together 
to work even within an adversarial institutional environment and under organizational 
conditions. 
 
The advent of NPM in the 1980s, which overshadowed PA because of the latter’s inherent 
constraints in addressing the contemporary challenges facing government, is now itself 
challenged by NPG. This is on the ground of its (NPM) disconnection from the network 
approach to public service delivery. Public service paradigms are shaped by external 
factors, as discussed earlier, and this could be observed during the economic and fiscal 
crises of the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Public service delivery has become an issue in which organizations from different sectors 
with different structures and philosophies must work together. This results in value 
contradictions in their relationships. These contradictions can be easily seen by examining 
the organizational attributes of each paradigm in terms of three elements, ‘organizational 
form’, ‘relationship’ and ‘accountability mode’ as shown in Table 4. 
 
However, many scholars (Dean 1996, Dargie 1999, Minogue 2001; Osborne, S.P. 2010; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011) believe that because of this contradiction, public service 
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provision forges a complementary relationship wherein organizations with diverse 
structures converge their strategic interests to achieve their respective objectives. 
However, although this complementarity may have brought about efficiency improvements 
in public service provision, it is still lacking in terms of the link between services and 
policymaking.  
Table 4: Paradigm and organizational attributes 
Paradigm Organization
al form 
Relationship Accountabilit
y mode 
Theoretical 
domain 
Value 
emphasis 
Public 
Administration 
Bureau, 
structure 
vertical 
Hierarchy 
within 
Within closed, 
bureaucracy 
to politicians 
Political 
Science and 
Public policy*  
Public values* 
(New) Public 
Management 
Management, 
structure 
horizontal 
Formal 
contractual 
relationship 
Managerial 
accountability 
but 
disconnected 
from policy 
regime and 
service users 
Management*
, public and 
rational 
choice*, 
Political 
Economy 
Efficiency and 
competition* 
in public 
services 
(New) Public 
Governance 
Network 
(hybrid?) 
Collaborative, 
social 
relationship 
Open, mutual 
and shared 
but blurring, 
boundary 
crossing,  
Institutional 
and Network* 
Dispersed 
and 
contested* 
(Public 
values, 
market and 
social values) 
* Osborne (2010) “Introduction” in Stephen P. Osborne (ed.) The New Public Governance? 
Emerging perspectives on the theory and practices of public governance, pp. 1-16, Routledge. 
 
Osborne et al. (2012) argue that the current public management theory is not fit for 
purpose because, according to them (Osborne et al. 2012), it focuses on intra-
organizational processes which are derived from the manufacturing sector, and 
management theory that ignores public services as ‘service’, while in reality it is an inter-
organizational phenomenon.   
 
Public service provision is a transacted relationship between two or more organizations. 
NPM recognizes this relationship from the management and market point of view. NPG 
advocates this relationship in a broader sense that is from a meta- and pluralist approach 
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that emphasizes networks, and a collaborative, cooperative and relational mode of 
relationship. The limitations of the assumptions underlying NPM have received much 
attention in the past, but those of NPG less so. The following review of themes arising 
from this research explores the application of some of these key assumptions due to 
organizational attributes in practice.  
2.4.1 Governance and accountability 
Governance features certain elements, but those commonly used are transparency, 
accountability, participation, inclusiveness and the rule of law (UNDP 1997, WGI-WB34). 
Through these governance elements, the government regulates any organizations (self 
regulatory and/or legal system regulated, explicitly or implicitly), be they private, public or 
social.  
 
Governance features in public service delivery in two ways, internal (intra) and external 
(inter) forms. The intra-governance of public organizations (bureaucracy) is different from 
that of private (shareholder) and social (stakeholder) organizations. This has meant a 
different kind of accountability chain in each type of organization. That is, a bureaucracy is 
answerable to the politicians, and through them to the citizens; directors of a company are 
answerable to the board, shareholders and the customers; the board officials are 
answerable to members of associations and to their communities respectively. 
 
In public service delivery, this intra-organizational accountability of each sectoral 
organization complicates inter-organizational accountability. For instance, voluntary 
associational social organizations operate in a relationship-based governance structure 
(mutual and shared responsibility) and process (trust, reciprocity), whereas the public 
organizations operate in a rigidly defined structure (hierarchy) in accordance with legal 
                                                
34 Worldwide Governance Indicators – World Bank, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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due process. Private organizations adjust their structure and process according to the 
market within the broader economic and fiscal environment.  
 
Farneti et al. (2010) have proposed four types of governance models that public sector 
organizations may adopt each with associated risks. These models are: procedural 
governance, corporate governance, market governance and network governance. The 
associated risks are citizen sensitivity, market competition and switching cost. According 
to them, overall, procedural governance has low risk, followed by corporate governance 
with moderate risk, market governance with high risk, and network government bears very 
high risk. There could be many other risks such as financial, investment, operation, etc. 
that might affect this modelling. According to them (Farneti et al.) network governance 
would remain high in terms of governance risk because of the nature of relationship 
forged between the government and service providers. This indicates that public service 
provision through network is a highly risky endeavour.  
 
Moreover, the pluralistic (inclusive) characteristic of network-based governance in service 
provision, with its emphasis on mutual accountability, conflicts with the need for an 
accountability chain via a formal hierarchy of authority to report, support, sanction, confirm 
and enforce the relationship between two or more organizations. The concept of joint or 
shared accountability in public service delivery with heterogeneous organizations in the 
real world seems yet to be theorized, although this concept is well deliberated in the 
homogeneous social sector especially in the literature of self-help community 
organizations. Even in homogeneous organizations, on an equal footing, some form of 
power relation exists and this provides the framework for accountability. The question 
arises whether this power asymmetry, that provides the basis of accountability, needs to 
be formal or informal.  
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2.4.2 Structure, hierarchy and accountability 
In public service, the rules of engagement35 for service delivery are set by the public 
organization, which is enabled to do so because of its legitimacy, and then accepted by 
other organizations, and accordingly the inter-organizational relationship is established. 
This transaction will not take place unless there is a purchaser and a provider, or a buyer 
and a seller, or a consumer and a supplier relationship. However, the relationship is 
paradoxical in the service delivery loop because of the multiple roles that the actors 
assume in the society. The public can be citizens or clients; the government and 
community organizations can assume the roles of purchasers, buyers, suppliers or 
consumers/users; and the private sector appear as providers, sellers or suppliers. 
Government, being a public institution, takes the ultimate responsibility for the service 
transaction that takes place between the government and third parties, but this 
relationship needs to be regulated to safeguard the interest of the public, which is done 
through a hierarchical structured relationship often called a formal (or less formal) 
contractual transactional relationship. A well-balanced formal contractual arrangement 
addresses all the possible transactional risks, not only by taking care of the interests of 
public organizations, but of course of the private and social organizations too.  
 
The procurement environment (legal and policy) of a country decides whether the 
relationship should be very formal in legal terms, or less formal in relational terms, and 
accordingly decides the terms and conditions that define the nature of services to be 
delivered by the service provider in terms of quantity, quality, deliverables, schedule, cost, 
etc. In such a relationship, the service provider acts as an agent, while the government 
assumes the responsibility of being a principal. The services are transacted by a process, 
in which the agent performs and the principal pays as per agreed terms. The formalization 
of this relationship requires means of verification i.e. official (legal) documents processed 
                                                
35  The institutional environment or meta-legal framework sets the general rules of engagement in public 
service arrangements, but within this meta-frame, public organizations work out in detail what kind of 
service delivery relationship can be developed with the service providers. 
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with authorities’ endorsement. In addition to this, all these transactions should be 
conducted impartially (in open bidding for market competition) and in a transparent 
manner (at least an adequate number of the public should be aware of the transaction).  
 
What this means is that public service transaction still attracts traditional public 
administrative bureau characteristics (Weber), although managerialism has increased its 
efficiency, and made the service delivery system result-oriented, and the governance 
network has improved the policy dialogue among stakeholders by making the process 
more participative. Where public accountability is concerned, some basic Weberian 
characteristics in public service still seem intact. This is because as long as public service 
is concerned with public value, bureaucracy provides the hierarchy, structure, and 
relational contents of accountability for public endorsement. Hierarchy is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition of accountability, but should be complemented by public 
involvement, as Paul (1992, p.1048) has argued:  
“… public service accountability will be sustained only when the ‘hierarchical 
control’ (HC) over service providers is reinforced by the public’s willingness…”  
Hierarchy also generates a requirement for accountability, as an unaccountable hierarchy 
presents risks of its own. As Hughes (2003, p. 237) has said: 
“Some kind of accountability is needed whenever there are hierarchical 
relationships or a relationship between principals and agents…”  
However, these caveats regarding the risks or limitations of hierarchy do not mean that 
hierarchy is dispensable and that an adequate intensity of accountability could be 
maintained in the absence of hierarchy. Thus, while the network collaborative 
governance’s challenge to the bureaucratic structure is partly justified, from the public 
governance point of view, so would be a challenge to New Public Governance from a 
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more traditional public accountability point of view. This raises the issue of whether a 
more balanced perspective might be attainable. 
2.4.3 Bureaucracy, managerialism and network 
Examining the role of accountability in the three service provision paradigms (PA, NPM 
and NPG) reveals that bureaucracy lodges accountability with bureaucrats and politicians, 
and managerialism premises accountability between public organization and service 
provider, or government and market; and network governance advocates shared 
accountability among the organizations involved in service provision. These paradigms 
have presented merits and demerits over time, varying as the wider context has evolved. 
NPG seems to be a holistic and institutional approach but lacks a clear accountability 
mechanism as to how this could be established in an inclusive network system, because it 
is more to be voluntarily observed than enforced, and thus far no available literature 
distinctly explains this.  
 
It is difficult to establish reciprocity in accountability because accountability follows a linear 
route (Figure 6), so there will always be some person or body to whom it is ultimately due, 
whereas service delivery is cyclic (Figure 7) as the public demand services from the 
government, and the government in turn provides services through service providers (or 
by itself) to the public and this process continues in a cyclic order in public service 
provision.  
 
This shows that service provision responsibility can be assigned to different organizations 
under different forms of relationships (partnership, cooperation, collaboration, co-
production, and contractual modes) but accountability cannot be so assigned.  
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Figure 6: Linear accountability 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Cyclic service delivery 
 
 
 
Perhaps in modern society public services may contain the relevant ingredients of all 
these paradigms, and be presented as one whole package. Or, perhaps they just need to 
look at their provision from an integrated perspective. It may be argued that public service 
needs to be inclusive because of its very nature; it needs to be public not only at the 
organizational level between organizations, but at the policy formulation and 
implementation level too. There should be a collaborative approach to coordinate 
resources in order to maximize outputs, but at the same time, the service efficiency of the 
collaborative approach needs to be tested in the market to ensure public value. There is a 
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need for some sort of reporting and enforcement mechanism to regulate service 
transaction in the context of the divergent organizational interests of service providers (or 
partners) and public agencies, and this implies bureaucratic features such as formal 
structure and hierarchy for accountability. The study of public service may require a new 
school of thought that encompasses new ideas to generate a new paradigm, if not a new 
theory.  
 
Hence, on the theoretical landscape of public services, if public governance is to undergo 
a paradigm shift, then it must include some of those ingredients of PA and NPM that 
support the idea of accountability both within and outside of organizations. This is 
because accountability anchors public value in public services. It is the spinal cord of 
public governance and democracy, and moreover, “representative democracy still needs 
the bureaucratic ethos” (Gay 2000, p. 146). The question is how one can make it more 
participative and inclusive in the service delivery chain without triggering ‘tragedies of 
commons’ but generating more value for money, and benefits for citizens.  
2.4.4 Organization, accountability and relationship 
However, in searching for a more balanced position one may note that collaboration and 
contractualism are not necessarily opposites. Isett and Provan (2005, p. 163) even 
confirmed that the “two types of relationships (trust base and contract) can readily exist 
side by side”. Some scholars have begun to include NPM within a framework of 
governance by contractualism (Grundmann et al. 2015), thereby linking it with the network 
collaborative approach. This gives the impression that NPM can be extended to cover a 
broader scope of public service delivery approaches, even encompassing collaborative 
governance. However, the governance itself is very broad in meaning, and from the 
accountability perspective it could be counted as encompassing a whole spectrum of 
types of accountability from very formal to very informal. 
 
 
91 
 
The organizational relationship in service transaction is termed “messy”, “boundary 
spanning and spinning”, “blurring”, “conflicting”, “tensioning”, “contradictory”, and so on so 
forth by many scholars (Osborne, 2010, Billis 2010, O’Flynn and Wanna 2008, Mullins 
and Bovaird, 2012). This may prevent any straightforward approach, such as that of a 
smooth transition from NPM to NPG. Osborne, S.P. (2010, p. 413) argues that NPG will 
overcome the NPM issues by bridging the public policy with service delivery. According to 
him: 
“… public governance is indeed a significant paradigm for contemporary public 
services delivery, embracing policy-making and a range of inter-organizational 
and network-based modes for public services delivery”.  
However, this aspirational model is contestable on several issues, as Osborne, S.P. 
(2010) himself has argued the questions relating to the organizational architecture of the 
plural state: How can sustainable public service systems be established? What values will 
underpin public policy implementation and service delivery, and the skills required for 
relational performance, and what should be the nature of accountability in fragmented 
plural and pluralist systems?  
 
Some scholars (Billis 2010, O’Flynn and Wanna 2008, Mullins and Bovaird, 2012) support 
his (Osborne’s) argument, in particular for inter-organizational arrangement, by taking this 
from the third sector perspective within the broader framework of governance rather than 
the public sector perspective. Billis’ (2010) hybrid organizations have an organizational 
equilibrium in public service delivery, but it is poorly explained how this equilibrium will be 
achieved. The proposed concept is still weak in addressing the ownership and 
accountability issues (Billis 2010, p. 250) of inter-organizational relationship (Cropper et 
al. 2010) in service provision. Even Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), in advancing their 
concept of the Neo-Weberian state (NWS), cannot clearly explain how accountability in 
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the service delivery chain can be developed, despite their assessment of three models – 
NPM, NPG, and the proposed NWS. 
2.4.5 Organization: Agency and Social Capital Theory 
The tension between different approaches to public service delivery may be attributed to 
the opposing theoretical foundations on which they are based while applying in the 
organizational context. The principal-agent framework of agency theory (Miller 2005, 
Gailmard 2012, Baez 2011, Alchain and Demsets 1972, Eisenhardt 1988, 1989; Jensen 
and Meckling 1976, Bahli and Rivard 2003) fundamentally conflicts with the social capital 
theory (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1990, Putnam 1995, Carney 1998, Flora 1998, Ostrom 
1998, Scoones 1998 and Uphoff 2000, Stephens et al. 2008) in terms of their 
characteristic features. Trust and reciprocity, which are features of social capital theory, 
imply less structure and hierarchy, which in turn provides less scope for the accountability 
in public service provision required according to the principal-agency framework. As long 
as public service is an inter-organizational transaction phenomenon, Agency Theory 
continues to be an effective theoretical tool for transaction analysis.  
 
However, NPG, which is rooted in the social capital and institutional theories that 
advocate a pluralistic network approach underpins mutually shared accountability, seems 
to be difficult to establish in a public governance framework, because, unlike tasks and 
responsibilities, accountability cannot be shared with dilution. Some scholars (Romzek, 
B.S. 2014; Romzek, B.; LeRoux, K.; Johnston, J.; Kempf, R.J. and Piatak, J.S. 2013; 
Romzek and LeRoux 2012) advocate informal accountability in such relationships, which 
is difficult to achieve in public organizations because both their internal system 
(bureaucracy) and the external environment (constituency) of the public sector demand 
greater accountability.  
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The dialectical interaction of these two theories has influenced the public service delivery 
approaches from two different perspectives (hierarchy and network), and the application 
of the idea of accountability features brings the differences between these into sharp 
relief. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This literature review shows that the provision of public services is multidimensional and 
complex. It attracts various theoretical approaches like PA, NPM and NPG and their 
inherited theoretical characteristics for interpretation such as managerialism, 
contractualism, collaborative network under different institutional domains i.e. politico 
administrative science, market economy, social capital, and political economy; and 
organizational conditions.  
 
To understand further these theoretical approaches, the meaning of service delivery was 
explored from the sectoral inter-organizational perspective where the service delivery 
relationship and the accountability that constituted in such relationships were examined. 
The strategy and structure as organizational proponents to relationships were also 
explored. Finally, some critical understandings of the theories and their contradictory 
implications are discussed and left open for future discussion.  
 
NPM, despite its heavy dominance in public affairs over the last 30 years is often criticized 
for its limited scope in the public sector domain because of its strong market orientation in 
pursuing efficiency in public service delivery. NPM’s formal managerial accountability may 
appear to be inadequate to address the public and political accountability in public 
services. The application of NPM in community-oriented participation in public services 
appears unclear in the theoretical discourse regarding NPM. 
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The proposition of NPG as a more comprehensive paradigm of public services advocates 
greatly for the collaborative and network approach in service provision, although scholars 
are yet to confirm this approach as an effective one. The greatest challenge that comes to 
NPG is the danger of accountability deficiency where the collaboration, networking and 
relational approach structurally disconnect actors (public, private and social) in public 
service provision. 
 
Public service provision through the TS, which in fact may be of either collaborative or 
business-like (contractual) relation, seems to be the most difficult one from the actors’ 
point of view because of their (TSOs) wide range of institutional forms (purpose, roles, 
structure), and accordingly the nature of the relationships they maintain with the public 
organizations in service delivery is wide in variation. 
 
Scholars have interchangeably used the term TS with variations to suit and support their 
arguments in terms of organizational form, their origin, objective, mission, ethos, 
functionality, resource generation, and relational approach with the public sector. 
Application of the six attributes (Shigetomi 2002, pp. 6 - 7; Salamon and Anheier 1994) to 
define the third sector as (i) non-governmental, (ii) non-profit-making, (iii) voluntary, (iv) 
solid and continuing form, (v) altruistic, and (vi) philanthropic give solid traits of TSOs, but 
in practice TSOs demonstrate various ranges and levels of these traits inconsistently in 
different socio-political and economic contexts of the regions, nations and sectors. These 
variations evidence that TSOs remain quite blurred in those areas that basically pertain to 
their service, voluntarism spirit and staff deployment, their resource dependency on 
external source, and more of their roles in working relationship with the government 
agencies.  
 
In many ways, both NPG and TS theoretically share the same institutional values (social 
capital) like ‘trust’ and ‘reciprocity’ that inspire their relationship in service provision. 
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Therefore it is difficult to anchor clear-cut formal accountability in NPG and TS for service 
provision. Moreover, these characteristics of the TS could cause fuzzy accountability in 
public service provision which itself remains within the purview of their legitimacy, as how 
they derive their legitimacy as organizations is challenged (Niggli and Rothenbuhler 
2003). 
 
This relationship-oriented accountability (Osborne SP 2010, Pollitt and Bauckaert 2011, 
Bills 2010a, Romzek 2004, NEF 2008, Geddes 2012) can be fragile if trust becomes 
eroded. This can easily happen if the organizational value systems of the partners are not 
well aligned. 
 
On the other hand, the scope of the collaborative approach in service delivery has been 
found widely interpreted as inclusive of contractualism, partnership (Montouri and Conti 
1995, Bovaird (2004 p.210-11, Huxham and Macdonald 19920), cooperation (McQuaid 
2010) and coordination, co-production (NEF 2008), and of course collaboration itself 
(Keast and Mandell 2013).  
 
To sum up, public service provision is a transacted relationship between two or more 
organizations. Each of these relationships (formal hierarchical, contractual and 
collaborative) are derived from their own theoretical domains (political science and public 
policy, public and rational choice and political economy, and institutional and network), 
paradigms (PA, NPM and NPG), organizational forms (bureaucracy, management and 
network), accountability modes (closed bureaucratic, managerial and open shared), and 
value emphasis (public values, efficiency and economy, and contested value).  
 
NPM emphasises this service delivery relationship from the management and market 
point of view while NPG advocates this relationship in a broader sense, from a meta- and 
pluralist approach that emphasizes networks, and a collaborative and cooperative mode 
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of relationship. However, these theory-driven approaches are contested in the arena of 
public services. Perhaps this contradiction; due to the organizational “fluidity”, 
“complexity”, and “blurring” boundary and relational “messiness” (Dean 1996, p. 233); the 
subject “public service delivery” have become the attraction of both scholars and 
practitioners as how to secure better public values in public service delivery, and also to 
why the subject that underpins all forms of capital (social, political and economic) 
mobilization for development and nation building process has become so alluring.  
 
This literature review has set out an adequate theoretical background and understanding 
of the public service delivery. The three major elements - organizational forms (public, 
private, social), relationships (contractual, collaborative), and accountability mode 
(political, market; and inter- and intra-organization) in service transaction are used to 
define the accountability features that characterise the public service delivery transaction 
and the relationship behaviour of the sectoral organizations (refer Research Questions of 
this research). In this research, these accountability feastures are easessed in the service 
delivery transaction relationship among three actors i.e. District Development Committee 
(DDC), Water Users’ Committee (WUC), and NGO service provider (SP), involved in the 
rural drinking water service provision of Nepal at the sub-national level.   
 
It is believed that the findings derived from this research could help explain this complex 
public service transaction relationship in the context of Nepal, and make it easier to 
understand this country-specific case in the light of relevant public service experiences 
and practices around the world. 
 
The next chapter sets the context of the country under study by discussing its historical 
background, and the evolution of the government and the drinking water sector of Nepal.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. Nepal: Background and Situation Analysis 
Chapter 3 has two sections. The first section talks about the historical background of 
public administration and the evolving trend in governance and public management of 
Nepal. The second section discusses the drinking water service provision in Nepal, 
particularly giving emphasis to rural drinking water services. 
3.1 Public Administration, Governance and Public Management  
This section deals with the politico-administrative genealogy of Nepal, showing how the 
governing structure has evolved over the last sixty years, together with some relevant 
historical background beyond this period. Particular attention is paid to the recent 
administrative reforms, the decentralization process, governance initiatives, and finally the 
application of NPM-type reforms to public services in Nepal. The objective of this chapter 
is thus to give an account of the changes (or reforms) undergone in the Nepalese public 
service history and to set the background for public service delivery in the present context.  
3.1.1 Public Administration as Political Discourse 
3.1.1.1 Historical background (Pre 1950s) 
As with any other country, the Nepalese governance and public administration system 
may be seen as reflecting the discourse of the political system (Berman 2011, UNPAN 
1998) of that particular period. In Nepal, the public administration history starts with the 
Kirata dynasty (or Kirati or Kirat) (Poudel 1986), which established the state system in 
terms of the relationship between the central and local administration, military 
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organization, administrative and judicial affairs, taxation policy, and social and regulation 
affairs. After Kirata, the Lichhavi dynasty (first century AD to 880 AD) ruled the country, 
developing well-organized administrative systems, based on the foundation laid by the 
Kiratas. The Lichhavi era is considered a golden era from the socioeconomic point of 
view. A very systematic administrative system at the central and local levels was 
established. Various types of departments and offices were established; land 
administration, a currency system, weighing units, maintenance of law and order, justice, 
collection of revenue.  However, this era also witnessed the entrenchment of the caste 
system in administration (Poudel 1986).  
 
Introduction of the first legal and civil codes in 1606-1636 by King Ram Shah of Gorkha, 
establishment of the Audit Office (Kumari Chowk) in 1771 by King Prithivi Narayan Shah, 
the Foreign Relations Office (Munshi Khana) in 1825 by Prime Minister Bhimsen Thapa, 
Record Office (Kitab Khana) in 1848, Law Making Office (Ain Khana) in 1852, Corruption 
Control Office (Dharam Kachari) by Prime Minister Junga Bahadur Rana to Municipal 
Office in 1919 were some major administrative arrangements that were introduced prior to 
or during the Rana Regime in order to govern the Kingdom (Singh, H.L. 2007). 
 
However, the evolution of governmental arrangements did not amount to wholesale 
modernisation. On the contrary “Nepal remained a medieval society until 1950” (Bista 
1991). The Rana Regime (1847 to 1950) ruled this country for one hundred and seven 
years during which the Royal (Shah) family remained silent spectators (Bista 1991, p. 
101). This oligarchical type of government system mainly protected the personal and 
family interests of the ruling Ranas through direct control of all military and administrative 
power. As a whole, the Rana Prime Ministers, as de facto rulers, ran the country’s 
governing system, while the Kings were de jure heads only (Poudel 1989, p.10). Despite 
this fact, the Ranas established many basic administrative structures, which later served 
as the foundation for the modern public administration of the country.  
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3.1.1.2 Politics and Government (1950 to 1959) 
Modern Nepalese administrative history starts with the promulgation of the first Interim 
Government Act by King Tribhuvan on 18 February 1951, after the ending of 107 years of 
Rana rule. In the eight years between 1950 and 1958, the government was changed 
eleven times36 (Poudel 1989; Singh, H.L. 2007). The political aspirations of the people, as 
represented by major political parties during these periods, were in direct opposition to the 
old feudal governing system of the country. Despite this political uncertainty, certain 
reforms did take place in terms of modernising the administration by dismantling and 
transforming the old structures of government. Among the government institutions that 
were created in 1951 were the Administrative Secretariat at Singha Durbur, the Public 
Service Commission, the Office of the Comptroller General, the Office of the Auditor 
General and the Office of the Election Commission. The judiciary system was also further 
strengthened during this period. Throughout this period, Civil Service, Ministries and 
Departments had undergone a massive restructuring process as each new government 
kept changing their functional priorities (Singh, H.L. 2007). 
 
During the period of 1951 to 1952, Nepal received considerable technical advisory 
support from India. Many of the administrative reforms mentioned earlier had been made 
through the Indian Advisory Services. Amid these reforms, the Nepal Administrative 
Reorganization Committee was formed (May to June, 1952). The recommendations of the 
Committee amounted to the imposition of the Indian administrative system and some of 
those recommendations were partially implemented. During the same time, Nepal had 
                                                
36  On 18 February 1951, Cabinet formed under Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher 
On 16 November 1951, Cabinet was formed under MP Koirala 
On 14 August 1952, Councillor’s Regime was announced 
On 15 June 1953, Cabinet was formed again under MP Koirala 
On 18 February 1954, National Coalition Cabinet was formed under MP Koirala 
On 18 February 1955, then crown prince Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah started ruling 
On 14 April 1955, Council of Royal Advisors formed 
On 27 January 1956, Praja Parishad Government under Tanka Prasad Acharya 
On 26 July 1957, Dr. K I Singh from the United Democratic Party became the Prime Minister 
On 19 May 1959, the government under the prime ministership of BP Koirala 
On 15 May 1958, a caretaker government was formed headed by Subarna Shumsher of Nepali Congress 
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also sought the United States of America’s (USA) support in the areas of development 
planning, training, in-village development planning, and agriculture technicians. Later, to 
these were added a request for providing expert services in the modernization of the 
administrative system (Poudel 1989). Figure 8 shows the timeline of Nepal’s 
governmental reforms and plots the political discourses that influenced the institutional 
reforms in each period, such as decentralization, liberalization, governance and public 
management. 
 
The emergence of two power centres, the Royal Palace (de facto) and the Government 
(de jure) in the early 1950s, led to frequent power clashes between the Royal Palace 
Secretariat and the government, such that it was not possible to establish a sustainable 
administrative system to govern the country. Poudel (1989, p. 66) characterises this 
period as “the evolution of a diarchy between the Royal Palace's Secretariat and the 
Government's Secretariat”.  
 
Crown Prince Mahendra became the king when his father Tribhuvan died on 13 May 
1955. Mahendra formed the new government of Nepal on 27 January 1956 under Prime 
Minister Tanka Prasad Acharya of Nepal Praja Parishad (Poudel 1989, p. 77). The King 
set up the first formal Administrative Reorganization and Planning Commission (ARPC) 
under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister in July 1956. This commission basically 
worked in two areas, the establishment of the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) and 
the reorganization of Districts with the help of three foreign experts, two from India, H. Lal, 
ICS and B.G. Murdeswar, and one Hartving Nissen from the United Nations (Poudel 
1989, p. 78) 
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Figure 8:  Political discourse, plans and administration reforms 
 
Source: Poudel 1986, 1989; Singh, H.L. 2007, National Planning Commissions, Nepal Law 
Society, … 
 
On 12 February 1959, the first Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1959 was 
promulgated, succeeding the Interim Government Act 1951. Following the Constitution, on 
18 February 1959, the first general election was held. On 27 May 1959, Nepal’s first 
elected government was formed under the Prime Ministership of Biseshwor Prasad (B.P.) 
Koirala from the Nepalese Congress party (Singh, H.L. 2007; P. 156). 
 
After less than two years, on 15 December 1960, King Mahendra dissolved both houses 
of parliament, seized power and jailed Prime Minister B. P. Koirala and his cabinet team. 
On 16 December 1962, King Mahendra introduced the unitary Panchayat political system, 
replacing the democratically elected government and dissolving the Constitution of 1959. 
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Many scholars and politicians perceived this as a ‘royal coup’ (Burghart 1994, p. 12). With 
this, the long history of the Panchayat system began, which remained almost thirty years 
in the political history of Nepal. 
3.1.1.3 Panchayat and Feudocracy (1960 to 1989) 
The inception of the Panchayat political system set the new course of government 
functioning in Nepal. The politico-administrative system of this period is also known by the 
term “feudocracy” (Agrawal 1973, 1980). Feudocracy is a system that mixes feudal social 
elements with a bureaucratic system of a government. In other words, the bureaucracy 
subscribed to feudal characteristics in its day-to-day affairs.  
 
Two parallel structures were established, in which the Royal Palace had become the 
ultimate power centre of governance. The king started appointing the prime minister of the 
country. Despite having a unitary political system, the Panchayat system initiated many 
important political and administrative reforms, including the division of the country into 14 
zones and 75 districts in 1962, and the establishment of the Administrative Training 
Centre and Public Administration Department. The Decentralization committee was 
formed in 1963 to strengthen the decentralization programme of the government, and the 
‘Go to the Villages’ National Campaign was launched in 1967 to bridge the gaps between 
urban elites and rural poor (Singh, H.L. 2007). A New Civil Code was enacted (1964) and 
the Zonal Commissioner and Chief District Officer replaced the existing posts of Bada 
Hakim (Commissioner) and Magistrate via the enactment of the Local Administration 
Ordinance. The National Election Commission was constituted in 1966 and the second 
Administrative Reform Commission was formed. All these reform initiatives showed 
greater emphasis on the modernization of the government functionaries by strengthening 
the presence of the government administrative mechanism at the local level, and also 
encouraged local participation in development through decentralization. 
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King Mahendra died of a heart attack in 1972. His eldest son Birendra became king. King 
Birendra established the National Development Council in 1974, in which the National 
Planning Commission became the secretariat of the Council. Through this, he introduced 
the regional development concept by dividing the country into four development regions, 
and later into five in 1982, to bring balance in regional disparities. In 1975, King Birendra 
constituted the third Administrative Reform Commission. The Prevention of Abuse of 
Authority was established in 1977. In 1980, the Ministry of Local Development was 
established. The Administrative Management Department was upgraded to the Ministry of 
General Administration. In 1982, the Decentralization Act was passed, and in the same 
year the Nepal Administrative College was established. Similarly, the Nepal Law Reform 
Commission was constituted in 1984. During the later stage of this period, the government 
attempted to improve the civil service system, and at the same time, it moved from a 
traditional public administration to development administration (Bhatta 2009) by making 
the government functionaries more development-oriented. 
 
Amid massive public protest against the Panchayat system, on 8 April 1990, King 
Birendra restored the multiparty democratic political system and the thirty years old 
Panchayat system came to an end. An interim government of transition was formed under 
the Prime Ministership of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai of the Nepali Congress. In the same 
year, the new constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal was promulgated which brought the 
multiparty democratic system under the constitutional monarchy. 
 
Throughout this period, the government brought in substantial structural changes in its 
functioning; despite this the Panchayat system failed to continue. Non-pluralistic, non-
inclusive, and undemocratic characteristics of the polity could be the reasons for this, but 
at the government level, it is more that the prevailing of feudocracy continued to promote 
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patrimonial, feudal, oligarchic systems which influenced the polity, the bureaucracy, the 
economy and the army of the country (Baral 2000). 
3.1.1.4 Liberalism, Democracy, and Conflict (1990 to 1999) 
The liberal policy drive in the government system gained pace during the 1990s, although 
some reform agendas had already emerged in the latter part of the 1980s. External 
pressure (IMF, donors) and internal political dynamics forced the government to bring 
about several changes in the country’ economic and governance systems. Changes 
enacted included the Industrial Policy of 1992, the Industrial Enterprise Act 1992, and the 
Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act 1992, which made the country more 
open to private sector participation in health, telecommunications, education, energy and 
transportation, and at the same time initiated downsizing and redundancy in the civil 
service, and privatization or selling off of public enterprises began.   
  
Despite these reform measures, during this period, the Communist Party of Nepal 
Maoist) began a violent insurgency in more than 50 of the country's total of 75 districts in 
February 1996. About 13,000 police, civilians, and insurgents were killed in the conflict 
(OHCHR 2012).  
 
On the political front, under the constitutional monarchy system (1991), the political 
parties agreed to give limited power to the king, including the right to declare a state of 
emergency in the event of war or armed revolt, but only with the advice and consent of the 
Council of Ministers that must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the lower house of 
the Parliament. 
 
Girija Prasad Koirala became the second democratically elected prime minister in 1991. 
He could not complete his five-year term because he was defeated in a no-confidence 
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motion in the House in 1994. After this, a new election was held, and the communist 
government was formed. However, even this government was dissolved in 1995 and Sher 
Bahadur Deuba of Nepal Congress became prime minister. By this time, the Nepal 
Communist Party (Maoist) movement had begun to establish Nepal as a People’s 
Republic. In 1997, The Deuba government could not get the vote of confidence in 
parliament, and Girija Prasad Koirala of the same Nepali Congress party later succeeded 
him again. All this meant changes of the government nine times in ten years, creating a 
politically volatile and administratively chaotic situation. 
3.1.1.5 Conflict and Post-conflict (2000 to 2010) 
The decade from 2000 to 2009 witnessed a very turbulent period in Nepalese history. 
Apart from the internal conflict, a Royal massacre took place on the 1st of June 2001 in 
which King Birendra was killed along with his family and other royal family members. King 
Birendra’s surviving brother Gyanendra was proclaimed king.  
 
The functioning of the government was almost paralyzed by the conflict in the early years 
of the decade and remained very unstable throughout the period. The Prime Ministership 
changed frequently, more than seven times between 2000 and 2006. Until 2006 the 
priorities of the government were peace negotiation, settlement of internally displaced 
people and Maoist cadres, and to bring the Maoists into the main political stream. 
However this process was challenged by the King’s intention to regain power on two 
occasions. In May 2006, the Parliament voted unanimously to curtail the king's political 
powers. Finally in November 2006, a peace accord was signed between the government 
and Maoists that ended the ten years of Maoist insurgency. 
 
During this period, the conflict had severely affected the functioning of local government in 
many districts. This was partly because of the absence of locally elected officials, since 
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local elections could not be held from 2002. By this time, the donors’ priorities were 
shifted from development to humanitarian aid, to conflict, and then to peace building 
(UNRHC 2011, NPC 2007).  
 
In April 2008, the Maoist party secured the largest number of seats in the Constituent 
Assembly election, but failed to achieve an absolute majority. Nepal was declared a 
republic on 28 May 2008 and the King ceased to be the head of state. Ram Baran Yadav 
became the first president of Nepal on 21 July 2008. On 15 August 2008, the Constituent 
Assembly elected Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal as the first Prime Minister of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, only for him to resign a few months later over the 
dismissal of Nepal’s army chief. Although the Maoist party was mainstreamed into 
national politics, disputes over power to govern the nation continued. Eventually, after 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Madhav Kumar Nepal of UML (United Marxist Leninist) became the 
second prime minister (May 2009 to February 2011) of the Republic of Nepal.  
3.1.1.6 Republic in transition (2010 to present) 
The chairman of his own party, Jhala Nath Khanal (February 2011 to August 2011), 
replaced Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, but this was for a short period only. 
Baburam Bhattarai (August 2011 to March 2013), who was the senior leader of the Maoist 
party, then succeeded Khanal. The government had changed four times in less than five 
years. Although the priority during this period had been to draft the constitution of Nepal 
and to take the peace process to a logical conclusion, some relief and reconstruction 
programmes were also begun in the rural areas where the conflict had destroyed public 
infrastructure.  
 
The political system changed, becoming more inclusive, but the government (and 
governance) structures and the public service delivery pattern did not change much. All 
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the governments formed after 2006 more or less followed the status quo service delivery 
structure. The major political parties failed to reach a consensus on major issues such as 
the federal structure and governing system of the country, and this eventually led to the 
dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly on 28 May 2012. Amid political uncertainty, 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Mr Khil Raj Regmi became the head of a 
caretaker government from March 2013 to February 2014. This nominated government 
successfully held the second Constituent Assembly election on 19 November 2013. The 
Nepalese Congress secured the highest number of seats, but not the majority required to 
form a government on its own. Therefore, with the support of the second largest party, 
United Marxist Leninist (UML), in the Constituent Assembly, Sushil Koirala of Nepalese 
Congress party became the prime minister of Nepal in February 2014.  
 
To summarise, the government was more or less stable during the Panchayat system 
(1960 to 1989) but the polity was unitary, autocratic, centralised and controlled by the 
King. From 1990, under the democratic constitutional monarchy, the political system 
became pluralistic and multi-party in character. However, the governance and economic 
reform initiatives started during this period did not have time to impact on the poor or 
reduce poverty in general, and the country’s internal conflict diluted all these efforts from 
the mid 1990s. The political landscape of the country was completely altered after the 
2000s when the focus was on conflict resolution, the peace process, and the drafting of 
the new constitution under the new political system. 
 
Throughout this period, especially from the 1990s onwards, the make-up of the 
government changed frequently before, during and after the conflict. During the 
constitutional monarchy system (1990 to 2008), the prime ministers were changed 14 
times (in between, the King took power twice, 2002 and 2005). This trend continued after 
the country became the Federal Democratic Republic Nation (2008 to present), in which 
period the prime ministers were changed seven times. In such a situation, it was difficult 
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to make a government structure responsive where the governing mechanism itself was 
crippled, demoralized, and staff over-politicized, and accountability distorted37. 
 
Since the conflict ended in a negotiated settlement between political parties, instead of 
going through a full-fledged revolution, this has meant an incremental change in 
government functioning rather than an overhaul of the system as a whole. Thus the 
current system of public administration in Nepal did not rise from the ashes of the past, 
but was built on the existing foundation that was laid by previous systems. 
3.1.2 Administrative Reforms 
Since the abolition of the oligarchy of Rana’s regime in 1951, the country has passed 
through sixty years of different political systems; from democracy to Panchayat to 
constitutional monarchical multi-party and finally to a democratic republic system. Moving 
from a feudal to a modern administrative system in order to support each change of 
political system was not easy for Nepal, especially given the strength of bureaucratic 
inertia to resist the changes. Throughout this period, successive governments made 
repeated efforts to strengthen the public administration of the country through 
commissioning Administrative Reform Commissions as the by-products of different 
political outcomes (Poudel 1989, p. 235). The four major reform initiatives, through 
constituting the Administrative Reform Commissions38, are considered milestones in the 
administrative history of Nepal. Each reform had been able to make some impact on the 
functioning of the civil service system of the country, but failed to address the perceived 
need to make the bureaucracy as a whole more oriented to serving the public. This is 
perhaps a common phenomenon given the high failure rate of administrative reforms in 
both developing and developed countries (Polidano 1999). 
                                                
37  A party line cadre office assistant in the departments or ministries can get senior officers in the 
bureaucracy transferred through the party’s pressure. 
38  Acharya’s Administrative Reform Commission (1956), Jha’s Administrative Reform Commission, (1968), 
Thapa’s Administrative Reform Commission (1075), and Koirala’s Administrative Reform Commission 
(1992). 
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A Nepalese development administration scholar, Bhim Dev Bhatta (2009, pp.132 to 133) 
has argued that failure to implement the recommendations made by the Administrative 
Reform Commissions during different times derived from a lack of mature, experienced 
politicians, the colonial legacy, weak implementation of policies, high expectations of civil 
servants and lack of government commitment (political will), lack of resources, political 
interference, and finally external pressures. 
 
Another Nepalese scholar-cum-practitioner G. B. N. Pradhan (2007) has expressed a 
slightly different view of the difficulties attending the implementation of the administrative 
reforms. He sees the problems of implementation as more operational than institutional or 
systemic. According to him, the key failings were lack of awareness and concern among 
the people about the administration, people’s apathy towards public/government affairs, 
corruption, routine-bound practice, the vagueness of proposals for reforms, poor 
realization of the institutional capacity of public service, and of the link to the 
administrative needs to civil society, failure to balance the concept of ability to pay with a 
living wage, and poor vision of political and bureaucratic leadership regarding 
administrative reforms.  
 
Poudel (1989), who studied the administrative reforms of the country thoroughly 
confirmed that the Administrative Reform Commissions constituted were ad hoc in nature, 
in order to meet the immediate crisis rather than looking for long term changes. According 
to him: 
“… the administrative machinery of the country continues to suffer from all 
kinds of bureaucratic evils. The decision-making process is slow, the attitude 
of bureaucrats is power- and status-oriented, the organizational atmosphere is 
characterized by nepotism and favouritism, the Chakari (undue personal 
service to the boss) and Chaplusi (flattery) system still persists, a hiatus 
between norms and practices still exists, and there is also a tendency of self-
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service among bureaucrats. Buck-passing is a common practice, corruption 
has become all-pervasive, waste of resources is a common phenomenon and 
the country’s economic development plans have been a failure.” Poudel 
(1989, p. 236) 
Poudel (1989) concludes a discussion of the poor implementation of administrative 
reforms by saying that the existence of two secretariats, one at the Singhadurbar 
(Government) and another at the Royal Palace, has caused the civil servants to place 
greater faith and loyalty with the senior functionaries of the Palace Secretariat than the 
Government Secretariat. The noted Nepalese development anthropologist, Dor Bahadur 
Bista (1991, p. 112), further extends this notion by saying: “… formally, these (palace) 
secretaries had no power. Informally, these secretaries were more powerful than the civil 
secretaries and the ministers…”  
 
The initiatives taken from 1951 to 1990 to establish modern public administration 
institutions suffered from many shortcomings, which may be seen as deriving directly from 
the politico-administrative culture of the country. Bista (1991, p.112) blamed what he 
referred to as the ‘paternal ruling’ system, while Agrawal (1980) referred to ‘feudocracy’ 
and Poudel (1986) to ‘bureau-pathology’. Taking all this into account, the Nepalese 
politico-administrative system has suffered from the ‘public choice syndrome’ and the ‘rent 
seeking behaviour’ of the royals, politicians and bureaucrats. This type of generic situation 
of public administration in developing countries was well described in the “Prismatic 
Society” by F. W. Riggs (1964). He proposed the “SALA” model, in which personal and 
family decisions influence formal administrative decisions because the government 
structures and functions are not well diffracted (that is, differentiated in specialised forms) 
like in developed countries. 
 
However, from 1990 onwards, after the restoration of the multiparty democratic system 
under the constitutional monarchy, the new course of state functioning was initiated by 
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embracing many reform initiatives. Donors were generous enough to extend their support 
during the administrative reforms of the country. Many of these initiatives were historic on 
the decentralization, liberalization, and governance improvement fronts, but again failed to 
deliver the outcomes as expected (Panday 2009). Madhu Nidhi Tiwari (Tiwari 2009) 
concludes this by saying that this was caused by the unstable political situation, frequent 
changes of government, the Maoist insurgency (which had affected the functioning of the 
civil service by barring, threatening, and extorting civil servants in their service location), 
politicization of the civil service, and the weak leadership of the Ministry of General 
Administration. To which may be added the lack of political will, bureaucratic resistance, 
misconceptions about the role of the civil service, inter-hierarchical rivalry between those 
at the same level and between the gazetted and non-gazetted levels of the bureaucracy, 
all of which, according to Shakya (2009) have caused the administrative reforms and 
public service delivery to fail. 
 
These problematic reform measures, and delayed reforms in the civil service, had both 
direct and indirect bearing on the functioning of the government. The government could 
not embrace the changes fully, particularly the new public management features such as 
liberalization, and market-oriented and performance-based service delivery. More will be 
discussed below under the decentralization, governance, and new public management 
headings. 
3.1.3 Decentralization 
Decentralization39 has a long history in Nepal. As Madhav Poudel (Poudel 1986, p. 111) 
states “The genesis behind the spirit of decentralization in Nepal starts from the Kirat (or 
                                                
39  A joint UNDP – Government of Germany Evaluation of the UNDP Role in Decentralization and Local 
Governance came up with a sampling of the definitions of ‘Decentralization’. According to them the 
meaning of decentralization is non-exhaustive. It is “different things to different people and it is primarily a 
function of the application”. In a nutshell “Decentralization, or decentralizing governance, refers to the 
restructuring or reorganization of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between 
institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, 
…Decentralization could also be expected to contribute to key elements of good governance, such as 
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Kirata) period which lasted until the first century A. D.”. In 1769, after the unification of the 
country, Prithivi Narayan Shah initiated a centralised governing system which was 
maintained until the Rana regime in 1951. After the downfall of Rana’s hegemony, the 
process of decentralization began again. Particularly from 1959 onwards, the country’s 
administrative system became more development-oriented, but centrally controlled 
(Bhatta 1990). Several structural reforms took place during the various plan periods40 for 
the purpose of this development.   
 
Under the Fifth National Plan (NPC 1975), the country adopted an integrated rural 
development approach, whereby development projects were initiated with donor support. 
But this failed mainly due to the poor coordination between the project management and 
the central institutions (department and ministries) in the project implementation (NPC 
1985). After the enactment of the Decentralization Act 1982 and the Decentralization 
Regulation 1984, the government placed emphasis on the local level annual and periodic 
planning, and the use of users’ committees in service provision (NPC 1980). Despite 
having the Decentralization Act and Regulations in place, the local developmental 
initiatives did not take place as was envisioned in the Sixth Plan (NPC 1980) and the 
Seventh Plan (NPC 1985). The Seventh Plan had emphasized self-reliant, small farmer 
development, production, and productivity improvement; and the creation of employment 
opportunity in rural village areas.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
increasing people's opportunities for participation in economic, social and political decisions; assisting in 
developing people's capacities; and enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and 
accountability.” And it (decentralization) is “a mixture of administrative, fiscal and political functions and 
relationships” (UNDP 1999). Decentralization can be of ‘deconcentration’, ‘delegation’, ‘devolution’ and 
‘divestment’ (Rondinelli, Chemma, 1983; UNDP 1999) 
40  In 1959, His Majesty’s Government had constituted the District Development Board. In 1961, District 
Panchayat Offices were established in all districts. In 1962, Nepal was divided into 14 zones and 75 
districts. In 1963, the Decentralization Committee was formed under Bishwabandhu Thapa. In 1973, the 
New District Development Plan was formulated and brought into operation in 1974; during the same year 
the country was divided into four development regions. In 1974, the New District Administration Plan was 
implemented. In 1982, the Decentralization Act was passed, and in the same year a further development 
region was established, thus totalling five development regions in the country. In 1999, the Local Self-
governance Act was promulgated.   
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Following the political changes of 1990, and the promulgation of the new constitution in 
1992, the Eighth Plan was launched (NPC 1992). The new government enacted enabling 
acts for local bodies. This signalled the departure of national policies and priorities from 
the traditional functioning of the government over the last thirty years under the Panchayat 
system (1961 to 1991). To manage their affairs by themselves, more autonomy was 
devolved to the districts, municipalities and villages; for instance, formulation of local 
plans and their implementation, collection of local taxes, recruitment of staff, and various 
development related activities. During this plan period, local development became the 
main development thrust of the government, in connection with which Nepal received 
substantial funding support from the donor community. A high level Decentralization 
Coordination Committee was formed in 1996 under the chairmanship of the Prime 
Minister to emphasise the government’s strong commitment to decentralization which 
later recommended the Local Self-governance Act 1999 for approval. 
 
At the national level, the government changed national policies, strategies, and 
programmes and reformed the civil service in order to comply with the liberalization 
agenda of the structural adjustment programme. Many state-owned enterprises were 
privatized, trading and business licenses relaxed, company registration simplified, foreign 
investments attracted, and various sectors, such as health, communications, civil aviation, 
education, hydroelectricity, and the financial market were opened for private sector 
participation.  
 
The Ninth Plan (NPC 1997) was politically volatile. Maoist insurgency41 was gaining 
momentum, while the government was struggling to keep control of state affairs. Under 
mounting pressure from the local bodies’ associations42 (Dhungel et al. 2011, p. 163), the 
government had enacted the Local Self-governance Act (LSGA) 1999 and the Local Self-
                                                
41  The Maoist insurgency was started in 1995 and ended in 2005. 
42  National Village Development Committees in Nepal (NAVIN), Municipal Association of Nepal (MuAN), 
Association of District Development Committees of Nepal (ADDCN) 
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governance Rules 1999 in the same year. These measures, which continued during the 
absence of the elected representatives (Dhungel et al. 2011), had conferred more 
political, functional, financial, and administrative power on local bodies. Some sectoral 
devolution was also made to the local government in some sectors.  
 
In the latter part of 1990s, the Decentralization Implementation Plan (DIP) was prepared 
and approved by the government. Again, a high level Decentralization Implementation 
Monitoring Committee (DIMC) was formed under the chairmanship of the prime minister to 
oversee the implementation of decentralization activities. The Local Bodies Fiscal 
Commission was set up to streamline the revenue and expenditure assignments of the 
local bodies. Massive capacity building and planning programmes for the District 
Development Committees and Municipalities were implemented with the support of 
UNDP, GTZ, Danida and other donor agencies. Despite the government’s efforts to 
reduce poverty through rural development during the Ninth Plan, resource constraints, 
poor institutional capacity, lack of accountability and the delayed transfer of functional 
responsibility had all adversely affected the implementation of the decentralization 
programmes of the Plan (NPC 2002). 
 
However, once again, there was a perception the failure had deeper roots. Devendra Raj 
Panday (Panday 2009) a highly respected scholar, bureaucrat and politician saw the 
failure of decentralization as caused by the delinquent characteristics of the country’s 
socio-politico-administrative culture:  
“This problem (decentralization) is related to the cultural structures of the 
country where the feudal traditions, and the patronage system accompanying 
our democracy, conspire to monopolize the control over political resources, 
including those that are available in the name of development, at the hands of 
the groups comprising the dominant coalition, These resources are used and 
absorbed for the benefit of the elite at the centre as well as the districts to 
perpetuate the status quo”. Panday (2009, pp. 117-118) 
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By the time of the Tenth Plan (NPC 2002) the political situation had become very violent 
and the government had lost its control over the functioning of many local government 
bodies in the rural areas. Maoists were running parallel governments in 25 out of 75 
districts of the country (Sharma, S. 2003). The situation became even worse when the 
government did not hold local elections that were due in July 2002. Many believed that 
this had further helped Maoists to expand their physical and ideological coverage in the 
later years in the absence of local leaderships to run the local development activities to 
counter Maoist proliferation. 
 
The Tenth Plan itself was the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP), which was seen 
by some as reflecting neoliberal thinking (Sharma, G.P. 2011). The Tenth Plan sought to 
link poverty reduction with decentralization and governance (in the contemporary 
participatory sense of governance rather than government). 
 
Despite the adverse political situation, the country made some notable progress towards 
strengthening local government, through measures such as the Local Infrastructure 
Development Policy and the Local Level Partnership Promotion Policy, amendment of 
LSGA (1999), and the formation of the Local Level Revenue Advisory Committee to make 
improvements in revenue administration of local government. The involvement of NGOs in 
local development was further promoted by the NGO mobilization policy. The country’s 
devolution strategy was prepared for the effective implementation of the LSGA. Furthering 
the Decentralization Implementation Plan (DIP) from 2001/02 onwards, devolution was 
tested in three sectors; namely, the agriculture extension and livestock service, primary 
education, and basic health services through local bodies.  
 
In the financial year 2002/03, the government approved the Local Infrastructure 
Development Policy, affecting seven sectors (rural roads, suspension bridges, small 
irrigation, community water supply and sanitation, micro hydro, rural building and social 
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infrastructure) that had been devolved to, and implemented through, local bodies. Most of 
these sectoral local development activities were triggered to address local needs, but their 
implementations were disrupted by the conflict, especially in the mid-far-western region 
during 2000 to 2005. As a result, the legal, policy and programme frameworks approved 
by the government to empower the local bodies virtually remained dormant because there 
were hardly any local bodies in rural areas that were untouched by the conflict. 
 
However, the Tenth Plan could be considered a success in terms of implanting the 
government’s policies for the localization of public service provision through Users’ 
Committees, NGOs and the private sector43, and initiating structural changes in local 
bodies in order to carry out local infrastructure projects in the districts44. 
 
Without differing from the basic development polices and strategies of the Tenth Plan for 
non-state service providers (NGOs, CBOs and private sectors), the Eleventh Plan, which 
was a Three-Year Interim Plan (TYIP-I) (2007 – 2010) (NPC, 2007) further enhanced the 
role of the private sector and social sector, as well as devolving more operational power to 
local government. To make the latter more responsive to local demands, and to make 
them more professional and competitive institutions, a ‘Minimum Conditions and 
Performance Measurement (MCPM)45 Framework’ was introduced for the central grant 
allocations. The involvement of stakeholders in planning, implementation, supervision, 
and evaluation of the local projects were ensured. Although local government was 
criticized for the misuse of funds, significant achievements were recorded in the rural 
areas (DoLIDAR 2011).  
 
                                                
43  National Development Forum 2004, the Government of Nepal, Service Delivery System in Nepal; www.ndf 
2004.gov.np/pdf/proceedings/service.pdf, accessed on 21 August 2013. 
44  District Development Committees’ technical capacity was built by establishing the District Technical 
Offices in all 75 districts after the introduction of the Local Infrastructure Development Policy 2061 (≈2004). 
45  For more details on ‘Minimum Conditions and Performance Measurement’ (MCPM) refer 
http://www.mofald.gov.np/userfiles/docs_100.pdf, accessed on 18 September 2013. 
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Successful implementation of the rural development projects during the post-conflict 
period owed much to the cessation of the conflict, the beginning of the peace process and 
the drafting of the new constitution of the country. Overall, TYIP-I formally recognized 
local level public service delivery and the development works of local government as one 
of the main policies for national development. 
 
The Twelfth Plan, which was also a Three-Year Interim Plan II (2010 to 2013) (NPC, 
2010), strategically paved the way for a new local government structure based on the 
envisioned inclusive federal structure of the republic. It further emphasized the need to 
make government, NGOs, CBOs, users’ committees and stakeholders accountable in the 
implementation of programmes at the local level, by clarifying their roles.  
 
Decentralized government in Nepal has undergone several changes over the last sixty 
years 46 , from merely a local entity during the Panchayat system, to planning and 
development vehicles in the transitional multi-party system, to service delivery institutions 
at the present time. Despite this long history, decentralization could not be materialized in 
a true sense as conceived in the form of local self-governance. The spirit of 
decentralization has often been more honoured in government policy statements than in 
terms of devolving adequate powers or building the capacity of local government to 
become self-reliant (Dhungel et al. 2011, pp. 19 – 20). 
 
During the Panchayat time, the paternalistic, patrimonial (Baral 2000, Dahal et al. 2001, 
Bista 1991), and unitary centralized system (Bienen et al. 1990) did not allow the 
decentralized governing system to become institutionalized. The frequent change in 
government47 during the multi-party system and the conflict in the later years (1990s to 
2000s) (Hesselbarth 2007) disturbed the development process (GoN and UN 2013) 
                                                
46  From 1962 after the establishment of Panchayat system 
47 In fifteen years, the government was changed fifteen times (1990 to 2005). 
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despite there being the most conducive policies and legal frameworks for decentralization. 
In the post-conflict situation, 2005 onwards, the local governments are fully entrusted to 
implement the development programmes with greater responsibility and mandates – but 
without locally elected representatives, since 2002. Since then the staff deputed from the 
central government have been running local governments. This has totally distorted 
grassroots downward constituency accountability. 
 
Two studies carried out by ADDCN (2002) and DASU (2003) explained that the poor 
performance of devolution in the country is due to the service provision breakdown 
between the governments (central government and district governments) and the service 
providers. The study, commissioned by DASU, focused on the three devolved sectors of 
health, education and agriculture, and revealed a number of problems including poor 
coordination for devolution, misunderstanding of roles in the devolution process, absence 
of political representation at the local government level, and other institutional issues such 
as limited human resources, unclear mandates (e.g. the mixing of executive authority with 
management authority), and finally the lack of a clear demarcation of tasks, i.e. 
responsibilities and authority between the various actors involved in service delivery (Rai 
2009). 
 
The failure of decentralization to deliver the expected outcomes lies perhaps not only with 
the lack of political commitment, will (RDF 2004) and ownership (Dahal, 2005), and the 
prevailing feudocratic behaviour in the Nepalese social, political and administrative 
culture, but is also due to the ill-construed structural reforms at the organizational and 
management level. 
  
Hence, despite having a very conducive policy environment (National Plans, NPC; LSGA), 
decentralization in Nepal has suffered due to organizational limitations (Bienen et al. 
1990, Gurung 2011, ADDCN 2012) and the lack of readiness to implement 
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decentralization as a real service delivery vehicle (WB 2014). Among many, two issues in 
particular – transparency and accountability (Baral 2000) – have emerged prominently in 
public service delivery discourse from the early 2000s.  
3.1.4 Governance  
The genesis of the governance (or good governance) reforms in Nepal can be formally 
recorded from the mid-1990s, when the government launched its Ninth Plan (NPC 1997). 
The government acknowledged in the Ninth Plan that due to poor governance there was a 
persisting problem, resulting in inefficiency in the utilization and leakage of public 
resources, despite having good public accountability mechanisms48.  
 
By the Tenth Plan (NPC 2002), Civil Service reforms dominated the governance agenda 
and efforts were made to make the government the ‘right size’, to reduce the growth of 
financial administrative overheads in order to make the civil service efficient, accountable 
and transparent, and to strengthen the institutional capacity of government to combat 
corruption. 
 
Corruption control, accountability and transparency may have been the main themes of 
governance improvement, but on-going conflict overshadowed these efforts. The situation 
compelled a change of course of governance reforms in the direction of inclusiveness, 
participation and representation of the interests of Dalits, Adibasi Janajati, Madhesis, 
Muslims, labourers, peasants, and people with disabilities, disadvantaged groups and 
regions. Henceforth, the element of ‘equity’ was to be an integral part of the governance 
reform policy. Some efforts to expedite service delivery at both central and local levels 
were also made by the application of the Civil Code of Conduct and the Citizen’s Charter 
                                                
48  This mechanism refers to the institutional mechanisms for public accountability that are Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC), Auditor General's Office (AGO), Financial Comptroller General's Office (FCGO), 
Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA). 
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to promote service users’ welfare through participation, transparency and accountability 
(NPC 2002). 
 
After the signing of the comprehensive peace accord in 2006 by the Maoists and the 
government, a massive task for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the rural areas started. 
Ensuring human rights became another major issue to be dealt with by the new 
government under both national and international pressure. To address these issues, the 
government integrated its good governance policy with the peace process in the Three 
Year Interim Plan–I (NPC 2007). To suit the changed context, the government embarked 
on a programme of legislative reform, of which The Good Governance Act 2064 (GGA 
2008) is one of the results. To some extent, this act is a milestone in public service 
delivery. It encompasses all level authorities from the ministerial, to departmental heads, 
to the person in-charge in the delivery of public services at the local level. 
 
Salient features of the Good Governance Act 2064 (2008) in brief include the 
following: 
The Act ensures that while executing administrative functions, the basis adopted should 
be in the greater interest of the nation and people; equity and inclusiveness; the rule of 
law; the guarantee of the human rights; transparency, accountability and honesty; 
economic (financial) discipline, corruption-free lean (smart) and people-oriented 
administration; impartiality and neutrality of the administrative mechanism; access for 
people to the administrative mechanism and its decisions; decentralization and devolution 
of powers; and popular participation and optimum utilization of local resources. 
 
The Act clearly specifies the responsibility of the minister, chief secretary, secretary, the 
head of the department, and chief office holder. It clarifies the procedures to be 
undertaken while carrying out administrative functions, such as that decisions are to be 
made within a certain time; by maintaining transparency; providing the basis for a decision 
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and the reason behind it; and avoiding conflicts of interest. For service provision, 
performance contracts can be made after consultation with civil society or stakeholders. It 
further laid down that responsibility cannot be evaded, or power be delegated, and that 
officials shall comply with the code of conduct. 
 
Furthermore, the Act persuades the responsible authorities to maintain the citizen’s 
charter, provision of a mobile service to access the users, the authority to fix service fees 
reasonably, public participation and ownership, the establishment of the governance 
reform unit, public hearings, and grievance management. It also makes provision to 
appoint the advisor in seeking expertise in the relevant subject areas, use of information 
technology, the establishment of monitoring and supervision committees for effective 
service delivery, setting of work performance indicators. It makes it clear that all 
constitutional bodies, local bodies, regulatory bodies, and public corporations shall abide 
with the major provisions49 made under this Act. 
 
When the second Three Year Interim Plan - II (NPC 2010) was publicly released, the 
government had framed an integrated policy by bringing all three major aspects of public 
services, i.e. decentralization, governance and local development, into one. The aim was 
to lay the groundwork for a new federalist governance structure by making the local 
bodies more powerful in local development, and to achieve a greater involvement of civil 
society, NGOs, users’ committees and the private sector in development (OPMCO 2014, 
NPC 2010). 
 
Although this Good Governance Act has created the possibility of improving services 
through governance initiatives within the civil service system, it does not provide for how 
public agencies should get involved in public service provision, as for example how they 
                                                
49  The provisions in the Good Governance Act 2064 (2008) are provided in Section 6, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 30. 
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should engage other stakeholders, partners and service providers in service delivery. This 
inter-organizational issue in service provision is partly addressed through other regulatory 
frameworks - LSGA 1999, LBFAR 2007, Public Procurement Act 2007, PPP Policy 2008 
(MoFALD) 50  - and in the policy statement of TYIP (NPC 2010) on governance 
improvements for service delivery, but in reality it remains challenged and inadequately 
attended to at the local government operational level.  
 
The World Bank Report (WB 2014) on “Local Service Delivery in Nepal” tried to touch 
upon this issue at the local level from the organizational and management perspective. 
The report clearly stated that service provision suffered from many problems, such as the 
frequent transfer of deputed civil servants, lack of coordination between the government 
agencies, a planning process dominated by local politics rather than technical analysis, 
and lack of linkage between the local and national plans. It said that the financial reports 
are fragmented, that no sector-wise financial reporting exists, the existing budgeting and 
reporting system limits accountability, and that the public trust in local government ranges 
from moderate to low. The report (WB 2014, p. 25) greatly highlighted that the “User 
Committees are the primary vehicle for carrying out local body (local government) funded 
projects” but that only 20% of people believe that they are responsible for the quality of 
works (local roads). This indicates that the local government service delivery is 
organizationally constrained, with limited managerial understanding of how to get other 
non-state actors, NGOs and private organizations engaged in service delivery, despite the 
fact that existing regulatory frameworks do not prohibit them to do so.  
3.1.5 New Public Management 
Frequent changes in the political system and the government have long prevented the 
establishment of a strong administrative foundation for the country. Initiatives such as the 
                                                
50  Public Private Partnership Policy 2060 (2008), for local government; for detail refer to the website of the 
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development, Nepal, http://mofald.gov.np/userfiles/docs_33.pdf 
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“Administrative Reform Commissions” established at different times (1956, 1968, 1975, 
and 1992) have had a certain impact on the functioning of the government, but could not 
help much to improve the service delivery system of the country, where corruption was 
rampant. Despite this, civil service capacity was strengthened through administrative 
procedures and training facilities (Poudel 1989, pp. 63 - 65). However, this was offset by 
the downsizing of the civil service after 1992 (Pradhan 2007, pp. 4 - 7).  
 
The Nepal Administrative Staff College (a government subsidiary), the Administrative 
Training Centre (Government)51, the Public Administration Campus (of the government 
subsidiary Tribhuvan University)52, Kastmandap School of Public Affairs Management 
(affiliated to private Purwanchal University), the Local Development Training Academy (a 
government subsidiary)53, the Revenue Training Centre (a government resource)54 and a 
few colleges that run management and development studies are responsible for the 
human resources development in the public sector. These organizations do teach and 
train the potential and existing civil servants, including development practitioners and 
students, but their courses, curricula and research have been found to be very weak on 
the theme of new public management (NASC 2071/72, KASPAM 2015, PAC). Some 
research works are found which are guided towards NPM, but their contribution to 
knowledge and skills at large is disconnected. What this shows is that these institutions 
are not well attuned to the contemporary national development priorities, and the policy 
and programmes of the government.  
                                                
51  For more information on National Administrative Staff College see http://www.nasc.org.np. 
52  For more information on Public Administration Campus see http://njpg.pactu.edu.np/?q=all-issues. 
53 For more information on Local Development Training Academy see 
http://www.ldta.org.np/service_content.php?id=11. 
54  For more information on Revenue Training Centre of Government see 
http://www.ratc.gov.np/index.php?page=viewpage&pageid=9. 
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Interestingly, this is the first time that the Administrative Reform Monitoring Committee, 
created as per the recommendation of ARC 1992, has carried out some service delivery-
related studies,55 with the help of UNDP (Pradhan 2007, p. 7).  
 
In the fiscal year 2012/2013, the Ministry of General Administration carried out a 
“Customer Satisfaction Survey (CSS)” in some districts. The survey result (Republica 8 
May 2014)56 shows that ordinary citizens are facing serious difficulties in seeking services 
from government offices, municipalities, district development committees, district 
administration offices, district public health offices, district survey offices, district land 
revenue offices and transport offices, among others. It further highlighted that ordinary 
people are unaware about the ‘Citizens’ Charter’ hanging outside government offices, 
thus making their work still more complicated and time-consuming. Members of the 
general public seeking services from the government offices are paying undue service 
charges to intermediaries, which is illegal. The survey explains that ordinary people 
cannot communicate their serious grievances at government offices due to non-
receptiveness and lack of cooperation from officials. 
 
Particularly from the NPM perspective, the following reform measures can be considered 
as NPM initiatives under civil service reforms, decentralization and governance 
improvement of the country. These are: 
• Sectoral devolution which has taken place (e.g. in education, health, livestock, and 
rural infrastructure) giving more power to District Development Committees and 
district level line agencies; 
• A decentralised financial management system introduced by creating the District 
Development Fund at the district level (all sectoral development funds are 
channelled through this); 
                                                
55  The studies carried out are in agriculture extension and agriculture inputs services, one-window payment 
system for paying revenue and utility (water, telephone and electricity) bills, land registration, health 
service delivery system, postal service, and transport management. 
56  The national daily Republica - http://e.myrepublica.com/component/flippingbook/book/1591-republica-08-
mayl-2014/1-republica.html 
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• Several administrative reform measures as per the recommendations of the 
Administrative Reform Commissions/Committee have been implemented, 
particularly downsizing of the civil service and restructuring of the ministries and 
departments to make the bureaucracy lean in 1992. These also include making the 
civil service more inclusive in the 2000s; 
• Many public enterprises and undertakings, mostly manufacturing, have been 
privatized and the service sector reorganized57; 
• Some government departments and agencies have been restructured and made 
autonomous entities; 
• An open door policy has been adopted in many sectors for private and foreign 
investments (e.g. health, education, telecommunication, energy, transportation, the 
financial market); 
• The company and business licence and registration process has been relaxed, 
thus improving the ‘doing business’ index; 
• Customs and trade policy have been relaxed. Nepal joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in April 2002; 
• A more liberal policy environment for NGOs and community participation in local 
development activities has been adopted, and cooperatives promoted; 
• The National Planning Commission has introduced a programme monitoring 
framework in the ministries and departments; 
• A performance-based incentive system in the Department of Revenue to increase 
revenues has been introduced; 
• The Public Procurement Monitoring Office (2007) has been established under the 
Office of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers in order to monitor all the 
important development projects; 
• There has been the introduction of an e-procurement system in the ministries and 
departments to speed up the contract management; 
• The Minimum Conditions Performance Measures (MCPM)58 for local government, 
a grant distribution mechanism encouraging in improving the performance of local 
government, has been implemented. 
                                                
57 For more details on the status of the public enterprises refer http://www.mof.gov.np/en/# 
58  More on MCPM can be accessed to Local Bodies Fiscal Commission, the Government of Nepal. 
http://lbfc.gov.np accessed on 18 May 2014. 
 
 
126 
 
Many of these reform measures are the outcome of the decentralization policy, 
governance initiatives, and market orientation; but, if closely observed, they have 
encompassed all the core elements of NPM, which are basically aimed to improve 
efficiency in public service delivery. However, these efforts at the local government level 
have less application when local government engages with non-state service providers in 
service provision. As said earlier, local government is more inclined to use the community 
organizations than the private and non-governmental organizations. 
3.1.6 Conclusion 
The discourse of New Public Management (NPM), widely influential from the late 1980s 
internationally, did not figure prominently in the politico-administrative history of Nepal. It 
is not referred to openly in government policy, nor did it become the public sector reform 
agenda. However, this does not mean that the reform measures that took place, 
particularly after 1990 in the functioning of the State, did not embrace the major elements 
of NPM. Contracting out, lean administration, output-based performance, involvement of 
both the private and the social sector have been introduced and promoted by the policy 
during the Ninth Plan, Tenth Plan, Three Year Interim Plan-I and Three Year Interim Plan-
II Plans, and other legal measures through Good Governance Act 2008, Local Self 
Governance Act 1999, Procurement Act 2007. Their successful implementation has been 
echoed in every sector at the central level, but the public, particularly the people living in 
remote rural areas, have never felt their benefits at the local level. This has been partly 
because the capacity of local government has not been built to absorb such changes.  
 
The fruits of administrative reform, decentralization, liberalization and good governance 
have not been able to meet the aspirations of the people in general, despite massive aid 
inflows since 1950 to support these development initiatives in the country (Panday 1999). 
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This is because accountability in service delivery is institutionally diffused (Rhodes 2006) 
between the central government and local government, and between the local 
government and local communities. Moreover, local government has never pursued 
seriously the “efficiency” issue (of NPM) in service delivery. They have relied too much on 
user committees for service provision, even rather than building their own capacity to 
assist user committees, which is apparently the intention of national government too (GoN 
and UNDP 2014, p. 70).  
 
Assessing the development policy regime of Nepal over the last twenty years reveals how 
the reform agendas of the government have been shifted from ‘Administrative Reform’ to 
‘Development Administration’ and then finally to ‘Decentralization’ and to ‘Governance’, 
and how all these are now packed together under the governance reform programmes. 
This policy transformation has happened due to the changed political landscape of the 
country, together with the impact of external influences on the state’s affairs. The aim has 
been to encourage a liberalized approach in state functioning, and so to devise the 
government machinery to adopt these changes.  
 
It is clear that reforms in this field have not performed to expectations, but the failure has 
not necessarily been one of design, but rather of the context in which they were applied – 
primarily the armed conflict, but also some problems in the political and administrative 
culture and, arguably, a lack of commitment and political will for policy transformation.  
3.2 Drinking Water Service Provision in Nepal 
This section gives an insight into the drinking water sector of Nepal with a focus on rural 
drinking water. It begins with a brief overview of the drinking water situation of the country 
and then moves on to consider the legal environment: policy, institutional arrangements, 
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financing and service provision approaches used in the sector and finally the issues faced 
in the sector along with a conclusion.  
3.2.1 Introduction 
In the literature, drinking water has typically been bracketed with sanitation, that is, ‘Water 
and Sanitation’ (in short WATSAN) up until the early 2000s. It later became associated 
with hygiene and thus became the WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) sector. In 
Nepal, the term ‘WASH’ began to be used in the national policy, programme and projects 
only after the mid-2000s.  
 
For this research study, only drinking water is taken into consideration, for three reasons. 
First, more than 80% of the government WASH fund goes to drinking water provision59; 
second, the sanitation service provision is different from the drinking water, in that it 
(sanitation) encompasses an aggressive social process, a high degree of behavioural 
input and community pressure; and third is that the community participation approach in 
drinking water provision is different from that with sanitation. In drinking water service 
provision, the ‘water users’ committee’ plays a very important role right from the 
beginning, i.e. from the planning stage, to construction, operation, maintenance and 
repair; whereas in sanitation, the campaign is carried out at the community level but the 
construction, maintenance and operation of toilets are done at the individual household 
level. 
3.2.2 Drinking Water supply 
Nepal is endowed with abundant water resources. Groundwater in Terai (the southern 
plain area bordering India), springs and streams in the hills are the main sources for the 
domestic use of water. Poor water resource management due to demographic change, 
                                                
59  This is the policy decision made by the Government of Nepal. 
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development pressures, competing uses and the lack of infrastructure compromises the 
accessibility, quantity and quality of the water. Shallow groundwater and surface streams 
are the most vulnerable to contamination. It is affected by seasonal variations, with acute 
shortage during dry periods (ADB 2008). 
 
The Nepal WASH Sector Status Report of 2011 (SEIU 2011) shows that 94 per cent of 
households in urban areas and 78 per cent of households in rural areas have access to 
improved drinking water despite the conflict the nation faced from 1995 to 2005. This 
progress is achieved mainly due to intensive government and donor interventions in the 
past, and partly because of the heavy community involvement in the rural areas, where 
the Maoists did not wish to lose the support of the communities. This is a huge 
achievement, a massive change from the situation in 1990, when the urban coverage was 
90 per cent and the rural coverage was 43 per cent only. With this achievement, Nepal 
has already overtaken the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of 73 per cent by 
2015.  
Table 5: MDG and UAT of Water Supply 
Indicator Status Target 
 2000 2005 PRSP 2007 (10th Plan) 
MDG 
2015 UAT 2017 
Urban      
% of population with access to 
improved water 86 93 85 95 100 
Rural      
% of population with access to 
improved water source 71 79 85 72 100 
Source: National Planning Commission/Government of Nepal; UNDP ‘Millennium Development 
Goals, Needs Assessment for Nepal’. 
 
However, in terms of functionality, 43 per cent of the built systems are not in a good 
functional condition, and the quality of the drinking water systems indicates much need to 
be done in the sector. Nepal expects to achieve a target of 100 per cent universal access 
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(UAT) by 2017, and accordingly the national WASH policy is geared towards this 
direction. 
3.2.3 Acts and regulations  
The legal and policy regime for drinking water is fairly conducive to providing adequate 
guidelines and safeguards in order to drive the sector to achieve both MDG 2015 and 
UAT 2017, although some institutional disarray 60  exists in policy coordination and 
transformation at the operational level. The main legislation that influences the provision 
of drinking water services in rural areas is briefly discussed here. These pieces of 
legislation provide the institutional arrangement, such as the formation, roles and 
responsibility of the water users’ committees, non-governmental organizations, District 
Development Committees, and the other government agencies involved in drinking water 
sector. All these actors are the subjects of study of this research. 
3.2.3.1 Water Resource Act 1992 (2049) and Water Resource Regulation 1993 
(2050) 
This is an umbrella Act that governs the water resource management of the country. It 
sets the priority order in the use of water, which is to say that drinking water is top priority, 
followed by irrigation. It provides a legal basis for the users’ committees via the formation 
of water users’ associations, through registration at the District Water Resource 
Committee, issuing licences to the associations for the use of water sources. 
 
To elaborate the Water Resource Act 1992 for operational purposes, the Water Resource 
Regulation 1993 was enacted. This regulation spells out the detailed procedure on how to 
register a Water User Association (this could be for irrigation, drinking water and other 
                                                
60  Two ministries, the Ministry of Urban Development and the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local 
Development and their respective departments, DWSS and DoLIDAR respectively are not effectively 
coordinating in the districts through their district line offices, WSSDOs and DTOs. 
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purposes) and to obtain a licence for operation. It provides detailed provision on how to 
establish a District Water Resource Committee and sets out the rights and obligations of 
Water User Associations and licence holders. It also deals with the acquisition and 
compensation of properties (house and land) for drinking water purposes. 
3.2.3.2 Drinking Water Regulation 1998 (2055 BS) 
The Water Resource Act 1991 and the Water Resource Regulations 1992 provide the 
general legal premises on how to use the water resources for general purposes, like 
drinking water, irrigation, hydroelectricity generation and other purposes. This regulation 
exclusively concerns the establishment and registration of consumer organization61 for 
drinking water, licensing for water source survey and utilization of sources, dispute 
settlement over the use of a source, source and environmental protection, level and 
utilization of services, and service charge.  
3.2.3.3 Local Self-governance Act 1999 and Local Self-governance Regulations 
1999 
This Local Self-governance Act (LSGA) is the umbrella act covering local bodies (local 
government) in Nepal. It is conceived in a spirit of decentralization. It devolves a whole 
range of political and development responsibilities to the local government of the country. 
It sets out the powers, functions and duties of the VDCs, Municipalities and DDCs. It 
entrusts local government with financial, taxation, revenue raising and expenditure power, 
including the coordination of all the government line agencies in development in the 
district including the private and social sector. It empowers the local government to 
arrange, or cause to be arranged, public services including the drinking water service and 
to impose service fees to sustain such a utility.  
                                                
61 Consumer organizations are also known as users’ committees in the case of drinking water, and when they 
get registered with the District Water Resource Committee as per the Act and Regulation, they become 
Drinking Water Users’ Associations. But people rarely use this term ‘association’; they prefer ‘committee’ 
instead. Here in this research, I have used ‘water users’ committee’ (WUC) throughout the deliberation 
because it reflects the correct terminology used commonly in Nepal. 
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The Local Self-governance Regulations further set out the powers, functions and duties of 
VDCs, Municipalities and DDCs in detail in relation to water and sanitation. Regarding 
drinking water, they specify the procedure for the formulation of water-related plans and 
project implementation procedures. This Act and the Regulations came into effect as an 
attempt to materialise the decentralization process of the country, in order to localise 
service delivery at the doorstep of the communities. This became disturbed during the 
Maoist conflict, although the local government is still functioning according to the Act and 
Regulations under the current transitional period. 
3.2.3.4 Water Supply Tariff Fixation Commission Act 2006 (2063): 
The purpose of this Act is to fix the tariff for water and sanitation. This Act makes provision 
for the formation, functions, duties and powers of the Water Tariff Fixation Commission, 
and further includes the handling of complaints, funding and audit of the Commission. 
Although the Commission has been in operation for more than nine years, it has played 
no such significant role to date in both urban and rural drinking water sectors owing to its 
poor organizational capacity (ADB 2009, p. 29). The role of this commission is imperative, 
as many water users’ committees are in the compact settlements, and these settlements 
are rapidly becoming municipalities, and are commercialising the drinking water services 
by adopting the user fee charge system to sustain the system. This may require some 
kind of regulatory enforcement, at least to address the equity issue in service provision. 
3.2.3.5 Drinking Water Quality Standards 2006: 
This is the implementation directive making provision for the agencies responsible to 
supply drinking water to consumers, confirming the National Drinking Water Quality 
Standard (NDWQS). It spells out the water sampling and testing procedure, monitoring 
and surveillance responsibility, and the parameters of water quality for NDWQS. Basically, 
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Service Providers are made responsible for maintaining and monitoring water quality, and 
the Ministry of Health & Population, and its district health offices, are responsible for water 
quality surveillance. In practice, the service providers in the cities and towns are 
monitoring the water quality [KUKL 2071, NWSC 2076 (2011)] and also some relatively 
big WUCs have initiated such activity, e.g. Shankarnagar of Butwal Municipality, Murgia of 
Rupandei District, Amarapuri of Nawalparasi District, but the majority of WUSCs, if 
considered as service providers, are not monitoring their water quality. Even those who 
are monitoring the water quality are still far behind meeting the national requirements.  
 
The Department of Health Services relies more on DWSS for the improved water supply 
and sanitation during any outbreak of diarrhoea than its own system (DoHS 20014), 
although these Standards have specified that water quality surveillance is the 
responsibility of District Public Health Offices. Despite reaching over 85 per cent of 
drinking water accessibility, ensuring standard water quality has been an issue, because 
the population receiving the piped water is less than 20%, which is also intermittent and 
the water sources used in the rural areas are open natural springs, spouts, shallow wells 
and hand pumps that can be easily contaminated (ADB 2014). 
 
With the advent of the new constitution in the near future, all these acts and regulations 
would be changed or amended, to adjust them according to the new federal structure. 
Particularly, the LSGA 1999 will be overhauled within the purview of new federal 
legislation, in which the functional jurisdiction of many public services would be devolved 
to the regional state governments, and through these governments to local bodies. How 
the relationship between state government and local government (district, municipality 
and village) will be established has yet to be seen. This also applies to whatever may be 
the legal framework to regulate the services in the drinking water sector in the near future. 
It can be expected that more power will be given to local government to mobilise local 
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resources through social and private sector participation, at the same time making these 
institutions accountable to their respective forum. 
3.2.4 Policy 
The policies that affect the rural drinking water provision are many, but the main ones are: 
3.2.4.1 Rural Water Supply and Sanitation National Policy and Strategy (2004) 
This policy and strategy have recognised the importance of drinking water and sanitation 
services for the socioeconomic development of the Nation, by improving the health status 
of the people. It sets national objectives on water and sanitation by setting the strategy to 
achieve the National Universal Targets by 2017. To achieve this, the policy has 
emphasised the enhancement of the capacity of local bodies, users’ committees, and 
NGOs, by reducing the direct involvement of the government in the implementation of 
water supply and sanitation programmes and projects. It has further set out that the 
service delivery mechanism of water supply and sanitation be carried out in partnership 
with users’ committees, community based organizations, non-governmental organizations 
and private sector organizations in line with the decentralization policy. But the policy fails 
to provide details on how to engage the community and private sector organizations in 
service delivery. 
 
This strategy specified the need for a minimum 20 per cent contribution from the 
community of the total water supply scheme construction cost, where 1 per cent must be 
in cash, and the rest can be in the form of labour and local material contribution. Both 
policy and strategy also deal with the whole range of operational and maintenance issues, 
and further include water quality and the use of appropriate and affordable technologies in 
drinking water supply. 
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The responsibility for policy formulation regarding drinking water is given to the Ministry of 
Physical Planning and Works (now the Ministry of Urban Development from 2015), while 
DDCs are entrusted with the District Development Plans, that also include district drinking 
water sectoral plans with inputs from VDCs. VDCs and WUCs take the implementation 
roles while DDCs and line agencies in the districts provide technical assistance as per the 
request of VDCs and WUCs. The policy specifies that eventually the rural drinking water 
supply and sanitation programme would be handed over to the DDCs, when they become 
capable of handling the sector on their own. It can be assumed that the spirit of the 
national policy and strategy regarding rural drinking water supply and sanitation is 
predominantly concerned to strengthen the local institutions and their participation in 
service delivery. 
3.2.4.2 Eleventh Three Year Interim Plan I (TYIP 2007/8-2009/10) 
This is the successor of the previous national development plans, and is geared towards 
achieving the national targets for WASH, emphasizing the sustainability of the drinking 
water system by improving the reliability and quality of the drinking water through socially 
inclusive development initiatives. Unlike the previous Tenth Plan (2002 to 2007), this Plan 
emphasises greater participation of both the social and private sectors, in order to 
increase the accessibility of drinking water and sanitation services. The Plan sets these 
targets: to achieve 85% coverage in the basic drinking water service, increasing from 
76.6%, and an increase to 15% from 8% in both the medium and high-level drinking water 
services within the planning period (Table 6). It encourages environmental concern by 
means of local participation and ownership in the provision of drinking water. It also deals 
with the functionality (repair and maintenance) of drinking water services and 
management. 
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Table 6: TYIP I Targets 2010 
Indicators Status by Fiscal 
Year 2006/07 
TYIP targets 
(2010) 
Basic drinking water service    
Total benefited population (in ‘000)  20,434 24,327 
Percentage of those benefited to total  76.6 85 
Medium and high level drinking water 
service  
  
Total benefited population (in ‘000)  2,134 4,293 
Percentage of those benefited to total  8 15 
Source: NPC (2010) 
3.2.4.3 Twelfth Three-Year Interim Plan TYIP II (2010/11 – 2012/13) 
Like the previous three-year interim plan, this plan is also formulated in keeping with the 
view of the objectives set by the National Water Resource Plan to provide basic drinking 
water and sanitation facility to all by 2017 (Table 7). The overall targets were slightly 
increased in numbers (25,223,000 popn.) from the previous plan’s target (24,327,000 
popn.) but not in per cent (85%). It is same with the medium and high service facility, 
where the target is slightly increased but with same percentage value (15%). Following 
the previous plan, the continuous expansion of drinking water services will be carried out 
by improving water quality and services, and by increasing the participation and 
ownership of local communities in the construction and operation of drinking water 
systems. These revised targets and achievements indicate that the strategies adopted in 
the previous Plan did not work well. Many believed that reaching 100% or close to 100% 
would be very difficult because the level of effort required is very high. For this reason, the 
Plan has emphasised water quality improvement, rehabilitation, maintenance and repair, 
and improving the governance of the drinking water supply system through the greater 
participation of non-state actors. The Plan also ensures drinking water services by 
improving the repair, maintenance and rehabilitation management systems.   
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Table 7: TYIP II Targets 2013 
Basic Drinking Water facility FY 2009/10 TYIP Targets 2013 
Total beneficiary population (,000) 22,547 25,223 
Total beneficiary in %  80 85 
Medium/high service facility   
Total beneficiary population (,000) 2944 4451 
Total beneficiary population in % 10.5 15 
Source: NPC (2013) 
 
An adoption of a sector wide approach in WASH, promotion of the use of local materials, 
along with ensuring climate resilience in the construction of drinking water systems, 
improvement of water quality and capacity building for sustainable drinking water and 
sanitation are the other features of the Plan. 
3.2.4.4 Thirteenth Three Year Plan (FY 2013/14 – 2015/16) – Approach Paper 
The Plan’s broader objective is to achieve inclusive, broad-based and sustainable 
economic growth through the greater participation in development of the three different 
sectors (private, government, and community). Following this strategy, this Thirteenth 
Three Year Plan is also formulated around the same objective as that of the previous 
National Plan – to achieve universal access in basic drinking water by 2017.  
 
Like before, it emphasizes enhancing the accessibility of quality drinking water, as per the 
National Drinking Water Standards 2005 and the Action Plan. Recognising the physical 
and geographical difficulties of reaching as yet unreached people, the Plan calls for the 
use of rainwater harvesting, solar and electric pumping, and hydraulic ramps as 
alternative technologies for providing drinking water in dry areas. Other features of the 
Plan are the same as in the previous plan: a sector-wide approach, environment-friendly 
and climate-adaptive measures, achieved by using local resources in the construction of 
drinking water systems. 
 
 
 
138 
However, the Plan gives more details on operational arrangements. For instance, the 
priority to be given to repair and maintenance of the completed projects, use of the 
management contract system if users’ groups are unable to handle large-scale drinking 
water and sanitation projects, and mobilization of local resources, including joint 
investment in the construction and use of drinking water and sanitation structures. Hence, 
the policy direction is more liberal, making use of NGOs and the private sector to improve 
the drinking water accessibility. 
3.3.4.5 Conclusion 
The national development policy priority has always been focused on poverty alleviation 
at the macro level in the past (Ninth Plan 1997-2002, Tenth Plan PRSP 2002–2007); and 
during the post-conflict era, peace building and reconstruction became the central issues 
in the last two Three Year Interim Plans (Eleventh Plan 2007 - 2010, Twelfth Plan 20010 - 
2013). The current Three Year Plan III (2013 - 2016) is poverty-focused as well. The 
underlying policy of this Plan has increasingly emphasised the achievement of inclusive, 
broad-based and sustainable economic growth by enhancing the contributions of the 
different stakeholders, i.e. private, government, and community, including cooperative 
sectors for development. The last three plans have clearly spelled out the importance of 
drinking water and accordingly formulated the policies and strategies in line with MDG 
targets, although the country has already achieved its MDG (2015), and is now heading 
for UAT (2017).  
 
To sum up, the legal and policy environment – that is to say all the acts, regulations, plans 
and policies related to drinking water – may be seen as very favourable, and testifies to 
the fact that this sector has been clearly identified as a priority (P1)62 for development, 
ensuring the flow of resources but also the mobilisation of institutions, such as local 
                                                
62  P1 means priority number one programme (or sector) as per the government development priority where 
the government whole-heartedly ensure the smooth flow of funds throughout the planning period. 
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government, community, social and private sectors, and donors, towards improved 
drinking water service provision.  
 
Considering all the existing legal and policy provisions one can assume that an adequate 
policy framework for drinking water has been put in place, that has the strategic aim of 
embedding the decentralized service delivery system within local participation and the 
governance initiative. How these policies are implemented through institutional and 
organizational structures is discussed further in the following sub-sections, with an 
emphasis on the most problematic area of the rural drinking water issue. 
3.2.5 Institutional arrangements  
The introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme in the mid-1980s (Shrestha 
2010), and particularly the adoption of liberal policies in the 1990s, has brought eminent 
structural changes in the politico63-administrative64 and economic65 features of Nepal. 
Decentralization, as being the key means for development, has received a greater thrust 
with the new Local Self-governance Act 1999 and other policies that recognize the 
involvement of both the private and social sectors in public service delivery. As a result of 
this, a large number of new actors, namely community-based users’ groups and private 
organizations together with non-governmental organisations, have emerged in the 
development sector, including in drinking water service provision.  
 
Although many such organizations already existed in the society, the formalization of 
users’ committees and NGOs as intermediary service providers through registration with 
the government has been tremendously increased. This has also empowered Local 
Bodies (governments) with devolved power to coordinate development programmes and 
                                                
63  A multiparty political system was introduced under the constitutional monarchy. 
64  Downsizing and streamlining of the Civil Service took place in the early 1990s as part of the structural 
adjustment programme under IMF pressure. 
65  De-regulation, privatization and liberalization of enterprises, fiscal policies and financial markets initiated. 
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mobilize resources for service delivery at the local level. Overall, the principle of local 
partnership between these sectors has been enshrined in, and encouraged by, the 
legislation. 
 
In order to implement the plans and policies of the government regarding drinking water 
supply, three dominant institutional forms for drinking water service provision have 
emerged, with some variations in their implementation (Figure 9). These are: 
• A Government regular programme through sectoral line agencies 
• A Government regular programme through local government  
• I/NGOs-supported programme 
Figure 9: Institutional arrangement for drinking water provision 
 
Source: Constructed based on Department of Water Supply and Sewerage, Sector Efficiency 
Improvement Unit/ Ministry of Urban Development /GoN, Asian Development Bank supported 
Small Town Project Preparatory Technical Assistance, Asian Development Bank supported 
Community Based Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project, World Bank supported Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board, NEWAH, WaterAid. 
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The MoUD stream is increasingly becoming the urban focus, but as discussed earlier, it 
also inherits the provision of rural drinking water as well. The Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation National Policy and Strategy (2004) clearly spelled out that the role of DWSS 
was to be eventually diminished in the rural areas. However, MoUD spread its rural reach 
through the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board (in short Fund 
Board), a quasi-governmental body. NWSC is also a parastatal body under MoUD that 
works in the 2I urban centres. 
 
The MoFALD stream works through the local government structure, DDCs, Municipalities 
and VDCs. DoLIDAR, under the ministry, provides technical support to the local 
government. Most of the off-budget programmes for rural drinking water are implemented 
through the SWC stream by means of which the INGOs and NGOs are registered, in 
order to work with communities in the rural areas. 
 
The National Planning Commission (NPC) of Nepal is an apex planning body of the 
government responsible for national development planning, policy and strategy 
formulation, working closely with the sectoral line ministries. In the case of drinking water 
supply, it works with the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) and the Ministry of 
Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD), but it also works with the Ministry of 
Health and Population (MoHP) for water quality surveillance and monitoring health-related 
results; and with the Ministry of Education (MoE) for school level drinking water and 
sanitation. These last two ministries and their district level line offices will not be discussed 
here, as their roles at the district level with the District Development Committees are found 
not compatible with effective service provision, due to structural and functional 
differentiation.  
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3.2.5.1 Ministry of Urban Development 
The Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) (formerly the Ministry of Physical Planning 
and Works) is the sectoral ministry responsible for water and sanitation. The Department 
of Water Supply & Sewerage (DWSS) under this ministry is the designated lead agency 
for the drinking water and sanitation sector. This Ministry chairs the Sector Stakeholders 
Group meeting for drinking water and sanitation at the national level, to formulate the 
national policy, guidelines, service standards, and sector-financing plan. It also issues 
directives from time to time, related to drinking water and sanitation. The responsibility for 
national-level monitoring of drinking water and sanitation also falls under this ministry. It 
works with MoFALD on rural drinking water and sanitation programmes and projects.  
 
The Department of Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS), which was established in 1972, 
operates through the regional offices in the five development regions and the divisional 
and sub-divisional offices in all 75 districts of the country. The DWSS’s functional 
jurisdiction still includes both the urban and rural areas of the sector, despite the national 
policy which has directed them to leave the rural areas to DDCs over a period of time 
(RWSSNPS 2004). DWSS has two major programme streams; one is to assist the MoUD 
in the formulation of sector plans, policy and coordination, and the other is to implement 
the drinking water and sanitation programmes and projects through its 75 district offices, 
and through donor-supported projects like the ‘Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation 
Sector Project’ (SSTWSSSP66 2010 - 2015) and the ‘Community Based Water Supply and 
Sanitation Sector Project’ (CBWSSSP 2004 - 2011) (ADB, 2013). 
 
The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board67 is a parastatal body 
established in 1996 under the oversight of MoUD. The cabinet has approved a bill some 
                                                
66  Second Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project funded with the ADB’s grant of $45.1 
million and the Government of Nepal’s $20.5 million, where the contribution of WUSCs and local 
governments is of $6.1 million (budgeted). Source: DWSS, GoN. 
67  For detail about Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board, refer http://www.rwss.org 
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time ago to give it a separate identity with more autonomy by making it the Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Fund, but the bill has yet to be passed by the parliament (or 
constituent assembly at this time) (WB 2004c). It has its own governing board and 
management structure to run its day-to-day affairs. Currently, it is in its Third Project 
period (First Project, 1996-2003; Second Project, 2004-2012 with $31.08 million) and is 
financed by the World Bank (WB 2013). It has the mandate to work in rural areas on small 
drinking water schemes, with technical support service providers (consultants) and 
support organisations (local NGOs). The Fund Board has the most extensive service 
coverage in the country. With its presence in 71 districts, it has already helped to build 
1,465 drinking water schemes, giving access to drinking water to 190,172 households 
(population 1,140,892) (WB 2013).  
 
The Nepal Water Supply Corporation (NWSC) is also a quasi-public organization, 
responsible for the provision of drinking water and sewerage in municipal areas since 
1973. MoUD oversees this body at the policy level. Owing to its poor performance in 
improving and sustaining services (WB 1991), this organization is struggling for its 
survival in the changed context of service delivery. To overcome the institutional issues 
affecting drinking water, the government has adopted a new policy that promotes more 
decentralised service provision with local participation. To affect this, in the capital city 
Kathmandu, all NWSC’s assets, and some 1,100 employees, were transferred to the 
newly formed Kathmandu Valley Water Supply Management Board (KVWSMB) in 2008. 
The Board subsequently handed over the assets of NWSC to Kathmandu Upatyaka 
Khanepani Limited (KUKL), which is now responsible for operating water and sewerage 
services in the Kathmandu valley. Despite following this new policy, converting NWSC 
offices into water management boards (asset owner) in some towns, NWSC is still 
responsible for operating drinking water services in over 21 municipal towns outside the 
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Kathmandu valley (NWSC)68. However, this policy, the arrangement of the responsibility 
of drinking water services as an asset owner, a service provider, and a regulator, 
contrasts with rural drinking water services where the WUSC assumed all these three 
roles. 
3.2.5.2 Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development 
The Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD) is the ministry 
responsible for overseeing the local development and decentralization programmes that 
are implemented through local government, i.e. the 75 District Development Committees 
(DDCs), 58 Municipalities and 3,915 Village Development Committees (VDCs)69. The 
Department of Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads (DoLIDAR) is the 
technical arm of the ministry. This department was established in 1997 and has an annual 
budget of NPR 35 billion for the fiscal year 2013/14 (DoLIDAR 2013). It is responsible for 
community level drinking water schemes, along with other local infrastructure programmes 
like rural roads, bridges, small irrigation, and housing, etc. These activities are 
implemented through the 75 District Technical Offices attached to the District 
Development Committees.   
 
The objective of DoLIDAR is: 
“… to undertake infrastructure development programmes, in accordance with 
decentralization policies, for attaining the goals set forth by the GoN’s National 
Strategy for Rural Infrastructure Development, by making the local authorities 
technically capable and competent, and ensuring their accountable 
participation” (DoLIDAR, LID Policy 200470). 
                                                
68  For more information on NWSC, refer http://www.nwsc.gov.np/contact.php 
69  The number of municipalities and VDCs has been recently changed. More municipalities have been 
created and the number of VDCs is reduced, for detail see the website of the MoFALD - 
www.mofald.gov.np 
70  Source: http://www.dolidar.gov.np/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/LocalInfrastructureDevelopmentPolicy2061-EN1.pdf 
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Through this department, MoFALD implements the highest number of donor-supported 
projects in the country, ranging from governance improvements and social infrastructure 
development to rural livelihood71. Two Finnish Government supported projects, the Rural 
Village Water Resource Management Project in the Far-Western Region (10 districts), 
and the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project in Western Region (9 districts), are 
active in the rural drinking water sector. These projects have been under implementation 
through the District Technical Offices, working together with DDCs, since 2006 and 2008 
respectively. 
 
As discussed earlier, other central level major stakeholders are the National Planning 
Commission, the apex planning body that formulates long term and annual plans, policies 
and programmes; and the Water Supply Tariff Fixation Commission (WSTFC) established 
in 2007 for fixing water tariffs, ensuring quality service delivery, monitoring of services and 
resolving disputes between Service Providers and the Consumers.  
 
UN bodies like UNICEF and WHO work with multiple government agencies, like the 
Department of Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS), the Department of Local 
Infrastructure and Agriculture Road (DoLIDAR), and the Department of Health Services in 
the drinking water, sanitation and health sectors. UNICEF also works directly with the 
DDCs in some districts. All these international bodies assist the Government to achieve 
MDGs through different measures, such as providing policy inputs at the central level, 
helping to implement projects at the district and school level, and building the capacity of 
government and non-governmental institutions in water quality improvement. However, 
effective donor support coordination has been considered essential for the sector’s 
effectiveness, and thus the Sector Stakeholder Group was established for donor support 
harmonization, and to address the fragmentation issues under MoUD (SEIU 2011).  
                                                
71  For more information on DoLIDAR, refer http://www.dolidar.gov.np 
 
 
146 
3.2.5.3 SWC-INGO Stream 
Apart from these two ministerial-guided programmes, there is a third major programme 
stream for drinking water and sanitation. This is known as the international third sector or 
INGO stream. These INGOs are registered with the Social Welfare Council (SWC-N). 
Some major INGOs working in the water and sanitation sector are: WaterAid, CARE, 
SNV, PLAN, Mercy Corp, and SCF. Many of these INGOs are also working in various 
types of community development programmes, like education, income generation, 
environmental conservation, mother and child health, savings credits, skills development, 
food, nutrition, women, human rights, democracy and governance as well as the drinking 
water and sanitation sector (AIN)72.  
 
These INGOs work through several national and local NGOs. For example, Nepal Water 
for Health (NEWAH) is a national level NGO which has been working in drinking water, 
health and sanitation in rural areas in partnership with local NGOs since 1992. It receives 
funding from WaterAid, which in turn receives funds from international donors like DFID 
and AusAid. As of June 2012, NEWAH has worked in 51 districts, and completed 1,672 
projects benefitting 1,406,953 population (NEWAH)73. This example shows the kind of 
scale which NGO’s, supported by INGOs, operate on at the national level. 
 
Lumanti74, a Kathmandu-based national NGO, is another example. It is very active in 
urban shelter issues, but also involved in WASH programmes, besides many other 
community development programmes. The Environment and Public Health Organisation 
(ENPHO75) is also a non-profit NGO that works on drinking water quality improvement 
                                                
72  According to the Association of International NGOs in Nepal (AIN) there are 110 active INGOs currently 
working in different sectors and sub-sectors. Source: http://www.ain.org.np/member_ingos.php accessed 
on 21March 2014 
73  For organizational information on NEWAH, refer http://newah.org.np/index1.php?option=information&id=32  
74  For organizational information on Lumanti, refer http://lumanti.org.np/cms/  
75  For organizational information on ENPHO, refer http://www.enpho.org  
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with donor-supported projects. It also promotes appropriate technology in water and 
wastewater treatment, health, sanitation and environmental management.  
 
The Federation of Drinking Water and Sanitation Users Nepal (FEDWASUN76) is a 
national level advocacy network organization, established in 2004. It represents more 
than 3,400 water and sanitation users’ committees, representing 510,000 households. 
Fifteen per cent of these are urban-based users (ADB 2008). Although it advocates 
WASH policy through lobbying at the central level, at the same time it implements some 
capacity building programmes with the help of donors such as WaterAid, UNICEF, Finnish 
Development Cooperation, and OXFAM. SNV Nepal77 has five major components, and 
one of them is WASH. SNV is working in more than 35 districts in Nepal. It receives 
funding support from the Royal Norwegian Embassy, DFID, the European Commission, 
ADB, IFAD and AusAid. 
 
Over the last ten years, donors have tended more to establish a joint platform, a kind of 
facility (which can be considered a donor SWAp), to support programmes and channel the 
funds through INGOs and/or national NGOs. The programmes like HUGOU now 
Governance Facility, the Danish-led programme supported by Swiss Embassy and DFID, 
working in human rights and good governance 78 , and the PRAN (Programme for 
Accountability in Nepal79) of the World Bank, are some initiatives moving in this direction. 
Although these facilities are working in a collaborative manner with the government 
agencies, they are not structurally and programmatically integrated within the government 
system. In the WASH sector, the Sector Efficiency Improvement Unit (SEIU) within MoUD 
is playing the sector coordination role regarding coherent policy implementation, which 
                                                
76  For detail information on the Federation of Water and Sanitation Users Nepal, refer 
http://www.fedwasun.org  
77  For more information on SNV, refer http://www.snvworld.org/en/countries/nepal  
78 For more on Danish led programme on human rights and good governance, refer 
http://nepal.um.dk/en/danida-en/programmes/peace-support/  
79 For more information on the World Bank led initiatives on accountability programme, refer 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2011/05/03/nepal-accountability-program-pran  
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includes all the major stakeholders including the INGOs (WaterAid, SNV) and NGOs 
(NEWAH, and Lumanti). Nevertheless, they are following their own implementation 
modalities. These may fall within the broader WASH national policy but are outside the 
national government structure. 
3.2.6 Service Provision Approach 
There are basically four approaches implemented in the rural drinking water sector in 
Nepal. These approaches are embedded in one of the institutional arrangements that we 
discussed earlier. In order to assess how each of these three streams of service flow 
works, the following account has been derived from a period of participant observation. 
This was undertaken through the author’s involvement in technical assistance of the Asian 
Development Bank for the project preparatory work of the Small Town Water Supply and 
Sanitation Sector Phase-II in 2008, Ramboll Finland Oy for Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Project from 2008 to 2012, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities for the 
Municipal Governance Programme from 2000 to 2002. These approaches are also 
substantiated by various workshops, high-level meetings attended by the author in the last 
13 years (2000 to 2013), and also the interactions held with the government and local 
government officials, various projects’ staff, other stakeholders such as NGOs, users’ 
committees and private sector organizations. 
3.2.6.1 Government’s own programme 
The Government’s routine programme implementation approach follows the normal 
government service provision protocol. For drinking water and sanitation programmes, the 
respective departments (DWSS, DoLIDAR) receive programme budgets from their line 
ministries (MoUD, MoFALD) and then implement the programmes through their district 
level offices (WSSDO, DDC/DTO) normally with the participation of Water Users’ 
Committees.  
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In general, DDCs in the respective districts try to coordinate the various sectoral 
programmes and resources through District Development Plans, following the LSGA, but 
many duplications and inconsistencies are found between the line agencies’ and DDCs’ 
programmes. The MoUD/DWSS stream is more a matter of centrally dictated top-down 
programmes, whereas MoFALD/DoLIDAR/DDC is concerned with community-driven 
bottom-up programmes. In fact the spirit of decentralization is hindered by the sectoral 
institutional rivalry in planning and implementation. For instance, the drinking water 
schemes in the districts that are implemented through WSSDOs should be approved by 
the DWSS of the MoUD, rather than by the respective DDCs of the districts, which often 
avoid the bottom-up local level planning process, which extends from community to ward 
to VDC to Ilaka (a kind of Electoral College) to DDC. There is hardly any monitoring and 
supervision by the DDCs for schemes implemented through WSSDOs. Overall, the whole 
funding channel is completely different. Here, WSSDOs have control of their own funds. 
This is a good example of the institutional constraints which have complicated the 
introduction of decentralization in Nepal over the last 30 years.  
 
Mismatches in community priorities (e.g. placing rural roads over rural drinking water or 
education), cost over-running (25% higher than RWSSFDB, WB 2008), delays in 
completion as “many government undertaken projects take over 10-15 years to complete 
a project” (WaterAid 2010, p. 20); and poor quality of construction, which has contributed 
to the fact that only 43% of drinking water schemes are functional (SEIU 2011) are often 
seen as typical problems in the functioning of government-funded and -implemented 
drinking water programmes and projects. In general, the government-implemented 
projects are likely to suffer from elite capture80, bureaucratic discretionary decisions and 
                                                
80  The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) that submits reports to the British Parliament has 
reported about the corruption in the Local Governance and Community Development Programme 
(LGCDP). This programme is supported by the joint donor platform including the UKAid. DFID within 
MoFALD has failed to check the corruption, in which the poor still bribe officials for services, and political 
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political patronage; all these have prompted accountability deficiencies thus leading to 
corruption in the service delivery system. 
3.2.6.2 Donor supported Government’s programmes/projects 
This approach follows the typical project implementation modality adopted by the 
government, after the failure of integrated rural development models (1976 to 1990) 
(Amatya 1989) to bridge income inequality in the rural areas. This failure has been 
ascribed to an inappropriate institutional framework, lack of community participation 
(Bista, S.K. 1999) and organizational issues like delay in budget disbursement, 
administrative and bureaucratic obstacles, and lack of sectoral coordination (Amatya 
1989). From the 1990s onward, with donor support, projects become more sector-specific, 
such as highway, education, drinking water, and health. But this has also brought some 
variations in operational modalities because each donor would like to pursue their own 
project/programme implementation procedure. 
 
In order to coordinate and consolidate the various programmes and projects – particularly 
the flow of funds – and also to have a consistent policy application, the Government has 
pursued a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp)81 from the mid-2000s (WB, 2004b), starting with 
the Nepal Health Sector Programme (NHSP 2004-2010) in 2004 (Vaillancourt and 
Pokhrel 2012). This trend continued in education with the School Sector Reform 
Programme (SSRP 2010-2015) (Rodriguez, 2010) in the 2010s.  
 
However, this sector-programmatic approach could not be implemented in the drinking 
water sector despite policy approval (NPC 2013). The issues of urban (DWSS) versus 
                                                                                                                                              
elites often use their status to influence the allocation of government funds. Source: Kathmandu Post, 1 
November 2014. 
81  “All significant funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure programme, under 
government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and progressing towards relying 
on government procedures to disburse and account for all funds.” Definition of SWAp by Foster, M; Brown, 
A; Conway, T (……….) ODI/WHO on Sector-Wide Approaches for Health Development: A Review of 
Experience.  http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4533.pdf 
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rural (DDCs), sector (MoUD is the WASH sector lead ministry) versus governance 
(MoFALD is the line ministry for local governments and community mobilizations), of who 
takes control of what, have all contributed to the drinking water sector remaining 
institutionally fragmented.  
 
This institutional fragmentation between MoUD and MoFALD has also led them to have 
their own donor-supported project implementation structures within their systems, each 
with a distinct implementation management structure and process. For instance, 
MoUD/DWSS has ADB-supported projects and MoUD also has the WB-supported 
RWSSFDB, while MoFALD/DoLIDAR has Finnish Government-supported projects. 
Nevertheless, it is claimed by both government and donors that this approach is 
community demand-driven, in order to respond to the failure of the previous government-
implemented service delivery model.  
 
In this approach, the government, with donor support, established a special Project 
Management Unit (PMU) at departmental level. Certain coordination and reporting 
mechanisms are framed within the department, but the operational function is completely 
insulated from it. The government deputes their senior staff as project coordinator or 
director, where the donor or the project hires international and national consultants 
(normally termed Technical Support Team, or Technical Assistance), to manage the 
projects. This typical service delivery arrangement, which has been widely used by the 
government from the early 2000s, can be considered a temporary form of agencification. 
This arrangement provides a different management and incentive structure, which often 
causes envy among the government staff and thus becomes the covert reason for non-
cooperation. 
 
The Community-Based Drinking Water and Sanitation Sector Project (CBWSSP) 
supported by ADB is presented here as a representative case. This Project was 
 
 
152 
implemented in the 21 districts of the Far-western (7), Mid-far-western (12) and Western 
(2) regions of the country. Although it was phased out in 2011 (ADB, 2013a), the features 
of this model are found throughout, particularly in rural development projects, including 
the drinking water sector. The model is improvised, based on the experience of many 
donors (DFID, WB, FINNIDA, UNICEF) who have worked in the sector for a long time. 
This model may be taken to represent a generic pathway (or blueprint) for development 
projects supported by donors in Nepal, with some variation in implementation82. For 
example, this is a community-managed project, but channelled through the local authority, 
whereas many community-managed projects are directly implemented by INGOs through 
local NGOs. The implications of this different approach are explored below. 
 
Community-Based Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project (CBWSSSP): 
A typical project management structure of this model is depicted in Figure 10. In this 
model, the line ministry (MoUD) has become the executing agency that has delegated the 
power to its department (DWSS) to execute the project. To facilitate the project, the 
National Project Steering Committee (NPSC) was formed, and the Project Management 
Unit (PMU) was created under that committee. NPSC is a policy-making body, while PMU 
coordinates the national stakeholders for policy, the strategy formulation and the funding 
arrangements.  
 
The participating DDCs became the implementing agencies at district level. For 
implementation, the ministry has entered into project agreements with the DDCs. A Water 
and Sanitation Support Unit (WSSU) was established in each project DDC. The chief of 
WSSDO on the deputation heads the WSSU.  
                                                
82  There are many development projects that have followed this system (project support or management unit) 
with some changes in other sectors like rural roads, rural infrastructure, trial bridges, irrigation, forestry etc. 
 
 
153 
Figure 10: CBWSSSP Implementation Modality 
 
Source: ADB CBWSSSP, 2012, 201383, 84 
 
A District Water Coordination Committee, chaired by a District Chairman (currently, LDO), 
was created to coordinate the project activities with various stakeholders like VDCs, 
NGOs, district line agency offices, and donor-supported projects at the district level. The 
WSSUs, consisting of support agencies (or consultants), and support organizations 
(normally local NGOs and CBOs), were attached to the DDCs in order to implement the 
projects’ activities by assisting the communities, that is, the water users’ committees, to 
construct drinking water schemes. WSSU also provide capacity-building training to the 
community on how to sustain the schemes. In order to facilitate the process, the PMU 
hired local technical service providers, private consultants or NGOs, to work with 
                                                
83  Developed based on the “Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on A 
Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Nepal for the Community-Based Water Supply And Sanitation Sector 
Project.” (ADB CBWSSS, 2012, 2013) 
84  For more information on Community Based Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project refer 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/projdocs/2003/rrp_R165_03.pdf  
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communities. This project followed the standard project implementation guidelines, 
procurement process, monitoring, reporting, and result assessment procedures.  
 
This arrangement is normally found effective in terms of the intervention outcomes, 
because it employs a different project management structure that allows a fast-track 
decision-making and fund-flow system by avoiding the normal government procedural 
system. Private sector and NGOs are given the responsibility through WSSU to assist the 
community in implementing the drinking water schemes. However, this model has 
suffered from two institutional constraints: i) accountability, and ii) capacity.  
 
DDCs were given the responsibility of project implementation by MoPPW (now MoUD). 
But at the same time, the DWSS of MoPPW deputed a WSSDO staff member as the chief 
of WSSU; whereas the DDC, which is under MoFALD, did not have much of a role, except 
to endorse the work of WSSU. 
 
This created poor coordination and weak accountability in service provision. It was found 
to be difficult for DDCs to become accountable to DWSS/MoPPW, as the project was 
virtually implemented by WSSDO in the name of DDC, and organizationally, WSSDO was 
officially accountable to DWSS/MoPPW not to MoFALD. The basic idea was that WSSDO 
was to work as a technical specialized arm of DDC, but the DDC has its own technical 
arm – ‘District Technical Office’ (DTO) – in every district. In fact the CBWSSP was never 
appreciated by DDCs fully as part of their responsibility in the implementation of the 
project, due to structural differences in the functioning and composition of this project. 
 
This arrangement could not be fully compatible with the DDC system because of its 
different project management structure, in terms of decision-making, fund flow, and 
monitoring and reporting procedures. Despite this, the project’s earmarked funds were 
reflected in the government annual budget “red book”, and it also followed government 
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reporting systems, quite apart from its own project formats and channels. In the Project 
Completion Report of CBWSSSP (ADB 2012), the weak project management capacity of 
DDCs was pointed out as affecting the service delivery adversely, undermining the ability 
to provide a service. Poor reporting performance by the consultants (SAs) and the 
inadequate technical capacity of NGOs (SOs) to support the WUSCs were also 
acknowledged as reasons for the poor performance of the project. However, overall, the 
project was rated successful by the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2012), which means 
the project approach used was affirmative for future reference, and no structural change 
in the project management and the extension of the project were recommended in the 
Project Completion Report. This rather shows positive remarks in favour of 
DWSS/MoPPW, and less concern with DDC/MoFALD. 
 
Contrary to CBWSSSP, UNICEF has used a slightly different approach. It has worked 
through the several government institutions involved in the WASH sector, but mainly for 
sanitation and hygiene, not drinking water in the later years. It provides funds to DWSS for 
monitoring system development, and has also helped DWSS and MoUD in the 
preparation of WASH sector policies and programmes at the national level. At the same 
time, it has worked with selected DDCs for the sanitation and hygiene campaign. Its 
schools programmes are considered the most effective ones in Nepal. UNICEF follows 
the national funding and programme system. However, the UNICEF programme did not 
use the technical service provider concept, i.e. service outsourcing, like other bilateral 
projects, but used their own field and regional office staff to assist DDCs to implement the 
programme. 
3.2.6.3 Quasi Non-Governmental Organization (QUANGO) 
The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board (RWSSFDB) is a 
QUANGO, or an arm’s-length body of the government, established with a long-term vision 
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to serve the rural drinking water and sanitation sector of the country. Institutionally, it is an 
independent body established in 1996 under the Development Board Act 1956 and 
governed by a Board of Directors drawn from both central and local government officials, 
and from civil society and professional organizations. It receives funds from the 
government, and from government guaranteed donors (currently the World Bank only). It 
has already implemented two phases (1996-2003, 2004-12) of the IDA/World Bank 
supported project. The Bank acclaimed the successful implementation of this project, and 
has approved the results and the approach used by RWSSFDB (WB 2004c, WB 2013). 
As a result, the Bank has decided to provide the funds for the third phase of the project. 
 
The project delivery approach used by RWSSFDB is very straight forward, as shown in 
Figure 11. It works directly with the community through a Service Agency (SA). SA in turn 
provides technical assistance to a Service Organization (SO) and the community in the 
construction and operation of schemes. SO works very closely with communities to 
implement drinking water schemes. SAs are normally private consulting firms, but can 
also be national and regional level NGOs, whereas SOs are generally local NGOs and 
CBOs. Both SA and SO are directly hired by RWSSPFDB’s Head Office in Kathmandu 
from the service market, through open pre-qualified bids.  
 
This was the first model that has recognised the outsourcing of technical assistance in 
drinking water service provision, which was later followed by other projects including 
CBWSSSP. Basically, this pattern of technical assistance in service provision is a type of 
service delivery chain extending from donor to government to QUANGO (RWSSPFDB) to 
SA/SO and community. The model reduces bureaucratic obstacles at the operational level 
and empowers the community to manage their drinking water systems.  
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Figure 11: RWSSSFDB Approach 
 
Source: RWSSFDB 
 
 
The main feature of this model, also known as the “demand driven community managed 
model”, is to reflect certain governance characteristics (such as direct community 
participation, as beneficiaries of the programme), but it also bypasses the formal 
accountability chain of local government. The model offers autonomy in operation, but is 
still subject to central government control on policy and funding. It offers the shortest route 
in service provision by bypassing at least two government layers under the MoUD stream 
– the department (DWSS) and its district line office (WSSDO). It also works outside the 
local government system, limiting the participation of local institutions. Hence this model, 
organizationally, offers less space for both, horizontal accountability across with other 
stakeholders in the district, and downward accountability from local government to public. 
On the other hand, it attracts both the private sector and NGOs in service provision. 
However, the capacity of RWSSDFB to mobilise SAs and SOs, and also the capacity of 
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SAs and SOs themselves to assist communities, can become problematic for effective 
service provision (WB 2013, pp. 45-46).  
3.2.6.4 I/NGO – Third Sector Provision 
This service provision model cascades from donor to INGO to national NGO to local NGO 
and finally to CBO and/or users’ group, which basically follows the route of the aid (Singh 
and Ingdel 2007).  Even within this stream, there is a great variation in support 
mechanisms as per the donor agencies’ preferences. For example, DFID provides funds 
to its own programmes, the ‘Enabling State Programme (ESP)’ and ‘Community Support 
Programme (CSP)’, in which they have established a direct working relationship with 
various local NGOs; but at the same time, it also channels its aid through multilateral and 
bilateral agencies (or shared aid platforms), such as UN bodies, GIZ and INGOs 
(Helvetas, WaterAid, Oxfam etc.); and these INGOs work with national and local NGOs. 
Likewise, the Royal Norwegian Embassy works directly with the national NGO, such as 
the Informal Service Centre (INSEC), and at the same time joins hands with other donors 
(DFID, AusAid, Danida) on human rights, democracy, inclusion and governance 
programmes, where these programmes are implemented through various INGOs, national 
and local NGOs.  
 
In the drinking water sector, WaterAid and The Gurkha Welfare Trust (a British trust) are 
dedicated INGOs working in rural drinking water and sanitation. Gurkha Welfare does 
everything itself with the community, while WaterAid works through national NGOs such 
as Nepal Water Health (NEWAH). Other organizations – for example SNV, Care, Plan 
International, and Helvetas – are also working in the drinking water and sanitation sector 
along with other community development programmes like education, livelihood and 
health. Interestingly, the common aspect of the model they use is that it does not use the 
government system, at least at the local level (DDCs and VDCs), although efforts are 
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being made to coordinate the programme at the central and district level to avoid 
duplication as much as possible, but not the budget. 
3.2.7 Drinking Water Sector Financing 
During the period 2004 to 2010, the WASH sector received (for both urban and rural) NPR 
25 billion. This works out at NPR 4.18 billion per year. Out of this, NPR 22.54 billion was 
disbursed through two government departments (DWSS and DoLIDAR) and RWSSFDB, 
and the remaining 10%, i.e. amount NPR 2.55 billion, was off-budget funding (SEIU 
2011), which is mainly through INGOs and the various embassies of different countries.  
 
The government has calculated that to meet the national target of universal drinking water 
and sanitation by 2017 (i.e. 100% coverage), the sector requires NPR 53 billion, which 
means NPR 7.57 billion annually from 2010. This stands about 1.4% of the total national 
budget of fiscal year 2013/14 (NPR 517 billion)85. With an annual disbursement rate of 
2004 to 2010 and projected during 2010 to 2017, there is a deficit of NPR 3.4 billion per 
annum (SEIU 2011).  
 
In this situation the government has certain options for raising resources. This could be 
done either through internal resources, an increase in the annual allocation in the national 
budget or securing pledges from donors for more aid. A further option could be seeking 
greater involvement of communities and users themselves in service provision, including 
the support of the non-state sector, given that national policies have sought greater 
participation of the third sector in service provision. 
                                                
85  For the government policies, programme and budget for the fiscal year 2013/14 refer 
http://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/cmsfiles/file/Budget_speech_Complete_20130730061251.pdf for details. 
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3.2.8 Issues 
The issues pertaining to drinking water services, particularly in rural areas, are discussed 
here. 
3.2.8.1 Fragmentation and coordination 
In addition to the many technical problems and sustainability issues that exist in the policy 
and operations, the drinking water sector is institutionally fragmented (SEIU 2011), and 
this fragmentation is deepening in the course of achieving the national universal target by 
2017. As shown in Figure 9, there are three major institutional streams (or arrangements) 
being employed to drive the drinking water sector. This figure also narrates the fund flow 
mechanism, planning, programming, and reporting and accountability routes of each 
institutional stream.  
 
Each of these streams has their own strengths and weaknesses in their particular 
institutional setting and context. Structurally, both Ministries (MoUD and MoFALD) have 
their presence in the 75 districts of the country through their district line agency offices 
(DWSSOs) and local governments (DDCs/DTOs). However, MoFALD has an institutional 
advantage over MoUD from the governance perspective, as it has political, social and 
technical networks in the districts. DDCs are also the local political bodies, where the 
DTOs under them are the technical wings which assist DDCs in the planning and 
implementation of infrastructure development projects.  
 
Quite often these two service provision streams, MoUD and MoFALD, take their stand on 
their institutional strengths to advocate their supremacy over the sector. The DWSS under 
MoUD commands sector leadership, but has failed to implement the programmes 
effectively in the districts, due to poor social and resource mobilization at the community 
level. The Sector Efficiency Improvement Unit (SEIU), which is established at MoUD to 
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coordinate the different actors working in WASH at the national level, could not seek 
better coordination at the inter-ministerial and departmental levels. The intervention of the 
National Planning Commission (NPC) in 2011 is evidence of the need to overcome this 
institutional disarray that arises at the central and district level, ensuring policy 
consistency and coordination among various ministries (MoE, MoHP, MoFALD) and the 
donor community, in the interests of sector acceleration. 
 
At the district level, District WASH Coordination Committees86 (SCNSA 2010) exist to 
coordinate the drinking water and sanitation programmes, but the effectiveness of these 
Committees is very much dependent on the personal working relationships between the 
LDOs of DDCs and the heads of the WSSDOs. Institutional rivalry and personal 
antagonisms between these two institutions, and with other sectoral agencies under the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Population impede the smooth 
development and functioning of the sector. 
 
This has also hampered the coordination of I/NGOs working in the districts. Although 
I/NGOs channel their funds through their own system. In some cases it is found that the 
programmes and costs of I/NGOs are reflected in the district annual plans for 
transparency purposes; however, the prioritization, selection, implementation, monitoring 
and reporting of programme activities do not align with the DDC system (refer Appendix 
VIII for the District Development Plans of the selected observed districts). 
3.2.8.2 Service delivery management 
The existing institutional arrangements and service provision approaches deployed offer 
contradictory and confusing implementation modalities on the ground. The situation is 
                                                
86  The DWASHCC is comprised of Local Development Officers (LDO) of DDCs as chairperson of the 
Committee and the District Chiefs of Water Supply and Sanitation Divisional (or Sub-divisional) Offices 
become the member secretary of the Committee. Other district level government line agencies, VDCs, 
chamber of commerce, NGOs and professional associations are members of this Committee. 
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further aggravated when the donor community adopts a dualistic approach in their support 
modality, i.e. ‘the government system’ where the donors provide the budgetary support 
through the Ministry of Finance, and/or ‘off the government system’ where the funds are 
directly disbursed by the donors themselves through international and national NGOs. 
This further distorts the service provider market by offering better service compensation 
than the national government system. Although drinking water is a public service and 
should be made available to all, it is being implemented through different institutions by 
adopting different approaches, meaning different implementation structures, fund flow 
systems, supervision, monitoring, reporting and incentive structures. This also entails 
different overhead and transaction costs thus leading to cost variation in service provision. 
 
It could be argued that, contrary to much donor thinking, service provision through the 
government regular system is best, as it builds the local national capacity to implement 
development programmes through their own system. However, the government system is 
often criticized for governance failure (corruption, lack of participation and transparency), 
and for capacity constraints, and thus alternative methods such as community and private 
sector participation are sought. Moreover, the attitude and morale deficiencies of the 
government staff, which are the outcome of the larger civil service system and the 
inherited bureaucratic culture of the nation, have hindered the public service delivery. How 
to motivate them and to make them discharge their duty responsibly is still the central 
reform agenda of the government.  
 
Some see that the joint government donor-supported projects are going well, as long as 
the project is insulated from the government system, e.g. RWSSPFDB, STWSSSP I, II 
and II, CBWSSSP in the drinking water sector, and UEIP in the urban sector while RAIDP, 
RRRSDP, etc. are in the rural road sector. Specific project objectives, somewhat easy 
fund flow mechanism, frequent monitoring and a comparatively better incentive structure 
have contributed to better performance. However, the model is still far from aligning with 
 
 
163 
the government system fully in service provision (donor supported programmes and 
budgets are not structurally integrated and reflected in the government “red book”). In 
many projects, the international and local employees are hired with a better compensation 
package, which many government officials see as a source of conflict in service 
provisions. 
3.2.8.3 Financing and resources 
RWSSFDB represents a typical QUANGO model. There are other QUANGO model 
organizations in Nepal such as Poverty Alleviation Fund, Town Development Fund, Solid 
Waste Management Board, Royal Nepal Airlines etc. This type of institution survives, as 
long there is perennial funding support from the government, which mainly comes from 
the donor community, and in some cases as matching funds. The situation becomes 
vulnerable when funding starts reducing as donors’ development priorities change and the 
government cannot provide the funds required. These types of organizations eventually 
become a financial liability and are termed as “white elephants” (K.C., Fatta Bahadur 
2003, p. 223). They cannot generate their own resources for sustenance. Public 
Enterprises (PEs)87 or Corporations, Authorities and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are 
the most vivid examples that have failed in the past (Wagle, B. et al. 2013). The donor-
supported development projects implemented through the government are less likely to 
suffer financially because of the host country’s counterpart budget support to the projects. 
However, there are still plenty of cases where the donor-supported government projects 
have failed to perform when the donor funding ceases to extend. 88 
 
                                                
87  Himalayan Times (2014) “The government spent close to Rs 200 million of taxpayers’ money this fiscal 
year on salary and other expenses of staff in defunct public enterprises” - See more at:  
http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/fullNews.php?headline=Unproductive+PEs+bleeding+state+coffers+dr
y&NewsID=418367#sthash.MBf13zSo.dpuf 
88  As an example - “Despite the novelty of a supply‑side intervention, however, the effort has not managed to 
survive the termination of DFID funding. This U4 Practice Insight explores how local ownership, through a 
combination of actions, inactions, and broader political factors, can dissipate at different stages of the 
project cycle. Since donor support ended, not a single anti‑corruption activity has been continued by the 
FNCCI.” - See more at: http://www.u4.no/publications/the-anatomy-of-a-failed-anti-corruption-project-a-
case-study-from-nepal/#sthash.juAFPUOX.dpuf 
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INGO/NGOs work very closely with the community, but focus on limited physical coverage 
with resources. They cannot replace the government system and can’t make the 
government follow their system either. However, their presence cannot be denied, 
especially their outreach to poor people living in the rural areas.  
 
From the transaction cost perspective, it is difficult to establish which service models offer 
the best option, as no study has ever been carried out to produce evidence for 
comparative analysis of the models used, although each implementing agency claims that 
their model is the best by using their own measuring parameters and indicators rather 
than following standard ones all parties have agreed89. 
3.2.8.4 Accountability 
Because of the different institutional arrangements in service provision, the accountability 
routes employed also differ in each case. At the central level, a unidirectional upward 
accountability frame exists in the case of the MoUD stream, where the WUC is reporting 
to WSSDO, and then the WSSDO is reporting to DWSS and finally the DWSS reports to 
MoUD. Under the MoFALD stream, both vertical (upward-downward) and horizontal 
accountability frames exist. For instance, DDC holds upward formal bureaucratic 
accountability to the line department (DoLIDAR) and the ministry (MoFALD), and at the 
same time, it holds downward political accountability to its constituencies and citizens. It 
equally holds horizontal accountability, which is less formal, but more in terms of 
organizational strategic obligations to its other stakeholders (sectoral line agencies, 
business and professional organizations, civil society, the chamber of commerce of the 
district). However, in the current situation, where the local elected officials have not 
existed in local government since 2002, the horizontal and downward constituency 
accountability appears to be weak. 
                                                
89  Refer to the Project Completion Reports of CBWSSSP (ADB), RWSSS (WB), RWSSP-WN (Finnish), 
RVWRMP (Finnish), and Gurkha Welfare (Trust). 
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In the government direct service provision model, the system relies heavily on civil service 
integrity. There is a greater chance of accountability blurring and distortion because 
reporting information can easily be asymmetrical, especially concerning any financial 
transaction that is bound not to be transparent. There is also the possibility of 
manipulating performance and monitoring reports, and poor compliance in work outputs. 
All these issues are well reflected in the annual report of the Office of the Auditor General 
(OAG, 2014). 
 
From the accountability point of view, the community-managed projects offer better scope 
for community awareness and participation in service provision, where community 
capacity is built in order to enable the community to make their rightful demands to the 
government for services. This bottom-up approach, promoted by RWSSDFB and 
INGOs/NGOs through external support, has made a substantial positive impact on the 
condition of rural people, but more needs to be done to make a greater and wider impact, 
considering the scale of accessibility proposed for safe drinking water, because of the 
organizational constraints these organizations (or projects) suffer from. However, owing to 
its multi-layered (Smith, S.T. 2014, p. 339) and distorted accountability route in the 
government system, mainly nonalignment with the local government system, the 
adaptation and scaling up of the programme are constrained by resources, and the long-
term commitment of the government and the donors as well.  
 
The Local Governance and Accountability Facility (LGAF) is established through the joint 
funding of various development partners (DFID, DANIDA, NORAD, SDC, UNDP) within 
the broader LGCDP framework under MoFALD in 2010 to address governance and 
accountability issues at the local level through Civil Society Organizations. Similar 
initiatives named ‘Programme for Accountability in Nepal’ (PRAN) and ‘Governance 
Facility’ are launched with the support of the World Bank (PRAN, 2011), and the group of 
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donors (Danish, Swiss Embassies and DFID) (2013) respectively. The compliance 
monitoring to ensure the civil entitlements in service demand through planning and 
service delivery is the key feature of LGAF. Their (Civil Society or NGOs) roles in the 
present context can be applauded when there are no elected officials in the local 
governments, and so voice and local oversight are lacking. Coordination of these projects 
seems to be problematic when they do pursue their objective with their own strategies and 
means. 
 
Moreover, how this arrangement (accountability and governance support programme) will 
work when the state enters into the new federal and local government structure with 
elected officials, and whether these social and civic organizations continue to receive the 
funding support from donors (Swiss, Norway, Danish Embassies, World Bank, ADB, 
USAID, GIZ, UNDP, JICA and DFID or other means) for this purpose, may leave this 
arrangement in question.  
3.2.8.5 Transparency 
Transparency has become the subject of mutual recrimination in Nepalese public affairs 
(Weaver, C. 2015; Newar, N. 2013; Subedi, A. 2015). This has remained an issue in the 
government working system for a long time. However, the issue is not only linked with the 
government, but also associated with INGOs’ and NGOs’ functioning as well. The 
government has often asked INGOs and NGOs to make their activities and financial 
transactions transparent, while INGOs and the Donors have expressed their 
dissatisfaction over the poor governance and lack of transparency in government. 
Financial transparency, particularly in service and materials procurement has become the 
main issue in both the public and the NGO sectors. The seriousness of this issue may be 
deduced from the establishment of the Public Procurement Monitoring Office under the 
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Office of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers90. This office exclusively deals 
with public procurement issues and facilitates the procurement process. However, the 
service of this office at the time is limited to central level procurement activities only. 
 
At the moment, many local government procurement issues related to corruption are 
within the purview of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), 
the apex anti-graft body of the country and its representatives, the District (Administration) 
Offices, in the districts. 
 
In the case of the third sector (I/NGOs) stream, being out of the government system, 
ultimate accountability lies with the funders who provide funds to them (i.e. this extends 
back from CBOs or local NGOs to national NGOs, to INGOs, and then from INGOs to 
foreign donors or embassies). A reporting system is maintained with the Social Welfare 
Council, which is more of a ritual exercise, rather than an evaluation of the impact of the 
programme interventions made by these INGOs and NGOs, for policy and programme 
coordination at the national and district levels. Transparency in the selection of NGOs and 
the funding of them by INGOs and donors, particularly the foreign embassies in 
Kathmandu, is an issue (Singh and Ingdal, 2007) often raised by the government, media 
and local NGOs. 
3.2.9 Conclusion 
The drinking water sector of Nepal has been doing well, as has been claimed by the 
government (SEIU 2011). But at the same time they have acknowledged that more needs 
to be done from the water quality and functionality point of view. The government 
programme and the donor support remain very crucial as a means to augment the 
accessibility of services. A positive thing about the sector is that relatively well-defined 
                                                
90  For more information on the public procurement monitoring by the Prime Minister’s Office of the 
government of Nepal see http://www.ppmo.gov.np. 
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and adequate legal and policy frameworks are in place to support drinking water services. 
In the past Nepal has tried, and is still trying, various types of service provision approach 
for rural drinking water. This has brought some innovative ideas (or approaches) into the 
sector to address the drinking water issues, but at the same time, it has also created 
problems, particularly due to the government’s weakness in dealing with the differences of 
the donors’ interests, and their influence on the service delivery approach.  
 
Despite operational mismatches between DDCs and WSSDOs in the districts, consistent 
policies – such as universal target achievement by 2017, community (user groups) 
participation (20% of total scheme costs), focus on functionality and quality improvement, 
and stakeholder coordination at the national and district levels – have been implemented.  
However, the transformation of policy into action has suffered from the institutional 
variations in structure, and the implementation arrangements of the actors (various 
ministries, departments and agencies, I/NGOs, and donors) and their accountability 
routes. This gives the impression of a sector that is institutionally fragmented, and service 
provision that is far from integrated between organisational levels. As a result, some 
common weaknesses have emerged in the management of the rural drinking water 
service delivery at the operational level. These include the role of public agencies, 
including DDCs, which appear to be weak in terms of regulation, oversight, supervision, 
monitoring and ensuring compliance in service provision, both by their own staff and by 
the third party service providers. This may reflect a lack of organizational capacity, but the 
issues of leadership may also be involved.  
 
Conclusively, the main issue still remains as to why the overall performance of public 
services appears to be dismal (OAG 2014). Perhaps a deeper understanding is required 
from the inter-organizational perspective as to how service delivery transaction is being 
carried out between the different sectors, how accountability is structured in the service 
transactional relationship and compliance ensured. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. Research design and methodology 
This chapter sets out the research context and then discusses the research objective, 
research design, analytical framework and methodology used. The chapter demonstrates 
how the research is underpinned by ‘Agency Theory’ (AgT) and ‘Activity Theory’ (AcT), 
and how the accountability features of the public service transaction can be framed in 
terms of Agency Theory, and further, how such transactions can be used in assessing the 
organizational relationship involved in public service delivery by applying Activity Theory.  
 
The research takes as its focus the service provision relationship between Nepal’s 75 
DDCs and local Water Users’ Committees (WUCs) for rural drinking water schemes, a 
relationship that is enacted through district annual plans, in which the needs of 
communities are identified, prioritized and in some cases politically negotiated for final 
implementation. This relationship also entails the construction of drinking water schemes, 
wherein DDCs provide financial and technical support to water users’ committees to build 
the system. The community assumes scheme implementation responsibility with certain 
resource participation. The legal basis for this service provision relationship is provided by 
the LSGA 1999, LBFAR 2007 and DWR 1998, and this transaction relationship between 
DDCs and WUCs pertains throughout the country. 
4.1 Participating districts 
The research examines the existing rural drinking water services implemented by the 
seven District Development Committees (DDCs) of Nepal (see Figure 12 for the 
geographical location of the districts). The names of the districts observed are:  
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i. Syangja 
ii. Tanahun 
iii. Rupanedhi 
iv. Nawalparasi 
v. Parbat 
vi. Baglung, and 
vii. Pyuthna 
 
Figure 12: Map of Nepal and the districts under observation 
 
Nawalparasi Rupandehi 
Syangja Tanahun Parbat	 Baglung 
Pyuthan 
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Among these seven districts, two districts - Rupandehi (880,196 population) and 
Nawalparasi (643,508 population) representing the Terai plain region, are highly 
populated districts compared to all five hilly districts - Tanahun (323,288 population), 
Syangja (289,148 population), Baglung (268,613 population), Pyuthan (228,102 
population), and Parbat (146,590 population). This also implies the population density, 
since the terai districts have higher density compared to the hilly districts. Interestingly, 
the sex ratio indicates that women have overtaken men in numbers, both in the national 
average (100 women: 94 men) and the average value of the seven districts (100 women: 
86 men). Among these districts, the hilly districts have a high sex ratio gap compared to 
the Terai districts. Brief information about the districts in terms of their household and 
population size and density is given in Appendix I.  
 
Apart from the geographical feature, what distinguishes the terai districts from hilly 
districts is the social composition of ethnicity. Although Terai is a mix of different enthnic 
groups, the presence of Tharu (indigenous tribal community) and other minorities such as 
Yadab, Muslim, Chamar, Harijan and Dhobi are significant. Economically, the Terai 
districts are fertile for agricultural ouptuts and vibrant for trading because of their close 
promixity to the Indian market.  
 
These districts have been selected because they are probably the first sub-national 
bodies to engage service providers directly for the provision of rural drinking water for 
communities. Unlike other service delivery models, in which donor-supported projects 
implement schemes in the name of or on behalf of DDCs, in this model the DDCs take full 
responsibility for hiring the service providers on a contractual basis to provide technical 
support to water users’ committees in order to implement the drinking water schemes in 
the country. To some extent, therefore, this model also challenges existing service 
delivery models (so-called ‘community approach models’) under the QUANGO and I/NGO 
streams (refer to Chapter 3.2.6.3/4). 
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However, it is not the intention of this research to compare the different models in terms of 
efficiency and effectiveness of results, but to see how accountability features in the rural 
drinking water service delivery transaction are embedded, and how these accountability 
features help to understand the service provision relationship between the organizations 
involved in service delivery. 
 
DDCs use service providers (SPs) to provide technical services to WUCs on behalf of 
DDCs. The services procured by DDCs from SPs are purely technical services in which 
the funds for the actual construction of schemes are not included. The financial 
transactions take place between DDCs and WUCs, for which the latter have opened bank 
accounts into which DDCs transfer the scheme construction funds. WUCs pay the cost for 
construction materials from the funds they have received from DDCs. The payments for 
the special (skilled) works would also be made by WUCs; otherwise for most of the 
construction work, Water Users’ Committees’ members contribute the labour. For 
technical services, DDCs pay directly to the SPs. This is because according to the LGSA 
1999, LBFAR 2007 and Rural Water Supply and Sanitation National Strategy and Policy 
2004, WUCs cannot procure the services directly from the service providers, especially 
the use of heavy equipment and technical consultancy services. For this, DDCs are made 
responsible to assist WUCs. The regulation also prohibits the WUCs to implement any 
drinking water scheme of over NPR 6,000,000 (approx. GBP 45,000). This has 
constrained the scope of WUCs, since the cost of materials and labour has been 
increased drastically after 2004 (when the policy was made effective for the total cost 
ceiling of a drinking water scheme allowed to WUCs). 
 
 
173 
4.2 Research objectives and key questions 
The research aims to understand what types of accountability features characterise the 
drinking water service delivery transaction, and how these accountability features 
influence relationships between the organizations involved in service provision at sub-
national (district) level in Nepal. 
 
The following key research questions were formulated to understand the service delivery 
relationship through accountability features: 
• What types of accountability features characterise the public service delivery 
transaction? 
• What types of relationship behaviour do the organizations (DDC, WUC and SP) 
involved in service provision exhibit? 
 
Other sub-questions that may trigger an understanding of public service delivery are: 
• What are the implications of the different theoretical concepts of public service 
relationship? 
• What are the respective potentials and limitations of existing service delivery 
approaches?  
4.3 Research design 
Taking into consideration the research objective and the key questions to be addressed 
through this research, the design adopted for this research is the ‘nested case’ (Thomas 
2011), with seven DDCs nested in a whole single case frame. However, the research 
method used in the research is a qualitative method. The design is ‘qualitative’ because 
the case study sets out to capture the subjective social relationship more precisely and 
appropriately with a narrative explanation of the reasons, particularly in defining and 
determining the service provision relationship and process between the actors involved. 
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The case design works at three levels: it is descriptive (Merriam 2009) in that it presents 
the whole process of service provision; it is explanatory (de Vaus 2001) in that it explains 
how the service provision relationships are forged, and it is theory testing (Bassey 1999) 
in that it tests the service delivery theories or paradigms, particularly Public Administration 
(PA), New Public Management (NPM), New Public Governance (NPG) and their 
epistemological roots (political science, social capital, market economy).  
 
At the same time, the research has used quantitative analysis for additional rigour, 
especially in terms of quantifying the service transaction relationship in terms of 
accountability features to support the qualitative outcomes, which is presented in 
Appendix IX. 
 
The data gathered by the information-seeking approach is deductive in nature and takes 
the reductionist (Thomas 2011) view regarding narrowing down to explain the 
relationships of the actors in service provision from the organizational point of view, and to 
examine the contents of this relationship, i.e. the accountability features. The 
interpretation of the findings is inductive as it derives from a micro-analysis of the contents 
of the accountability features of the transaction between the actors (DDC, WUC and SP) 
in the service delivery process and then to meso-analysis of the relationships of actors at 
the organizational level, and finally to macro-analysis at the institutional level. The 
analysis is representative (Yin 2009) too, in the sense that it fairly represents the national 
context of the rural drinking water supply situation in Nepal. 
4.4 Analytical framework 
Since the objective of this research is to understand the service provision relationship of 
the organizations involved from an accountability perspective, Table 8 gives a broader 
outline of the analytical framework. Service transactional relationships are examined at 
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the micro-level, on the basis of accountability features, following the World Bank’s 
accountability framework (WB 2007). Based on the results of this assessment, the 
organizational relationships of these three actors are appraised at the meso-level from the 
objective, strategy, structure (Batley 2011) and financial aspects of the organizations 
concerned. And finally, at the macro-level, the institutional relationship is considered, 
based on the findings of the organizational relationships, but through the lens of 
institutional features i.e. the actors’ origin91, purpose and roles.   
Table 8: Outline of analysis 
Level Approach used to 
diagnose relationship 
Aspects used to 
examine the 
relationship 
Theoretical application 
for analysis 
Macro Institutional  Origin 
Purpose 
Roles 
Activity theory 
Meso Organizational  Objective/Strategy 
Structure 
Finance 
Activity theory 
Micro Service delivery 
transactional 
Accountability features Agency theory 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the theoretical application of an analytical framework for this 
research is drawn from two theoretical bases through which the information is gathered, 
and the arguments regarding service provision are built upon. These theoretical 
frameworks are: 
• Activity theory (AcT) for meso- and macro-analysis 
• Agency theory (AgT) for micro-analysis 
 
                                                
91  ‘Emergence’ has been taken as a dominant feature of institutions and is considered here as the origin of 
institutions. 
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The logical relationship of these two theories for analysis is presented in Figure 13 
depicting how the accountability features have been transformed into a service delivery 
transaction and then into the organizational and institutional relationship respectively.  
Figure 13: Application of analytical framework in rural drinking water service provision 
 
 
4.4.1 Activity Theory (AcT) 
This theory provides the meta-analytical framework for the service provision construct in 
terms of subject, mediation (tool) and object that together trigger the outcome. It is not, 
according to Leadbetter (2008 p. 209), “just a static, descriptive or analytical modelling 
device: it has been developed to be used as a way of engaging with organizations to 
examine and expand efficient working practices”.  
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Fjeld et al. (2002) and Nardi (1995) attest that AcT provides a method of understanding 
and analysing a phenomenon, and that it is a goal-directed process from subject to object 
through the use of tools. This theory has been extensively used in the social welfare 
sector (for instance, in education, children’s services, and health care). It has evolved 
through three generations. The first generation of activity theory was formulated based on 
Lev Vygostsky’s (1978) concept of mediation (Daniels, 2008) in terms of the artefact, or 
tool, or instrument (for example, a machine, writing, speaking, gesture, architecture, etc.) 
that mediates human action. By that means, subjects’ attainment of their objects can be 
expressed diagrammatically in a triangular form that illustrates the motivation required to 
achieve the outcomes. See Figure 14 for a simple illustration.  
Figure 14: First Generation of Activity Theory 
 
Source: Adapted from Engestrom (1999, p.30) 
 
 
Engestrom (1999a) improved this first generation of activity theory in 1987 by expanding 
this triangle. He added three more features: ‘rules’, ‘community’ and ‘division of labour’; 
this gave the theory a much wider ‘macro-level’ analysis that emphasizes contextual and 
historical factors (Leadbetter 2004, Leadbetter et al. 2007). Figure 15 illustrates the 
second generation of AcT and Table 9 provides the main features of it. 
 
Mediating Artifacts 
Subject (s) Object Outcome 
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Figure 15: Second Generation of Activity Theory 
 
Source: Adapted from Engestrom (1999, p. 31) 
 
Table 9: Nodes and functions of activity system 
Node Function 
Subject This refers to an individual, group, community or dyad taking action. 
Object This refers to the process of being worked on, acted on or the focus 
activity which is characterized as object-oriented. 
Outcome This refers to what is expected to be achieved. 
Rule This reflects what either supports or constrains the work of activity. This 
could be national legislation and requirements. Agreements, ethical 
guidelines, accountability framework. 
Community This refers to whoever are involved in the work or activity such as family 
or community members, representing the wider socio-cultural influences. 
Division of labour This refers to role demarcation and role expectation: who does what, how 
and why. It includes professional skills. 
Mediating artifacts This is the mediation process that takes place between the subject and 
the object in order to achieve an outcome. 
Source: Adapted from Leadbetter (2004, p135; 2008) and Greenhouse (2013). 
 
The third generation AcT (Figure 16) propounded by Engestrom advocates the concept of 
instability, tension and contradiction as the ‘motive force[s] of change and development’ 
(Engestrom 1999b, p.9), evolving the theory beyond the boundary of a single activity 
system, by including interaction with the environment which results in new activity 
systems.  From this it is clear that activity theory has provided a means of examining the 
Mediating Artifacts 
Subject (s) Objec
t 
Outcome 
 
 
Division of labour Community Rules 
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process of the multi-agency working environment (Greenhouse 2013). The relationships 
between multi-organizational and inter-organizational networks through alliances and 
partnerships, and the collaborative constellations between organizations (Engestrom and 
Kerosuo 2007) are also embodied in the Actor-Network Theory. But what distinguishes 
Activity Theory from Actor-Network Theory, according to Engestrom and Kerosuo, is that 
in Actor-Network Theory the notion of ‘object’ has only a very general meaning that covers 
all artefacts, and this dilutes the potential analytical power of the concept.  
Figure 16: Third Generation of Activity Theory 
 
Source: Adapted from Engestrom (2001, p. 136) 
 
4.4.2 Application of Activity Theory 
For this research, application of all three generations of activity theory is considered, but 
recognising the limited scope of the second and third generation AcT to provide an 
appropriate level of understanding. The basic foundation of first generation AcT, featuring 
the Subject, the Object, the mediating Artefact, and the Outcome are used for meta-
analysis with second generation ‘rules’ at the organizational (DDC, WUC and SP) levels. 
Third generation AcT entails ‘expansive learning’ in a multi-organization or agency setting. 
This is because the tension in organizational relationships offers a unique opportunity to 
examine the activity of the actors (in this case DDC, WUC and SP). This results in the 
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creation of new knowledge and practices, resulting from the newly emerged conflicting (or 
collaborative) relationships which can be observed between them (Daniels et al. 2007), 
which eventually provide critical assessments of the theoretical discourse in public service 
delivery. 
 
The major features (or nodes) of AcT are seven, but only five features are used 
extensively to safeguard the result analysis of the study at two levels (see Table 10).  
Table 10: Application of AcT Nodes 
Node Organizational level Institutional level 
Subject DDC, WUC and SP are the subjects 
engaged in the activities in the whole 
activity system. 
Same organizational subjects 
become the subjects for analysis at 
the institutional level but more from 
‘actors’ and its external relationship 
perspective. 
Object Service provision relationship among the 
actors (DDC, WUC and SP) is the object 
required to achieve outcome. 
Drinking water becomes the object 
at the institutional level. 
Outcome Drinking water is the desired outcome of 
the activity system that motivates the 
subjects (DDC, WUC and SP) to act in 
relation to each other and achieve this 
outcome with the help of artefacts (or 
tools). 
Here the outcome is ‘living standard’ 
which is a higher level of outcome at 
the institutional level from the 
organizational level. 
Artefact (Tool) Tools for mediation, also known as 
instruments (the contract, agreement or 
other forms) – mediate between the 
subjects (DDC, WUC, with or without SP) 
and objects (service relationship) to 
achieve outcome (drinking). 
Here the tool for mediation is 
‘organizational relationship’ at the 
institutional level. 
Rules Legal, policy and other institutional 
frameworks that affect the whole 
functioning WASH service provision 
system. 
The same legal and policy 
environment is considered as the 
framework during the analysis. 
Source: The nodes are constructed based on extensive deliberation of the literature combined with 
practical knowledge of the subject matter by the researcher himself. 
 
The application of the theory for analysis is considered at two levels, the organizational 
and the institutional, hence the use of the two units of analysis as the artefacts. At the 
organizational level, the unit for analysis as mediating artefact is the “means of 
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compactness”92, and at the institutional level, the unit of analysis is the “relationship” the 
actors hold in service provision. This entails a successive transformation of the same 
analytical framework at different levels from the organization to the institution. Figure 17 
depicts the use of activity theory in the rural drinking water service provision frame at the 
district level.  
 
For this case, the organizational level artefact is the working relationship (contract, 
agreement or other form of relationship means) within the nexus of three organizations, 
the particular District Development Committee (DDC), Water Users’ Committee (WUC) 
and Service Provider (SP) which have forged the service provision relationship. This 
contractual relationship is studied in detail by applying Agency Theory that shows how the 
service provision relationships (object) are forged among the subjects (DDC, WUC and 
SP) in order to achieve the service delivery outcome (drinking water). These relationships 
are further examined at the institutional level, from the actor-relationship point of view, for 
a broader understanding of the public service provision in general. 
Figure 17: Transposing the activity theory in service provision 
 
                                                
92  ‘Means of compactness’ are the accountability features. These are delegation, financing, performing, 
reporting, enforcing (WB 2004) and arbitration. 
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4.4.3 Agency Theory (AgT) 
While Activity Theory (AcT) offers a meta-analysis framework for the drinking water 
service provision relationship from the actor perspective, Agency Theory (AgT) has looked 
into the service provision relationship between the actors (organizations) from the 
‘compactness’ (i.e. accountability features) perspective. Therefore, AgT is used to 
understand the organizational relationship in service provision from the micro-analytical 
point of view. To further reinforce the notion of organizational relationship, Ross (1973, p. 
134) is of the opinion that the theory of agency deals with the relationship of agencies 
which: 
“…has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the 
agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for other, designated the 
principal, in a particular domain of decision problems”.  
AgT is found extensively theorized almost in every social science discipline and sub-
discipline. According to Eisenhardt (1989), this theory has been applied in any number of 
fields, such as accounting (Demski and Feltham 1978), economics (Spence and 
Zeckhausar 1971), finance (Fama 1980), marketing (Basu, et al. 1985), political science 
(Mitnick 1986), organizational behaviour (Eisenhardt 1985, 1988; Kosnik 1987), and 
sociology (Eccles 1985, White, H. 1985). 
 
The theory emerged here particularly in relation to the problem that arises over how 
compensation (an incentive) determines the behaviour of an agent in a way which is 
consistent with the principal’s preferences. Hence, it is the nature of the incentive that is 
inbuilt in the service delivery relation that determines the behaviour of the agents, 
whereas the nature of the risk associated with the service delivery transaction and 
information sets the condition of choice for the actors involved (Mitnick 2006). 
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The common underlying assumption of this theory is that the ‘principal’ is too busy to do a 
given task, and for this reason, it hires an ‘Agent’ to do the job; but it is assumed that the 
principal for some reason cannot monitor the performance of the agent, and the agent 
manipulates the information. It is further assumed that both principal and agent are 
motivated by self-interest, although an agent is supposed to act in the sole interest of the 
principal, which should be the common objective of both parties once the contract is 
made. When the agent has failed to work in the interest of the principal then “Agency 
Loss” has occurred. This is the difference between the possible outcome for the principal 
and consequences of the acts of the agent93. Table 11 presents an overview of Agency 
Theory. 
Table 11: Agency theory overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
Organizational assumptions Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumption Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problem Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly differing 
goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, regulation, 
leadership, impression management, whistle blowing, vertical 
integration, transfer pricing. 
Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt, M.K. (1989) 
 
Notwithstanding all the elements and assumptions about AgT that are mentioned in Table 
11, three elements that directly influence the service delivery relationship between the 
actors are: 
                                                
93  For more information see http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/morality-101/agency-theory/agency-theory. 
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• the ‘unit of analysis’, which is the contract as the medium artefact of relationship,  
• the ‘organizational assumptions’, that is the participants’ goal in service delivery, and 
information asymmetry between principal and agent about the performance reporting 
of agents, 
• the ‘contracting problem’ arises due to agency moral hazard and inappropriate risk 
sharing. 
To sum up, AgT deals with the agencies (individual or organizational) involved in 
performing certain tasks through a contractual relationship. This contractual relationship 
defines the incentive structure in order for an agent to perform the tasks according to the 
principal’s terms. However, the contractual relationship fails when a conflict arises mainly 
due to the failure of principals to verify appropriately the performance of agents and the 
sharing of the risk associated with the contractual arrangement. 
4.4.4 Agency theory and public service delivery 
Although AgT has been used widely in the organizational behaviour and business 
management domain (Alchain and Demsets 1972, Eisenhardt 1985, Jensen and Meckling 
1976, Bahli and Rivard 2003), it later appeared prominently in the arena of public service 
delivery following the publication of the ‘World Development Report 2004: Making 
Services Work for Poor People’ (WB 2004). In the report, the framework of the 
accountability relationship is discussed in the service delivery transaction loop, and it is 
concluded that strengthening the relationship would help to make the service delivery 
effectively address the poor. Moreover, through accountability features, AgT particularly 
addresses the issue of how the public sector interacts with the market in public service 
provision, because, as the World Bank puts this: 
 “Why pure public sector production often fails – and why pure privatization is 
not the answer.” (WB 2004, p. 46) 
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Traditionally, there are two institutional arrangements for service provision, public 
production and market production, or the combination of both. The fundamental notion of 
public production is that governments assume prime responsibility for the welfare of their 
citizens, and the most effective way to fulfil these responsibilities is by producing the 
goods or services directly through public sector organizations with civil service employees 
(WB, 2004). On the other hand, the goods and services are produced through a market. 
Customers buy where they get the best value for the services of their greatest 
satisfaction. The customers have choices. So do the providers, who therefore offer a 
variety of services. The beauty of the market is that providers have a wider opportunity for 
innovation to suit the clients’ needs and preferences.  
 
However, the market often fails to meet the needs of the public in general and particularly 
of the poor. The policy choice between a public or private provision in service delivery is 
conditional upon many factors (socio-political and economic) and it has remained a 
challenge to all governments around the world. 
 
However, looking at the public service provision from the accountability perspective 
reveals a different dimension and a different understanding of public service delivery, one 
that emphasises governance and institutional concerns. Moreover, the application of AgT 
provides an analytical framework to probe the institutional causes of the poor performance 
of services in depth (WB 2004, p. 55).  
4.4.5 Actors in rural drinking water service  
Although this research has used AgT for microanalysis of the transaction relationship in 
service delivery, as the World Bank has illustrated (WDR 2004), there are some 
differences in its application in this research.  
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These are:  
Actors: the terms used in the WDR are the ‘State’, ‘Citizens/clients’ and ‘Providers’ as a 
general case. However, in this research this framework is applied to rural drinking water 
service provision made by the District Development Committees (DDCs), and these being 
public organizations are considered to be the State. Likewise, the Water Users’ 
Committees (WUCs), which represent users as beneficiaries, are considered as the 
Citizens, but at the same time service implementers as well, because they enter into the 
service transaction relationship with DDCs to implement the drinking water schemes. The 
third parties that provide technical services regarding drinking water to the WUCs on 
behalf of DDCs are considered the Service Providers (denoted as SPs). In this research, 
all the SPs are intermediary NGOs (Brinkerhoff 1999, p. 64, Cameron 2006, p. 91).  
 
Relationships between the actors vary on account of organizational characteristics. This 
research has looked into the “Compactness” of the relationship between DDCs and the 
Service Providers (NGOs); and the relationship between DDCs and WUCs, which is 
unlike the “Voice” that links the DDCs as state and WUCs as citizens. This is because the 
role of WUCs is more of service implementers than citizen representation. In a way, 
WUCs are also wholesale service providers to their user-members. 
 
Application of the WB framework in service delivery is targeted at the poor, i.e. via an 
inclusive approach. In this study, this framework is applied to rural drinking water services, 
and aims to illuminate the service provision relationship between these actors (DDC, 
WUC and SP) by applying the same accountability features (of WB, 2004) in a service 
delivery relationship.  Figure 18 depicts how the accountability framework fits into this 
research context. 
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Figure 18: Rural Drinking Water Service Delivery Transaction Compactness 
 
 
DDC as the State: A state as an actor enjoys through its political mandate the legitimacy 
to govern the state’s affairs. Through this legitimacy, politicians derive the power to 
regulate, and to enforce these regulations (WB, 2004). Others that assume these 
responsibilities under state legitimacy are policymakers, civil servants and other 
government appointees representing the government. According to WB (2004, p.49) 
“politicians set general directions, but policymakers set the fundamental rules of the game 
for service providers, to be operated by regulating entry, enforcing standards, and 
determining the conditions under which providers receive public funds”.  
 
At the sub-national level, the District Development Committees (DDCs) in Nepal assume 
all these three responsibilities: setting the development agenda, i.e. direction, making 
policy based on the local agenda and implementing these policies in the form of plans, 
programmes, and projects. Hence, they can be considered both the politicians and the 
policy makers and implementers as well, because they are the local government at the 
district level. The local politicians are elected to DDCs from the different political parties 
through local elections, and they are the policy makers at the district level. They frame the 
policy and implement it, through the local administrative management structure. 
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Unfortunately, since 2002, no local elections have been held. Since then the central 
government has deputed civil servants to run DDC affairs. But DDCs still serve as the 
frontline offices of the government, directly dealing with the day-to-day affairs of the public 
in general compared to any other agencies or field offices of the government. In this 
research, in the given political void, the role of DDCs is more one of policy makers than 
politicians. This is because the current situation offers less prospect of the DDCs taking 
the politicians’ role, as there are no elected officials.  
 
While implementing plans and programmes, DDCs, as the front line bureaucracy in the 
districts, engage themselves with the social and private sector actors. As implementers, 
DDCs have performed two tasks. The first task is to provide financial support to WUCs, 
the funds which DDCs receive as part of the central government grant to implement social 
infrastructure services. The second task is to purchase technical services from the market, 
and provide those services to WUCs – especially in the areas of social mobilization, 
construction of drinking water schemes, establishment of accounting, management and 
governance systems – as part of the technical and capacity-building support they give to 
WUCs. 
 
Users’ Committee as Citizens and Clients: Individuals and households play a dual role in 
service provision. As a citizen, either as an individual and/or through coalition 
(communities, unions, political parties, social and business associations, etc.), they 
participate in the political process for collective objectives. As clients, they act as 
consumers, and expect to receive services such as water, education, and health from 
service providers. Hence, what kind of roles they, as citizens or clients, play, depends on 
with whom, either politicians or service providers, they interact or maintain the relationship 
in service provision. The cautionary interpretation here is that the role of citizen and that of 
client as service beneficiary do not necessarily hold the same meaning. Likewise, many 
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civil societies do not necessarily inherit the characteristics of communities (e.g., self-help 
groups) and individual beneficiaries (as consumers).  
 
In this research, WUCs take the role of the users’ associations, representing their 
members’ collective interest rather than citizens and clients. However, at the same time, 
their contradictory roles as providers within the community, as ‘self service providers’, and 
as the members of WUCs when they are ‘clients’ or service receivers cannot be ignored. 
In this sense, the role of WUCs is dualistic, and so they are further scrutinized for their 
roles as service receivers (mainly of financial support) from DDCs, and as service 
providers for their members as well. For this research’s purpose, the role of WUCs as 
service receivers (financial and technical support) is taken into consideration rather than 
as providers, and accordingly the compactness in relationships between DDCs and 
WUCs is observed. 
 
NGOs as Organizational Service Providers: There are several types of organizational 
forms of service provider. Its nature can be that of a public or social or community 
organization. Choosing the right type of organizational form as a service provider is 
perhaps a difficult task, because each type of service provision attracts a different type of 
incentive structure in the service delivery chain. It has moreover been conditioned by the 
politico-economy of the country, and by the policy adopted by the government.  
 
For this study, the service providers are the social and private sector organizations. In 
Nepal, it is difficult to distinguish the organizational characteristics of the social sector, 
especially the NGO type of organizations, in terms of their behaviour and performance. 
Many of the NGOs in Nepal are registered as social associational organizations, but they 
are motivated by financial gain rather than by servicing the community. In recent years, 
their participation in the service development market through competition has made 
Nepalese NGOs more market-oriented. In the area under study, NGOs are the service 
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providers which enter into the service provision relationship with DDCs, in order to provide 
technical assistance to WUCs on behalf of DDCs in the planning, construction and 
management of drinking water schemes.  
 
Hence, throughout the rest of this research the term ‘Service Provider’ (SP) denotes the 
actor or organization which is the intermediary service provider NGO, whose 
organizational characteristics are associational but not participative and inclusive like a 
self-help grass roots organization, e.g. users committee.  
4.4.6 Accountability features 
According to the World Bank (‘World Bank Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor 
People’ p. 47) “accountability is a relationship among actors that has five features: 
delegation, finance, performance, information about performance, and enforceability” 
(Figure 19). For the microanalysis in this study of the accountability transaction in service 
delivery, one more feature, that of ‘arbitration’, is added to this list. From the accountability 
feature perspective, the responsibilities of a principal in the service transaction 
relationship are the delegation, financing and enforcement of the tasks. At the same time, 
the functional responsibilities of an agent are to perform the tasks as per contractual 
obligation and to provide the information about the performance of tasks to its principal.  
 
In order to have better accountability there must be a fully reciprocal arrangement of these 
features. For instance, enforceability by the principal will be unfair if the agent (also known 
to the provider) does not have clearly delegated and precisely specified desired objectives 
(or outcomes). Similarly, it is also unfair and ineffective if the agent is held accountable for 
poor outcomes when the principal has refused, or is unable, to provide adequate 
resources to agent. It is also stressed that caring about an outcome is not good enough, 
unless the actors involved in service provision put up a “stake” (WB 2004, p. 47). 
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Figure 19: Accountability features 
 
Source: Adapted and transformed from WB, 2004 
 
For micro-level analysis in the successive deliberations, these six accountability features 
have been used to examine the level, type and nature of the service delivery relationships 
between the actors involved in the country’s rural drinking water service provision, with 
DDCs as principals, and WUCs and NGOs as agents. All the research instruments 
employed are deliberately based on these accountability features with regard to how they 
are transacted in service provision. The contents of each feature are provided in Table 12. 
Table 12: Adapted accountability features 
Principal 
(DDCs) 
Deployed contents in this research 
questions for both DDCs and SPs 
Agents 
(WUCs and NGOs) 
Delegating  > 1. Tasks, roles and responsibilities  
Financing   > 
2. Financial provision (mode of 
payment/disbursement, payment time, 
approval procedure…) 
 
 
3. Deliverables, outputs, targets set for 
work /assignments. 
4. Time duration for tasks/activities; 
time bound implementation. 
<   Performing 
Delegating 
Financing 
Enforcing 
Performing 
Informing 
Actors (principals) 
including clients, 
citizens, 
policymakers 
Accountable Actors 
(agents) including 
policymakers, 
providers 
Arbitration 
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 5. Work progress reporting (format, channels, levels, time and frequency) <   Informing 
Enforcing   > 6. Enforcement in case of failure to comply terms and conditions  
Arbitration   > 7. Arbitration in non-compliance of agreement or contract <   Arbitration 
Source: Adapted from WB, 2004 (except ‘Arbitration’ which is proposed by the researcher himself 
based on his experience working with the DDCs, WUCs and Service Provider-NGOs) 
 
4.4.7 Methodology 
The methodology adopted for this research is primarily qualitative. The objective of the 
research is to interpret and understand the service provision relationship between the 
actors, which is very much subjective in nature and thus appropriately examined with a 
qualitative approach. The quantitative approach is used for illustrative purposes (Appendix 
IX), to substantiate the qualitative analysis in drawing findings to support both the 
arguments which are critical of the relationships in drinking water service provision, and 
those which are not. The relationships in question are both those between the DDCs and 
the WUCs, and between the DDCs and SPs (NGOs). Figure 20 gives the data collection 
and information-generation approach that was used for this research.  
 
 
193 
 
Figure 20: Information generation and data collection approach 
 
4.5 Sampling 
4.5.1 Sampling type 
The type of sampling used in data collection is known as ‘judgment sampling’. This is a 
non-probability sampling method, also known as ‘purposive sampling’. According to 
Bryman (2012, p. 418) “the goal of purposive sampling is to sample cases/participants in 
a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are 
being posed”. Marshall (1996) further reinforces this argument by saying that the 
researcher chooses this type of sampling because it offers to select the most productive 
Service provisions 
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sample to answer the research question. Here a framework can be developed around the 
practical knowledge of the researcher and the research areas chosen, and it is convenient 
to have access to the literature and information for research. He (Marshall) further argues 
that this is a strategic intellectual approach towards the sample type of research.  
 
This type of sampling is becoming more prominent in the field of organizational studies. It 
eases the selection of units such as organizations, people, documents, and so on with 
direct reference to the research question being asked (Bryman 2012, p. 416). 
4.5.2 Sample representation and levels 
In Nepal, there are 75 districts. Each district has one DDC (or local government). Out of 
these 75 districts, 7 DDCs are chosen for the study (around 10% of DDCs, 11% of 
households and 10% of the total population of the nation). Refer to Figure 12 for the map 
of Nepal and the DDCs taken for this study. These DDCs are chosen due to the following 
reasons. 
• Each of these DDCs has implemented drinking water schemes in partnership with 
drinking water users’ committees, with the technical support of a third party service 
provider.  
• All these sampled DDCs are situated within the same physical proximity of 
development regions of Nepal (six districts in the western region and one district in 
the mid-far western region). They also represent ecological diversity; four districts 
are from the hilly mountain area and the other two districts are from the Terai plain 
area. 
• The researcher is personally familiar with the subject matter, working areas and 
organizational system of the local governments, particularly DDCs. 
• Data, information and literature on the sector are easily available. 
• The choice is partly motivated by the researcher’s desire to test the third party 
intervention (i.e. service provider) in service provision. 
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4.5.3 District Development Committees (DDCs) 
Altogether 7 officials from 6 DDCs participated in the interviews and discussions. No one 
from Pyuthan DDC participated, while from Rupandehi DDC 2 officials participated in the 
interviews. These officials were directly involved in the procurement of SP services and 
had also been involved in engaging WUCs. They were further responsible for the 
monitoring of the performance of SPs and WUCs. In some cases, they were also engaged 
in providing capacity-building and technical support to WUCs when the SPs were not 
available. These officials are the Chiefs of District Technical Offices (no. 2), District 
Technical Engineer (no. 1), and District WASH Advisors (no. 4). They are highly qualified 
technical professionals and all have graduated in civil engineering except one (WASH 
Advisor) who has a Master’s degree in social science. Most of them have worked more 
than three years in their respective districts, except one with just over 10 months. Two 
Chiefs of District Technical Offices and one District Technical Engineer were permanent 
civil servants, and four WASH Advisors were deputed to the DDCs from the bilateral 
project (RWSSP-WN) commissioned by the Governments of Nepal and Finland.  
4.5.4 Service Providers (SPs) 
These 7 observed DDCs had made formal contracts with 33 SPs to implement the WASH 
programme in 40 VDCs (see Appendix II for the details on DDC and VDC-wise drinking 
water schemes). The majority of these schemes were completed during the period 2009 
to 2013 and a few were under construction. These SPs are the institutional SPs that are 
formally registered with the government. Out of these 33 SPs, only 12 SPs (39%) are 
interviewed. Refer Appendix III for the details of SPs involved in providing technical 
services to WUCS on behalf of DDCs. Among these interviewed 12 SPs, two SPs are 
working in more than one district.  
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For interview, groups ranging from 2 to 5 officials of the service-providing organizations 
participated in the discussion, but their views are collectively documented as representing 
individual institutions. Most of the participants were chairperson/president, vice-
chairperson/president, executive director, treasurer, members, programme coordinators, 
office secretary, health promoter, overseer, or programme officer. These SPs have been 
in operation for more than five years, and have been involved in a wide range of 
community development and capacity building programmes. The task to be performed by 
these SPs, according to the contract, was to provide technical support to WUCs in the 
implementation of WASH plans, particularly focusing on drinking water schemes in the 
respective assigned VDCs.  
4.5.5 Water Users’ Committees (WUCs) 
Since there were more than 320 drinking water schemes, almost the same number of 
WUCs had been established in the 40 Village Development Committees of the 7 observed 
districts. These WUCs are registered with the District Water Resource Committee under 
the Water Resource Act 1992. The number of the sampled DDCs and the SPs are given 
in Table 13. 
Table 13: Sampled DDCs 
No. Name of DDCs 
DDC officials 
participated in 
interview 
Service providers 
participated in 
interview 
1 Baglung 1  
2 Parbat 1 2 
3 Tanahun 1 2 
4 Syangja 1 2 
5 Rupandehi 2 2 
6 Nawalparasi 1 2 
7 Pyuthan  2 
 Total 7 12 
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4.6 Subject and Unit of Analysis 
4.6.1 Subjects of Analysis 
The subjects of analysis of this research are ‘actors’ i.e. ‘organizations’ and their 
‘relationships’ in service delivery. How the organizations involved in service delivery 
forged their relationships has been assessed based on the accountability features as 
referred to in Chapter 4.4.6 above.  
4.6.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis taken at the micro-level is the ‘contract’ or ‘agreement’, or in another 
words, the ‘feature of accountability’ being transacted between DDCs and SPs, and 
between DDCs and WUCs. Through these features the nature and intensity of 
accountability are measured. The unit is measured through i) a questionnaire with 
structured interviews and discussions held with the DDC officials and the SP officials, and 
ii) the contents of the contract or agreement documents being made between DDCs with 
SPs and WUCs for service delivery.  
 
In the successive deliberation, the terms “features or contents of contract or agreement” 
and “features of accountability” are used interchangeably. All these terms represent the 
same meaning since the features or contents of contracts or agreements are derived from 
the features of accountability for service transactions. 
 
At the meso-organizational level, the nature and type of the service provision relationships 
between DDCs and WUCs, and between DDCs and SPs, have been examined based on 
accountability features. Here the unit of analysis is ‘organizational relationship’ but how 
the relationships of these organizations are influenced by their structure, strategy 
(objective) and finance have also been observed. 
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4.7 Instruments 
4.7.1 Primary analysis  
A structured interview is also known as a ‘standardized interview’ (Bryman 2012, p. 210). 
For this research, two separate sets of semi open-ended questionnaire, one each for DDC 
officials and SPs officials, were used in a semi-structured interview environment. In a way, 
this is a mixed approach towards generating the information, one that encapsulates both 
qualitative and quantitative aspects. In general, a qualitative approach interview tends to 
be less structured compared with a structured interview.  
 
According to Bryman (2012, p. 470): 
“The structured interview is designed to answer … questions. Instead, in 
quantitative research, there is an emphasis on greater generality in the 
formulation of initial research ideas and on interviews’ own perspectives.” 
In compliance with this notion, the structured interview with an open-ended questionnaire 
cultivates both more targeted responses from the interviewees, directly addressing the 
research questions, and, at the same time, obtaining broader views on research issues. 
Therefore, this instrument fitted appropriately the task of generating the required data and 
information, as it focused on the working relationship between the actors from the 
accountability perspective at micro-level. At the same time, it gives enough premises for 
debate on how these relationships affect the organizational structure and institutional 
framework, or vice versa, at the meso- and macro- levels in service provision. 
 
The researcher carried out all the interviews himself at the respective interviewees’ office 
premises, except for three. These three interviewees were briefed about the questionnaire 
beforehand and filled them in by themselves in their respective offices. The researcher 
himself later collected those completed questionnaires. It took between thirty minutes to 
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more than one hour to complete a single interview, including filling in the questionnaire, 
depending on the interest of participants in the subject matter. Following the standard 
research code of practice (UoB 2014) and ethics94, all the participants were properly 
briefed about the questionnaire and interview by clarifying the objective of the research 
and how their participation helped in fulfilling the research objective by maintaining 
confidentiality. The interviews were carried out only after obtaining their written consent. 
Since the questionnaire is of the objective ‘tick-box’ type, a few open-ended questions 
were also asked to supplement the objective questions in order to comprehend 
appropriate required information. Mainly for subjective understanding, the opinions of the 
participants were asked regarding both the improvement of the contents of contracts and 
the capacity of SPs and WUCs to implement the contractual (or agreement) obligations. 
The interviews and meetings took place from March to June 2013 covering six districts. 
4.7.1.1 Interviews with DDC officials 
A seven-page semi-open questionnaire was administered with the seven DDC officials in 
the structured interview environment, followed by a freewheeling discussion closely 
related to the topics.  Refer to Appendix IV(a) for a sample of the questionnaire devised 
for the DDC officials. Each set of questionnaires has 6 major questions, which are further 
classified into 22 sub-questions and 32 sub-sub questions. The questionnaire is objective 
in order to examine accountability features in the service delivery transactions, both 
between DDCs and WUCs, and between DDCs and SPs; and from the DDCs’ point of 
view, to indicate how the DDCs perceived these relationships. Question no. 4 is 
particularly related to the issues regarding the ‘Contents of Agreement’ in terms of: tasks, 
roles and responsibilities; deliverables, outputs and targets; time duration for 
tasks/activities to be carried out; financial provision (payment/disbursement, time, 
approval procedure); work progress reporting (formats, channels, levels, time, frequency); 
                                                
94 For research ethic of the University of Birmingham refer 
https://intranet.birmingham.ac.uk/finance/accounting/Research-Support-Group/Research-Ethics/Ethical-
Review-of-Research.aspx 
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arbitration and enforcement provisions. Question no. 5 dealt with the ‘Implementation of 
the Agreement’. Under this, if the agreements made with WUCs and the contracts made 
with SPs were unsuccessfully concluded or withheld, then what could be the reason for 
this? Was it because of poorly structured agreements and contracts, or poor supervision 
and monitoring of these agreements and contracts, or could financial obligations not be 
met in time? Was enforcement capacity weak? 
4.7.1.2 Interviews with SPs 
Almost the same pattern of questionnaires was used for SPs, but oriented towards 
examining the service delivery relationships between SPs and DDCs from the SPs’ 
perspective, to discover how the SPs perceived this service transaction relationship. Like 
the questionnaires used for DDCs, this is also an open-ended questionnaire, which 
includes 6 major questions that are further divided into 31 sub-questions and 46 sub-sub 
questions. This is a bit higher in number compared to the set of questionnaires used in the 
interview with the DDC officials. Like with the DDCs, the questionnaire is in fact divided 
into two parts, i) regarding the contents of contracts, which entails how the accountability 
features are structured in the contracts, and ii) questions designed to see how the 
contracts are implemented and what could cause the implementation to be hindered.  
 
The interviews with SPs also took place in the SPs’ office premises, conducted by the 
researcher himself. Altogether, 13 SPs participated in the interview, but only 12 were 
considered, because two SPs were found to be representing the same sister 
organizations. These had split up only for strategic business purposes in order to win the 
contract, which is a normal practice in Nepal. The interviews became lively in most cases, 
as SPs were very much eager to volunteer and share their experiences. As a result, the 
duration of the interviews took more than one hour in some cases. Refer to Appendix 
IV(b) for a sample questionnaire devised during the interview with SPs. 
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4.7.1.3 Observations 
The researcher had made operational observations of these seven DDCs very closely 
from time to time since 2008. He was partly involved in the restructuring of these DDCs in 
order to adjust the WASH programme within the DDC organizational systems. The 
importance of having direct observation in this research is that it can confirm and 
corroborate interview data, in terms both of scale and quality of service transaction 
between the actors (DDCs to WUCS and DDCs to SPs). The organizational assessments 
of these DDCs were carried out in 2009 (by RWSSP-WN), and their programmes and 
budgets were constantly observed over the period of five years (2009-2013).  
 
As Yin (2003, p. 92) puts the observation method:  
“By making a field visit to the case study ‘site’ you are creating the opportunity 
for direct observations...some relevant behaviours or environmental conditions 
will be available for observation”.  
Yin (2003) further argued that it is “… a special mode of observation, in which you are not 
merely a passive observer” which is also true in this case, where the researcher himself 
had been involved in the monitoring of the performance of the contracts/agreements being 
made by these DDCs with over 300 WUCs and 39 SPs. It is expected that these 
observations further helped in the formulation of credible arguments during discussions 
with actors of their relationship in service provision. 
4.7.2 Secondary Analysis 
According to Heaton (1998, p.1): 
“Secondary analysis involves the use of existing data, collected for the 
purposes of a prior study, in order to pursue a research interest which is 
distinct from that of the original work; this may be a new research question or 
an alternative perspective on the original question”.  
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In this respect, secondary analysis differs from systematic reviews and meta-analyses of 
qualitative studies, which aim instead to compile and assess the evidence relating to a 
common concern or area of practice (Popay et al. 1998). Therefore, in order to measure 
the ‘Unit of Analysis’, i.e. the ‘features of the contract’, besides the questionnaire, the 
secondary sources of data are also used. It should be understood that the secondary 
analysis entails both quantitative (Dale et al. 1988) and qualitative (Corti et al. 1995) 
analysis. The sources of secondary data/information are discussed below. 
4.7.2.1 Contract and agreement documents 
Altogether six agreement documents, drawn up and executed between the DDCs and 
WUCs, are examined to see whether the agreements fulfilled the basic requirements of 
the agreement to implement the drinking water schemes in their respective communities 
or not. Refer to Appendix V for the sample of the agreement document used by DDC with 
WUC. Later on, it was also confirmed that all seven districts have used the same format of 
the agreement for 300 drinking water schemes with almost the same number of WUCs. 
 
Likewise, the five contract documents executed between the DDCs and SPs were 
examined, in terms of their contents, to investigate whether they fulfilled the best possible 
purpose-of-contract requirements in providing the technical services to implement the 
rural drinking water schemes in the respective assigned VDCs. Refer Appendix VI for the 
sample of a contract document used by the DDCs to purchase the technical services of 
SPs. While examining these documents, as discussed earlier, attention was given as to 
how and to what extent the accountability features had been built into the service delivery 
transaction.  
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4.7.2.2 Other documents 
Other sources of information used for the secondary analysis were the District 
Development Plans of the DDCs (refer to Appendix VIII), and other relevant policy 
documents, acts, rules, reports etc. (Chapter 3.2.3 and 3.2.4). 
4.7.3 Measurement 
For measurement purposes, both ordinal and interval scales were used in the 
questionnaire, in order to obtain information regarding the intensity of the issues in the 
contents of contracts and agreements, in order to assess the accountability features in the 
service delivery relationship.  
 
The statistical tools applied for analysis are simple ‘average mean value’, ‘standard 
deviation’, and ‘correlation’. However, the last two tools, ‘standard deviation’ and 
‘correlation’ are used for illustrative purposes only, to support the findings as provided in 
Appendix IX. The average mean value is used to measure the intensity of perceived 
working relationships in terms of accountability features; the higher the score or mean 
value, the better the accountability, or vice versa. In addition, these helped to reveal which 
accountability feature/s in the service transaction were weak and which were strong. 
Standard deviation is used to discover how the values are dispersed from the mean value. 
Perceived accountability intensities in the service delivery transactions can be expressed 
as follows. 
 
General equation: 
Accountability = Delegation (Task + Deliverability) + Financing + Reporting (Work 
Progress) + Arbitration + Enforcement 
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In this equation, the ‘Accountability’ is the dependent variable, and ‘Delegation’, 
‘Financing’, ‘Reporting’, ‘Arbitration’ and ‘Enforcement’ are the independent variables. 
Where: 
Acc =  Accountability 
Del=  Delegation 
Fin =  Financing 
Rep =  Reporting 
Arb =  Arbitration 
Enf =  Enforcement 
 
Accountability in service transaction as perceived by DDC on WUC:  
Acc (DDC-WUC) =  Del (DDC-WUC)+Fin (DDC-WUC)+Rep (DDC-WUC)+Arb (DDC-
WUC)+Enf (DDC-WUC) 
 
 
Accountability in service transaction as perceived by DDC on SP: 
Acc (DDC-SP) =  Del (DDC-SP)+Fin (DDC-SP)+Rep (DDC-SP)+Arb (DDC-SP)+Enf 
(DDC-SP) 
 
 
Accountability in service transaction as perceived by SP on DDC: 
Acc (SP-DDC) =  Del (SP-DDC)+Fin (SP-DDC)+Rep (SP-DDC)+Arb (SP-DDC)+Enf 
(SP-DDC) 
 
4.8 Analysis presentation 
Tables are used for presentation and discussion; wherever possible, the graphic 
presentations in figures are made to illustrate the findings more meaningful way, so that 
the analysis and discussion would be presented in a logical sequence in order to convey 
the rational meaning and to enhance understanding. For the statistical analysis, SPSS 
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Version 21 was used for the purposes of description and correlation (Refer Appendix IX 
for analysis). 
4.8.1 Validation and generalization of results 
The 75 District Development Committees of Nepal function in the same politico-
administrative settings, guided by the same national rules, regulations, and institutional 
environment. Hence the service delivery provision adopted by all these DDCs is the 
same. The situation described concerning the observed DDCs, and the findings obtained 
from this research can be generalized for the external validation of all 75 DDCs in the 
areas of rural drinking water service provision. 
4.8.2 Derivation of findings 
To derive findings, the following frame shown in Figure 21 is used. This frame gives 
systematic triangulation to conclude the research findings. The perceptions of DDCs and 
SPs are collected through questionnaires and interviews. They are tabulated and 
interpreted to draw the meanings. For a broader understanding, the findings are further 
collated with the agreement and contract documents used by DDCs for WUCs and 
Service Providers (NGOs) respectively. The information generated through both sources 
is validated by comparison with the DDC plans, policies, and the organizational 
performance of DDCs, WUCs and SPs.  
 
All these findings are later used to define the accountability features in the service delivery 
relationships of the actors, and then finally their organizational and institutional roles in 
drinking water service provision, drawing on the broader scope of public service delivery 
practices and theories around the world. 
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Figure 21: Triangulation of findings 
 
Source: Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE), Global Environment Facility (GEF)95 
                                                
95  Global Environment Facility (GEF) promotes this evaluation approach to triangulate the findings. For detail 
on this see www.thegef.org/gef/CPE accessed on 21 April 2014. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. Findings 
This chapter presents the findings and the analysis based on the questionnaire interviews 
(primary source) and other relevant documents (secondary sources). These findings, 
when analysed with due consideration of the key research questions, define and explain 
the accountability features in the service delivery transaction relationship between DDCs 
and WUCs, and between DDCs and SPs. Furthermore, based on these relationships, the 
organizational and institutional features in service provision are examined. A simple linear 
causality (Figure 22) is suggested as a means of illustrating how the findings may be 
related to each other for interpretation at the different levels. 
Figure 22: Causality of finding interpretation 
 
5.1 Perceptions regarding accountability features  
The accountability features discussed here are the perceived views of the respondents. It 
is expressed in the form of ‘contents of agreements’ in the case of DDCs with WUCs to 
implement the drinking water schemes; and in the form of the ‘contents of contracts’ in the 
case of DDCs with SPs for technical assistance to be provided to WUCs on behalf of 
DDCs in order to implement the drinking water schemes.  
 
Therefore, the content features of agreements or contracts are synonymously used as 
accountability features of service delivery transactional relationships. 
Accountability features Service provision relationship 
Organizational /
institutional features 
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5.1.1 DDCs’ and SPs’ perceptions of contents  
Altogether seven respondents, all the DDC officials representing the six districts –
Rupandehi, Nawalparasi, Tanahun, Parbat, Syangja and Baglung – participated as 
interviewees and questionnaire respondents. Similarly, twelve representatives of the 
technical service providers (SPs) of the same five districts also participated as both.  They 
were asked to respond to the questions related to the ‘contents’ of the agreement and 
contract documents, and the ‘implementation’ of the agreed tasks. Their recorded 
perceptions are discussed here. 
 
Table 14 gives the perceived intensity of accountability features in terms of the contents of 
the agreement documents used by DDCs with WUCs, and the contents of the contract 
documents used by DDCs with SPs. The intensity is derived by using the rating scale 0 – 
4 (Linkert Scale) throughout the responses given to each question asked to the DDC and 
Service Provider (NGO) officials, and their aggregate value is presented as an intensity of 
the content/accountability feature.  
 
 Denotation of the views regarding the contents (features) of ‘agreements’ and ‘contracts’ 
as perceived by DDC with regard to WUCs and SPs, and by SPs with regard to DDCs is 
as follows:  
 
DDC>WUC  denotes the agreement made by DDC with WUC as perceived by DDC 
DDC>SP  denotes the contract made by DDC with SP as perceived by DDC 
SP>DDC  denotes the contract made by DDC with SP as perceived by SP 
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Table 14: Perceived clarity on contents (accountability features) 
 Agreement Contract 
Variables (Content 
features-
accountability 
features) 
DDC>WUC (n=7) DDC>SP (n=7) SP>DDC (n=7:n=12)* 
Task, roles 19 21 20 
Deliverables 20 21 19 
Time duration 18 20 21 
Financial provision 24 24 21 
Work progress 17 23 19 
Arbitration 10 18 16 
Enforcement 14 14 16 
Total 122 141 132 
Mean 17 20 19 
* Value is adjusted with 0.583 to make equal comparison. 
 
5.1.1.1 DDCs’ perception regarding agreements with WUCs (DDC>WUC) 
The perception of DDCs toward the features of agreements with WUCs is poor in terms of 
their clarity, adequacy and understanding, compared with the contracts made by DDCs 
with SPs. The agreements made between DDCs and WUCs are found weak on every 
aspect of the accountability features except financial provision. The weakest part in the 
agreements is ‘arbitration’ followed by ‘enforcement’ and ‘work progress reporting’. 
Examination of the features such as ‘task, roles and responsibility’, ‘deliverables’, and 
‘time duration’ show better clarity and understanding by DDCs, but this is still poor 
compared to the content features of the contracts made by DDCs with SPs.  
 
5.1.1.2 DDCs perception regarding contracts with SPs (DDC>SP)  
DDCs’ perceptions regarding the contents of the contract documents made between 
DDCs and SPs have indicated more clarity of accountability features in comparison with 
the agreements made between DDCs and WUCs. All the features i.e. ‘task, roles, 
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responsibility’; ‘deliverability’’, ‘time duration’, ‘financial provision’, and ‘work progress 
reporting’ have shown clear and adequate provision in the contract documents, except in 
the cases of ‘arbitration’ and ‘enforcement’, where the clarity is poorly perceived by the 
DDC officials.  
5.1.1.3 SPs’ perceptions regarding contracts with DDCs (SP>DDC) 
The SPs’ perceptions of the contents of contracts made between DDCs and SPs rank 
better than the perceived features of the agreements made between DDCs and WUCs, 
but are poor when compared with the perception of the same (DDC-SP) contracts as 
perceived by DDCs. Overall the two features ‘enforcement’ and ‘arbitration’ are seen as 
the weakest aspects in the structure of both ‘agreements’ and ‘contracts’ by DDCs in the 
provision of rural drinking water services, but more so in the case of those with WUCs 
than in those with SPs. 
5.1.2 Composite perception regarding content features 
A radar chart (Figure 23) is plotted, based on the perceptions held by DDCs and SPs on 
the contents of ‘agreements’ and ‘contracts’ (the same figures taken from the Table 14 but 
used for the graphical illustration to make it more comprehensible). The chart shows 
interesting accountability features in the service delivery transaction relationships of the 
actors involved in rural drinking water service provision. All the features of the contracts 
between DDCs and SPs have exhibited better accountability features (task, roles, 
responsibility, deliverables, time duration, financial provision, work progress reporting, 
arbitration and enforcement provisions) than the features of the agreements that were 
made by DDCs with WUCs, except for ‘financial provision’, where the agreements appear 
slightly better.  
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From this analysis, one may conclude that, in terms of intensity, there are certain 
variations in the contents (or accountability features) of agreements and contracts made 
by DDCs with WUCs and SPs respectively. However, this also clearly reveals that the 
DDCs, being public institutions, are very poor in the provision of ‘enforcement’ of both the 
agreements with WUCs and the contracts with SPs. Apart from this, the provision for 
‘arbitration’ and monitoring of ‘work progress’ on the part of agreements with WUCs has 
been found to be poorly structured.  
 
In sum, it appears that the contents of agreements made by DDCs with WUCs are poorly 
structured from the accountability features point of view, when compared with the 
contractual arrangements made by DDCs with SPs. 
Figure 23: Radar Chart – composite perceptions 
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5.2 Perceptions regarding implementation 
5.2.1 DDC’s perceptions regarding implementation of agreements and 
contracts 
To understand the perceptions of DDCs and SPs on the implementation of the 
‘agreements’ and ‘contracts’, respondents were asked: 
“If the agreements made by District Development Committees (DDCs) with 
Water Users Committees (WUCs) and the contracts made with Service 
Providers (SPs) were unsuccessfully concluded or withheld for longer than the 
stipulated time frame, then what could be the reasons for this?”  
For this, four sub-questions concerning the ‘structure of agreements’, ‘properly and timely 
conducting of monitoring and supervision’, ‘timely meeting of financial obligations’, and 
‘failure of enforcement of agreements with WUCs and contracts with SP’ were posed 
before the DDCs’ officials, and the responses obtained are briefly discussed here. 
5.2.1.1 Structure of agreements/contracts 
Responding to the sub-question “Was implementation unsuccessful because of 
agreements that were poorly structured?” DDC officials felt that the poor provision 
regarding monitoring and supervision of WUCs and SPs, together with a weak 
enforcement and compliance mechanism to enforce agreements and contracts, came out 
as the most perceived problem, with 22% each (see Figure 24). Incentive provision for the 
performance of WUCs and SPs was the second commonest issue cited (19%); other 
reasons cited include outputs, deliverables to be produced by WUCs and SPs (15%), 
arbitration provision to solve disputes (7%), activities and tasks (4%), and financial terms 
and condition (4%). All these contents appeared to require improved provisions in the 
agreements for their better implementation.  
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Figure 24: DDCs’ response to structure of agreements and contracts 
 
5.2.1.2 Monitoring and supervision of agreements and contracts 
In order to probe further into the monitoring and supervision of the agreements and 
contracts, which was another cause of poor enforcement and compliance, the following 
question was asked: “Why could the DDC not monitor and supervise agreements and 
contracts in a timely fashion?” The answers given revealed some unanticipated results.  
 
According to the DDCs, the main reason was the weak supervision and monitoring 
mechanism (28%) of DDCs, followed by the fact that DDCs neglected to monitor and 
supervise the agreements properly and timely (20%), lack of trained human resources 
(20%) and lack of human resources in general in DDCs (16%). Lack of knowledge on how 
to perform monitoring and supervision (12%) and others (4%), are two other factors 
perceived by the DDC officials leading to poor monitoring and supervision of agreements 
and contracts. Interestingly, no DDC officials indicated that there was a lack of funding to 
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monitor the agreements and contracts. This might suggest that funding is not an issue for 
effective monitoring and supervision in the implementation of the agreements and the 
contracts (Figure 25). 
Figure 25: DDCs’ response to monitoring and supervision of agreements and contracts 
 
5.2.1.3 Financial obligation 
Finance has always been an issue in service delivery due to pressure for cost 
effectiveness. The question was asked: “Why can’t DDCs meet their financial 
obligations?” The failure of WUCs and SPs to comply with financial norms as per the 
agreements and contracts came out to be the most commonly perceived cause (36%) 
followed by undue internal and external pressure exerted by the DDC officials (27%), the 
cumbersome financial approval procedures of DDCs (27%) and lastly, poor financial 
planning (9%) (Figure 26) despite the DDCs having shown better accountability features. 
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Figure 26: DDCs’ responses to financial obligations 
 
5.2.1.4 Enforcement of agreements and contracts 
Finally, the DDCs’ response to the question “Why did DDCs fail to enforce agreement?” 
was that it was due to the lack of a sense of responsibility on the part of DDC officials 
(67%), and undue internal and external pressure to enforce agreements (33%) (Figure 
27).  
Figure 27: DDCs' response to enforce the agreements and contracts 
 
It appeared that nobody responded to the DDCs’ lack of adequate authority to enforce the 
agreements or contracts. This indicates that it is not a matter of the inadequacy of the 
enforcement mechanism (legal authority) to enforce the agreements and contracts, but 
the willpower of the DDC officials and the organizational system to support such 
measures. 
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5.2.2 SPs’ perceptions regarding contract implementation 
More comprehensive views on the part of SPs on the implementation of contracts were 
obtained, compared with other respondents. This may have been because they, as the 
service providers, faced bureaucratic obstruction and subordination (SPs are at the mercy 
of civil servants due to the power-centred bureaucracy) in contractual relationships with 
the government offices, including DDCs. 
5.2.2.1 Implementation of contracts 
Responding to the first question, on the implementation of contracts, 33% SPs responded 
that the activities were fully implemented, 58% said mostly implemented, and the 
remaining 8% SPs said partially implemented. SPs identified many issues regarding the 
poor implementation of contractual activities (Figure 28). This is covered in more detail in 
Chapter 5.2.3 Supplementary discussion below. 
Figure 28: Activity implementation 
 
5.2.2.2 Financial payment 
Regarding financial payment, the question whether the ‘payments for works are made 
fully, mostly, partially or not at all’ was asked. Around 42% of SPs said that they had 
received full payments as per the contracts, another 42% of SPs said they received most 
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of the payments, and the remaining 17% SPs admitted that they had received only part 
payment (Figure 29).  
Figure 29: Financial payment 
 
 
The reasons for not making full payments, as forwarded by the SPs during the group 
discussions, were mixed. Both DDCs and SPs appeared to be responsible for this. The 
reasons that emerged included DDCs being not able to evaluate the drinking water 
projects for final payment on time, not giving the work order on time, changing the scope 
and volume of works later, after the contract was signed, and delaying payment for 
completed works. On the SP side, it appeared they could not facilitate the WUCs to 
complete the construction works in time, and also the late formation of WUCs caused 
delays in payment. 
5.2.2.3 Time and deliverables 
To the question related to the timely completion of the contracts, 83% of SPs said 
implementation was delayed and did not complete on time, whereas 17% of SPs said that 
the contracts were completed within the stipulated time (Figure 30). Despite a majority of 
the contracts being delayed in implementation, 42% of SPs agreed that the expected 
deliverables (targets and outputs), as specified in the contracts, were fully achieved, and 
50% of SPs responded that they were mostly achieved. Only 8% of SPs said that the 
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deliverables were partly achieved. None of them said that these had not been achieved at 
all (Figure 31). 
 
The reasons behind non-achievement of the specified deliverables as per contracts, as 
pointed out by the SPs, were said to be mainly due to a larger volume of works than 
anticipated in the contracts, poor community participation, delayed payment, lack of DDC 
cooperation, and delays in the transportation of construction materials to the drinking 
water scheme sites. 
Figure 30: Time keeping and assignments 
 
Figure 31: Deliverables, targets 
 
5.2.2.4 Progress report submission 
Submission of progress reports to DDCs by SPs regarding their performance seemed 
poor. Out of 12 respondents, only 7 SPs had submitted the reports, while the frequency of 
reporting seems to be very low against the terms specified in the contracts. Normally, the 
contracts’ duration was 18 months. Only 3 SPs (25%) had reported more than 10 times, a 
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similar number of 3 SPs (25%) had reported 4 times, 2 SPs (17%) reported 5 times and of 
the rest, each one had reported of their progress of performance to the DDCs 10 times, 9 
times, 8 times, and 7 times respectively. 
 
On the submitted reports (n=10), only 50% of SPs received comments or feedback from 
the DDC officials, and the rest of SPs did not receive any. Some comments given by 
DDCs to SPs were regarding the revision of WASH Plans, improvement of technical 
inputs, quality of programme activities and reporting, including data and information 
management, to increase local community participation (more than 20% of the total 
drinking water scheme cost), and the involvement of VDC Secretaries in the programmes. 
5.2.2.5 Contractual dispute 
Regarding contractual disputes, 67% SPs said that they did not face any disputes during 
the implementation of the contracts, whereas 33 % SPs said ‘yes’ they had faced disputes 
(Figure 32). Among those who faced disputes, 2 SPs had done so once, 1 SP had on 2 
occasions and the other had faced disputes 4 times. The types of disputes faced by the 4 
SPs were over delayed payments by DDCs, inadequate staff deputation in the work site, 
and local political parties’ interference in the conduct of a baseline survey for WASH Plan 
preparation.  
 
Out of these disputes, only one payment issue had been solved through continuous 
requests put by the SP. Other payment issues, despite having had as many as four 
meetings with concerned officials, still remained pending. Regarding staff availability, 
upon the request of one SP, one DDC had opened up a site office to deal with problems, 
and the disturbance caused by the local political party in one district was solved through 
the DDC’s mediation.  
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Figure 32: Contractual disputes 
 
5.2.2.6 Warning 
Eighty-three per cent SPs said that they could not implement the contracts in time, but 
surprisingly only 25% SPs received warning of delays in implementation (Figure 33). 
Interestingly, only 1 SP received the warning in written form while other two SPs had 
received the warning verbally. Of these two SPs, one had received warning once and 
other one twice. 
Figure 33: Warnings 
 
 
None of the SPs were penalized for non-compliance with the contracts. Likewise none of 
the SPs were incentivised for their good performance. At the end, only 58% of SPs 
considered that the contracts were successfully implemented, while 42% of SPs denied 
this. Those SPs who had denied success gave the following random reasons for the 
unsuccessful concluding of the contracts:  
• Poor community participation.  
• Contract package consists of three sub-packages (planning-implementation-
consolidation) that required a longer period of involvement and more resources. 
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• Additional work such as the construction of huge overhead tanks including the 
deployment of sophisticated technologies caused delays in Terai.  
• Additional manpower required due to increased work volume. 
• Difficulty in motivating Terai Madhesi (people living in the plain areas of the 
southern part at the border to India) communities for participation. 
• Poor dialogue/communication with DDCs. 
• Household survey could not take place in time due to local people's protests. 
5.2.2.7 Contract comparison 
Most of the SPs had substantial experience of developmental works in rural areas and 
had carried out quite a number of assignments, not only in drinking water supply, but also 
in various other sectors for many donors and clients. In order to identify perceptual 
differences regarding the scope, features, specificity and implementation between those 
contracts executed by SPs with DDCs for rural drinking water and the contracts 
implemented for other clients (donors, INGOs and NGOs), the following question was 
asked: 
“Compared with other contracts your organization had implemented in the 
past, how did you find this contract and its implementation?”  
The responses received to this question are provided below in summary: 
 
A majority of SPs believed that the features of the contracts with DDCs were good, and 
even suitable from the DDCs’ point of view, as there was a complete package from the 
planning, through the implementation to the consolidation (post-construction) phases. 
These were also better in terms of objectives and features, compared with other contracts 
made with, and implemented for, other donors and clients. They also said that both the 
contract package and investment under this modality were big in scale compared to the 
contracts for other projects or programmes they had implemented for other clients.  
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However, the monitoring, supervision and enforcement of the contracts by DDCs emerged 
as the weakest part of this arrangement.  SPs reported that the scope and volume of 
works were excessively large, partly because the number of drinking water schemes to be 
implemented was not well specified in the contracts. Delays in payment, poor technical 
backstopping support from DDCs, sectional or malicious motives of bureaucrats, poorly 
defined outputs, and poor programme implementation structures and mechanisms were 
some of the more serious concerns identified.  
Box 1:  DDC capacity 
The DTO Chiefs of Nawalparasi District and Rupandehi District openly acknowledged the 
weakness on the part of local government systems to monitor and enforce the 
contract/agreement. As Mahesh Chandra Neupane, DTO Chief, Nawalparasi, says: “the 
agreement between DDC and SPs failed to conclude successfully due to DDC incapacity 
to administer the contract properly”. They both believed that the existing DDC system 
does not support to structure and execute the service delivery system through third party 
arrangement especially for procuring the technical services. 
5.2.3 Supplementary discussion  
As mentioned earlier, formal meetings with the officials of DDCs and the SPs during the 
same period triangulated the questionnaire survey. The data gained from these 
discussions have generally supported the questionnaire-generated findings and are briefly 
summarized below. 
 
In the meetings, respondents stated that the problems related to DDCs were unnecessary 
bureaucratic obstacles, and spoke of the lingering and lengthy process for payments. 
They further said that the contracts (technical service support) between SPs and DDCs 
were made on time, whereas agreements (drinking water project implementation) 
between DDCs and WUCs did not take place on time, and that there were inadequate 
staff to manage the contracts and agreements, an improper attitude on the part of DDC 
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officials, unwilling to adjust or accommodate changes in contract duration, ill-defined 
works and cost estimation are the other problems they had mentioned. In addition to this, 
there had been no provision of advance payment and the revision of estimate and scope 
of works in the middle of project implementation including a dispute on SP selection, and 
hidden interest in the procurement of construction materials.  
Box 2: Procurement 
Local Body Financial Administration Rules (LBFAR) 2064 (2007) have clearly mentioned 
that if the communities are involved in service delivery then the materials and works 
should be the responsibilities of the users’ committee, and the DDC can only provide 
technical and management support to the committee for implementation. However, due to 
the dishonest interests of some DDC/DTO officials, they get involved in material 
procurement directly or indirectly. In some cases, the cheques are issued in the name of 
Water Users’ Committees but ask the committees’ officials to make the payment to that 
particular supplier. The DDC officials do not only dictate where to buy the materials but 
also instruct the service provider to hire the staff recommended by them (Nepal Red 
Cross, Rupandehi).  
 
According to SP respondents, they (SPs) could not retain technical staff, partly because of 
intermittent inputs of these staff during the contract period, partly because they are 
expensive, and also partly because the contract duration kept changing, and staff inputs 
were difficult to assure in the given time. Furthermore, SPs could not facilitate the timely 
formation of VWASHCCs96, and faced difficulties in terms of the remoteness of the sites of 
drinking water schemes, and difficulties in terms of how to cope with the work volume.  
 
Apart from this, other problems expressed by the SPs are the significantly large number of 
beneficiaries, including Dalit communities97 and illiterate Madhesi communities98, in the 
                                                
96  VDC WASH Coordination Committee (VWASHCC) is formed at the VDC level where the VDC secretary 
chairs the committee. 
97  In general, Dalits’ community participation in drinking water programmes is weak because of their poor 
economic condition, social subordination and isolation. 
98  Madhesi communities live in Terai areas, the southern part of the country, near or along the Indian border. 
They live in a relatively close society and have certain social taboos that are different from those of the 
hilly or mountain people. 
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Terai and the difficulty of mobilising them. SPs were unable to comprehend the nature, 
scope, volume, time and cost of works: for example, the number and size of drinking 
water projects are relatively big, and the process of implementing three packages 
(preparation phase, implementation phase and consolidation phase) of the contracts 
takes longer time. Besides this, SPs were less competent to adapt to new technologies 
such as that of huge overhead tank construction with an electromechanical component, 
and in some cases a solar or electric powered pumping system.  
Box 3: Technological sophistication 
The DDC of Syangja with its District Technical Office have not tried the electric powered 
lift drinking water system before, as most of the systems used to be of gravity flow. The 
community of Chitre Bhanjyang used to rely on the rainwater, and some spring sources in 
the foothills, for drinking water which takes 1 to 2 hours time to fetch. . So the system was 
designed to lift the water in three stages from below the spring source. Aanda- Aandi 
Community Development Centre (AACD) of Syangja was assigned as the service of this 
scheme. Both Chairman Bishwa Poudel, and Programme Coordinator Eknayran Sapkota 
of AACD admitted that the construction of such a scheme is beyond their imagination and 
had never been tried before. 
 
All these issues could have been addressed if the accountability features had been 
carefully structured within the contractual relationship between DDCs and SPs. 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
The descriptive analysis suggests that the ‘agreement’ type relationship in service 
provision contains less intensity of accountability features compared to the higher intensity 
in the ‘contract’ type relationship. This means that more compactness is instituted in the 
contract type service transaction. Despite the higher accountability features in the 
‘contract’ type relationships between DDCs and SPs, the perception remained different in 
cases where DDCs have perceived higher accountability features in mean value, but at 
the same time a high dispersal too, compared to SPs on the same contracts. 
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Finally, from this analysis, one can conclude that a contractual arrangement offers better 
scope for accountability features and service compactness than agreement-based service 
provision. This suggests that the accountability features in the service transaction 
relationship directly influence service compactness in public service delivery. This finding 
is also supported by the results of correlation analysis as provided in Appendix IX. 
5.3 Agreement and contract documents 
5.3.1 DDCs’ agreements with WUCs 
In Nepal, the agreements between DDCs and WUCs are regulated by the Local Self-
governance Act (LSGA) 1999, Clause 200, where the standard format for agreement is 
provided in Annex 3 of the Act. This clause is meant to enable implementation of the 
project with consumers’ groups (also called ‘users’ groups’; these become ‘users’ 
committees’ or ‘associations’ once registered with the government) or non-governmental 
organizations. The agreement format consists of two pages that contain mainly the name 
of the project and those of the representatives, the address, and a brief description of the 
project. It also includes: the total estimated cost of a project, identifying funding sources, 
some details on construction materials and labour required. Likewise, it gives brief 
information on beneficiaries in terms of households and population, a description of the 
project implementer (WUC in this case) and its establishment date, and the names of 
WUC officials; and a schedule of instalments, amounts and dates. In addition to this, the 
format shows which organization takes the responsibility for repair and maintenance, the 
number of labourers to be used, the fees to be raised, the donation to be received, the 
grant for cost participation, the savings to be made, and other technical and management 
arrangements. At the end, the terms and conditions of agreement are open-ended, 
allowing the parties involved in it, mainly DDCs, to add in the required terms and 
conditions, such as are deemed necessary for the implementation of projects.  
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Some common terms and conditions found to be used by DDCs include the principle that 
the organization which operates the project must use the funds only for the purpose they 
are meant for; the starting and ending date of the project; and undertakings not to affect 
already built physical structures adversely, and to be responsible for repair and 
maintenance of the project. In addition to this, the standard agreement includes 
undertakings to: carry out a public audit; to adhere to the approved budget (cost estimate) 
and agreed time; to establish a maintenance fund; and to follow the existing rules and 
regulations. Refer to Appendix V for a sample of the actual agreement form used. 
 
Since all 75 DDCs in the country are using this format for project implementation with 
WUCs, for this research only the sample documents (agreements) used by 6 DDCs are 
examined. Although the sample is small, it is representative for all DDCs, because around 
327 drinking water schemes in the 7 observed Districts have been implemented by using 
this format. Refer to Appendix II for the details of these schemes. This format is used not 
only in the drinking water sector; it can be used for other sectors too where the 
communities are involved in as users’ associations (or users’ committees). 
 
The format is simple, and has created very few hurdles for communities seeking drinking 
water schemes from DDCs. Since the format requires minimum inputs with an open-
ended provision for other terms and conditions, this allows the agreement to be framed 
flexibly as per the discretionary provisions. This format gives flexibility to the DDCs and 
WUCs to structure the agreements as per their requirements. However, it becomes 
problematic when the monitoring and accountable authority (in this case the DDCs, as 
they finance the schemes) fails to comply with the basic norms of the agreements, due to 
their structuring of the agreements too poorly to obtain optimal results. The weakness of 
this type of service delivery provision is already confirmed by the analysis of perceptions 
regarding the contents of the agreements (Chapter 5.1); the implementation of 
 
 
227 
agreements (Chapter 5.2); and the descriptive analysis (Appendix IX). This assessment 
further reinforces the findings. 
5.3.2 DDCs’ contracts with SPs 
The contracts made by DDCs with SPs to provide technical assistance to WUCs to 
implement the drinking water schemes are found to be consistently of high quality, 
fulfilling the basic requirements as used by the standard procurement documents (refer 
Appendix VI for the sample contract used by DDCs). This format has followed the 
standard national Procurement Act and Regulations of the country. The analysis of the 
five contract documents used by DDCs has shown that the DDCs have adopted the 
standard procurement features practised by international financial institutions. Similarly, 
many donor-supported projects in Nepal, particularly those projects supported by the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, have used this format. Although these SPs 
are NGOs, which normally prefer the agreement type of relationship with their clients, in 
these cases they entered into the service delivery relationship with DDCs through the 
competitive bidding process.  
 
With some variation, all the observed contracts made by DDCs with SPs have clearly 
specified the scope of works, such as the nature of the services to be procured, the date 
of commencement, detailed personnel requirements, financial management provisions 
that include a ceiling for expenditure, the currency of payment, payment conditions, 
agreements on time extension and programme administration, the reporting procedure, 
and the mode of payment. Further, they detail the service provider’s responsibilities, such 
as the performance standard, the information requirement, the maintenance of 
confidentiality, the duty to avoid conflict of interests, the laws and regulations to be 
complied with, the property rights of clients, insurance provision and contractual ethics. 
Other general provisions made are for the suspension and termination of contract, 
 
 
228 
settlement of dispute, force majeure; and other miscellaneous provisions such as the 
service provider’s commitment towards gender equality and social inclusion, the site and 
liaison office establishment etc. If one sees this from the accountability feature 
perspective (delegating, financing, performing, informing, enforcing, and arbitration) then it 
has more or less covered all the aspects of these features. Refer Appendix VII for the 
assessment of accountability features of the participating SPs through which DDCs have 
procured the technical services.  
 
It is difficult to gauge by what method procurement documents could be standardized, 
because each is contingent upon many factors, normally guided by the national 
Procurement Act, various regulations and donor (or lender) conditions; and the nature and 
type of services, materials or works to be procured. Despite this, some issues in drinking 
water as perceived by SPs, especially regarding the ‘quantification of works’ and 
‘deliverables’ with ‘time bound action plans’ were found lacking in the contract documents. 
 
To conclude, the contractual arrangements made between DDCs and SPs appear to be 
very comprehensive compared to the agreements made between DDCs and WUCs. This 
is also supported by the findings concerning the perceptions of both by DDCs and SPs. 
Hence, the ‘agreement’ type of service delivery relationship appears to be less compact, 
from the accountability features point of view, when it is compared with the ‘contract’ type. 
However, to use the term ‘agreement’ itself is loose when discussing the service 
transaction relationship, if one sees this in terms of the Principal-Agent framework, 
because the very nature of this framework emphasises formal accountability features and 
a hierarchical relationship. It is difficult to establish clearly in the ‘agreement’ type of 
relationship who will do what for whom; since in it the purpose, function, and resource 
sharing in service provision between two parities (DDCs and WUCs) are based, unlike in 
the Principal-Agent framework, on the assumption of good intentions, and are therefore 
not well defined in order to safeguard the results. 
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The following section considers the service provision relationships between the three 
organizations (DDCs, WUCs and SPs) that are constructed according to the service 
transaction accountability features already described.  
5.4 Service provision relationships 
This analysis aims to examine and understand the service provision relationships 
between the three organizations (DDC, WUC and SP) involved in rural drinking water 
service provision. This also provides some basis to understand the organizations involved 
in service provision. The situation discussed here is based on the findings from primary 
sources i.e. interviews and discussions, and on documentary sources, such as the 
agreement and contract documents, existing acts and regulations, district development 
plans and other relevant documents. 
5.4.1 Relationships between DDCs and WUCs 
Despite their different institutional settings, DDCs (bureaucratic and public) and WUCs 
(community or social) have come together to forge their relationships in service provision. 
This relationship is less formal and less legally binding than a contractual one, as the 
accountability features (derived from the primary source) and the agreement documents 
(derived from the secondary source) have shown. It appears that this relationship is based 
on partnership, trust, and to some extent reciprocity. The parties have shared risks in 
investment, implementation, and operation of the drinking water schemes. 
Organizationally, DDCs have maintained, or been subject to, both upward bureaucratic 
accountability to their ministry (MoFALD), and downward political accountability to their 
constituencies; while WUCs have maintained social accountability via their committee 
management structure and community membership, and also to DDCs for the funds they 
have received to build the drinking water schemes. 
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The relationship between DDCs and WUCs is a non-profit one, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity as part of the local government obligation to its constituency. It is collaborative 
and complementary, and the relationship is cemented through documents called 
“Memorandum of Understanding” and/or “Agreement”, unlike the competitive bidding or 
the negotiation done in the open market. It is also observed that sometimes the initial 
commitments for service requirements are accompanied by verbal assurances from the 
principal (DDC) at the agent’s (WUC) request, although the formal local planning process 
later inducts such demands into the local District Annual Development Plan for resource 
allocation. 
 
Despite the different institutional orientations of these two organizations, a P-A 
relationship exists between the DDC, as financier and regulator, and the WUC, as fund 
receiver and user. The present analysis shows (Table 15) that the accountability features 
in this service transaction are found weak if one compares the relationship in terms of the 
enforcement, arbitration provision, and monitoring by DCCs, and the progress reporting 
by WUCs. All these have contributed to the poor and untimely completion of drinking 
water schemes. On the surface, this is a socio-politically negotiated transaction, in which 
two parties work together to implement the drinking water schemes. Hence, gauging the 
service provision relationship between the DDC and the WUC seems not an easy task, as 
one is a regulator and other is a regulated entity, one is a financier and other is a receiver, 
one is a public organization and other is a membership-based community organization. It 
is difficult to establish a true P-A relationship between these two organizations, particularly 
regarding the ‘financing’ and ‘performing’ features in service provision, in which 
community participation is made mandatory through the statutory provision. Considering 
the nature of partnership in resource sharing, this service provision relationship tends to 
show more “co-production” characteristics (Horne and Shirley 2009) than collaborative 
ones.  
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In this service transaction, the DDC asks for a certain level of accountability from the 
WUC.  The DDC itself is accountable to its elected council (but not, in reality, since 2002); 
and also to the central government, on one hand via regulatory obligations, on the other 
hand for the grants it receives for WUCs. DDCs also ask WUCs to be accountable to their 
members and community through signing an agreement to improve the governance 
system in the water users committee, and all the observed agreement documents verified 
this. This is also part of the LSGA that regulates the functions of WUCs and DDCs. 
Table 15: Service provision accountability - DDCs and WUCs 
Accountability 
Node 
DDCs WUCs Provision and practice in agreements 
Delegating Yes  
DDCs’ responsibility, as it initiates the agreements with 
WUCs and defines the roles and responsibilities in service 
provision, but in very loose terms. 
Financing Yes Yes 
For implementation of a drinking water scheme, 20% of the 
total cost should come from the community’s participation, 
which is mandatory as per the rules, and 80% comes from 
the Government.  
In practice, this is more or less maintained by both parties. 
Performing Yes Yes 
Major responsibilities fall to WUCs, but DDCs are also 
involved in providing technical support to WUCs free of cost 
as part of their supervisory role, though DDCs depend on 
SPs to provide this. 
Informing Yes Yes 
Major responsibilities fall to WUCs to provide the physical 
and financial reports to DDCs, but the DDCs also monitor the 
progress of WUCs and submit progress reports to the DDC 
Council and to the respective department and ministry. 
It was found that WUCs failed to report the progress of the 
schemes timely and with adequate information, and also that 
DDCs failed to actively secure the information from WUCs. 
Enforcing Yes  
DDCs assumed full responsibility for this, as the financing 
and executing authorities of the drinking water schemes. 
However, in reality DDCs are too weak to enforce WUCs to 
comply with the provisions made in the agreements. 
Arbitration None None 
No such provision exists in the agreement format, clauses, 
terms or conditions established in the written form. This is 
one of the reasons why the agreements with WUCs end up 
with informal settlements. 
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In an ideal ‘co-production’ situation, this relationship comprises certain characteristics like 
reciprocity, mutuality, self-organization, peer support, and the virtues of a network (NEF 
2008). It also embodies the principles of the social capital co-production features 
(customers as innovators, critical success factors, resources, assets-holders and 
community developers) (Bovaird and Loffler 2013). Although not every single one of these 
characteristics and principles may be found in any specific relationship, several of these 
characteristics have shown their strong presence.  
5.4.2 Relationships between DDCs and SPs 
The development market contracted during the Maoist Insurgency period (1995 to 2005), 
but later expanded following the signing of the peace accord between the Government 
and the Maoists in 2005. Immediately the expanded donor market started crowding with 
SPs (NGOs). This was not only limited to community development activities such as 
education, health, livelihood, micro-finance, women’s and children’s services, but in other 
sectors such as human rights, peace building, democracy and governance. For their 
survival, many SPs (or NGOs) started exploring the possibility of work in the open job 
development market – in many cases, jointly with other partners or as the sub-contracting 
partners of the local, district and national level NGOs and INGOs. Many social sector SPs 
have registered themselves both as an NGO and as a private company in order to enter 
into both the social and private sector development markets. Many service provider NGOs 
do this to create a pseudo-competition for bidding in order to fulfil the requirement of a 
minimum number of bidders when both NGOs and private firms solicit their bids.  
 
NGOs: 
For instance, Integrated Development Society (IDS), a Kathmandu-based NGO has also 
established the Engineers Trainers Associates (ETA) NGO as its sister organization. Both 
NGOs won the contracts to provide technical services to the DDC for Pyuthan District. 
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Likewise, the Development Management Institute (DMI) Consulting Pvt. Ltd. Kathmandu 
has also established a firm named Support for Development Initiative Consultancy (SDIC) 
Pvt. Ltd. Although they are registered separately, their sole purpose is to maximize the 
chance of winning contracts. 
 
In this research, according to DDC officials and SP staff, the DDCs had selected all 
service providers from the open job market although the tender was opened for all, 
including private companies, to procure the technical assistance services. For this, DDCs 
had applied an elaborate selection process. An adequate number of NGOs, more than 
three in most of the cases, had participated in the bids, but interestingly not a single 
private registered company came forward. The whole procurement process was carried 
out according to the standard procedural measures prescribed in the National 
Procurement Act and LBFAR (Local Bodies Financial Administration Rules) of the 
Government, and also following many basic elements of the World Bank’s and the Asian 
Development Bank’s procurement guidelines. The service transactional arrangements 
reflected NPM principles through the use of a performance framework for service 
measurement and open competitive bidding.  
 
Interestingly, during recent years, a greater number of NGOs as service providers has 
entered into the private sector market. Most of their relationships are business model-
based, originated through the market (or negotiated in the market), which is of a client 
relationship in nature and not like the social value-based relationships that exist between 
DDCs and WUCs.  
 
This argument is also strongly supported by the accountability framework (Table 16), 
which shows that SPs and DDCs have a clear-cut contractual relation without any 
duplication or overlap of accountability nodes. In addition, this relationship shows a very 
strong NPM orientation and P-A characteristics. 
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Table 16: Service provision accountability - DDCs and SPs 
Accountability 
Node 
DDCs SP/NGOs Provision and practice in contracts 
Delegating Yes  
DDCs delegate contractual responsibility to SPs 
(deliverables, outputs, cost, reporting, monitoring, 
arbitration). 
Financing Yes  DDCs compensate SPs for rendering the specified services as per contractual terms and conditions. 
Performing  Yes SPs perform as per contract. 
Informing  Yes 
SPs report work progress to DDCs as per contract 
but findings show SPs provide little information on 
time while DDCs lack means to compel them.  
Enforcing Yes  DDCs should enforce sanctions if SPs fail to perform as per contracts though seldom do.   
Arbitration Yes Yes 
Provisions for arbitration exist in contract 
documents. But findings uncovered no examples of 
their use.  
 
5.4.3 Relationships between WUCs and SPs 
No formal ‘agreement’ or ‘contract’ between WUCs and SPs has been found in drinking 
water provision, although one is the beneficiary and other is the service provider on behalf 
of the DDC for drinking water schemes. However, it was found that some working co-
operations between WUCs and SPs were sought in the contract documents. This has 
been achieved in most cases by using the VDC secretaries (government officials at the 
lowest units of local government) and the WUCs’ members to witness the contract. During 
interviews with SPs, some were in favour of having tripartite (DDC-WUC-SP) or even 
quadruple (DDC-WUC-SP-VDC) contracts for the effective implementation of schemes. If 
this had happened then it could have been an interesting subject to study, to see how the 
accountability features would work to define the service delivery relationship in such a 
situation. 
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5.4.4 Conclusion 
By applying the P-A framework, the accountability relation in the drinking water service 
provision between DDCs and SPs is found to be unidirectional, while on the other hand, 
the relationship between DDCs and WUCs entails a mixed and shared accountability, 
which is collaborative but more of the co-production type in the given service provision.  
 
SPs are directly accountable to DDCs, as no such shared partnership (responsibility, risk 
and reward) is established, except in that one purchases service from the other purely in a 
competitive contractual form. Hence, a market-driven relationship characterizes the 
accountability transaction in this relationship. Therefore, the organizational character of 
SP NGOs as service providers here is ambiguous – is the motive purely social (as with 
non-profit voluntary sector organizations) or has this ultimately been transcended by the 
financial one? 
 
Legally, WUCs are accountable to DDCs partly because of the devolved process of public 
service delivery provision (LSGA 1999). DDCs, by their institutional characteristics as 
local government organs, are public organizations that finance, supervise and monitor the 
drinking water schemes for WUCs, and at the same time WUCs also co-finance and share 
the resources for drinking water schemes’ construction. DDCs are also involved jointly in 
planning, designing, public auditing, and providing technical supervisory support variably 
for the construction of the schemes, and some are also involved in providing support to 
WUCs in the schemes’ operation and maintenance, besides this being available through 
SPs. Although all these things do not happen rigorously and seriously in practice, as 
shown by the findings, there are enough policy support and moral obligations on DDCs to 
support the WUCs in these areas. This relationship is based more on reciprocity (resource 
sharing), self-help (voluntarism) and community governance. Hence, the accountability in 
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this service provision can be characterized by a social relationship, which tends to give 
more emphasis on the community social process. 
5.5 Organization and financing 
5.5.1 District Development Committees (DDCs) 
The 75 Districts of Nepal are the intermediary local government institutions in between the 
central government and the 58 Municipalities and 3915 Village Development Committees 
(now 191 Municipalities and 3,625 VDCs) of the country. They are autonomous 
institutions with a legally established political mandate for self-governance and 
development. They enjoy a high degree and wide range of functional power, ranging from 
developmental (education, transportation, health, water), financial (tax, revenues, 
expenditure) to judiciary matters (handling of minor local legal cases). They coordinate 
developmental activities with other line agencies of the government and also with the local 
NGOs, CBOs, political parties, and private sector (merchant and business associations, 
consumers associations).  
 
They are permanent institutions with elected bodies. Institutionally they are politico-
administrative and development bodies, and their developmental roles change as per the 
national development priorities and policies. From the 1980s, under various institutional 
means (legal, policies, structural adjustment), the government has tried to strengthen local 
bodies as the vehicles for service delivery in rural areas. To bring the private and third 
sectors into public service provision, adequate service provision mechanisms have been 
made in the Local Self-governance Act 1999 and the National Development Plans (NPC). 
Although DDCs are development-oriented organizations, their organizational 
characteristics fit into what Norman Uphoff (1993) considered typical of public sector 
institutions. For instance, they still have bureaucratic administrators rather than 
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development facilitators, are guided by regulations, use state authority to enforce 
sanctions, and the mode of operation is normally top-down.   
 
In drinking water service provision the role of DDCs in partnership with WUCs is one of 
financing, monitoring, and supervision, while WUCs themselves implement the schemes 
through sharing the resources with DDCs, such as matching funds, the contribution of 
labour and local materials.  
 
The application of New Public Management in the DDC service delivery system is 
constrained by two factors. The first is that DDCs in the past have never been developed 
as professional service delivery organizations; they act more like political institutions. The 
second is, as a by-product of the first, that the national government has always preferred, 
where foreign aid has been involved, to establish separate project implementation units 
within the local governance system under the direct control of the central government’s 
departments or ministries, instead of making DDCs fully responsible for the 
implementation of local development projects. As discussed earlier, there are many types 
of sectoral development projects (e.g. RAIDP99, RRRSDP100, DRILP101, and CBWSSSP102 
etc.) implemented through DDCs, but having their own separate independent units (or 
project offices), so that they are accountable to their line departments and funding 
agencies, rather than to DDCs.  
 
                                                
99  The Rural Accessibility Improvement and Decentralization Project (RAIDP) supported by World Bank. For 
more information refer http://www.dolidar.gov.np/program-projects/rural-accessibility-improvement-and-
decentralization-project/.  
100  The Rural Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Sector Development Programme (RRRSDP) supported by 
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Department for International 
Development (DFID).  For more information refer http://www.dolidar.gov.np/program-projects/rural-
reconstruction-and-rehabilitation-sector-development-program-rrrsdp/.  
101  The Decentralized Rural Infrastructure and Livelihood Programme (DRILP) supported by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). For more 
information refer http://www.dolidar.gov.np/program-projects/decentalilzed-rural-infrastructure-livelihood-
programme/.  
102  The Community Based Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project supported by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). The project is already phased out. 
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Their budgeting, management, operation, reporting and decision-making systems indicate 
that these project support units are more like independent entities under their own line 
departments. However, from the central government perspective, this can be considered 
an effect of NPM, as part of agencification rather than the devolution of functions to the 
local governments. The DDCs are used just as an institutional cover to give devolution a 
local face, whereas in practice, the central government departments play the role by 
following certain standard procedural measures prescribed by the government and aid 
donors. 
 
With their diverse and very wide roles and responsibilities, DDCs have 40 to 60 
permanent regular staff, more administrative than technical; each has an annual average 
budget of approximately NPR 272 million103. Staff and budget may be greater in larger 
and urbanised districts. Since DDCs perform all sorts of development administrative tasks, 
their strategies are guided by public demand through a bottom-up planning process 
(LSGA) that is reflected in the District Annual Plans (see Appendix VIII for the list of the 
District Annual Plans and Budgets that have been studied thoroughly). With the support of 
the central government, or of donors, and also on their own initiative, some districts have 
formulated 3 to 5 year periodic plans. These plans may be considered the mid-term 
strategic plans of the districts.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a tendency not to update these plans, so that the needs and 
priorities become mismatched over a period of time. These plans, both periodic and 
annual, are capped within the broader national development policies under the guidelines 
of the National Planning Commission’s own periodic plans, and accordingly the budgets 
are released to the respective DDCs by the Ministry of Finance through MoFALD. Owing 
to their poor capacity to mobilise internal resources, and depending heavily on central 
                                                
103  The average annual budget of 7 observed DDCs’ for the fiscal year 2067/68 (2010/11). The average 
budget of 75 DDCs is NPR 271.9 million (approx. GBP 1.7 million). (Source: Local Bodies Fiscal 
Commission Secretariat, GoN (2012). Local Bodies Financial Status Assessment FY 2067/68)	
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transfers (77% of the total revenue) (LBFC 2011), almost all DDCs in Nepal find difficult to 
mobilise their resources for their own development. 
 
The national development policy instrument has focused more on drinking water after 
2008 (UNDP Nepal MDG, NPC 2013), although in general the overall national policy 
towards development was already favourable (see Chapter 3 for details). As a result, from 
the fiscal year 2009 onwards, detailed policy directives have started to emerge as the 
dominant policy feature in District Development Plans, taking into account the technical 
support for the various projects and programmes including RWSS Project104, UNDP, WB 
and ADB. Refer to Appendix VIII for the list of the District Development Plans of 
Nawalparasi DDC, Parbat DDC, Syangja DDC, Pyuthan DDC, and Tanahun DDC that 
have been examined minutely for the purpose of analysing their policy and programme 
and its implementation status.  
 
In the absence of elected officials, the downward accountability of DDCs in the service 
delivery chain is weak, although DDCs implement development programmes working very 
closely with public and other social organizations, and helping them to articulate their 
demands, needs and priorities through popular participation. Since 2002, DDCs have 
been non-representative organizations, becoming more bureaucratic than political, and 
this has adversely affected development works. Throughout this period, the development 
strategies of DDCs have been more inclined towards central government, and have had a 
bureaucratic orientation rather than a local constituency-based one. Nevertheless, from 
2012 the MoFALD has encouraged local participation by establishing the ‘Citizen Ward 
Forum’ to address the people participation issue (see http://www.mofald.gov.np). 
 
For the observed DDCs, the involvement of NGOs as service providers by the DDC itself 
is new, particularly in rural drinking water provision. Although the CBWSSSP project 
                                                
104  For detail refer to www.rwsspwn.org.np 
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attached to DDCs as a separate project management unit had done this (see Chapter 
3.2.6), DDCs on their own have never done technical service procurement for drinking 
water supply before. Each observed district used to receive roughly NPR 5 million 
annually for drinking water and sanitation programmes from DoLIDAR. Each DDC also 
received additional funds from the central government. This also included donor support 
in some cases, ranging from NPR 3.5 million to NPR 22 million for drinking water 
annually, over the period of the fiscal year 2008/9 to fiscal year 2012/13, depending on 
the absorption capacity of the DDCs (RWSSP-WN 2013, p. 76). They used these funds 
directly, together with the water users’ committees, for drinking water schemes’ repair and 
maintenance, and used very little for the construction of new schemes. For DDCs, finance 
for drinking water programmes comes from three sources: central government transfer, 
donor funding, either directly or through the government system, and community 
participation. 
 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 3.2, the national policy thrust particularly in the rural 
drinking water sector is characterized by a ‘collaborative’ and ‘co-production’ approach, 
often called the ‘community approach’, that has prompted an ‘agreement’ type of 
transaction relationship with community associations. This policy environment also 
encourages the mobilisation of community resources. However, this type of relationship 
contains weak accountability features in the public service domain, where the role of 
DDCs has remained merely as weak facilitators rather than compliance enforcers. On the 
other hand, the DDCs’ relationship with SPs in service delivery is a contractual one, but 
DDCs are organizationally weak in structuring, monitoring and enforcing the ‘contract’ with 
the SPs. Apart from routine functions, DDCs in general were found not to be 
strengthening their service delivery capacity for better performance, except in some 
districts where donor-supported projects are helping them to build their capacity. 
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5.5.2 Water Users’ Committees (WUCs) 
Both the concept and the establishment of WUCs have proliferated in Nepal, mainly after 
the 1980s, with a fairly strong policy change in favour of community and civil society 
participation in service provision at local levels (refer to Chapter 3.2.4). This has been 
through community participation as service users, financers, operators, managers and 
owners as well. Its successful application in the forestry sector in 1990s (Dahal and 
Chapagain 2008) has tremendously influenced the service provision policy in the country. 
Making the community responsible for planning, programming, financing, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of their resources, projects and services has proven very 
successful in some sectors in the past. This self-reliance approach in rural development 
has been further extended to other sectors such as health, education, agriculture, drinking 
water, sanitation, income generation and micro-finance.  
 
The effect of this policy change has also been seen in the drinking water sector, where 
the participation of users’ committees in service provision has become imperative, 
particularly in the rural communities. With users’ participation, Nepal was able to achieve 
a figure of 78% provision of drinking water in rural areas by 2010 (SEIU 2011). It is difficult 
to say how many WUCs are registered and in operation: FEDWASUN105 has claimed that 
there are around 3,400 WUCs, benefiting 3 million people in 52 Districts (out of 75 
Districts) of the country. This shows the importance, scale and scope of WUCs in service 
provision, which is very high for any level of policy effect for change in service delivery 
through social capital mobilization. 
 
Organizationally, WUCs’ capacity varies greatly in terms of their structure, management, 
human resources, finance and operation. Two aspects, those of financial and technical 
issues, are particularly significant in the successful operation of drinking water schemes 
                                                
105  For more information on WUCs membership of FEDWASUN see http://www.fedwasun.org  
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by WUCs. These two issues can be attributed to the poor performance of WUCs as 
indicated in the National WASH Sector Status Report 2011 (SEIU 2011) which speaks of 
the poor functional status of the drinking water system106. 
 
WUCs are grassroots community-based self-help organizations (Uphoff 1993), that are 
therefore different from the general category of NGOs or the third sector which work for 
others. The rationale for, and origin of, both types of organizations, i.e. WUC and NGO, is 
different. Their objectives, structure and resource base are also different, although both 
are membership-based (associational) organizations. In Nepal, WUCs are highly 
leveraged with state protection while NGO-type service providers are subject to market 
survival, primarily in the donor development market. 
 
Both WUCs and NGOs may be seen theoretically as examples of social capital, as they 
display ‘reciprocation’, ‘trust’ and ‘network’ (Platteau 1994, Woolcock 1998, Bourdieu 
1986, Coleman 1990, Siisiainen 2000). These social capital values are still found strongly 
in the traditional social and religious institutions in Nepal. These organizations have for 
many years been constructing and restoring guest-rest houses, wells, trails and temples 
(Shrestha 2005, Chand 1999), initiating Guthi (trusts for land), and Dhikur (saving credit) 
for communities (Shrestha, 2010), and sharing their labour (a kind of time banking) to 
support each other in farming, and in constructing community members’ houses, irrigation 
canals, and drinking water systems, and this system is still working very well in rural areas 
in Nepal. They have shown the spirit of true voluntarism, philanthropic and altruistic 
behaviour. However, this core value is eroding around the world (Lin 1999, Putnam 1995), 
which is also true in the case of Nepal. 
 
                                                
106  The national improved water supply coverage is reported as 80%, but about half (43%) of the water supply 
projects are not fully functional. Source: Nepal WASH Sector Status Report 2011 (SEIU 2011) 
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Transposing these true characteristics (voluntarism, philanthropy) of social capital into the 
modern WUCs’ behaviour is not a fully compatible exercise, except with their 
associational and non-profit characteristics. This is because organizational growth invites 
certain modern management skills and requires market intervention. Many WUCs that are 
big and successful have already embraced market orientation by charging users fees for 
service consumption wherever the local economy can support this. However, many 
drinking water schemes have become defunct where the government’s interventions have 
broken the social structure by the misapplication of incentive. 
5.5.3 Service Providers (SPs) 
A substantial number of NGOs (37,539)107 and INGOs (182)108 have emerged in Nepal, 
with a variety of purposes, ranging from AIDS education, child welfare, or community, 
rural, and environmental development to disability issues, women’s health, youth services 
(SWC-N) and human rights and good governance (Danida, DFID, ADB and others). The 
NGOs’ proliferation started during the same time as that of WUCs, from 1980 onwards, 
when the country embraced liberal economic policies. But this was expedited during the 
1990s when the country entered into the multiparty political system, with heavy donor 
influx. Interestingly the majority of NGOs work outside the government and national 
budgetary system (36% in 2012/13) (MoF 2013a), and the Government is trying hard to 
bring them under the national budgetary system (MoF 2013c).  
 
In the WASH sector, around 13% are characterized by ‘off national budget’ funding (SEIU 
2011). Direct donor funding to INGOs/NGOs is often associated with the transparency 
and accountability issues that have been raised several times in donor forums by the 
                                                
107  These NGOs are registered with the Social Welfare Council (SWC) of Nepal as of Ashad 2070 (July 2013). 
The NGOs registered with the District (Administration) Office are not included here. If these were included, 
then the total number of NGOs would be very large. 
108  For more information on the Social Welfare Council (SWC) refer www.swc.org.np  
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government, a fact which has been reflected in programme/project evaluation reports 
(DFID 2005) (IEG WB 2008). 
 
NGOs’ organizational strength varies widely, from having a few numbers of staff to 
hundreds109 and additional associated members. They have shown themselves adept in 
community mobilization, especially in the areas of community development, group 
formation and raising awareness. They suffer from inadequate technical competency 
because they find it difficult to retain technical staff, since these demand higher salaries 
than other staff (see Chapter 5.2.3). 
 
As mentioned above, the rationale for the existence of NGOs is different from that of 
WUCs. NGOs are providers or suppliers of services; they are not the users like WUCs. 
Their purpose for being is blurred and motivated by financial gain. They are weak in their 
governance, structure and relationships with communities (Shrestha 2010), and financially 
risky as their own revenue base is mainly dependent on the donor supported development 
market. They, as service providers, are neither charity organizations nor trusts, and are 
unable to raise funds through donations or members’ contributions, with the exception of a 
few Kathmandu-based NGOs, such as Maiti Nepal110 and Tewa111. Furthermore, they lack 
strong membership associations for the purpose of raising funds and contributing to 
voluntary work. It could be argued that NGOs in Nepal are frequently opportunists, in that 
they fill the service gaps where private companies do not see much scope for financial 
gain. In the observed districts, only one Service Provider NGO was found involved in 
micro-finance activities alongside other community development work. This NGO, having 
several branch offices in other districts, is fairly large compared to other NGOs.  
                                                
109  Some NGOs have a saving credit/micro-finance component along with other components. NGOs with a 
micro-finance component hired a large number of staff for outreach purposes. 
110  “Maiti Nepal” campaigns against the trafficking of children and women in Nepal. For details refer 
http://www.maitinepal.org  
111  “Tewa” was established as an alternative model for development within the Nepali context. It promotes 
both sustainable development and women’s empowerment. For details refer http://www.tewa.org.np  
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Since the NGO service market in Nepal is primarily guided by donor funds, they dictate 
the terms and conditions for the use of these funds according to their own priorities and 
interest. They use different funding approaches at different partnership levels (INGOs, 
Urban NGOs, Rural NGOs and CBOs) (Singh and Ingdal 2007). Normally, NGOs have 
entered into “partnership” with foreign embassies or INGOs directly through signed 
agreements. However, in the recent past, the selection of NGOs has become more 
rigorous and competitive, especially in those projects or programmes jointly funded by the 
government and donor agencies. For instance, the quasi-governmental bodies like Rural 
Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board (RWSSFDB, funded by the World 
Bank) and the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF, also funded by the World Bank) have 
outsourced technical services to a third party through competitive bidding.  
 
Although the institutional characteristics of NGOs are grounded on the same social capital 
roots as those of WUCs, the observed Service Provider NGOs involved in drinking water 
supply have shown different attributes from those of an ideal NGO. They tend to deviate 
from their public benefit and social values (Edwards 1999, Fowler 1997, Gerard 1983, 
Kilby 2006).  
 
To summarise, in Nepal the service providers, which are intermediary NGOs, particularly 
those studied in this research, are associational in structure, and describe themselves as 
voluntary organizations. However, many are very dependent on the donor market, both for 
their long-term prosperity, and even for their survival. Their decision-making style is not 
transparent and remains lodged with a few members, mostly confined within the circle of 
family relatives or close friends. They prefer grant agreement (Geldards 2013) for their 
mode of service relationship, but will also take the opportunity to enter into the competitive 
service market through bidding or negotiation. Organizational decision criteria are 
influenced by revenue maximization, and the sanctioning of members’ behaviour is 
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achieved through business transactions. The mode of operation is individualistic and their 
collective action exhibits remunerative behaviour rather than normative values. Refer to 
Table 17 for the traits exhibited by the Service Provider NGOs in general, and particularly 
in the drinking water service provision. 
Table 17: NGOs in Typological Grid 
Typology Ideal characteristics Exhibited by SP-NGOs 
Structure* Voluntary association* Established as voluntary association but 
later moved towards market competition.  
Decision makers* Leaders and members* Lodged closely with a few executive 
members. 
Guide for behaviour* Agreements* Normally seeks work relationships through 
agreement but increasingly involving in 
competitive bidding.  
Criteria for decisions* Interests of members* Maximization of revenue, efficiency 
Sanctions* Social pressure* Business transaction loss 
Mode of operation* Bottom-up* Tends towards individualistic 
Collective action 
behaviour* 
Normative or 
Remunerative* 
Moving towards remunerative 
Source:*Adapted from Uphoff, N. 1993, p. 610 
 
5.6 Externalities 
Two major factors have emerged which influence relationships between the actors 
involved within the current institutional setting. 
5.6.1 The institutional framework 
National policy, the national priorities, the legal framework and the present organizational 
structure have hugely favoured the decentralization of the governance system in Nepal. 
Local people’s participation is imperative on every development front, and most 
importantly in the rural areas where the capital and financial markets do not function 
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properly. Here the presence of the government is minimal, due to physical remoteness 
and access difficulties, thus making the government largely dependent on the 
community’s own resources for development. This institutional environment supports the 
arguments of “self-help”, “subsidiarity”, and “bottom up” development approaches, in 
which the role of government is limited to assistance, facilitation, or oversight, or more 
prominently to stewardship (Kee, Newcomer and Davis 2007). The community has been 
given more power in service provision, as it is believed that government alone cannot fulfil 
the basic service requirements without the active participation of the local communities in 
all aspects of development. Therefore the Government of Nepal has adopted the 
community development approach to public service provision as one of its main 
development policy tools. 
 
This approach has prompted the notion of the rural drinking water service as a socially 
delivered goods. The process is conducted jointly by public (DDCs) and social (WUCs) 
organizations for the benefit of their members (WUCs) or citizens (DDCs). Here the 
objective, the means and ends are the same, therefore more trust-based relationships (in 
the form of “agreements”) can be established, which are less formal than the legally 
binding relationship in the form of the “contract” which DDCs use with SPs. This 
relationship (DDCs with WUCs) exhibits more of “co-production” and “collaborative” 
characteristics in service provision. Nevertheless, despite this, DDCs exert certain 
regulative power, being public institutions. 
 
However, the organizational readiness of DDCs to facilitate the process of service delivery 
through agreement is constrained by the easy-going attitude of the DDC officials, and the 
poor organizational capacity of DDCs to monitor the performance of the agreements, 
given that they are not fully competent in the areas of oversight and enforcement. 
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But, so far as the service provision relationship between DDCs and SPs is concerned, this 
has demonstrated a “contractual” arrangement, as it depends on heavy and formal legal 
clauses and compliances. However, again as in the agreement type of relationship, the 
DDCs’ organizational condition indicates that they are very weak in managing the contract 
properly, especially from the monitoring and enforcement perspectives. Overall 
transaction (or accountability) features in this research show that the relationship is more 
market-oriented than that with the WUCs, in that DDCs procure technical services from 
the open market through an open bidding process. Although the technical services are 
procured for a public purpose from Service Provider NGOs, whose institutional purposes 
should entail non-profit motives, their actions show otherwise. Hence, despite their 
claimed non-profit objectives, the NGOs of Nepal pursue their survival in the development 
service open market, which is highly vulnerable to donor funding.  
 
This has posed a serious challenge in our understanding of the term “NGOs as service 
providers” in the Nepalese context, and poses questions for policy debates in public 
service delivery. That is to say, NGOs involved in public service delivery through open 
market bidding are surrendering their core institutional values, and taking undue tax and 
legal benefits. This has already tagged them as opportunists, and places them in danger 
of losing trust in the eyes of the public. The question of their motives, and their loss of 
credibility because of their poor governance and non-transparency, has damaged their 
image. 
 
These non-profit organizations competing for profit in the development market often end 
up in hostile relationships with DDCs because of the ‘rent seeking’ behaviour of the DDC 
officials. Besides this, the DDC officials either overlook the poor performance of SPs or 
scrutinize them over-strictly, so that later on, by showing up Service Providers’ faults, they 
can exert undue pressure in order to take undue benefits for themselves. This situation 
becomes more persistent when the DDC officials think that service providers are making a 
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profit out of the transaction and are getting their share from this transaction as part of their 
right.  
Box 4: Commission 
This is the by-product of the administrative bureaucratic culture of Nepal in which any 
financial transaction carried out by government offices with private organizations, 
including non-profit ones, bears a minimum 10% commission for government staff. This 
tradition has long been in existence. Efforts are being made to control it, but are still far 
behind in their attempts to reduce the effect. See the article in Kantipur, (Nepali national 
daily) 1 August 2014 page 2, titled “Caught in red hand”. In the article, government 
officials clearly mention that they receive 10% of the payment made to contractors. Every 
day, such articles on corruption are featured in the national and local newspapers. 
 
Policy debate is warranted, because of the difficulty in instilling appropriate accountability 
features in the service transaction relationship, both due to the legitimacy issue and to the 
functional relationships of DDCs with WUCs and SPs. Each of these actor-sectors has 
different organizational and institutional features in terms of their origin, purpose, 
structure, and resource generation. Debate is particularly needed because of the existing 
anomalies both in policy directives, and in the legal framework that defines the users’ 
committees and non-governmental organizations as fundamentally the same. It sees them 
as inhabiting the same normative social domain, whereas in fact they are two quite 
different organizational entities or institutions, as the findings of this research reveal. 
WUCs are social units, while Service Provider NGOs behave like private business units. 
Both are associational organizations but with different means and ends. The former are 
intended to provide services to their members while the latter aim for financial gain; the 
former (WUCs) have a limited physical location (where the service users’ community 
exists) and are sectoral in scope (drinking water only, sometimes including sanitation) 
while the latter (NGOs) can operate right across the country in a multi sectoral 
environment (drinking water, health, education, irrigation, livelihood, for example). 
Similarly, the former (WUCs) generate resources through their members (service fee, 
 
 
250 
donation or other contribution e.g. labour, materials) while the latter (NGOs) generate 
resources by selling their services mainly in the development and private sector market. 
5.6.2 External factors 
In Nepal, the ‘off budget’ aid (36% of national WASH budget, 2013) is enormous, and a 
quite significant influence on public sector programmes. The donors directly disburse 
these funds, mostly through INGOs112, without following the participating government’s 
national system. Thus they influence the objectives, structure and functions of the non-
profit voluntary sector in Nepal in three closely interrelated ways. These are i) by offering 
a different incentive structure within service delivery, ii) by adopting a different service 
delivery structure, and iii) by distorting the national and local accountability chain. 
 
Setting a different incentive structure that is more than the market can offer has led to a 
wage and price disparity in both service and material procurements. This also allows the 
elites (political, social, civil society, business, civil service etc.) to make captures in many 
cases. It has side-lined the indigenous know-how and deep rooted social self-help 
voluntary spirit, which has now been displaced overcome by the modern intermediary 
NGOs (Carroll et al. 1996, Sanyal 2006),113 who have become the service providers 
mostly working for donor supported projects and INGOs. Some of the NGOs involved in 
human rights, democracy, and humanitarian services were strongly promoted by donors 
during the conflict period, with the objectives of saving lives and humanity. During the 
same period a large number of NGOs emerged and flourished under the influence of the 
                                                
112  The Development Cooperation Report of 2013/14 of the Ministry of Finance, the Government of Nepal 
shows 56 INGOs that have spent NPR 75 million (approx. GBP 468,750) on 110 projects in Nepal during 
the fiscal year 2013/14. Source: 
http://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/DCR_final_12_13_2014042507361_20140426023938_2014
0724072150.pdf 
113  For this research, the intermediary NGOs are those NGOs who work as service providers mainly for the 
community, not for themselves like WUCs. One of the good indicators is that they are associational but 
they do not raise funds through their members. They receive these funds from other organizations, 
especially from external donors in the case of Nepal. Their governance structure is different from 
indigenous community based organizations, in which a few board members influence the policy and 
operation of the NGOs and also the distribution of resources is confined within a very few. 
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elites, in the interest of resource generation for their own private or political purposes. As 
representatives of the elites, regardless of whether they are from political, social, civil 
society, business community, or civil service backgrounds, they have easy access to the 
donor community in Kathmandu for business deals which are mainly done through 
personal connections and networks (Singh and Ingdal 2007). All these have differentiated 
the indigenous CBOs from the donor-promoted modern intermediary NGOs in Nepal, and 
these modern NGOs have eclipsed indigenous CBOs. Despite this, indigenous CBOs still 
survive because of their social roots, whereas many modern NGOs exist in name only, 
and many of them have already disappeared, either defunct or remaining dormant (SWC-
N). 
 
The biggest challenge to donor support is in its need to trace the chain of accountability of 
the donor-funded NGOs. Normally, NGOs are found to be opaque and unaccountable to 
both the local and national government system. This issue is widely acknowledged in 
development cooperation in Nepal. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The concept of ‘medium artefact’ (or ‘tool’) of Activity Theory (Engestrom 1999) is 
applicable to service transaction relationships between the actors in this study (DDCs with 
WUCs and Service Provider NGOs). These relationships are built on the ‘accountability 
features’ following Agency Theory (WB, 2004), and an examination of the contents of this 
artefact has revealed two distinctive service delivery transactional relationships between 
the actors in the rural drinking water service provision in Nepal. They are ‘contractualism-
oriented’ and ‘collaborative-oriented’ service transactional relationships. As a result, the 
service transactional relationships between DDCs as public organizations and WUCs as 
social-community organizations can be seen as loosely defined, both in a legal sense, 
and also with regard to the transactional formalities required to safeguard the outcomes. 
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Thus it is characterised by weak accountability features compared to those of the service 
transactional relationship between the DDCs and SPs as the findings of this research 
show.   
 
Hence, the service delivery compactness in the ‘agreement type’ of relationship is found 
to be weak compared to that in the ‘contractual type’ of relationship. This leads to the 
theoretical proposition that, in public service delivery, ‘compactness’ can be achieved in a 
more formal hierarchical accountable structural relationship more successfully than in the 
loose type of informal relationship. 
 
Among the accountability features (delegating, financing, performing, informing, enforcing 
and arbitration) in service delivery transaction, the enforcement, arbitration and informing 
(progress reporting) are the weakest aspects of both types of relationships: agreement 
and contract. However, more of these problems are seen in the agreement type 
relationship because of the poor structuring of the contents in agreements.  
 
Moreover, the DDC officials have accepted many procurement management-related 
issues themselves. These include a lack of timely monitoring of the performance of the 
SPs and WUCs, lack of financial compliance, delays in approval, and inappropriate work 
volume and costing; and lack of trained manpower. They have also affirmed that 
resources are not a problem for monitoring, supervising and executing the agreement or 
contract. 
 
WUCs, as community based self-help organizations having a very simple associational 
form and management structure, often lack management competency to run and expand 
these systems. The community collaborative approach towards community services, 
mainly through resource and labour sharing (time banking), is the key strategy they adopt 
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to meet the financial requirements. Their survivability depends on their membership, on 
local human and natural resources, and on government support. 
 
Service providers, as intermediary NGOs, are very susceptible to the capital market, and 
even more to the donor supported development market. They change their structure and 
strategy to align with the development support policy of external aid rather than relying on 
their own membership and internal resource mobilization. Some Service Provider NGOs 
are innovative and contribute meaningfully to development, but their sustainability in the 
long run is questionable, unless they divert their strategy towards other resource 
generation activities, and change their resource base. This is because, on the service 
demand side, either the donor market may be constrained in future or it may become 
more competitive, thus demanding greater public value, transparency and accountability 
in service delivery transactional relationships.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. Discussions 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter discusses the findings of the research in relation to the theoretical premises 
(PA, NPM, and NPG) and practices in public service delivery. The discussion is 
developed through consideration of the service provision relationship, which is based on 
accountability features (WB, 2004) (refer Chapter 4.4.6), between three sectoral actors. 
Figure 34 provides a diagram of the concept of micro- to meta-analysis of public service 
provision; at the same time, it helps examine the epistemological roots of theories (or 
disciplines) involved in public service provision.  
Figure 34: Conceptual framework for discussion 
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From an organizational perspective, public service delivery is a transactional phenomenon 
in which different sectoral organizations forge relationships in order to achieve specific 
objectives. The theoretical foundations for the functioning of each of the organizational 
forms involved may be characterised as the market economy for private organizations, 
politico-administrative science for public organizations, and the social capital theory for 
community organizations. As these organizations have different organizational features 
and institutional roots, when they interact with each other their structure, values and 
culture are negotiated or compromised. These interactions have been derived from a 
dyadic theoretical base such as Political Economy (Frant, H 1998, Lane, J.E. 2000), 
informed by ideas such as New Public Management for the relationship between the 
public and private organizations, and the concept of Social and Public Values that 
characterises the collaborative and network relationship between the public and social 
organizations.  
 
The following discussion deals with these theoretical domains and their practical 
implications in public service delivery, in the context of the provision of rural drinking water 
in Nepal. 
6.2 Service delivery discourse 
Public service provision may be considered from a political angle to be within the public 
policy perspective, on account of the role played in it by considerations of power and 
resource distribution. Its prime concern is “who” (individuals, constituencies, location) gets 
“what” (resources) and “when” (time). The policy and strategic decisions regarding how to 
deliver public services fall within the purview of incumbent governments. The decision 
choices available to select the means of service provision comprise three types: getting 
things done by others outside of the government organizational system; or by the 
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government itself directly; or in partnership. To accomplish service provision tasks 
demands a kind of working relationship between the actors that represents three sectors 
(public, private and social). Without this relationship, perhaps, modern government cannot 
function. And this relationship is formalized by a ‘written form’ or a ‘verbal consent’. 
Among the reasons why the Government may tend to use public organizations for service 
provision, is that it needs to produce formal evidence (Isett and Provan 2005) that is 
subject to public audit and sanction. Even the ‘written form’ comes in two types, ‘contract’ 
and ‘agreement’ forms. In practice, the term agreement is found to be synonymous with 
the term ‘grant’114 in loose contractual terms. 
 
The research findings have demonstrated that the contractual arrangement in service 
delivery transaction offers better accountability features than the agreement type. Despite 
this fact, as discussed earlier, a large volume of development budgets in Nepal still flows 
through the ‘grant agreement’115. NPR 10 billion (approx. £80 million) of the Ministry of 
Federal Affairs and Local Development’s expenditure in the FY 2014/15 was mostly spent 
through grant agreements between DDCs and users’ committees (MoF 2015). This does 
not include the funds for users’ committees spent by other ministries through their sectoral 
line agencies, which means that the total sum of public funds being disbursed through the 
agreement type of service delivery relationship could be very substantial. 
 
It is well understood that the ‘contract’ forms part of a legal discourse that derives from 
‘social ethic’ values (Carruthers 1999), which have become the spirit of social relationship 
constructs, and is formalized by governments by institutional and legal means in order to 
conduct public business. This shows that moral value is an essential part of a contract, 
but in formal governmental transactions, moral value is not adequate by itself. This is 
                                                
114  In Nepal, the Public Procurement Act (2007) and Rules guide all public procurement-related works, either 
for goods or services. At the same time the Local Self-governance Act and Rules (1999) and the Local 
Bodies Financial Rules (2007) guide public procurement, though these are based on the Public 
Procurement Act, but concentrate more on how to engage the social organizations like NGOs and CBOs in 
the service provision through ‘agreements’ to receive grants.  
115  In the UK, £ 11 to 12 billion each year goes to the TSOs (Papasolomontos and Hand 2009). 
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because moral value is subjective in human behaviour. It may help individuals to do the 
right things but it does not provide the means as to how these things are transacted. 
Therefore, in public service, both ‘moral value’ and a ‘formal contract’ are essential and 
complementary.  The former can ethically guide the behaviour of service providers, and 
the latter provides means of accountability. In other words, it is there to see whether the 
performance and commitments are carried out as per the contractual relationship or not.  
 
Interestingly, contractualism has become a global phenomenon now that world 
development co-operation has become a cross-boundary issue. A contract as part of a 
procurement regime has become an important aspect of development co-operation 
globally, by means of which the aid (grant or loan) providers (EU116, ADB, WB) exert 
tremendous pressure on the recipient countries, demanding strict compliance with the 
standard operating guidelines or procedures of procurement (Basheka, B. 2009). For 
example, the European Union as a single market follows the European Commission’s 
‘Public Procurement Rules’ for its members. Similarly the World Bank compels its 
members to follow the World Bank’s standard procurement guidelines117, and so too does 
the Asian Development Bank118. Many countries must have adopted these guidelines 
within their own national procurement system, which the two international banks (WB 
2011, ADB 2013b) encourage them to do as part of their mission to build the domestic 
procurement capacity of the recipient countries. The Nepalese procurement system is 
also influenced by these global procurement practices. They are well reflected in the 
country’s Public Procurement Act, and the rules, policies and institutional mechanisms 
whose ultimate aim is to improve the overall governance system of the country. 
 
                                                
116  For the European Union procurement guidelines see 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/index_en.htm accessed on 26 March 2014. 
117  For the World Bank procurement guidelines see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/ accessed on 26 March 
2014. 
118  For the Asian Development Bank procurement guidelines see 
http://www.adb.org/documents/procurement-guidelines accessed on 26 March 2014. 
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The WB (2011) and ADB (2013) advocate procurement, especially in the contractual form, 
not only in order to obtain economy and efficiency in the implementation of projects (or 
services) but also to offer uniform and equal opportunity to eligible bidders, and 
furthermore to ensure transparency in the procurement process. However, this 
procurement has far reaching implications from the governance perspective, if one 
considers accountability as one of the main ingredients of good governance. It is more 
than a process (transparency and participation), even more than an output (economy and 
efficiency). In public services it dictates service quality, quantity, price, time, process, 
place, beneficiaries, management, the supplier or producer, allocation of responsibility, 
monitoring, supervision, compliance and enforcement, and above all it ensures 
accountability. In other words, a successful design, structuring and implementation of a 
contract provides a fair chance that a project (service) will be commissioned and operated 
successfully and sustainably. In fact it is the link in the service transaction relationship 
between the actors involved that ensures the democratic accountability of the spending of 
public money (Steele, J. et al. 2003). 
 
In Nepal, at the sub-national level, the grant is used mainly for social services, and is 
normally formalized by signing an agreement between the local government and 
community organizations (WUCs). Due to the requirement for local participation, this 
arrangement does not tend to attract those types of NGOs who are objectively established 
as intermediary service providers (Carroll et al. 1996, Sanyal 2006), but only those who 
are users themselves and who pool their resources in the common interest of community 
(Uphoff 1993).  
 
In the UK, the terms “contract” and “grant” are distinctively defined. According to Geldards 
(2013), the Welsh Government (HM Treasury 2006, p.17) defines a contract with 
procurement as:  
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 “Procurement is defined as being the acquisition of goods and services from 
third party suppliers under legally binding contractual terms, where all the 
conditions necessary to form a legally binding contract have been met.”  
Regarding grants, according to HM Treasury (UK) “A grant is a financial transfer used to 
fund an activity because that activity is in broad alignment with the funder’s objectives” 
which is further qualified by the National Audit Office by saying that “A grant is an 
extremely useful way for a public body to fund a TSO for activity that is in line with one or 
more of the public body’s objectives” (Geldards 2013).  
 
There are two fundamental characteristics by which to distinguish a contract from a grant 
(also called a grant agreement) (Geldards 2013). These are ‘legality’ and ‘competition’. A 
grant is normally relatively free from these two conditions, while a contract is strictly 
regulated by the state’s contract law, broadly in some cases called a Procurement Act, 
which seeks to procure services or goods from the market through a competitive bidding 
process. This would suggest that the grant system is objectively intended for funding 
TSOs (HM Treasury 2006). 
 
It may be argued that these two artefacts (Engestrom 1987) ‘grant agreement’ and 
‘contract’, in fact define the whole public service delivery relationship – the approach, 
principles, theories and practices implied in public service provision – from the 
organizational relationship point of view. As we have seen, these two artefacts (or tools) 
that formalize the relationships in service provision are often found blurring or overlapping 
in their meaning and application, and thus have given different connotations to public 
service provision in different contexts. For instance, a written form of service delivery 
relationship could be one of a heavily legal binding contract or just simply an agreement 
or even in a loose form like a memorandum of understanding. The grant agreement might 
have its unique strength in public service provision, but many governments around the 
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world have, according to Smith and Smyth (2010, p. 273) “shifted their initial funding of 
third sector organizations to more formal contracts with competitive tendering and 
substantial regulation”.  
6.3 Factors affecting accountability 
The institutional environment and the organizational system determine the features of 
accountability in the service transactional relationship. Three factors in particular that 
directly affect the relationship of sectoral organizations may be considered. These are 
whether the organizations concerned, as part of their institutional domain, have 
homogeneous or heterogeneous characteristics in terms of: 
• their origin, purpose and core values,  
• their source of legitimacy, 
• their organizational, administrative and management structures.  
 
These are considered in more detail below.  
6.3.1 Homogeneity and heterogeneity 
Organizations with similar origin, purpose, structure and resource base work on trust 
within the broader framework of the institutional environment (refer to Chapter 2.3.1 for 
organizations and environment). Their relationship is based on mutual understanding and 
reciprocity. Such societal units are bonded by unwritten social norms and values that have 
long been the tradition. The concepts of ‘time banking’ (Cahn 2011) and ‘food banking’119 
are still used in societies where the currency and the market become obstacles to 
facilitating the service transaction. This social capital concept is widely used in the 
developed countries like the US, UK, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Social capital 
                                                
119  For more information on food banking see http://www.foodbanking.org/food-banking/ and 
http://www.trusselltrust.org 
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theory (Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1990, Putnam 1995, Carney 1998, Flora 1998, Ostrom 
1998, Scoones 1998 and Uphoff 2000) advocates that social units (or community 
organizations) having similar origin or purpose, mostly growing out of shared social 
needs, will share their resources to fulfil these social needs. They exchange their support 
reciprocally, giving less value to monetary exchange, thus maintaining a very harmonious 
and cordial relationship.  
 
As long as the social organizations are homogeneous in terms of their origin, purpose and 
structure, the relationship tends to be informal, trustful and reciprocal. Community 
initiatives in Nepal in areas such as forestry, irrigation, education, health, saving credits, 
and drinking water and sanitation provide examples of how social capital is successfully 
mobilized in the rural areas for local benefit. Many of these social organizations were 
established after the government introduced a more liberal policy in the country during the 
1980s. The effect of this policy has been seen in the great proliferation of social capital 
almost in every sector of development in Nepal (Dhakal, T.N. 2007).  
 
In Nepal, these social organizations, particularly the community based self-help 
organizations, may be seen as working effectively without external assistance. They have 
often performed well in terms of building, operating and sustaining systems (irrigation, 
drinking water, resting places, schools etc.), only to see this start falling apart when the 
government has started intervening through regulatory and financial measures (Pant, D.R. 
2000). In such circumstances the interests of bureaucrats and elites, both social and 
political, come into play in resource distribution (Ostrom 2005, Gurung et al. 2011). This 
has distorted the spirit and basic value system (voluntarism, trust, reciprocity) of these 
social institutions by embedding formal structural relationships. These may often be 
compromised for political and financial gain (e.g. the community leaders of the social 
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organizations fight for financial grants and power) in the case of the public institutions120. 
Government regulates the social organizations by instituting legal frameworks (e.g. Water 
Resource Act 1992, and Rules 1993), such as setting the criteria to form associations, 
specifying their governance and management structure, or their revenue mobilization 
power. These legal frameworks provide oversight on (or control) the social organizations, 
and provide the means to interfere positively in their day-to-day affairs by facilitating the 
process. But at the same time, these legal frameworks also provide the means to interfere 
negatively (rent seeking, corruption) (Wagle, U.R.). Perhaps, in the given socio-economic 
and political context, it prevails more negatively than positively, due to the residual feudal 
mentality and resistance to change which characterise the bureaucracies and political 
leaders in Nepal (refer to Chapter 3.1.3 for details). 
 
DDCs and WUCs of Nepal exhibit “non-profit” oriented relationships. Both have pursued 
somewhat similar objectives (ends), i.e. public and social welfare, with non-profit means 
(public and community values) although they differ in strategies (value for money versus 
membership enhancement), in structures (bureaucratic structure versus community 
governance), in human resource arrangement (paid staff versus volunteers) and in 
resource base (tax versus sharing). But despite having different natures as organizations 
(one is public and the other is social) these two sector organizations show major forms of 
homogeneity in their organizational characteristics and relationship. When interacting for a 
common cause, these types of organizations forge their relationship based on their value 
system, which is guided, confirmed and assured by their compatible purpose, which is to 
serve the people with non-profit motives.  
 
If the same lens is used to view Service Provider NGOs, as observed in this research, 
then a different type of relationship is demonstrated. They are found to be rigorously 
                                                
120 For Jupra Drinking Water Users’ Committee in Surkhet District all major political parties (Nepali Congress, 
UML and others) have fielded their own panels for the election of the governance body. Source: Nepal 
Republic Media, edition of 5 August 2015. There are numerous cases of this in Nepal. 
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pursuing their work in the development service market in order to maximize their income 
(or profit in the name of income). The ends (financial gain) and means (business 
transaction) used by these NGOs do not match with the DDC public service objective. 
Although the NGOs are established for social reasons and registered with the government 
to pursue social causes, they do not align with the organizational characteristics of DDCs 
and WUCs in important respects. They differ from them in their ulterior motive (making 
profit), their strategy (winning more contracts), their structure (associational but within a 
close network of family members or friends), their resource base (generated through 
business transaction, mainly from the donor and the government public service market, 
using both grant agreement and competitive contract), and their staff arrangement (mostly 
paid staff).  
 
When the service provider is profit oriented, the government becomes more cautious 
about forging a working relationship with them. Profit orientation changes the 
associational characteristics of NGOs. Their management structure becomes a 
stockholding rather than a stake holding one. Many NGOs in Nepal either have 
established private companies as their sister organizations to bid for contracts, or are still 
working as NGOs in the development market with a hidden interest in making income for 
personal benefit through undisclosed share stocks or investments. Table 18 provides a 
synopsis of the features exhibited by the DDCs, WUCs and Service Provider NGOs in 
Nepal. 
 
In summary, those organizations which have, or tend to have, homogeneous 
organizational characteristics, build their relationship on “trust” (non-profit motive with a 
shared cause of public service) and “reciprocity” (sharing of resources), that attracts less 
formality of legal application, compared with the heterogeneous organizations, where the 
relationship is forged based on the formal contractual transaction mode.  
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Table 18: Organizational practice and features exhibited by DDCs, WUCs and SPs 
Features DDCs (buyers) WUCs (users) NGOs (Service 
Providers) 
Purpose Public service Social service  A mixture of profit and 
community service 
Strategy Value for money  Providing social 
benefit to members 
Works in public 
service market (Gash, 
et al. 2013) (Brown 
and Potoski 2004) 
Structure Hierarchical Associational. Service 
user membership- 
based. Self-governed 
(stakeholders) 
Associational but 
mostly confined within 
family members, 
relatives and friends. 
Human resource Paid staff Members Mixed, but more paid 
staff 
Resource source Tax and grants Membership fee, 
donations, labour and 
material contribution 
Income generated 
through business 
financial transactions 
(profit!) 
Resource exchange 
value 
Money Money, time banking 
(labour sharing), 
material banking 
Mostly through money 
 
 
This also means that in an organizational relationship, homogeneity has less scope for 
formal (legally binding) accountability, because of the informality in its service transaction 
relationship. But in organizations with greater heterogeneity, the relationship has higher 
scope for formal accountability, as supported by the findings of this research (refer to 
Chapter 5.4). However, these findings also challenge the meaning and definition of 
accountability in the broader social and institutional context. For example, they raise the 
question of how accountability is perceived in the informal social institutional setting where 
the structure, norms and customary practices prevail over the formal structure of 
government rules and procedures; or even whether accountability has any meaning in a 
context of mutually shared responsibility. 
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6.3.2 Legitimacy 
An organization draws its legitimacy from its institutional environment (Patel, A.M. et al. 
2005, Brinkerhoff 2005) and constituency. According to Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p.122) 
“Organizations seek to establish congruence between the social values associated with or 
implied by their activities, and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social 
system of which they are a part”. In the public sector it is clear that government derives its 
legitimacy through its public mandate, in which its activities are sanctioned or approved by 
democratic or larger polity norms. Similarly, a private sector organization derives its 
legitimacy by reference to the market where customers sanction its activities. But the 
legitimacy of social organizations, which are characterised by associational self-
governance, is increasingly questionable, due to the potential for a systematic divergence 
between their practice and their norms and value systems. Their conflicting objectives 
(service delivery, advocacy, and community development [Lister 2003] ranging to 
development, human rights and environmental concerns [Lewis and Kanji 2009]), 
excessive financial dependency on public funds and private sources, and moreover the 
blurring of the accountability mechanism (Vidal et al. 2006) due to “multiple 
constituencies” (Lewis and Kanji 2009, p. 28) have created further controversy regarding 
their legitimacy.  
 
This research has revealed that although both WUCs and Service Provider NGOs are 
from the same social sector or institutional environment, they have demonstrated distinctly 
contrasting behaviour when they have entered into service transactional relationships with 
DDCs. This is because their interaction with their environment has changed the course of 
their relationships. Their relationship constructs embed different accountability features 
according to the ‘contractual type’ relationship between Service Provider NGOs and 
DDCs, and the ‘grant agreement’ type relationship between WUCs and DDCs. 
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Lister (2003) enumerates the various aspects of legitimacy as emanating from the 
following: 
• moral justification for action (Atack 1999),  
• rightful authority (Saxby 1996),  
• participation in policy processes (Nelson 1997),  
• legal compliance (Edwards 1999);  
• consistency between professed mission (values) and actual behaviour (Edwards 
1999; Saxby 1996),  
• representativeness (Eade 1997, Hudson 2000, Pearce 1997),  
• accountability, (Edwards and Hulme 1995, Saxby 1996) 
• performance (Eade 1997, Fowler 1997, Pearce 1997, Saxby 1996). 
 
He has accordingly proposed three key aspects of legitimacy. These are: accountability 
(the structural issue of who is accountable to whom), representativeness (the 
representation issue in advocacy work) and performance (the issue of comparative 
advantage). Notwithstanding the question of where the legitimacy of NGOs might rest in 
terms of these propositions, Lister (2003) suggests that legitimacy can be ensured 
through organizational structures and procedures. If this is so then this notion seems to be 
derived more from the organizational domain than the larger institutional environment. It 
undoubtedly influences organizational behaviour. 
 
In addition, Lister (2003, p.179), following Scott (1995), suggests that, from the point of 
view of institutional theory, legitimacy can rest on one of three types of pillar. These can 
be described as ‘regulatory’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘normative’. He further explains, “Regulatory 
legitimacy is dependent on conformity with the regulatory institutions … normative 
legitimacy requires congruence between the values pursued by organizations and wider 
‘societal’ values. Cognitive legitimacy is related to conformity to the established cognitive 
structure in ‘society’”. In the light of this, each organization in the provision of rural drinking 
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water in Nepal, whether from the public, private or social sector, tends to some degree to 
draw its legitimacy from a combination of all three of these roots, though in some one type 
is more dominant. For example, Service Providers (NGOs) tend towards cognitive 
legitimacy, being situation-specific for their survivability, while WUCs’ legitimacy could be 
considered normative, as they derive their structure and roles from social values; and the 
DDCs’ legitimacy definitely draws on the regulative source, since they are public 
authorities. 
 
Interestingly, when all these are involved in service provision then two types of legitimacy, 
normative (WUCs) and cognitive (NGOs), are compromised by regulatory type legitimacy 
(DDCs). This is because the government can regulate the public service market, which is 
to some degree monopolistic. The issue regarding how to construct accountability, given 
these differentiated types of legitimacy, is poorly discussed in the literature. This may be 
because in public service, accountability is regarded from the public discourse angle that 
demands formal structure and procedure. This is in order to inform, confirm, and finally 
legitimize government activities, including public affairs and services, through regulation, 
rather than through the normative values and cognitive structure (Palthe 2014) that are 
held by social and private organizations respectively. 
 
Slim (2002, p. 206) posits that an organization derives its legitimacy from moral value and 
law. He is of the opinion that “legitimacy and accountability are not the same thing, but 
they are closely related”. How they do relate, or how closely they are related are 
unexplained. Nonetheless, the regulative type of legitimacy regime requires formal inquiry 
that can pursue formal accountability in organizational relationship in service transaction. 
This tends to be in public organizations’ dealings with other non-public organizations. At 
the same time, the normative type of legitimacy emphasizes pursuing informal social 
accountability in service transaction relationships that social organizations form with other 
organizations. This can also be seen from this research. 
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Summing up, it can be said that there are two sources by which to establish the legitimacy 
of any organization. One derives from morality and ethics (normative) and the other from 
regulation (regulative). Taking this fact into consideration, the actors involved in rural 
drinking water service provision derive their legitimacy from contrasting sources. DDCs, 
being local government agencies, draw on the regulative, while WUCs, being social 
organizations, tend towards the normative.  However, Service Providers (NGOs) tend to 
hold cognitive legitimacy, despite having provoked wide criticism concerning their role in 
public service provision for compromising their values by trading in the market. 
6.3.3 Organization, structure and relationship 
By virtue of societal needs, institutions are created with specific purposes, and the roles to 
be played by these institutions serve the purposes of their origin. These institutions take 
different structural forms at the organizational level, even within the same institutional 
environment, adopting different strategies (Chandler 1962, p12) to pursue their 
organizational objectives. These organizations cooperate with or conflict against each 
other, depending on whether their objectives and interests are aligned or colliding. 
However, in public service, when the government is involved in service provision with 
organizations representing different sectors, they trade for services through formal 
(contractual) or informal (or social) relationships in the public service market. 
 
The application of the P-A framework in this research has helped in clarifying how the 
nature of the service delivery relationship contains the accountability features. This 
relationship can also have an influence on the organizational strategy, structure and 
process (e.g. NGOs becoming private organizations). For instance, any organization 
getting into a contractual relationship not only needs to know the deliverables (output-
results in terms of quality, quantity) to be achieved, but also for it to be specified how, 
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when, and where to do this, and with what type of resource inputs. This includes being 
made aware of any other management requirements which it needs to be compliant with. 
All these will be defined in the terms and conditions of the contract document to be signed 
by both parties.  
 
Many organizations, including both TSOs and private organizations, align their contractual 
relationship with the government based on their core competency, so as to qualify for 
contract bids. This is their strategy to sustain themselves in the market. As seen in the 
research findings, they may compromise their values in order to meet the contractual 
obligations. For example, SP NGOs, as intermediary service providers, have entered into 
profit oriented contractual relationships with DDCs through open competition. In a way, 
the organizational structure and process are influenced by the strategy they adopt through 
their external business relationships. Hence, the organization’s internal accountability may 
be affected by the external accountability (Ebrahim 2003, p. 814) which the organization 
maintains with its partners or client organizations in the field of public service provision.  
 
Public service delivery appears to be a conflicting paradigm, within which diverse 
organizational interests converge. Hence, if one sees this purely from the market 
perspective, public service delivery is connected through the relationships between the 
sellers, the buyers (buyers do not necessarily mean consumers) and consumers. From 
the public service perspective, the semantic terms used are providers, purchasers and 
users, where the providers can be the government, NGOs, private firms or even the users 
themselves; and the purchaser could be the government or the user-citizen. In the same 
way, the users (or consumers) can also be citizens themselves.  
 
In the market, this relationship is defined by price for exchange of goods and services. In 
the public service market, it is defined by contractual terms where the accountability is 
inbuilt. In a way, public service is a buyers’ (or purchasers’) market, which means 
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government (and donors) enjoy overall freedom on how to select the providers by setting 
the market environment, or erecting entry barriers to avoid the risk of market failure 
(Brown and Potoski 2004). How strong the service transaction relationship among actors 
is, depends on how well accountability features are embedded in service provision. 
Though the social sector prefers trustful, reciprocal relationships (Witesman and 
Fernandez 2013), the private sector would have a formal, structured, and legally binding 
transaction relationship to safeguard their financial interest.  
6.4 Theoretical implications – Nepalese context 
6.4.1 Public management 
For NPM to flourish, there should be an adequate number of service providers in the 
public service market to ensure competition (NAO 2012). It does not necessarily need to 
be a fair competition, because the government often uses a ‘quasi-service market’ (Gash 
et al. 2013) or even ‘value based relations’ (Osborne, S.P. 2010) to fulfil their 
requirements through the social service sector (e.g. charities, trusts and other form of non-
profit organizations). The service providers can be from either the private or the social 
sector depending on how the government devises its service delivery policies, and 
whether this aims to engage the service providers either through strict contractual legal 
terms or just in the form of a grant agreement or “quasi-contract” with and within 
government agencies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, p.192). 
 
In the context of Nepal, the administrative reform initiatives implemented at different times 
since 1956, decentralization from 1982, the adoption of liberal policies from 1990, the 
governance reform from 2002, and the implementation of thirteen National Development 
Plans from 1956 till the present have all been accompanied by changes in government 
structure and functioning (refer to Chapter 3 for details on the evolution of the 
administrative management and governance system of the country). During this period, 
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the government attempted to make the civil service more people- and result-oriented. 
Private sector involvement has been encouraged in public utilities (e.g. 
telecommunication, power generation, drinking water), financial market reforms, and 
social services (e.g. health care, education) since the 1990s, while during the same time 
the privatization of public enterprises began to reduce the financial burden on the 
government (MoF 2014b). During the same period (1990s) the role of the social sector in 
development was also enhanced, particularly through the involvement of community 
associational organizations in rural development such as irrigation, forestry, education, 
drinking water, sanitation, health, and roads and bridges. 
  
The period of the 1990s witnessed a sea-change in the role of the state in public service 
provision, whereby innumerable providers emerged in both private and public sectors. 
Service accessibility has substantially increased as a result, although quality has become 
an issue in every sector (most obviously in health and education), due to government 
failure to monitor, supervise, and regulate the services properly (IMF 2003). When market 
forces discriminated in favour of the urban centres while the rural poor are deprived of 
basic services, the government lagged behind to redistribute those essential services 
through development (service delivery) instruments, and by reforming public sector 
institutions (NPC 2013, World Bank 2014, Pokharel 2013). 
 
The ten-year internal Maoist conflict (1995 to 2005) pushed back some of these reform 
agendas, but overall development policies remained in favour of change for better 
government for better public services (see the National Development Plans NPC 1992 to 
2013). The change in the political system in 2005 from the constitutional monarchy to a 
federal republic in Nepal did not change the overall open liberal development policy of the 
country, but rather further enhanced it. Although it was overshadowed by the Maoist 
insurgency, the overall functioning system of the government did not change much; 
instead a more decentralized federalist governance system is expected in future, once the 
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constitution is promulgated. The role of the central government will further be diffused at 
the regional and local level (through federalism and a decentralization structure), and in 
public service provision both NPM managerialism and NPG collaborative-oriented 
relationships will remain. 
 
At the sub-national district level, DDCs are found to be using two types of service 
provision relationships, as revealed by the research findings; one is a full-fledged legally 
binding ‘contract’ used to procure the technical advisory services from the NGOs and 
private organizations, and other is the ‘grant agreement’ which is used exclusively with 
users’ committees, in this case water users’ committees, as regulated by the LSGA 1999 
and LBFAR 2007. 
 
Particularly in the case of rural drinking service provision, the Nepalese government 
keeps pursuing the social self-help approach in rural areas where community 
coerciveness is strong, which allows community members to come together to reciprocate 
or share the resources for the common cause. This community-led development initiative 
has shown greater ownership, and the resource participation required to sustain such 
facilities, although this approach is also not free from corruption (OAG 2014). On account 
of this social process, the government (see the National Policies in NPC 2002 to 2013) is 
more inclined to use the collaborative approach, i.e. social contract and co-production, 
whereby services involve greater rural community participation. This service provision 
relationship still draws on the contractualism principle although in a loose form. Some 
scholars call it relational contract (Osborne 2010), or social contract (Batley 2011), or 
informal contract (Romzek and LeRoux 2012).  
 
From an accountability point of view, this is a trust- and value-guided relationship. The 
service transaction relationship between DDCs and WUCs is in a loose form and so the 
accountability instituted in the relationship is not as strong as in the contract made by 
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DDCs with service provider NGOs. It was the internal organizational and management 
constraints within the DDCs that in general prevented them from being able properly to 
construct, supervise, monitor, and ensure the compliance of the agreements and 
contracts rather than the external factors, such as policy, market or structural deficiencies 
that might negatively affect the development of a productive service delivery relationship 
between these three actors. 
6.4.2 Public governance 
Advocates of public governance in service delivery emphasise inter-organizational 
networks (Conteh 2013), relational contracts (Osborne, S.P. 2010) and collaborative 
relationships (Rees et al. 2012, Wanna 2008, Geddes 2012) (although the term 
‘collaboration’ is used loosely, to denote partnership and cooperation). All these terms 
may be taken as implying social capital attributes such as ‘trust’ and ‘reciprocity’. 
Regardless of variations in application, whether by social contract, relational contract, 
grant agreement or agreement, collaborative systems are used to forge the relationship 
between two or more parties working together; though these relationships are not 
necessarily on an equal footing, but instead on negotiated terms around values, meaning 
and relationship (Osborne, S.P. 2010, p. 10).  
 
Some scholars (Osborne, S.P. 2010, Geddes 2012, Wanna 2008) further advocate that 
public governance should embrace an open system with a radial horizontal structure, less 
formal management and varied institutional and organizational forms. These could range 
from charities, trusts, grass-root organizations, and self-help user-groups to intermediary 
service providers. However, the non-profit motive of this sector, as discussed earlier, is 
ambiguous. There is a difference between global non-profit organizations such as SCF, 
ICRC, SNV, Oxfam, Peace Corp, JOCV, DED, SNV, VSO, which are characterised by 
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strong mission objectives and resource support base, and the status and activities of the 
local third sector in Nepal. 
6.4.3 Third Sector Organizations 
 TSOs, particularly the intermediary NGOs of developing countries like Nepal whose 
resource base is solely dependent on donors (some on public funds) are inherently 
unstable. This image of this type of NGO has suffered in recent years in Nepal. This type 
of NGO does not include the NGOs working in civil rights or humanitarian aid, although 
some are found involved in democracy- and governance capacity-building in Nepal.They 
are often branded as the “Dollar Farming Organizations” (or in Nepali ‘dollar making 
business’) (Rabindra Kumar 2013)121 because their origin and survival lies more with the 
donors than in their own social base or community. This is reflected in the apathy shown 
towards NGOs by the government officials and the public in Nepal (See the daily nationals 
like Kathmandu Post, Himalayan Times, and Republica where the issues over I/NGOs 
functioning were widely featured at different times during 2013, 2014 and 2015), although 
national policy would suggest otherwise (NPC 2002 to 2013, Shrestha, K.C. and Dhakal, 
G.P. 2010). Their obscure and perhaps conflicting goals (is it voluntarism, altruism or 
income generation?), closed associational system (typically run by elites, family members, 
relatives, close friends), and weak collaborative culture (they are competing with each 
other for shares in the same development ‘pie’) all may lead observers to question their 
rationale. 
 
The involvement of the third sector, in various organizational forms, in public service 
delivery has prompted a preference for a less formal ‘contractual’ relationship. Globally 
renowned charities and voluntary organizations hardly get involved in a formal business 
type, legally secured contractual relationship with the governments or donors (both 
                                                
121  See the interview of Rabindra Kumar, Member Secretary of Social Welfare Council, Nepal 
http://www.spotlightnepal.com/News/Article/INGOs-and-NGOs-have-been-making-a-lot-of-differenc Issue: 
Vol: 07 No. -13 Dec. 27- 2013 (Poush 12, 2070) 
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national and international). Typically it ends up with a ‘grant agreement’, which is also 
formal but not legally binding, with the governments or donors where the intention for the 
use of funds is mentioned but only loosely defined, depending more on the credibility of 
the organizations’ abilities in service delivery (refer to Social Welfare Council of Nepal for 
the registration of I/NGOs). The same is the case with government-to-government bi-
lateral cooperation122. This type of relationship either contains a very loose form of 
principal-agent relationship or avoids it altogether, in effect neglecting the implications of 
transaction cost theory (Williamson 1981) in favour of international relational theory 
(Schraeder et al. 1998).  
 
However, the tendency to have more accountability constructs is increasing (Smith and 
Smyth 2010), even, in recent times, in the ‘grant agreement-type’ service transaction 
relationships by the governments and donors with TSOs. This is due to a quest for more 
public value, as in the UK (NAO 2012), and to the overcoming of governance weaknesses 
(transparency and corruption) in developing countries like Nepal. The findings of this 
research have shown that the NGOs of Nepal still prefer the ‘agreement’ type of 
relationship (SNV, WaterAid, SCF, GWS, Plan International, CARE, and many other 
INGOs), but at the same time, international financing institutions (ADB, WB) are moving 
towards more legally binding relationships with their clients (CBWSSSP, RWSSFDB, and 
PAF).  
 
However, the study’s findings further confirmed that the service delivery relationships 
maintained by the government agencies, in this case local governments, with WUCs are 
of a different type from that with intermediary NGOs. This relationship has shown inherent 
‘co-production’ features, as both (DDC and WUC) hold similar objectives, i.e. to serve the 
people with a public ethos and non-profit motive, and values (social and public), and 
                                                
122  This researcher has studied the project documents of RWSSP-WN, CBWSSSO, RWSSFDB, STWSSSP, 
RVWRMP: however, while implementing their projects through local service providers these Projects have 
used the formal contracts. 
 
 
276 
believe in resource sharing (cost sharing, time and labour banking), e.g. WUCs share a 
minimum of 20%, 1% upfront cash and the rest 19% in cash or kind of the total cost of the 
water scheme in rural areas and the rest 80% comes from the DDCs (government) as part 
of the matching funds, in the construction of drinking water schemes, and in some cases, 
in post-construction and in building the long-term sustainability of the schemes. 
6.4.4 Collaboration 
The ‘collaborative approach’ works well where there is a need for successful coherent 
policy making (Wanna 2008, p. 11), where the very nature of the concerned stakeholders 
involved means that they participate to further common objectives. Within the government 
system, this works relatively well because of their institutional homogeneity – the partners 
share similar values, structures, and rules and regulations. It also may work well within the 
social system where social organizations share similar objectives and values, and 
perhaps even a sense of a sisterhood relationship.  
 
To exemplify this, a representative case based on the observation of the researcher is 
presented here on the application of collaborative approach in two different Nepalese 
contexts. 
Box 5: Context 1- WUC and FUC 
This is a social-to-social type of collaborative relationship that has long prevailed in 
Nepalese society. The most relevant example for this research context would be a WUC 
where the users committee have found it difficult to raise their 20% (1% cash and other 
19% labour and material contribution as a mandatory provision) of matching funds from 
their members, for cost sharing in the construction of a drinking water scheme, and where 
the other remaining 80% comes from DDC. Some poor new WUCs in Mahendrakot VDC 
of Kapilvastu District could not raise the said contributions (20%), as the costs of the 
power lift drinking water systems were high, compared to the simple gravity flow systems. 
The WUC approached the Forest Users’ Committee (FUC) of the same community, which 
is comparatively rich in terms of resources (by selling forest products). The FUC provided 
funds without any hesitation. Here the need for water is reciprocally addressed by building 
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a trustful relationship between these two committees, because the benefit of water is 
equally important for the human life of both organizations. The money taken by the WUC 
from the FUC would be returned to the FUC later when the WUC generated enough funds 
through membership or user fees. This transaction is simply carried out between two 
organizations based on mutual trust and reciprocity. There is no formal contract, no 
supervision, no oversight, no performance result measurement, and no reporting but just 
a self-governing trustful relationship with each other. This gives the best understanding of 
the collaborative approach (or culture) in community service delivery in the purview of 
social capital theory. Many such cases exist in Nepal123. 
 
Box 6: Context 2- WUC and DDC 
The situation is different when the same WUC enters into a service delivery relationship 
with the DDC (government) for 80% funding to finance the schemes. This relationship 
draws on some forms of formality. This is where a social sector organization gets involved 
with a public sector organization, and the service transaction relationship is forged in the 
‘co-production’ mode. Although this mode of relationship also embedded in trust and 
reciprocity like in Context 1, it also embraces certain formalities. The DDC provides public 
funds through grant agreement, in the written form where both parties consciously agree 
to honour the agreement, considering that the legally recognized self-governing 
associational organization would be accountable to their user-members through the 
established community governance system. This relationship attracts co-production 
features, such as that of self-organized, self-help groups (or communities) assuming both 
the roles of producer and consumer, combined with a peer support network (NEF 2008). 
The non-profit motive and social goals are the main reasons to come together where the 
relationship is more of a social nature than a rigorous legally binding contractual one.  
 
This case shows that the concept of mutual accountability in collaborative network 
governance in service provision seems to work, with variations depending on how 
homogeneous the institutional environment is for the actors involved in the service 
provision relationship. However, such relationships (between user committee and user 
committee, and between user committee and DDC) do not ensure the successful forging 
                                                
123  Recently the Bikashpur Forest Users’ Committee of Nipane VDC in Sindhuli District has provided NPR 
300,000 (approx. GBP 1,875) to build a Model English Boarding School to offer quality education at an 
affordable cost by selling the timber. Source: The Kathmandu Post, 11 October 2014, Kathmandu, Nepal. 
There are many such cases that support how the social organizations shared their resources for mutual 
benefits.  
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of a service transactional relationship from the formal accountability perspective. This is 
particularly the case between WUCs and DDCs, where DDCs are under public scrutiny for 
their performance, especially concerning the use of public funds. This relationship 
becomes further complicated when there is a very wide variation both in the 
organizational form and in the scope of TSOs (Cornforth and Spear 2010, p. 75), and the 
relationship can become hostile when the government asks for more accountability and 
transparency in the performance of TSOs.  
 
The ‘co-production’ approach, a form of collaborative approach, is used with TSOs in the 
UK by both the central and local governments (Bovaird, Loeffler and Symonds 2015). This 
approach is also being actively promoted in Nepal through policy frameworks (LSGA 
1999) and practices (FEDWASUN 124 , NFCG 125 , Dahal and Chapagain 2008). It is 
particularly used with self-organized communities like user committees or consumers’ 
associations. The existing institutional (legal and policy) regime strongly promotes and 
safeguards their role in development. This is particularly true for rural development, where 
the community resources (as social capital) can best be mobilized for community interests 
(Uphoff 1993, p. 613). Among the reasons given to justify its application are: the 
sustainability of projects through addressing local needs, the creation of local ownership, 
and the need to ensure resource participation in order to reduce the funding burden of the 
national government.  
 
                                                
124  “The Federation of Drinking Water and Sanitation Users Nepal (FEDWASUN) is a people-based umbrella 
organization of drinking water and sanitation user’s groups in Nepal. It facilitates the provision of drinking 
water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services to communities, advocates for water and sanitation rights 
(drinking water and sanitation for all and forever), brings people’s issues to the attention of policy makers 
and service providers, and promotes good governance in relation to both user’s committee/ groups and 
service providers.” http://www.fedwasun.org 
125  “The Nepalese Federation of Forest Resource User Groups (NEFUG) is a national representative body of 
Community Forest User Groups (CFUG), for buffer zone forest, leasehold forest and other forms of forest 
users of the country. It is a federation with the status of an autonomous, independent, non-ethnic, non-
political, non-governmental and non-profit making organization. NEFUG has district offices (NEFUG-
District Committee office) in seventy four (74) districts. At the operational level, NEFUG promotes different 
programmes through its district offices. It was established on 2058 BS (2001 AD). NEFUG is probably the 
largest network of forestry sector and civil society in Nepal.”  
http://www.forestrynepal.org/organizations/3867 
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The Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development126 disburses a substantial amount 
of development funds every year through this transaction mode (co-production). This is 
paid to different sectors, mainly for rural infrastructure development. Successful 
implementation is mainly contingent upon the organizational capacity of DDCs and WUCs 
to manage service delivery, and on their leaderships’ ability to drive the process forward 
on the basis of trust. 
 
The partnership model of relationship, which is also considered part of collaborative public 
governance (Greave and Hodge 2010), requires some distinct understandings between 
the parties. If the partnership is between two or more different types of organizations 
whose institutional roots, purposes, organizational objectives and structures are not 
similar, then it is more difficult to forge a collaborative (cooperation or coproduction) 
relationship. This is because, unless the meaning of ‘partnership’ is defined otherwise, 
this type of relationship is built on legal terms in order to secure the interests of both 
parties. It attracts more of a private sector business-like transaction relationship where the 
risk, responsibility and reward define what kind of relationship is to be structured formally 
(OGC 2004). This type of relationship is premised on risk-taking behaviour (basically 
investment) of partners, where the partners proportionately share the responsibility and 
rewards (income or profit). In partnership, there is less emphasis on key features of the 
collaborative approach, such as ‘trust’ and ‘reciprocity values’ (Rigg and O’Mahony 2013). 
Theoretically, ‘partnership’ is ambiguous as to whether it contains the features of 
contractualism (NPM orientation) or collaborative networking (NPG orientation) (Bovaird 
2004). Hence, ‘partnership’ is problematic to define when it comes to the question of 
accountability in this research context – does it imply the stricter, formal contractual type 
of accountability (as with a Service Provider NGO), or the less formal agreement type (as 
with a WUC)? 
                                                
126  Some other ministries also use this approach, but to a lesser extent compared to the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and Local Development. Refer to the Ministry of Finance for the detailed allocation of the 
development budgets to the respective ministries and the local governments. www.mof.gov.np  
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6.4.5 Governance 
From the collaborative point of view, the meaning of ‘governance’ itself is contested. The 
main features of governance, such as transparency, accountability, participation, 
inclusion, networking, self-regulation, and less hierarchy, may to some extent be seen as 
mutually contradictory. For example, here governance emphasises networking without a 
hierarchical organizational relationship and with less structure, but at the same time it 
demands accountability, which is not possible, as this, at least in the public sector, 
requires a formal hierarchical structure. This is because accountability is constituted 
through the allocation of roles, responsibility, and authority (or power). In this context the 
Principal-Agent model at best can be weakly applied. It may even be quite inapplicable in 
a collaborative network, and consequently here the governance is compromised. 
 
In Nepal, the collaborative governance network approach, particularly the cooperation 
type (Keast and Mandell 2013, Najam 2000), works well at the national level, especially in 
the areas of policy advocacy and human rights issues, where civil society joins hands with 
other similar interest groups/organizations to work as a collective pressure group. Trade 
unions, teachers’ unions and civil service unions affiliated to different political parties often 
come together for demonstrations when they have a common agenda and interests. 
Similarly, many professional and social organizations, such as the Federation of 
Community Forestry Users Nepal (FECOFON), the Federation of Drinking Water and 
Sanitation Users Nepal (FEDWASUN), and the NGO Federation of Nepal (NFN) work in 
the same manner. 
 
It also works well when it comes to the implementation of policy, particularly in community-
driven initiatives; then the ‘complementary type’ of collaborative approach may work 
relatively well, although it is more ‘co-production’ oriented. The findings of this research 
regarding joint work between DDCs and WUCs support this conclusion. On the other 
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hand, DDCs working with service providers (NGOs) can become organizational 
adversaries because of their heterogeneous character, where their end goals (public 
value vs. financial gain) and means (delivering services) are different (Najam 2000). For 
this very reason, the service delivery transaction relationships between DDCs and SPs 
have become more formal in order to safeguard service outcomes. 
 
In recent years in Nepal, especially in rural areas, there has been increased access to 
basic public services like drinking water, sanitation, primary health care, and education as 
evidenced in some social indicators, e.g. lower infant and child mortality, a higher literacy 
rate, more school enrolment and greater overall HDI (UNDP 2013). These achievements 
have sometimes been accompanied by accusations of corruption (CIAA 2071) and an 
impression of a sluggish administrative system that seemed to work against both the 
public interest ethos and the spirit of decentralization. However, in the given socio-political 
context, at least in the current political transition, and even in the forthcoming federal 
republic, this ‘co-production’ mode of collaborative relationship is likely to retain a stronger 
presence than ever in the development discourse of Nepal, at least at the sub-national 
level. At the same time, the accountability issues identified are also likely to remain to 
challenge the government and its attempts at development.  
6.4.6 Agency and Activity Theory as Research framework 
This research has drawn on both Agency Theory and Activity Theory. These two theories 
are logically intertwined. They are used to examine the intensity of accountability features 
in service transaction (i.e. micro-analysis) and the nature of relationships between 
organizations (i.e. meta-analysis), and to explore the organizational and institutional 
behaviour in public service provision. Activity Theory is an innovative interactive learning 
process in social science (Engestrom 1987), and in this research this has been used as 
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an analytical tool to examine the organizational relationship between DDCs, WUCs and 
SPs in service delivery. 
6.5 Nepal’s drinking water service 
6.5.1 Accountability in rural drinking water service 
Since the drinking water sector is institutionally fragmented, so the implied accountability 
framework is different in each institutional arrangement (refer to Chapter 3 for detail). This 
is particularly the case of rural drinking water services, in which DDCs, as being the local 
government, play the central role in service provision at the sub-national level. From the 
accountability perspective, in DDCs, two types of accountability structures have been 
found to exist in the organisational setting of service delivery. These types are the “linear 
structure” and the “collaborative network” (Figure 35).  
 
The DDCs, despite their strong legal base in self-governance (devolved power), are 
following the linear accountability structure. Their heavy dependency on central grants, 
and the inherited feudal administrative culture that promotes self-serving bureaucrats, 
have made them more power-centred than accountable to the public. However, the 
pursuit of decentralization in recent years, especially from the 1990s onwards, has 
extended linear accountability from the government offices to local government and 
further, to communities, and at the same time expanding the functional scope of local 
government, including DDCs.  
 
In the present context, this linear structure of accountability encompasses all forms of 
accountability in drinking water service provision. This ranges from ‘political accountability’ 
where the ministries are accountable to parliament, ‘bureaucratic administrative-
managerial accountability’ where the bureaucracy (departments, district line agency 
offices, DDCs and VDCs) is accountable to their respective higher organizations (e.g. 
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departments or ministry), ‘service transaction accountability’ where the WUCs are 
accountable to DDCs, and ‘social accountability’ where the WUC officials are accountable 
to their committee’s members (users). This linear accountability structure clearly shows 
who is accountable to whom at what level. It maintains a silo compartmental upward 
unidirectional flow of accountability chain.  
 
Figure 35: Accountability in rural water drinking service provision 
 
 
However, the DDCs, being local self-governed institutions, also maintain horizontal 
relationships (with other stakeholders in the districts), which are collaborative in nature 
and where the role of DDCs is more that of coordinating the various actors of the districts 
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for development. This collaborative network structure is found to be working well when 
there is a need for district level policy formulation, and planning in which the district level 
stakeholders participate. DDCs motivate, facilitate and coordinate the development 
cooperation through building cordial relationships with the stakeholders. However the 
DDCs cannot control the behaviour of stakeholders in order to make them work as per the 
DDC’s plans. Instituting formal accountability mechanisms in such a relationship is 
difficult, and thus there is less scope to construct an accountability relationship between 
the public agency offices (DDCs with WDSSOs) and social and business organizations 
(DDCs with local NGOs, CBOs and business associations). DDCs cannot establish a 
formal P-A relationship between themselves and stakeholders unless the private and 
social organizations get involved in service delivery through formal contractual 
arrangements. 
 
Amid the present on-going political situation (transitional government), the DDCs’ 
downward political accountability is not effective. This has been so since 2002 because of 
the absence of locally elected representatives, but some DDCs are trying to construct it by 
instituting social accountability at the community level, and this is also vigorously pursued 
by some donor-supported projects (PRAN, World Bank, ADB, DFID, Danida etc.) through 
third parties, often by-passing the local government structure.  
 
The DDCs’ upward accountability through their respective department to the ministry, and 
thereafter to parliament (a kind of long-route accountability), is well in place, but it may be 
doubted whether the DDCs reflect the real demands of their constituencies through this 
accountability in the given political context, due to the lack of elected representatives in 
local government. These current deficiencies in the DDCs contradict the spirit of the 
decentralization policy of the country (LSGA 1999). In fact, from the accountability 
perspective, there is no clarity in the chain of accountability and its source. In these 
circumstances, how is the accountability established? Who is made accountable to whom, 
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in every stage of the chain, from beginning to end? Emphasising the upward 
accountability aspect always weakens the downward accountability of DDCs, as has 
happened in the past, and this trend may be likely to continue unless some drastic 
measures are introduced in the new constitution of the country, including holding the local 
elections. 
 
The existing institutional setting offers a greater scope for collaborative policy networks at 
the district level, for a consensus between stakeholders and the political structure in the 
interests of consistent policy formulation, and the integration of the sectoral programmes 
and budgets. However, such collaboration, as discussed earlier, remains constrained 
when it comes to the actual implementation of programmes on the ground, because of 
diffused accountability between the stakeholders. 
 
The accountability in service transaction depends on with whom (community 
organizations or intermediary NGOs and private organizations) the DDCs would like to 
forge the relationships (agreement or contractual) within the linear structure. Making this 
an integrated part of the broader collaborative institutional network would also be possible 
with regard to policy networks, but could lead to an accountability deficit if applied in 
programme implementation. However, some governance features may be common to 
both NPM and NPG, although their application and scale in each will be different. For 
example, the implementation aspect, as emphasised by NPM, is mostly associated with 
managerial skills. But it also requires transparency, accountability, equity and 
participation, particularly for the organizational internal environment. These are equally 
essential ingredients for the collaborative network service delivery of governance, but 
applied in the external environment. In the present DDC situation, the governance 
network (radial) accountability, which is informal (with stakeholders like district line agency 
offices, civil society, business communities etc.), can play a complementary role in order 
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to strengthen the formal accountability structure in the service delivery process (with the 
parent department and ministry, and constituencies) (Romzek and LeRoux 2012, p. 443). 
6.5.2 Policy implications 
The institutional environment (both legal and structural) in Nepal has become conducive 
to the participation of both the third and the private sector in public service delivery, after 
the adoption of liberal market-oriented development policies from the late 1980s. To date 
no studies have been commissioned to measure the service delivery effectiveness in 
public sector reforms, except a few at the subnational and sector levels performed by the 
donor-aided programmes and projects (DFID 2005, WB 2008, ADB 2012, WaterAid 
2010). Most of these documents are donor project-specific, and do not offer a 
countrywide, holistic picture of developments in this field. Therefore, for reliable 
information on public service delivery, the concerned stakeholders depend on the annual 
reports of the respective ministries, departments and the National Planning Commission.  
 
Perhaps most information on the overall performance of the public sector comes from the 
reports of the Office of Auditor General (OAG, 2014), an independent body entrusted by 
the constitution to audit the public funds. The annual reports of this Office have, at 
different times, heavily criticized the allocation, procedure and utilization of funds, and 
weak procurement management and misuse of the funds as well; which, in other words, 
clearly indicates that the public agencies in general are very poor at forging the service 
delivery relationships with their clients, partners and service providers, and also at 
administering them. At the same time, local governments are also criticized for their poor 
performance in the execution of development projects. For instance, some of the District 
Development Committees that had frozen their budgets in FY 2013/14 are Kanchanpur 
DDC NPR 50 coror, Kailali DDC NPR 620 million, Baitadi DDC NPR 320 million, Darchula 
DDC NPR160 million, Bajura DDC NPR 2 million, Dadeldhura DDC NPR 130 million, Doti 
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DDC NPR 320 million127, Saptari DDC NPR 76 million128, Bhaktapur DDC NPR 148 
million129, including those projects implemented through users’ committees that include 
drinking water schemes through water users committees all across the country. 
 
To improve overall public sector performance, especially working through third party 
arrangements, the government has introduced some institutional reforms such as the 
establishment of the Public Procurement Monitoring Office at the Prime Minister’s Office, 
and has revitalized its anti-corruption body the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of 
Authority (CIAA), by appointing commissioners to fill longstanding vacancies whose task 
is specifically to check the misuse of public funds in procurements. The Finance 
Committee of the Parliament, the Office of Comptroller General, and the Office of Auditor 
General are other organizations in place ensuring better financial performance, including 
contract management and procurement. It is important that these bodies understand the 
inherent organizational constraints of the actors involved in service delivery, for example 
how the service transaction relationships must be strengthened in terms of monitoring, 
compliance, arbitration and enforcement, to ensure better service provision. 
 
At the sub-national level, MoFALD has introduced MCPM (LGCDP, 2009), quite apart 
from the provisions made by LSGA, LSGR and LBFAR regarding procurements, 
especially for the local governments (started with DDCs, and now extended to 
Municipalities and VDCs). Sub-indicators, like ‘DDCs should have a procurement plan’, 
under the heading ‘Resource Mobilization and Financial Management Indicator’, 
suggested in MCPM for DDCs, are made, but their implementation has been dismal, as 
indicated by the Auditor General’s Report of 2014 for the fiscal year 2013.  
                                                
127  Source: Kantipur, 25 July 2014 
128  Source: Republica, 27 July 2014 
129  Source: Kantipur, 2 August 2014 
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Box 7: MCPM 
The objective of MCPM (Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures) is to improve 
the overall functioning of the local governments in service delivery by applying 
performance-based central grant distribution as an incentive, but also to penalize those 
who perform below the set thresholds. The first MCPM was carried out in 2008/9 for the 
fiscal year 2007/8. This framework has five major indicators, covering: (i) planning and 
programme management, (ii) resource mobilization and financial management, (iii) budget 
release, expenditure and programme coordination, (iv) monitoring, evaluation, 
communication and transparency; and (viii) organization management and job 
responsibility. (www.lbfc.gov.np). 
 
In this report, the public finances are shown to have grossly suffered as a result of poor 
contract and procurement management. Issues were aired such as the selection of 
procurement types (direct, open bid etc.), time extensions without proper justification 
(1,632 contracts, 56% of total, OAG 2014), an inability to make procurement timely, and 
fragmented piecemeal procurements. All these have raised the procurement costs, 
resulting in the increment of the overall project costs, thus making service delivery 
expensive. Other issues in the procurement process, such as pre-qualification, approval 
of tender, and cancellation of tender have been cited with great concern for improvement 
(OAG, 2014). Although all these issues in procurement may seem purely technical, they 
have a direct impact on the service delivery relationships between government agencies 
and other partners. For example, DDCs are found to be weak on the structuring of 
contracts, particularly the agreements with community organizations (WUCs), and the 
implementation both of contracts and agreements. This is due to poor monitoring, 
reporting, enforcement, compliance and arbitration, and all these have attributed to the 
risky service delivery relationship between the public agency and the service provider. 
 
Important points arising from this research concerning the policy regime of Nepal in public 
service delivery at sub-national level include: 
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• The findings revealed that the application of accountability features in the public 
service delivery relationship explicitly produces two types of relationship forged by the 
DDCs with the WUCs and Service Providers (NGOs). The ‘grant agreement’ mode, 
which tends towards the “co-production” type of relationship formed by DDCs with 
WUCs, exhibited less formal legal binding accountability features. This mode of 
relationship, the community approach, which is based on a self-reliant and self-
governed associational entity with a non-profit motive, will sustain the drinking water 
system through the community’s own means, particularly in the homogeneous rural 
social structure. However, the accountability features, like ‘informing’ (‘work progress 
reporting), ‘enforcement’ and ‘arbitration’ were found to be weak in this mode of 
service transactional relationship. This clearly indicates that the existing service 
delivery system has induced the habit of an easy-going attitude on the part of the DDC 
and its officials, due to lack of organizational and individual accountability. As a result, 
WUCs have been left to manage their affairs on their own without adequate technical 
and governance capacity-building support in order to sustain the drinking water 
system in the rural community. Reassessing the existing “community users’ group” 
approach in development, in order to discover how to improve intra-organizational 
(within associational self-governance system of WUCs), and inter-organizational (in 
combination with DDCs) accountability, could help better service delivery 
compactness.  
• Improving the accountability chain would also check the sub-contracting 
commissioning issue of the WUC and DDC officials taking undue benefits from 
contractors illegally (OAG, 2014). According to the rules, the users’ committee cannot 
sub-contract the work to a third party. Social audit and public audit are the tools used 
to ensure accountability at the community level, but how these tools enhance 
accountability within the users’ committees and their link with VDC and DDC seems 
unclear. There is a lack of clarity, both in the law and in individual agreements, about 
who is supposed to monitor and enforce the non-performance behaviour of WUCs.  
• The amount of government intervention varies by sector, and so does the formation of 
users’ committees to respond to government interventions. For example, users’ 
groups in forestry, rural roads, trail bridges, and irrigation sectors are community 
organizations, but work somewhat differently from one another because of their 
different institutional arrangements. Although the Local Self-governance Act (LSGA) is 
the umbrella act to regulate the users’ committees of all sectors in general, they are 
also guided by their own sector-specific regulations, polices and directives. For 
example, WUCs are regulated by LSGA under DDCs and MoFALD. They are also 
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regulated through the Rural Drinking Water Rules, and Strategy under DWSS and 
MoUD. This creates dual or multiple accountability sources, and therefore confusion 
among the service delivery organizations. Consistency in policy, strategy and 
regulations is required to align the accountability in order to ensure effective service 
delivery, or the other way round, as aligning the accountability in service delivery helps 
to formulate the appropriate policies and regulations. 
• Many of these sectoral users’ groups have shared or started sharing resources, if they 
are serving the same communities, and are from the same geographical locations, 
and their needs are strongly interrelated.  As we see, such sharing has attracted the 
self-help collaborative approach especially in the case of resource sharing (e.g. WUC 
and FUC in Mahendrakot VDC of Kapilvastu), where the government intervention is 
almost negligible. In such a relationship, it is difficult to frame formal inter-
organizational accountability from the public accountability perspective, and it may 
even not be necessary to do so, where the government and its agencies are not 
involved. Encouraging this kind of cross- or same-sectoral community-to-community 
approach could reduce the dependency on public funds considerably, and at the same 
time improve public services by transforming them into community collective services. 
However, a cautionary note here is that when the government get involved in 
communities’ affairs, then there is a chance of destroying the true spirit of self-help 
voluntarism, and the danger of elite capture and corruption engulfing the service 
transaction relationship, thereby creating a long-term dependency syndrome.  
• DDCs working with NGOs (as service providers) tended to demonstrate more of a 
business approach regulated by strong and secure accountability relations. It was 
clear that the definition of NGOs is very wide and varied, but the NGOs observed in 
this research turned out to be the intermediary ones working in the various types of 
community development programmes and projects, and for income generation, or 
even for profit. The plethora of NGOs at the national and district levels in Nepal 
showed an abundance of social capital resources, but their opportunistic behaviour 
(Besley and Ghatak 2007, p.140) made them work more like private entities than 
philanthropic voluntary organizations. Structurally, they are well recognized by national 
development policies and the government working system. However, their behaviour 
in the public service and development market poses questions about their roles, 
structure and functioning. The functioning of NGOs in Nepal is not well appreciated, 
either by the public or by the government. They have often been criticized for their 
opaque functioning, political affiliation (Kansakar 1999), and unaccountability to either 
the national or local government.  However, their increased involvement in drinking 
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water services, as technical service providers, shows that there is the potential to 
engage NGOs, and to make them more productive and resourceful by embedding 
accountability features appropriately, despite their poor organizational capacity in the 
areas of technical competency.  
• There is an on-going debate over whether to put the NGOs under stricter supervision 
and the oversight of the government by introducing standard contracts, joint 
monitoring and evaluation practice (Singh, A. and Ingdal, N. (2007); and if so then to 
what extent? This has been an issue in which the Nepalese Government (and Social 
Welfare Council), development partners (donors) and INGOs are currently struggling 
to find common ground, specifically regarding the question of accountability: to whom 
should the I/NGOs be accountable, and in what manner? Mapping the accountability 
nodes in a collaborative network could be an answer, but it again raises the questions 
of how to formalise it, and who takes the ultimate responsibility at the organizational 
and inter-organizational level. This may require serious debate.  
6.5.3 Capacity issues 
Local government in Nepal has grossly suffered from organizational capacity constraints 
(Dhungel et. al. 2011). However, viewing this issue from the service transaction 
perspective, both the Service Providers (NGOs), and the DDCs in this research, have 
indicated that it is a problem on the part of DDCs. They are not capable enough of 
monitoring and enforcing contracts, or of resolving or arbitrating contract-related issues. 
This clearly shows the poor attitude of DDCs and their officials, and their capacity gap in 
managing the service delivery relationship. The well-founded policy and regulatory 
environment for DDCs, designed in order to enable them to execute, oversee, and 
regulate contracts or agreements, has suffered from the organizational incompetency of 
DDCs.  
 
The DDC leadership needs to be completely reoriented towards the management of 
service delivery. Structurally, the existing procurement units, which are lying idle or even 
have disappeared from the DDC structure in most of the DDCs, need to be capacitated in 
order to assist the respective District Technical Offices, or the sections within the DDC 
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organizational system, to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of the 
development projects through contractual and agreement (grant) arrangements. In the 
agreement type of service delivery, DDCs’ focus should be on governance improvement 
through social accountability mechanisms, by giving more freedom to users but also 
instituting an output control agreement130. 
 
Whatever the reform measures that take place, these cannot yield the intended results if 
civil service reform, especially on the issues related to corruption, is not addressed. By 
this is implied the question of what kind of motivation and incentive system should be in 
place for bureaucrats who are responsible for the overall implementation of the 
development projects and programmes? This will become still more complex when the 
elected representatives join the local governments. In such a situation, the accountability 
chain of the elected officials as the chairmen of DDCs, and the central government 
deputed bureaucrats as the chief administrative officers (called Local Development 
Officers) pull in opposite directions. The Chairman has downward accountability to the 
constituency, and the Local Development Officer has upward accountability to their 
respective department and ministry. Here, again, how to align intra-organization 
accountability with inter-organization accountability is a challenge to be resolved. This is 
something that should be addressed by the new constitution, although there is as yet no 
evidence that it will be.  
 
The emergence of users’ committees as development partners is ever accelerating in 
every sector: forestry, irrigation, roads, water and sanitation. However, these modern 
users’ committees and NGOs are different from those community level social institutions 
that historically have existed in Nepal, mostly without government support. Those old 
                                                
130 In 2009, the Finnish Government gave around € 9 million to UNICEF for the WASH programme under the 
output-based agreement proposal which UNICEF termed as “partnership”. This type of service provision 
mode is growing in development cooperation. Funders demand a performance- and result-oriented 
agreement (or MoU), if not a detailed legally binding contractual arrangement. 
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institutions are strongly socially bonded with purely altruistic and philanthropic purposes, 
such as ‘Guthi’ and ‘Dhukiti’.  
Box 8: Guthi 
Guthi is an organized institution created by a group of persons united for a common 
objective to enhance the standard of living of the people. Guthi came into being due to the 
realization of the need to live together, earn one's livelihood, and the need to work 
together for a common purpose. As the need to create Guthi was inspired by the religious 
spirit, Guthi gives a prominent importance to religion. Many kinds of Guthis have been 
established to fulfil various needs in Nepalese society 131.  
Box 9: Dhukiti 
‘Dhikur’ or dhukuti or dhikuti (in Nepali) is another example of such an institution that is 
found commonly in a tribal community like the Thakali of Nepal. This literally means a 
‘storage box’ used for valuables or food grains – the Dhikuti is a financial self-help group 
which originated from a system of communal food grain storage for the needy. With the 
onset of the market economy, it expanded quickly and became a sophisticated informal 
people's bank, providing capital to small businessmen as well as to farmers. Its resources 
are solely derived from internal saving mobilization. Dhikuti has become a major informal 
financial institution for small enterprise finance in Nepal, particularly for investments in 
non-farm and off-farm activities. In many cases, it is the only source of credit (in rural 
areas)132.  
 
Many others of such type of religious and social institutions still exist in Nepal. These 
traditional community associations (many are not registered with the government) are 
mobilized on the principle of reciprocity.  For instance, ‘Parma’ is a kind of labour sharing 
(or a kind of ‘labour bank’ or equivalent to ‘time bank’) within the community to accomplish 
tasks like rice planting, or to facilitate events, functions and ceremonies. These institutions 
are seen as having been the foundation of social harmony and development in Nepal. 
Many of them are still functioning, particularly in the rural areas. Normally they work 
outside of the government system, unlike the present officially registered formal users’ 
                                                
131 Source: http://www.aioiyama.net/lrc/papers/cbhnm-ppr-6.htm). 
132 Source: http://www.gdrc.org/icm/dhikuti.html 
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committees and NGOs/CBOs. Promotion of this socially deep-rooted home-grown type of 
social organization, or the inculcation of such characteristics into users’ committees, and 
moreover, into the modern NGOs, could help to build sustainable institutions, not only for 
delivering services but also to maintain them. DDCs may need to give priority to such 
types of home-grown, socially deep-rooted, self-help community organizations, without 
destroying their traditional values. 
 
As this research shows, the majority of NGOs behave as service delivery intermediaries. 
In the past, donors have been increasingly involved in building the capacity of such 
NGOs, and this still continues, in some cases with some NGOs, in Nepal. These NGOs 
are used for governance improvement, community development, awareness raising and 
advocacy. They are still handpicked by the donors (or INGOs), but also have entered into 
competitive bidding in recent years. They can be effective organizations in service 
delivery, especially where the private sector does not see any financial motivation, and 
where local NGOs become local knowledge retainers and practitioners as well. However, 
in coming days, the government might demand that they be more transparent in their 
activities and in financial disclosure. 
 
Finally, since there is a large number of NGOs in the country, their organizational capacity 
is subject to competition in the development market. This offers sufficient space for DDCs 
to select suitable and competent service providers from the market. The issue here is how 
the DDC would employ an appropriate procurement mechanism that embeds and ensures 
accountability.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. Conclusion 
The provision of public services is a complex process because the service transaction 
involves competing organizational interests. This research has tried to understand this 
process at the sub-national (District) level of Nepal via the case of rural drinking water 
supply in seven districts. Agency Theory has been applied to examine accountability 
features in the service delivery transaction. Similarly, Activity Theory has been applied to 
assess the organizational relationships that have been forged between the sectoral 
organizations (DDC, WUCS and SP-NGOs) in service delivery. 
 
Apart from this, the relevant background materials – particularly the District Development 
Plans of the observed DDCs, National Plans and Policies (NPC), Acts and Regulations, 
and the project documents and reports of various donors – were studied, looking at public 
service delivery from the organizational perspective by taking into consideration the 
objectives, structure, and resource base and the institutional environment (origin, 
purpose, values) that influenced them. Similarly, the contemporary theoretical 
interpretation of service delivery paradigms, and their shift from Public Administration to 
New Public Management, and subsequently to New Public Governance, has been 
considered, with the aim of a better understanding of public service delivery. 
 
As a whole, the research has revealed the following findings by addressing the research 
questions in the understanding of public service delivery discipline in the given theoretical 
context, and drawing from both the practical experiences of Nepal and others around the 
world.  
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7.1 Research questions and findings 
The following accounts are considered in addressing the key research questions through 
this research. 
Research Questions Findings 
Q.1 “What type (or nature) of 
accountability features exist 
in public service delivery 
transaction?” 
This research has used the accountability features 
denoted by the World Bank (2004) in service delivery 
transaction by applying Agency Theory. It has clearly 
established the fact that accountability features 
(delegating, financing, performing, reporting, enforcing 
and arbitration) do exist in the service delivery 
transaction, and these can help to overcome any 
accountability deficiency by measuring their intensity of 
compactness in the service delivery relationship.  
The perceptions of DDCs and Service Provider NGOs 
confirmed that the contractual (legally binding) 
relationship offers better accountability features 
compared to the loosely defined (in legal terms) grant 
agreement type relationship in public service delivery, 
although its successful implementation depends very 
much on the DDC’s organizational capacity. This is 
discussed under the findings of this research in 
Chapter 5. 
Q.2 “What types (or nature) of 
relationship behaviour do the 
organizations (Public/DDC, 
Community/WUC, and 
Private/Service Provider 
NGO) involved in service 
provision exhibit?” 
Examining the intensity of the compactness derived 
from the accountability features in service delivery 
transaction has helped to define clearly what type of 
relationship the actors (DCCs, WUCs and SPs) hold in 
service provision.  
The relationship DDCs have with WUCs tends to show 
collaborative network co-production, and is less of a 
formal agreement type relationship, while the one that 
DDCs have with Service Provider NGOs tends to show 
a highly legally binding contractual relationship in 
service provision. The discussion of this appears in 
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Chapter 5. 
Q.3  “What are the implications of 
the different theoretical 
concepts of public service 
relationship?” 
The assessment of the sectoral organizational 
relationships (DDC-WUC, DDC-NGO) has been 
examined using the different theoretical means (and 
approaches) in Chapter 6 to explore their 
organizational and institutional features in public 
service delivery from the accountability perspective. 
Based on this theoretical derivation and on the practical 
implications, it is found that the WUCs are influenced 
by social capital theory. So are the Service Provider 
NGOs, but their (NGOs) behaviour exhibits market 
orientation, thus that through adjusting their 
organizational structure and strategy by accepting 
private sector values to survive in the market. 
By combining these theoretical approaches, it can be 
shown that the service delivery relationship between 
DDCs and WUCs is influenced by social and public 
values, and the relationship between DDCs and NGOs 
is influenced by NPM and political economy. 
Q.4 “What are the respective 
potential and limitations of 
existing service delivery 
approaches?”  
 
Although the “collaborative network (public) 
governance” is the most appealing theoretical approach 
offered by the scholars in recent times, some also see 
the service delivery from the “Inter-organizational 
Relationship” point of view. The former is more from the 
perspective of public governance, while the latter is 
more from the general and private sector perspective. 
However, both approaches are inadequate to 
deliberate the “publicness” of the public service delivery 
from the accountability standpoint. This means that 
public service delivery is still a contestable paradigm 
open for an uncharted theoretical course. 
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7.2 Accountability in public service 
The NPM (Hood, 1991; Polidano, 1999; Pollitt, C. 1990; Gerry 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2011, McCourt 2001, Ridley 1996, Gruening 2001) which has been the dominant feature 
of public service delivery over the past forty years (since late 1970s in OECD countries) is 
still functioning in modern governments although there has been criticism of its excessive 
market orientation, managerialism, and intra-organizational focus (Rhodes 1997), and that 
it has failed to address “the complex reality of the design, delivery and management of 
public services in the twenty-first century” (Osborne S.P. 2010, pp. 4 - 5).  
 
From another quarter, scholars (such as Kennett, Peters, Moore and Hartley, Kooiman, 
Hughes, Osborne, McLaughlin, Chew, Pestoff, Brandsen, Kettl, Martin, Klijn in Osborne, 
S.P. 2010) who seek a comprehensive collaborative network approach in public service 
(Huxham and Vangen 2010), which is inclusive of co-production (Bovaird and Loeffler 
2013, Pestoff and Brandsen 2010), argue for a shift in service delivery systems towards 
the network governance perspective, by making them more participative and “public 
values” oriented. Hence, public service delivery has become more of the network inter-
organizational relational system (Conteh 2013, Cropper et al. 2010) than the organization 
alone itself. 
 
Caught between these two arguments, one for internal reform of NPM by inclusion of 
governance and value elements, and the other for the overhauling of public service 
through new inclusive public governance networks (NPG), most scholars (Osborne, S.P. 
2010, O’Flynn 2008, Billis 2010, Dean 1996) have agreed that public service provision in 
the modern world is “messy”, “blurring” and “boundary spanning”. What kinds of risks are 
produced in service delivery because of these characteristics is not clearly explained. 
Applying accountability features in service transaction is one of the ways to observe how 
the associated risks in service delivery are managed and mitigated. This research has 
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looked at the accountability features in the organizational relationship of the different 
types of organization involved in rural drinking water provision. The findings having been 
presented in Chapter 5 and the discussion based on these findings is deliberated in 
Chapter 6.  
 
None of these theoretical approaches have explicitly demonstrated the comprehensive 
accountability features in the public service delivery supply chain. PA inherits structure 
and accountability features (Gay 2000, p. 146) from within the bureaucracy and from 
politicians, NPM contains market-transacted managerial accountability, and in NPG, it is 
difficult to anchor where the formal accountability should finally rest. The application of 
Agency Theory provides a framework for understanding accountability in PA and NPM, 
but accountability is difficult to construct in NPG because of the network governance 
model. This model finds it difficult to accommodate accountability in public services, since 
that requires a hierarchical and formal structural relationship. For some, herein lies the 
specificity of public service transaction, in that the formal structure (regulative) supersedes 
the moral obligation (normative) (Palthe 2014). Therefore, according to this view, the 
normative characteristics of NPG are not a sufficient basis for formal public accountability. 
 
The issue of organizational risk in service delivery was explored regarding the extent to 
which accountability may be essential when actors from different institutional backgrounds 
have forged their relationship for a common objective (not long term organizational 
objectives, but short term task-mission objectives). Featuring accountability appropriately 
in service transaction relationships would help to mitigate the associated risks and 
safeguard the interests of all actors involved in service delivery. 
 
To an extent, accountability acts as a creative tension in an adversarial organizational 
context, enabling a successful service transaction relationship. The question is how one 
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structures the accountability features, whether as a highly structured business-type legally 
binding relationship, or a less structured socially motivated type relationship.  
 
In the case of rural drinking water provision in Nepal both types of approach have been 
applied, a highly structured legally binding contractual type with the technical service 
provider NGOs, and a less legally structured agreement type with the community 
organizations. From the accountability risk point of view, a highly structured legally binding 
contractual relationship (formed by DDCs with Service provider-NGOs), which is NPM 
oriented, offers a better basis in terms of accountability features compared to the 
agreement type relationship (formed by DDCs with WUCs), which (agreement type) 
shows co-production features under the broader umbrella of collaborative governance.  
 
However, successful completion of the service transaction is contingent upon the public 
sector’s institutional ability, and hence its competence to engage with the private and 
social sectors effectively. For this, the question of the DDCs’ (or local governments’) 
existing organizational capacity remains the most urgent to be addressed at the sub-
national level. 
 
While engaging a third party in service delivery, government requires certain means of 
verification to be presented before the citizens to ensure public support and legitimize the 
functioning of the government through an accounting procedure. As Hughes (2003, p. 
240) has said: 
 “The relationship between government and citizen depends on the system of 
accountability…”  
Another convincing argument for the need for accountability in public services is the need 
to confirm public value in terms of cost efficiency and market competitiveness. The grant 
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agreement types of service provision are often negotiated on the basis of personal or 
organizational relationships (Osborne 2010, p.10). This may overlook prevailing market 
prices thus can push the costs of public services high although the argument is that the 
grant type (non-profit) relationship, which is based on trust, reduces the transaction cost 
and ensures the long term working relationship (Witesman and Frenandez 2013).  
 
As we have seen, through accountability features the quality, quantity, cost, and time all 
can be ensured to be appropriately in line with the market price through competition. 
Public goods and services cannot be treated like social or community goods that are 
traded, as in a barter system, or by sharing labour (time banking) or goods (food banking) 
unless there exists some form of public accounting mechanism.  
 
Public service provision is constantly under pressure for a trade-off between public values 
and cost effectiveness. To provide good services at lower cost is always a challenge to 
government. The risk that public values will not conform to the market price is that the 
cost of service provision will escalate. This will eventually lead to a demand to justify the 
economic rationality of public services. Featuring accountability appropriately in service 
delivery transaction addresses this issue. 
7.3 Rural drinking water in Nepal 
In the past, governance failure (refer to Chapter 3) can be seen as the main cause for 
poor performance of the public sector in Nepal, directly connected with the political 
change from the unitary Panchayat system (1960) to a multi-party democracy under the 
constitutional monarchy (1990), and then eventually the transition to the federal republic 
(2005). The political system and the bureaucracy had been the establishments of elites 
and privileged groups throughout the history of Nepal (Bista 1991, Poudel 1986). Despite 
many institutional reforms and the adoption of liberal policies from 1990s onwards, the 
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Nepalese polity, society, and governance system could not become more open and 
inclusive as expected, due to the institutional inertia caused by the behaviour of politicians 
and the bureaucracy. The reform agenda, brought in due to external pressure, has been 
implemented successfully in some sectors (e.g. telecommunications, press and 
communication, financial markets, education, health, energy) by adopting a liberal market-
oriented approach, which involved measures such as improving the licensing system and 
introducing competition, but much of the reform agenda has largely remained on paper 
(acts, rules, policies, programmes) only. Some basic public services, like community 
schools, public health and social security have suffered despite heavy public investment. 
 
Sectoral devolution was also introduced within the government structure and functioning 
in 1990s, by devolving basic public services such as public health, education, agriculture 
extension, and rural infrastructure (e.g. drinking water) to the districts, but with a functional 
overlap with the line agencies. This has created confusion within the government structure 
rather than streamlining the services. At the local level, it was made mandatory for local 
governments to use the community approach in local infrastructure development, 
involving users’ groups. Despite this, public sector performance has not been improved as 
envisioned in the national plans and polices. The accountability failure in the public 
service delivery chain has been blamed for the poor performance of the public sector, 
hence the adoption of governance improvement initiatives133 in service delivery in the 
recent past, through development plans and policies (NPC). 
 
This research has made an attempt to see how service delivery is being carried out at the 
sub-national level by DDCs, representing the public sector, as being the principal and 
overseeing authority of service provision, with WUCs as the self-help community 
organizations, and the NGOs as technical service providers that often show opportunistic 
                                                
133  These initiatives are Good Governance Act 2064 (2008), Local Governance and Community Development 
Programme (LGCDP), Service Operation Guidelines 2065 (2008) etc. 
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behaviour with commercial motives in the service market. The observations and findings 
of the research have clearly supported the notion that DDCs are still organizationally too 
weak to procure, manage, and oversee effective implementation of public services, 
whether by ‘agreement’ with WUCs or by ‘contract’ with Service Providers – the NGOs. 
Accountability features such as enforcement, arbitration, and progress monitoring are 
found to be weak in both types of service transaction relationships, but, importantly, more 
in the case of those formed with WUCs (by grant agreement) than with SP-NGOs (by 
contract). Although the application of this service delivery model has yielded better 
results, as claimed by both DDCs and Service Providers, it has prompted certain 
operational, capacity-building and policy issues, as discussed under in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6.  
 
Currently, state restructuring and the governance (politico-administrative) framework are 
the two major agendas 134  before the Constituent Assembly of Nepal. Therefore, 
federalism, decentralization and devolution are at the forefront of attention. The new form 
of politico-administrative and governance structure will directly influence the service 
delivery mechanism of the country in future. Amid this change, the role of the community 
in public service provision will remain as it was before, and equally, the role of private 
sector. How successfully the state engages itself with these two sectors will determine the 
best service delivery outcomes. One thing that needs to be carefully observed is how the 
accountability features are built into the service delivery chain within the different layers of 
the government system, and with the other actors and stakeholders, by instituting the 
appropriate policy, legal and structural framework. 
 
This research has shown that considerable results have been achieved since the 
procurement of technical services by DDCs from a third party (in this case SP-NGO) 
                                                
134  The judiciary system and the election system are other two issues before the Constituent Assembly but 
less intricate and controversial compared to the state structuring and governance system. 
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which is a new initiative in drinking water systems. But there is still much to be done to 
improve the procurement and overall service delivery capacity of DDCs. As a public 
institution the role of the DDC would be facilitative, one of ‘steering not rowing’, but this 
still requires it to be regulative and enforcing in order to ensure successful service 
transaction relationships to achieve greater public value and benefits. 
7.4 Future research agenda 
The findings of this research have prompted the following research agenda for further 
reference. If public service provision is a multidisciplinary contested subject from the 
organizational relational perspective then what kind of accountability feature can be 
instituted in the service provision?  The ‘Inter-organizational Relationship’ deals with the 
need for and process of the organizational relationship, but it is less explained from the 
accountability perspective. It talks about both collaborative network and contractual type 
of relationships, but it does not see how and what kind of accountability features are 
embedded in such relationships.  
 
The public value dilemma seems to be at the crossroads of the debate –does private 
sector provision of public service really help? The question exists because private 
provision is increasingly under criticism for undermining public value. Furthermore, does 
the third sector (social and community) involvement in public service ensure 
accountability? Moreover, does the existing public sector need to reorient to incorporate 
all the governance issues that are advocated by NPG in service delivery? Or is there a 
need for a new paradigm shift (Q4)?  
 
As has been seen, many governance features (inclusiveness, equity, collaborative, 
networking) contradict with market (contractualism, price, competition, accessibility) and 
bureaucracy (structure, hierarch, formality) as discussed in Chapter 6. The issue of 
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making policy networks inclusive of service delivery, and the question of what could be 
the appropriate mechanism to maintain the inter- and intra-organizational tension in public 
service delivery – particularly in the case of TSOs, given their wide range of organizational 
forms – could be interesting avenues to explore.  
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning what Robert Chambers declared at the United Nations 
Development Cooperation Forum (ECOSOC) on 10 July 2014135, on the theme “Bringing 
the future of development cooperation to post – 2015”. He laid emphasis on the South-
South relations, and stressed that development cooperation should be based on ‘trust’, 
transparency’ and ‘truth’ rather than on ‘result-driven payment’ as used by the UK 
government. He criticized the excessive control by government in general over NGOs. His 
message to the UN bodies and the donor community was not to impose strict conditions 
on aid but rather to facilitate local institutions. His approach seems to be driven by ideas 
concerning social capital, institutional networks, and the collaborative spirit at the 
organizational level. However, the situation is different when, due to the intense pressure, 
which comes from the public, themselves, to make the government more accountable to 
the public, the governments in both developed136 and developing countries are imposing 
more stringent conditionality on the working relationships with TSOs.  
 
The dichotomy between the ‘social type’ and the ‘business type’ of relationships and their 
application to public service provision has been, and will be likely to remain, a subject for 
an academic debate which is to be continued. It would also be in the interests of public 
policy to devise appropriate interventions in the service delivery process which can 
                                                
135  http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/conferencessummits/3rd-international-conference-on-financing-for-
development-addis-ababa-ethiopia-13–16-july-2015/interviews-and-other-videos/watch/opening-2014-
development-cooperation-forum-ecosoc-high-level-segment/3668498203001 
136  “The Canada Revenue Agency has built a team of 15 auditors specifically to audit the political activities of 
the selected charities. Some 52 audits are under way or concluded, with eight more expected to be 
launched by 2016, drawing on a special $13.4-million fund.” [Dean Beeby (2014) on National Newswatch, 
source http://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2014/07/30/small-foreign-aid-charity-struggles-with-onerous-
cra-demands-after-audit/#.VQCdUSkyXOM]. In the case of the UK “’Handing over’ public money, in the 
form of commissioning services, to bodies that are apparently not directly accountable through electoral or 
public appointment systems is seen to be problematic” Steele, J. et al (2003, p. 20). 
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institute equilibrium in the accountability between actors in the service transaction 
relationship (collaborative or network). There are no simple answers in the theoretically 
and practically contested area of public service delivery, but this research has been an 
attempt both to broaden and to focus the terms of the debate.  
7.5 Limitations 
This research is primarily focused on accountability in the service transaction relationship 
between actors in public services. Therefore, the research does not explicitly consider 
political, social and other forms or types of accountability. This also means that the 
research did not consider the philanthropic type of service transactional relationship as 
part of corporate social responsibility normally initiated by the private sector between 
private organizations, communities and public organizations. 
 
The service transaction relationship was observed from the DDCs’ and Service Providers’ 
(NGOs) perspective only, which does not include the community perspective (WUCs), 
thus limiting the perception loop of all three actors involved in rural drinking water service 
provision for better triangulation of the perceptions. However, this (survey results) 
limitation is adequately complemented by the interviews and observations.  
 
A related issue is transaction cost. This research did not undertake to look at the 
comparative analysis of transaction costs which also entails the cost-benefit analysis of 
the different approaches employed in service delivery i.e. ‘contractual’ and ‘agreement’. 
Nevertheless, the assumption is that the less formal agreement-type relationships 
(network governance) reduce the transaction cost (Isett and Provan 2005). However, it 
also assumes that the consequence of not having proper accountability features in the 
relationship could mean, at the end, a high risk of service transaction failure, due to the 
poor structuring of the relationship and the lack of enforcement measures.  
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Finally, this research is carried out during a time when Nepal is under political transition. 
Many issues discussed in the light of the existing local government system would not be 
the same when the country has embraced the new federal structure. The local 
governments at the sub-national level will be re-organised according to a new politico-
administrative structure. The central, provincial and local relationships will be defined in a 
new form. Accordingly, the responsibility for service delivery at different governance levels 
will be determined.  
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Appendix I: Studied Districts Data 
 
 
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal 
 
  
	Sn.	 	District	 	Household	 	Total	 	Male	 	Female	
	Area	in	Sq.	
Km.	
	Average	
Household	size	
	Sex	
Ratio	
	Population	
Density	
1																	 Parbat 35,719									 146,590							 65,301									 81,289									 494																		 4.10																	 80.30					 297													
2																	 Baglung 61,522									 268,613							 117,997							 150,616							 1,784															 4.37																	 78.30					 151													
3																	 Nawalparasi 128,793							 643,508							 303,675							 339,833							 2,162															 5.00																	 89.40					 298													
4																	 Rupandehi 163,916							 880,196							 432,193							 448,003							 1,360															 5.37																	 96.50					 647													
5																	 Tanahun 78,309									 323,288							 143,410							 179,878							 1,546															 4.13																	 79.70					 209													
6																	 Syangja 68,881									 289,148							 125,833							 163,315							 1,164															 4.20																	 77.00					 248													
7																	 Pyuthan 47,730									 228,102							 100,053							 128,049							 1,309															 4.78																	 78.10					 174													
Total 584,870							 2,779,445			 1,288,462			 1,490,983			 9,819															 4.75																	 86.42					 283													
National 5,427,302			 26,494,504	 12,849,041	 13,645,463	 147,181											 4.88																	 94.20					 180													
Share	% 11																 10																 10																 11																 7																						
Population
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Appendix II: List of DWS Schemes (Completed and On-going)  
Sn
. 
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is
tr
ic
t N
am
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Sn
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VD
C
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am
e 
Sn
. 
Schemes Name WUSC Name 
WUSC 
Registratio
n 
War
d No 
Additi
onal 
Wards 
Cover
ed 
Work Start 
Date 
Nature of 
Scheme 
(New or 
Rehab.) 
Sche
me 
Type 
Benefici
ary HHs 
Benefi
ciary 
Popul
ation 
Estimated 
Total 
Scheme 
Cost in 
NPR 
Implement
ation 
Status as 
of July 
2013 
1 
B
ag
lu
ng
 
1 
B
ih
un
ko
t 
1 Bhimsen HSS DWS Jukepani  Registered 6 7 26/03/2011 New             Gravity  -     -    415,916 Completed 
2 Bihunkot Mandir DWS 
Bihunkot 
Mandir Registered 4    27/03/2009 New             Gravity 51 318 928,640 Completed 
3 Dadrakhola DWS Dadrakhola Registered 4 5,7 28/03/2011 New             Gravity 165 1,047 4,668,717 Completed 
4 Jukepani  DWS Jukepani  Registered 6 7 26/03/2011 New             Gravity 77 441 1,915,127 Completed 
5 Shasradhara DWS 
Shasarsadhar
a  Registered 7 6 25/03/2011 New             Gravity 110 748 3,077,162 Completed 
6 Suldanda Bihunkot II DWS 
Bihunkot 
Second Registered 1 2,3,5 3/9/10 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 51 318 2,730,538 Completed 
7 Tripureshwor temple DWS 
Tripureshwor 
Mahadev 
Mandir 
Registered 6    8/3/11 New             Gravity 21 50 1,025,380 Completed 
2 
C
hh
is
ti 
8 Chhisti DWS Chhisti Registered 4 2,5,6,7,9 18/07/2011 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 575 3,465 5,956,245 Completed 
9 Dhusa Tyang DWS Dhusa Tyang Registered 4    24/03/2011 New             Gravity 33 195 796,986 Completed 
10 Phurkesalla Khanepani  
Phurkesalla 
Khanepani Registered 1 0 8/6/10 New             Gravity 115 607 2,135,608 Completed 
11 Rapung Pandhero DWS 
Rapung 
Pandhero Registered 7    12/4/11 New             SI 9 49 93,466 Completed 
12 Sapaudi DWS Sapaudi  Registered 1    24/03/2011 New             Gravity 12 66 273,266 Completed 
13 Takuri Jukemul DWS 
Takuri 
Jukemul 
Dhuseni 
Registered 8    25/03/2011 New             Gravity 53 283 1,341,085 Completed 
3 
D
am
ek
 
14 Biraune DWS Biraune Registered 7    22/04/2011 New             Gravity 49 333 1,247,935 On-going 
15 Chaurase DWS Chaurase Registered 3    13/04/2011 New             Gravity 32 206 1,132,798 Completed 
16 Deuralikhani DWS Deuralikhani Registered 6    11/4/11 New             Gravity 74 373 706,249 Completed 
17 Gajadaha Pahare DWS 
Gajadaha 
Pahare Registered 9 0 8/3/11 New             Gravity 29 182 1,754,840 Completed 
18 Gauderi DWS Gauderi Registered 4    12/4/11 New             Gravity 29 152 586,490 Completed 
19 Kalapatal DWS Kalapatal Registered 5    11/4/11 New             Gravity 114 615 2,587,829 Completed 
20 Nepane DWS Nepane Registered 8    11/3/11 New             Gravity 114 628 3,108,230 Completed 
21 Ritip DWS Ritip  Registered 1    13/03/2011 New             Gravity 36 287 1,188,378 Completed 
22 Shivapuri DWS Shivapuri Registered 7    10/3/11 New             Gravity 19 137 687,838 Completed 
4 
K
an
de
ba
s 
23 Batase Dandbase and Birkot DWS 
Batase  
Dandbase Registered 8 9 21/03/2011 New             Gravity 34 407 1,770,803 Completed 
24 Janajagriti HSS DWS Janajagriti Registered 8    13/04/2011 New             Gravity  -     -    857,690 On-going 
25 Kandes DWS Kandebas Bazar Registered 8 0 19/05/2010 New             Gravity 30 190 392,634 Completed 
26 Rajbagar DWS Rajbagar Registered 3 0 19/05/2010 New             Gravity 15 100 528,357 Completed 
27 Thalepokhara DWS 
Thalepokhara 
RWH Not Started 7    2/6/10 New             Gravity 58 357 1,214,243 Completed 
28 Thalepokhara RWH DWS Thalepokhara Registered 7 0 2/6/10 New             RWH 58 700 2,333,244 Completed 
29 Uchuka RWH Uchuka Not Started 7    20/03/2011 New             RWH 17 201 1,117,683 Completed 
5 
N
is
i 
30 Chaitekharka DWS Chaite Kharka Registered 6    27/02/2011 New             Gravity 32 160 536,690 Completed 
31 Nglasha DWS Nglasha Registered 8    13/03/2011 Rehabilitation  Gravity 24 147 330,302 Completed 
6 
S
uk
ha
ur
a 32 Bhitriban DWS Bhitriban Registered 7    12/7/10 New             RWH 10 85 986,285 Completed 
33 Mahendra Ma Vi DWS 
Mahendra Ma 
Vi  Registered 5 0 19/09/2010 New             Gravity  -     -    1,114,105 Completed 
2 
N
aw
al
pa
ra
si
 
7 
B
ai
da
ul
i 
34 Ambedakar DWS Ambedakar (Chamar Tole) Registered 5    16/11/2011 
Rehabilitati
on  DW 11 38 150,109 Completed 
35 Badki Baidauli (Aarati) DWS 
Aartidevi Inar 
maramt 
(Badki 
Baidauli) 
Registered 2    29/01/2011 Rehabilitation  DW 10 66 123,091 On-going 
36 Bhairabpur DWS Bhairavpur Registered 6    26/05/2010 Rehabilitation  DW 13 65 143,493 Completed 
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2013 
37 Laxmi Dharmauli DWS 
Laxmi 
Dharmauli Registered 1    16/11/2011 
Rehabilitati
on  DW 17 80 127,876 Completed 
38 Panchmukhi DWS Panchmukhi Betahani Registered 5    6/6/10 
Rehabilitati
on  DW 18 77 156,416 Completed 
39 Saraswoti Dharmauli DWS 
Saraswoti 
Dharmauli Registered 4    6/4/10 
Rehabilitati
on  DW 14 60 165,020 Completed 
40 Srirampur Krishna DWS 
Shreerampur 
Krishna  Registered 5    3/1/11 
Rehabilitati
on  DW 15 93 154,645 Completed 
8 
D
ha
ub
ad
i 
41 Aale tole DWS Aale tole Registered 7    15/04/2011 Rehabilitation  Gravity 11 95 100,905 Completed 
42 Amlabhnjyang Jharnakhola DWS 
Aamlabhanjya
ng 
Jharnakhola 
Registered 6    15/04/2011 Rehabilitation  Gravity 35 275 1,110,740 Completed 
43 Badhthumki DWS Badh thumki Registered 7    12/1/11 New             Gravity 13 96 473,405 Completed 
44 Chauradhap Kokhetole DWS 
Chauradhap 
kokhetole Registered 7    17/04/2011 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 29 228 883,364 Completed 
45 Dhaubadi Harde DWS Harde In Process 1 5 2/6/12 New             Gravity 59 417 2,461,714 On-going 
46 Dhaula Baseni DWS 
Dhaulabaseni 
WUSC Registered 6    21/04/2011 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 30 360 580,707 Completed 
47 Kute DWS Kute Registered 7    10/5/11 New             Gravity 19 151 658,591 Completed 
48 Madaneghat DWS Madaneghat Registered 2 7 9/7/12 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 95 631 712,033 On-going 
49 Pangre DWS Pangre Registered 8    24/05/2010 New             Gravity 24 169 1,229,963 Completed 
50 Pokhari-Dhauba DWS Pokhari dhoba Registered 3    20/04/2011 New             Lift 33 274 2,246,038 Completed 
51 Ramche DWS Ramche In Process 9    29/11/2011 New             Gravity 43 288 1,221,119 On-going 
52 Shanti tole DWS Shanti tole Registered 7    21/04/2011 Rehabilitation  Gravity 24 187 1,091,937 Completed 
53 Wakhkhor DWS Bakh khor  Registered 4    20/04/2011 Rehabilitation  Gravity 21 232 248,901 Completed 
9 
P
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54 Balmiki DWS Balmiki Registered 1    20/01/2011 New             DW 46 234 261,777 Completed 
55 Gangotri DWS Gangotri Registered 7    24/01/2011 New             DW 28 156 127,102 On-going 
56 Garib Kalyan DWS 
Garib 
Kalyan/Chamr
auti 
Registered 2    2/8/11 Rehabilitation  DW 18 70 107,803 Completed 
57 Kamal Binayak DWS Kamal Binyak Registered 5    24/01/2011 
Rehabilitati
on  DW 28 174 265,806 Completed 
58 Kumarbarti DWS Kumarbarti Registered 7    10/2/11 New             DW 28 156 111,172 Completed 
59 Laligurans DWS Laligurans  Registered 3    2/8/11 Rehabilitation  DW 39 215 207,065 Completed 
60 Pashupati/ Gangapur DWS 
Pashupati/Ga
ngapur Registered 1    2/8/11 
Rehabilitati
on  DW 20 88 126,893 Completed 
61 Pratappur DWS Pratappur Registered 1    2/8/11 New             Lift 48 324 847,138 On-going 
62 Triveni DWS Tribeni Registered 4    27/02/2011 New             DW 26 144 167,725 On-going 
10 
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 63 Kashiya Pachgau DWS 
Kashiya 
Pachgau Registered 12    13/09/2011 New             Lift 257 1,439 5,312,611 On-going 
64 Kunuwar DWS Kunuwar Registered 12 13,3,5 18/03/2011 New             Lift 180 1,113 3,869,576 On-going 
65 Padatikar Siwangadh 
Padatikar 
Siwangadh Registered 13    23/06/2011 New             Lift 183 1,109 5,174,891 On-going 
3 
P
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66 Bangemul DWS Bangemul Registered 2 1 18/04/2010 New             Gravity 12 75 178,406 Completed 
67 Katus & Sotakhar DWS Katus & Sota Registered 6    31/07/2011 New             Gravity 34 282 1,379,738 Completed 
68 Kharibot DWS Kharibot Registered 6    21/04/2010 New             Gravity 114 684 974,015 Completed 
69 Paharepani DWS Paharepani In Process 8    31/07/2011 New             Gravity 36 197 942,136 Completed 
70 Patal Ambari DWS Patal Ambari In Process 4    31/07/2011 New             Gravity 56 326 1,783,278 Completed 
71 Tilahari DWS Tilahari Registered 6    31/07/2011 New             Gravity 25 139 837,874 Completed 
12 
D
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72 Bhawanipuje DWS Bhawanipuje Registered 8 3,4,5 21/05/2010 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 45 271 519,411 Completed 
73 Bhusune Salyantar DWS 
Bhusune 
Salyantar Registered 4    1/6/11 New             Gravity 68 302 2,491,345 Completed 
74 Chaurasidhara DWS 
Chaurasi 
Dhara Registered 9 6,7,8 19/04/2009 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 235 1,126 947,797 On-going 
75 Dhadkharka DWS Chaurasi Dhara Registered 9 6,7,8 19/04/2009 New             Gravity 66 436  -    On-going 
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76 Dhadkhola DWS Mahabhir Registered 9    19/12/2011 New             Gravity 21 129  -    On-going 
77 
Dhadrocha 
(Rochapatra) 
DWS 
Dhadrocha 
(Rochapatra) Registered 8    22/06/2011 New             Gravity 48 319 1,361,344 On-going 
78 Jukepani DWS Jukepani  Registered 5    22/06/2011 New             Gravity 210 1,385 3,649,800 On-going 
79 Mahabir DWS Mahabhir Registered 9    19/12/2011 New             Gravity 56 285 2,071,419 On-going 
80 Purjakhola DWS Purjakhola Registered 2 3 7/11/10 New             Gravity 102 549 6,716,697 On-going 
81 Salyan DWS Bhusune Salyantar Registered 4    1/6/11 New             Gravity 35 210 1,353,043 Completed 
82 Thotneri DWS Thotneri Registered 5    22/06/2011 Rehabilitation  Gravity 55 330 3,063,753 On-going 
13 
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83 Babajiko Kuwa DWS 
Babajiko 
Kuwa Registered 5    1/8/11 New             Gravity 16 96 301,674 Completed 
84 Chharchhare DWS Chharchhare Registered 8    1/8/11 New             Gravity 26 157 589,781 Completed 
85 Chitipani DWS Chitipani Registered 8 5,6 23/06/2010 Rehabilitation  Gravity 55 330 1,100,681 Completed 
86 Dhandpani  DWS Dandapani Kuwa Registered 4    2/8/11 New             SI 21 126 77,048 Completed 
87 Gramin Khanepani DWS 
Gramin 
Khanepani Registered 1 
2,3,6,7
,9 5/7/11 New             Gravity 288 1,670 3,945,937 On-going 
88 Jhaklak DWS Jhaklak Gahate Registered 4 3,5,6 23/06/2010 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 65 355 2,609,437 Completed 
89 Kharewa Kuwa DWS Kharewa Registered 1    2/8/11 New             SI 25 123 100,105 Completed 
90 Ratpate DWS Ratpate Registered 9    1/8/11 New             Gravity 9 69 500,035 Completed 
14 
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91 Badhako Dhara DWS 
Badhako 
Dhara Registered 4 5 27/04/2011 New             SI 16 96 442,835 Completed 
92 Budigade DWS Budigade Registered 9    21/04/2011 New             Gravity 17 111 549,755 Completed 
93 Chhipchhipe DWS Chhipchhipe  Registered 8    25/04/2011 New             Gravity 27 140 1,450,592 Completed 
94 Gadakhola DWS Gada Khola  Registered 8    24/08/2011 New             Gravity 19 108 682,341 Completed 
95 Haluwabed Muni Mul DWS Budigade Registered 9    21/04/2011 New             Gravity 6 39 190,620 Completed 
96 Joshiko Dhara DWS 
Kafalbot 
Khanepani Registered 5 
4,6,7,8
,9 27/08/2010 New             SI 9 56 131,866 Completed 
97 Jukepani DWS Sindure Dhunga Registered 2    1/4/11 New             Gravity 16 103 504,390 Completed 
98 Kafalbot DWS Kafalbot Khanepani Registered 5 
4,6,7,8
,9 27/08/2010 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 59 354 2,017,095 Completed 
99 Kalidaha DWS Kalidaha Khanepani Registered 6 
1,2,3,4
,5,9 22/04/2010 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 94 564 5,712,722 On-going 
100 Kaushini Kalala DWS Budigade Registered 9    21/04/2011 New             Gravity 20 110 675,458 Completed 
101 Kausini Salghari DWS Budigade Registered 9    21/04/2011 New             Gravity 7 47 379,543 Completed 
102 Lakuri Dhara DWS 
Kalidaha 
Khanepani Registered 6 
1,2,3,4
,5,9 22/04/2010 New             SI 9 62 200,257 Completed 
103 Pakhrikhola Dasa DWS Budigade Registered 9    21/04/2011 New             Gravity 14 89 428,006 Completed 
104 Pakhrikhola DWS Budigade Registered 9    21/04/2011 New             Gravity 18 110 463,586 Completed 
105 Sallako Bot Muni DWS 
Sindure 
Dhunga Registered 2    1/4/11 New             Gravity 18 109 507,172 Completed 
106 Sinduredhunga DWS 
Sindure 
Dhunga Registered 2    1/4/11 New             Gravity 17 104 200,256 Completed 
107 Tindhare Muhan DWS Tindhara Registered 5    26/04/2011 New             Gravity 12 75 506,014 Completed 
15 
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108 Aanpgaira DWS Aanpgaira Registered 4    8/5/11 New             Gravity 14 84 262,448 Completed 
109 Aarupata DWS Tunigaira  Registered 9    20/04/2011 New             SI 12 46 168,123 Completed 
110 Ashurabot DWS Asurabot Registered 8 0 2/3/11 New             Gravity 19 156 505,931 Completed 
111 Bhakuta DWS Tunigaira  Registered 9    20/04/2011 New             SI 10 56 111,656 Completed 
112 Bhattarai Pandhero DWS Tunigaira  Registered 9    20/04/2011 New             SI 7 43 106,564 Completed 
113 Bhulka Bhati DWS Bhulka Bhati Registered 5 1 1/3/11 New             SI 36 216 637,734 Completed 
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114 Chakaude Lift DWS Chakaude  Registered 2    17/05/2011 New             Lift 12 72 542,249 On-going 
115 Chharchhare DWS 
Lauke 
Chharchhare Registered 2 3,4, 12/5/11 New             Gravity 18 108 207,801 On-going 
116 
Chisapani 
Khamaripata 
DWS 
Chakaude  Registered 2    17/05/2011 New             SI 24 144 253,881 Completed 
117 Deuralikuwa DWS Nepaltara Registered 2    11/10/09 New             SI 4 20 159,570 Completed 
118 Dhapgaira Chisapani DWS 
Dhapgaira 
Khamaripata Registered 4    12/6/11 New             SI 11 66 121,035 Completed 
119 Dhapgaira Pandhero DWS 
Dhapgaira 
Pandhera Registered 2    18/06/2011 New             Gravity 12 73 121,035 Completed 
120 Imichaour Lift DWS Imichaour Lift Registered 5    20/05/2011 New             Lift 29 157 625,692 On-going 
121 Imichour DWS Imichour Registered 5 0 2/3/11 New             Gravity 16 96 482,220 Completed 
122 Jhaurikhola DWS Jhauri Khola Registered 7 0 2/3/11 New             Gravity 67 373 772,778 Completed 
123 Kulainthan DWS Kulainthan  Registered 6 7 18/06/2011 New             Gravity 46 276 1,058,784 Completed 
124 Kulbandh DWS Aanpgaira Registered 4    8/5/11 New             Gravity 54 314 851,022 Completed 
125 Lahose DWS Lohose Registered 5 0 2/3/11 New             Gravity 7 35 466,870 Completed 
126 Lauka Kuwa DWS Lauke Chharchhare Registered 2 3,4, 12/5/11 New             Gravity 18 108 1,011,421 On-going 
127 Nepaltara DWS Nepaltara Registered 2    11/10/09 New             Gravity 7 50 826,000 Completed 
128 Paanchmure Pandhera DWS Tunigaira  Registered 9    20/04/2011 New             SI 6 37 84,624 Completed 
129 Thulachour DWS Thulachour Registered 8 0 2/3/11 New             Gravity 26 151 568,922 Completed 
130 Thumkapandhera DWS Tunigaira  Registered 9    20/04/2011 New             SI 6 34 86,345 Completed 
131 Tunigaira DWS Tunigaira  Registered 9    20/04/2011 New             Gravity 58 407 563,293 Completed 
16 
Th
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132 Bagalekhanepani DWS 
Baglekhanepa
ni Registered 8 0 22/05/2010 New             Gravity 12 76 428,224 Completed 
133 Batase Dhara DWS Batase Dhara Registered 9    4/11/11 New             SI 19 88 82,986 Completed 
134 Bhaterpata DWS Bhatera Pata Registered 3    1/11/11 New             Gravity 20 131 536,271 Completed 
135 Bihechaur DWS Bihechour Registered 6 7 19/05/2010 New             Gravity 40 214 691,446 Completed 
136 Chhipchhipe Malyangdi DWS 
Chhipchhipe 
Malyangdi Registered 2    18/06/2011 New             Gravity 24 135 403,882 Completed 
137 Dandare Jyamire DWS 
Dandare 
Jimire Registered 2    3/5/11 New             Gravity 11 78 309,451 Completed 
138 Dandare Kuwa DWS 
Dandare 
Kuwa Registered 7    5/4/10 New             SI 15 55 826,000 Completed 
139 Jhakrikhola DWS Jhakrikhola In Process 5    27/11/2011 New             Gravity 10 50 310,462 Completed 
140 Jhakriko Than DWS Jhakriko Than  Registered 8    9/11/11 New             SI 41 159 207,716 Completed 
141 Kalikhola DWS Kalikhola  Registered 5    2/4/10 New             SI 65 350 826,000 Completed 
142 Kamere Khola Arghase DWS 
Kamerekhola 
Arghase Registered 2    18/05/2011 New             Gravity 7 56 601,818 Completed 
143 Khoriya Pani DWS Khoriya Pani  Registered 6 7 19/10/2011 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 98 575 2,434,178 On-going 
144 Khuttekhola DWS Khutte Khola Registered 5    14/11/2011 New             Gravity 22 131 609,943 On-going 
145 Majhpani  DWS Majhpani  Registered 3    29/05/2011 New             SI 41 159 207,716 On-going 
146 Okhale Kuwa DWS Okhale Khola Registered 5    2/4/10 New             SI 15 55 60,000 Completed 
147 School Muniko Kuwa DWS School Muni Registered 8    13/11/2011 New             SI 19 88 85,396 Completed 
148 Seto Pairo DWS Seto Pairo In Process 1 2 13/05/2011 Rehabilitation  Gravity 4 23 211,351 Completed 
149 Thadekhola DWS Thadeko Kuwa Registered 8    9/11/11 New             SI 19 85 85,396 Completed 
150 Upallo Gaganpani DWS 
Upallo 
Gaganpani  Registered 7    13/11/2011 New             Gravity 15 85 340,149 Completed 
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151 Amili DWS Amili  Registered 4 2.3.5 3/7/11 New             Lift 202 1,515 9,924,938 On-going 
152 Chisapani Takura DWS 
Chisapani 
Takura Registered 2    1/2/10 New             Gravity 13 72 488,028 Completed 
153 Dabara DWS Dabara Registered 4 0 20/02/2010 New             Gravity 48 391 1,623,261 Completed 
154 Kalikatha DWS Kalikath Registered 3 0 10/3/10 New             Gravity 29 249 1,221,190 Completed 
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155 Kayani Khola DWS Kayani Khola Registered 6 0 12/3/10 New             Gravity 36 280 1,298,208 Completed 
156 Kudule DWS Kudule Registered 3 0 26/01/2010 New             Gravity 19 104 484,272 Completed 
157 Majhidamar DWS Maghidamar Registered 2 0 1/2/10 New             Gravity 31 265 1,131,195 Completed 
158 Majhidamar MUS 
Majhidamar 
Irrigation 
Pond 
Registered 2    28/02/2010 New             SI 34 220 414,490 Completed 
159 Pakhapani DWS Pakhapani Registered 7    10/3/10 New             Gravity 26 181 990,875 Completed 
160 Sallikot Besi DWS Sallikot Besi Registered 8    29/06/2011 New             Gravity 23 166 1,266,189 Completed 
161 Tallo Bayakhola DWS 
Tallo 
Bayakhola Registered 4    3/7/11 New             Gravity 45 310 1,671,792 Completed 
162 Upallo Simpani DWS 
Upallo 
Simpani Registered 9    29/06/2011 New             Gravity 56 458 1,808,598 Completed 
163 Wangri DWS Wangri  Registered 7    3/7/11 New             Gravity 25 168 585,420 Completed 
18 
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164 Baike DWS Baike Registered 7    29/03/2009 New             Gravity 24 176 1,870,798 Completed 
165 Bange Besi DWS Bange Besi Registered 6 0 12/3/10 New             Gravity 17 146 614,607 Completed 
166 Biware Khola DWS Beware Khola Registered 7    28/04/2010 New             Gravity 10 61 594,927 Completed 
167 Chaba Khola DWS Chakhola Registered 6 0 26/02/2010 New             Gravity 11 95 542,767 Completed 
168 Dandabari Dharapani DWS 
Dandabari 
Dharapani Registered 8    28/01/2011 New             Gravity 13 125 379,747 Completed 
169 Dharapani  DWS Dharapani Registered 6 0 20/04/2010 New             Gravity 10 70 977,956 Completed 
170 
Dhava 
Thulopandhera 
DWS 
Dhava 
Thulopahera Registered 7    26/06/2011 New             Gravity 21 131 430,261 Completed 
171 Hanspur DWS Hanspur Registered 1    1/2/11 New             Gravity 26 144 487,478 Completed 
172 Jhakrikhola DWS Jhakrikhola Registered 5 0 29/04/2010 New             Gravity 25 225 1,253,476 Completed 
173 Jukepani DWS Jukepani In Process 5    26/05/2012 New             Gravity 45 340 1,122,129 On-going 
174 Kirale Khola DWS Kirale Khola Scheme Registered 5 0 24/01/2010 New             Gravity 20 167 812,229 Completed 
175 Palu Pandhera DWS 
Palu 
Pandhera Registered 6    12/2/11 New             Gravity 30 208 279,536 Completed 
176 Pandey Khola DWS Pandey Khola Registered 7    29/01/2011 New             Gravity 9 78 437,137 Completed 
177 Pauwa Khola DWS Pauwakhola Registered 9 0 21/06/2010 New             Gravity 11 80 758,760 Completed 
178 Rani Aanp DWS Rani Aanp In Process 7    6/3/12 New             Gravity 11 78 283,830 On-going 
179 Saune Khola DWS Saune Khola Registered 9    29/01/2011 New             Gravity 25 183 913,918 Completed 
180 Thulo Pandhera DWS 
Thulo 
Pandhera Registered 4    3/7/11 New             Gravity 20 186 270,662 Completed 
19 
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181 Baraha Ni Ma Vi DWS Raju khola Registered 6    23/11/2011 New             Gravity  -     -    343,008 Completed 
182 Dharen khola  DWS Dharen khola Registered 6    24/11/2011 New             Gravity 43 241 1,406,821 Completed 
183 Milijuli DWS Milijuli Registered 2    26/11/2011 New             Gravity 30 198 980,159 Completed 
184 Pangrang Tal DWS Pangrang Tal In Process 1    22/09/2012 New             Gravity 108 550 2,905,858 On-going 
185 Rajukhola DWS Raju khola Registered 6    23/11/2011 New             Gravity 10 71 350,181 Completed 
20 
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186 Ghurcha DWS Ghurcha In Process 1    11/6/12 New             Gravity 119 903 4,946,301 On-going 
187 Mul Khola DWS Mul Khola Registered 8    23/12/2010 New             Gravity 48 269 1,394,998 Completed 
188 Pandhera Khola DWS 
Pandhera 
Khola Registered 5    23/02/2011 New             Gravity 16 147 571,277 Completed 
189 Sakribang DWS Sakribang Registered 6    23/02/2011 New             Gravity 47 320 1,705,327 Completed 
21 
Li
gh
a 
190 Dargauda DWS Dargauda  Registered 5    23/02/2011 New             Gravity 48 342 1,050,268 Completed 
191 Lum Khola DWS Lum Khola Registered 2    21/02/2011 New             Gravity 58 437 1,246,090 Completed 
192 Panimul DWS Panimul Registered 1 3 21/01/2011 New             Gravity 98 612 2,901,960 Completed 
193 Sirbang DWS Sirbang In Process 4    22/09/2012 New             Gravity 79 583 3,027,309 On-going 
194 Tanglabang Khocheri DWS 
Tanglabang 
Khocheri Registered 8 9 26/05/2011 New             Gravity 107 655 2,723,056 Completed 
22 
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195 Bahun Pani DWS Bahun Pani  Registered 4    10/6/11 New             Gravity 44 284 869,141 Completed 
196 Dulepani Mulpani  Dulepani Mulpani  Registered 3    25/06/2012 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 30 180 144,000 Completed 
197 Hamja DWS Hamja Registered 5    13/05/2011 New             Gravity 29 247 1,151,323 Completed 
198 Nas DWS Nas In Process 8    1/11/12 New             Gravity 58 359 1,115,458 On-going 
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199 Pangrang DWS Pangrang  Registered 3    20/03/2011 New             Gravity 50 284 1,267,103 Completed 
200 Swargadwari RWH Swargadwari Not Started 4    21/02/2011 New             RWH 59 395 3,930,341 Completed 
5 
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23 
A
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201 Aama Mini Overhead DWS Aama Registered 2 1 2/4/11 New             Lift 234 1,842 4,363,926 On-going 
202 Ramjanaki STW DWS Ram Janaki Registered 3 
4,5,6,7
,8,9 18/04/2011 New             TW 240 1,914 1,156,853 Completed 
24 
D
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203 Bisalnagar DWS Bishal nagar Taterachabi  Registered 6    7/5/10 New             Gravity 210 1,205 891,307 Completed 
204 Charange DWS Charange Registered 1 2 8/4/11 New             Lift 496 2,950 14,765,529 On-going 
205 Daldale DWS Daldale Registered 9    2/6/10 New             Gravity 14 80 628,645 Completed 
206 Keuli DWS Keuli Registered 3    20/08/2010 Rehabilitation  Gravity 44 265 532,650 Completed 
207 Mudhabas DWS Mudhbas Registered 9    5/6/10 New             Gravity 27 170 597,201 Completed 
208 Tallo Sarrentadi DWS 
Tallo 
Sarentadi Registered 3    8/6/10 New             Gravity 22 197 338,437 Completed 
25 
Jo
ga
da
 209 Dhupai DWS Dhupai Registered 5    15/04/2011 New             Lift 105 953 3,668,988 On-going 
210 Jogada DWS Jogada Registered 1 2,3,4,6,7,8,9 17/06/2011 New             TW 162 1,148 1,342,771 Completed 
26 
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211 Brahamabada DWS Brahmababa Registered 9    5/4/11 New             Lift 331 1,736 
13,624,98
2 On-going 
212 Hariyalil DWS Hariyali Registered 5    2/4/11 New             Lift 94 510 4,002,967 Completed 
213 Kotiyamai DWS Kotiyamai Registered 4    4/4/11 New             Lift 259 1,866 12,528,473 On-going 
214 Sorauli DWS Sorauli Registered 5    19/05/2010 New             Lift 127 693 1,987,152 Completed 
27 
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215 Fulwariya DWS Fulbariya Registered 6    24/06/2011 New             Lift 96 665 3,965,752 On-going 
216 Silautiya DWS Silautiya Registered 1    25/06/2011 New             TW 277 1,811 719,342 Completed 
6 
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217 Aarkhordi Ka BHu Pu WSSP 
Aarkhordi 
"ka"(bhu 
pu)WSSP 
Registered 3    12/2/12 New             Gravity 164 905 2,383,364 Completed 
218 Aarkhordi KHA WSSP 
Aarkhordi 
KHA WSSP Registered 3    12/2/12 New             Gravity 87 501 1,508,735 Completed 
219 Dumaikhola DWS Dumaikhola Registered 9 6,7,8 1/1/11 New             Lift 311 2,010 17,219,842 Completed 
220 Kukhure DWS Khukhure  In Process 1    12/2/12 New             Gravity 117 444 1,149,152 Completed 
29 
C
ha
nd
iB
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221 Bariradi DWS Bairadi DWS  Registered 6    26/07/2012 New             Gravity 18 90 290,829 Completed 
222 Birendra P S(Ritu Khola)DWS 
Birendra 
PS(Ritu 
Khola) 
Registered 7 7 9/5/11 New             Gravity  -     -    169,134 Completed 
223 Jaruwa Khola Lifting DWS 
Jaruwa Khola 
Lifting  Registered 3 
1,2,3,6
,7, 9 24/01/2011 New             Lift 371 2,505 
18,196,85
6 On-going 
224 Khaltepane DWS Kholte Pani Registered 8    21/02/2011 New             Gravity 21 96 361,000 Completed 
225 Kholte DWS Kholte Pani Registered 8    21/02/2011 New             Gravity 37 237 251,876 Completed 
226 Phedi DWS (WSP) 
Phedi WUSC 
(WSP) Registered 2 2 10/5/11 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 16 91 71,964 Completed 
227 Pyugha DWS 
Birendra 
PS(Ritu 
Khola) 
Registered 7 7 9/5/11 Rehabilitation  SI 125 540 207,221 On-going 
30 
C
hi
tre
bh
an
j
ya
n 
228 Dharam pani WSS Dharam Pani  In Process 6    22/02/2011 New             Gravity 31 183 91,474 Completed 
229 Dhaukhani Grihakot WSS 
Dhaukhani 
Grihakot Registered 3 2,4,5 11/7/11 New             Lift 318 2,086 
18,434,07
6 Completed 
31 
K
ew
ar
eB
ha
nj
ya
ng
 
230 Bankatta DWS Bankatta Registered 1    14/04/2009 New             Lift 135 722 3,101,174 Completed 
231 Khalukagaira DWS 
Khalukagaira 
DWS Registered 9    15/01/2012 New             Lift 58 392 2,647,580 On-going 
232 Sapaudi DWS Sapaudi Registered 4    13/07/2011 New             Lift 108 649 4,610,925 On-going 
233 Tapke DWS Tapke Registered 2    13/05/2009 New             Lift 151 1,208 2,873,762 Completed 
32 
K
ya
km
i 
234 Ale Thok DWS Purkot RWH Registered 1    21/05/2010 New             Gravity 38 192 351,063 On-going 
235 Alethok DWS Aalethok  In Process 5    28/03/2012 New             Gravity 28 192 975,176 Completed 
236 Amalabhanjyang DWS 
Amalabhanjya
ng In Process 4    11/4/11 New             Gravity 31 194 1,247,342 Completed 
237 Dadakhani DWS Dandakhani In Process 1    28/03/2012 New             Gravity 45 273 1,627,479 Completed 
238 Dagdi DWS Dagdi Registered 9 1,2 11/4/11 New             Gravity 56 410 2,234,237 Completed 
239 Dandakhani 1 DWS Purkot RWH Registered 1    21/05/2010 New             Gravity 54 273 1,627,479 On-going 
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240 Kamausa A DWS Kamausa A Saunetari Registered 5    21/12/2010 New             Gravity 11 100 485,143 Completed 
241 Kamausa B DWS Kamausa B Barbate Registered 5    14/02/2011 New             Gravity 18 125 548,552 Completed 
242 Kamausa C DWS Kamausa C Belswara Registered 5    13/02/2011 New             Gravity 16 101 383,305 Completed 
243 Kutumsa A DWS Kutumsa A DW/S Registered 6    25/12/2010 New             Gravity 60 580 3,193,952 Completed 
244 Purkot DWS Purkot RWH Registered 1    21/05/2010 New             RWH 51 395 3,176,118 Completed 
245 Purkot DWS (Water Safety) Purkot RWH Registered 1    21/05/2010 New             RWH 25 161 107,796 Completed 
33 
S
ak
ha
r 
246 Alaichhe  DWS Alaichhe Registered 5 3, 4 and 6 27/02/2010 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 194 1,288 7,189,224 Completed 
247 Badanda DWS Baddanda Registered 7    12/6/09 New             Gravity 31 183 1,004,795 Completed 
248 Dharapani DWS Dharapani Registered 8    13/07/2011 New             Gravity 39 306 1,528,828 Completed 
249 Gothadi DWS Gothadi Registered 7 9 2/3/10 New             Gravity 128 776 2,442,575 Completed 
250 Jaubari Tangle DWS 
Jaubari 
Tangle Registered 2    7/6/09 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 54 587 3,185,556 Completed 
251 Jhakrepani DWS Jhakrepani Kha In Process 6 8 13/07/2011 New             Gravity 157 827 5,218,230 Completed 
252 Kusunde DWS Kusunde In Process 3    13/07/2011 New             Gravity 65 393 2,310,365 Completed 
253 Murtichaur DWS Murtichaur Registered 8    3/3/10 New             Gravity 25 152 1,072,574 Completed 
254 Pipalchhap DWS Pipalchhap Registered 9    28/02/2010 New             Gravity 50 294 2,286,591 Completed 
255 Samakot DWS Samakot Registered 2    9/6/09 Rehabilitation  Gravity 35 307 1,455,628 Completed 
256 Tarkeni DWS Tarkeni Registered 1    1/3/10 Rehabilitation  Gravity 78 555 1,969,535 Completed 
34 
S
ek
ha
m
 
257 Bangradi DWS Bangradi Registered 3 3 26/06/2009 New             Gravity 22 155 1,703,230 Completed 
258 Bhurung thung 
Bharungthung 
Water Safety 
Plan 
Registered 5 5 2/5/11 New             Gravity 5 27 91,771 Completed 
259 Birdanda Ghadada DWS 
Birdada 
Gahadada Registered 6 6 3/12/11 New             Gravity 34 244 1,876,466 Completed 
260 Ganjar School DWS 
Ganger 
Vidyalaya Registered 4 4 13/07/2011 New             Gravity 21 151 934,048 Completed 
261 Ghur Pal DWS Ghurpal DWS Registered 1 1 28/03/2012 New             Gravity 69 395 673,002 Completed 
262 Hulmadi Khasa khasa DWS In Process 2    14/06/2012 New             Gravity 45 222 920,387 Completed 
263 Jalukeni Jalukani Registered 3 3 15/06/2010 New             Gravity 91 597 3,391,697 Completed 
264 Kamti DWS kamti Registered 6 6 25/06/2010 New             Gravity 70 514 3,037,930 Completed 
265 Khani Gaun DWS Khani gaun Registered 7 7 9/5/09 New             Gravity 71 561 1,848,768 Completed 
266 Phara DWS Phara Registered 6 6 9/6/09 New             Gravity 41 335 761,475 Completed 
267 Ramali Dharadi School DWS 
Ramali 
Dharadi Registered 7 7 13/07/2011 New             Gravity 17 163 810,813 Completed 
268 Ramdanda DWS Ramdada Registered 5 5 15/06/2010 New             Gravity 54 338 973,008 Completed 
269 Sandhi Moundada DWS 
Shandhi 
Moundada Registered 5 5 25/03/2010 New             Gravity 17 119 546,108 Completed 
270 Satdobata Hatya DWS 
Satdobata 
Hatya In Process 9    3/2/12 New             Gravity 57 237 815,602 Completed 
271 Sim Madhana GairaDWS 
Sim Madhana 
Gaira Registered 4 4 25/07/2010 New             Gravity 85 372 1,846,586 Completed 
7 
Ta
na
hu
n 
35 
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272 Aapkhola Aapkhola Registered 9    7/4/12 New             Gravity 55 275 979,137 Completed 
273 Barepani DWS Barepani Registered 5    29/05/2011 New             Gravity 16 87 352,292 Completed 
274 Bhirmuni DWS Bhirmuni WUSC Registered 4    28/05/2011 
Rehabilitati
on  Gravity 61 307 227,626 Completed 
275 Chhatibane DWS Chhatimane Registered 5    19/07/2011 Rehabilitation  Gravity 178 890 712,225 Completed 
276 Dharapani Gairathok-7 DWS 
Dharapani 
Gairathok-7 Registered 7    23/05/2010 New             Lift 58 315 2,451,023 Completed 
277 
Dharapani 
Maidanthar-3 
DWS 
Dharapani 
Maidanthar-3 Registered 3    23/05/2010 New             Lift 64 344 2,425,351 Completed 
278 Jaljale DWS Jaljale Registered 4    12/7/11 Rehabilitation  Gravity 19 203 419,657 Completed 
279 Kafalswara DWS Kafalswara  Registered 2    2/7/11 New             Lift 64 344 2,659,878 Completed 
280 Koirala Pandhero DWS 
Koirale 
Pandhero Registered 5    17/04/2011 New             SI 30 128 151,431 Completed 
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281 Nabarung Devi DWS 
Nabarung 
DeVi Registered 5 6,7,8,9 6/5/10 New             Lift 200 1,200 7,927,488 Completed 
282 Nagnagini Nagnagini Registered 7    22/02/2012 New             Lift 77 350 2,210,657 On-going 
283 Thulodhunga DWS Thulodhaunga Registered 4    22/06/2010 New             Gravity 35 197 667,620 Completed 
36 
B
hi
rk
ot
 
284 Banskhola DWS Banskhola Registered 1    20/03/2011 New             Lift 188 1,083 5,293,662 Completed 
285 Bhedakhola DWS Bhedakhola Registered 2    6/4/11 Rehabilitation  Gravity 62 288 1,315,861 Completed 
286 Bhokaradi DWS Bhokardi Registered 6    2/3/11 New             Gravity 36 238 1,384,374 Completed 
287 Gomandi DWS Gomandi Registered 8    12/3/11 New             Gravity 74 590 1,083,642 Completed 
288 Handiban DWS Handiban Registered 3    6/5/11 New             Gravity 25 140 661,227 Completed 
289 Mulyadi Fedikhola DWS 
Mulyadi 
Fedikhola Registered 5    14/07/2011 New             Gravity 27 176 909,008 Completed 
290 Nebadi DWS Nebdi Registered 9    18/06/2010 New             Gravity 22 222 1,179,022 Completed 
291 Rindi Pandhero DWSS 
Rindi 
Pandhero Registered 9    12/6/12 New             Lift 29 208 1,319,925 On-going 
292 Sanyasitar DWS Sanyasitar Registered 1    2/5/09 New             Gravity 33 264 1,206,249 Completed 
37 
G
ha
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a 
293 Bangesimal DWSS Bangesimal Registered 1    10/3/12 New             Gravity 162 810 1,229,476 On-going 
294 Baspani DWS Baspani Registered 4    2/5/12 New             SI 15 85 61,018 Completed 
295 Bhulbhule DWS Bhulbhule Registered 1    23/03/2010 New             Gravity 18 98 339,923 Completed 
296 Chhabdi Chisapani DWS 
Chhabdi 
Chisapani Registered 2    23/06/2010 New             Gravity 37 172 822,845 Completed 
297 Chhabise DWS Chhabise  Registered 9    4/3/10 New             Gravity 19 223 896,307 Completed 
298 Dharapani DWS Dharapani Registered 6    25/05/2010 New             Gravity 45 232 1,221,334 Completed 
299 
Kamalbari 
(Malepahara) 
DWS 
Kamalbari 
(Malepahara) Registered 3    23/05/2010 New             Gravity 74 356 587,732 Completed 
300 Khanigaira DWS Khanigaira Registered 4    9/6/10 New             Gravity 18 97 478,906 Completed 
301 Khoriyapani Kuwa Khoriyapani SI Registered 7    11/6/11 New             SI 12 72 24,686 Completed 
302 Panirdhara DWS Panirdhara Registered 9    13/07/2011 Rehabilitation  Gravity  -     -    83,928 Completed 
303 Tallo Dharapani DWS 
Tallo 
Dharapani Registered 8    18/04/2010 New             Gravity 137 649 1,226,589 Completed 
304 Thulo Pandhero DWS 
Thulo 
Pandhero SI Registered 4    24/05/2011 New             SI 25 150 24,686 Completed 
38 
R
am
ja
ko
t 
305 Chisapani Barhabise DWS 
Barhabise 
chisapani Registered 8 0 1/6/10 New             Gravity 11 79 387,122 Completed 
306 Jarpani SI Jarpani SI Registered 9    27/04/2011 New             SI 11 54 79,253 Completed 
307 Madane Kholsi DWS 
Madane 
Kholsi Registered 1    23/05/2010 New             Gravity 23 163 877,651 Completed 
308 Sindure Kholsi DWS Sindure Kholsi Registered 5 8 1/6/10 New             Gravity 89 533 2,427,552 Completed 
309 Siradi DWS Siradi DWS Registered 1    28/05/2010 New             Gravity 14 110 508,708 Completed 
310 Tallo Suksal DWS Tallo Suksal Registered 7 0 15/06/2010 New             Gravity 28 249 836,018 Completed 
29 
S
am
bh
un
gb
ha
gw
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i 
311 Chhangadi Siplung DWS 
Chhangadi 
Siplung Registered 1 9 11/4/09 New             Gravity 104 673 2,437,380 Completed 
312 Dharapani DWS Dharapani Registered 2    9/7/10 New             Gravity 24 165 736,739 Completed 
313 Dhodeni DWSS Dhodeni Registered 3    8/6/12 New             Gravity 22 196 760,082 On-going 
314 Gannapur DWS Gannapur Registered 2    15/05/2010 New             Gravity 18 138 688,068 Completed 
315 Khaharekholsi DWS Khaharekholsi Registered 4    15/12/2010 New             Gravity 83 781 1,153,938 Completed 
316 Khaltekholsi DWS Khaltekholsi Registered 8    11/6/10 New             Gravity 30 174 760,347 Completed 
317 Mandatar DWS Mandatar Registered 9    22/03/2011 New             Gravity 23 132 1,204,058 Completed 
318 Manfa DWS Manfa Registered 6    22/03/2011 New             Gravity 26 216 790,948 Completed 
319 Namdi Budhakot DWS 
Namdi 
Budhakot Registered 1    20/03/2009 New             Gravity 95 573 2,396,606 Completed 
320 Pairan DWS Pairan Registered 5    28/04/2010 New             Gravity 16 119 485,806 Completed 
321 Tallo Balsigaunda DWS 
Tallo 
Balsigaunda Registered 4    3/5/10 New             Gravity 49 345 645,933 Completed 
322 Yorde DWS Yorde Registered 2    8/3/11 New             Gravity 7 68 324,446 Completed 
40 
Th
ap
re
k 323 Bhaterkharka DWS 
Bhaterkharka 
Kuwa Registered 4    7/1/10 New             SI 33 122 59,400 Completed 
324 Bilaunepani Bilaunekhola Registered 3 4 28/11/2011 New             Lift 118 578 4,283,268 On-going 
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DWSS 
325 Dharmaswara Kuwa DWS 
Dharmaswara 
Kuwa  Registered 3    7/2/10 New             SI 15 58 59,400 Completed 
326 Dhobidanda Judikhet DWS 
Dhobidanda 
Judikhet  Registered 1 2 30/06/2010 New             Gravity 38 231 942,766 Completed 
327 Makaimro DWS Makaimro Registered 5 6,7,8,9 13/04/2012 New             Lift 265 1,685 11,827,309 Completed 
 
T
ot
al 
40 
 
327 
        
18,445 115,856 
503,264,6
39 
  
Source: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project in Western Nepal, Departmet of Local Infrastructure and Agricultural 
Road, the Government of Nepal 
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Appendix III:  List of Service Providers used by DDCs 
  Districts Total 
VDC 
covered 
by SP 
services 
Intervie
wed SPs Sn. SPs Baglung Kapilvastu 
Nawalpara
shi Parbat Pyuthan 
Rupan
dehi Syangja 
Tanah
un 
1 
Andha Andhi Community 
Development Centre, 
Syangja       
1 
 
1 1 
2 ASK-Nepal 
      
1 
 
1 1 
3 BISBAS 
      
1 
 
1 
 
4 Bishwa Dristi VISION 
 
1 
      
1 
 
5 CeCRED Nepal 
   
1 
    
1 1 
6 Chautarfi Development Resource Forum Nepal    
1 
    
1 1 
7 CODEF (Community Development Forum)     
3 
  
1 4 
 
8 CRCD Butwal Rupandehi 
     
1 
  
1 
 
9 CRDS Rupandehi 
     
1 
  
1 
 
10 
Dhaulagiri Community 
Resource Development 
Center, Baglung 
1 
       
1 
 
11 Dipjyoti Youth Club Baglung 1        
1 
 
12 
ETA (subsidiary of 
Integrated Development 
Society)     
2 
   
2 
 
13 FIRDO 
    
1 
   
1 
 
14 Forum For Social Welfare Baglung 1        
1 
 
15 Gaja Youth Club Baglung 1 
       
1 
 
16 Integrated Development Society (IDS)     
1 
   
1 1 
17 Indreni Rural Development Centre  
1 
   
1 
  
2 1 
18 
Local Infrastructure 
Development Organization 
Nepal  
1 
      
1 
 
19 Milijuli Bikas Baglung 1 
       
1 
 
20 NCCDC 
   
1 
    
1 
 
21 Nepal Red Cross Society, Tanahun        
1 1 1 
22 Nepal Red Cross Society, Syangja.       
1 
 
1 
 
23 NESDO Nepal 
   
1 
    
1 1 
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24 Nepal Red Cross Society, Rupandehi      
1 
  
1 1 
25 RSN 
    
1 
   
1 
 
26 Rural Area Development Programme        
1 1 
 
27 Rural Development AS Parbat    
1 
    
1 
 
28 Siddhartha Social Development Centre JV  
1 
      
1 
 
29 Siswa Community Development Centre  
1 
      
1 
 
30 Social Development and Research Centre  
1 1 
     
2 1 
31 Society For Social Development Project        
1 1 1 
32 Swarnim Community And Development   
1 
     
1 1 
33 Tanahun Service Committee        
1 1 
 
 
Total 5 6 2 5 8 4 4 5 39 12 
 
 
 
Note:  
Highligted are the Service Providers inducted for the survery questionnaire and interview. 
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Appendix IV (a): Survey questionnaire-District Development 
Committee   
 
Note: 
The sub-question related to the “treated agreement” was not used because the 
agreements that were made by the DDCs with WUCs were found the same as normal 
agreements during the investigation. 
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 350 
 
 351 
 
 352 
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Appendix IV (b):Survey questionnaire-Service Provider 
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 355 
 
 
 356 
 
 
 357 
 
 
 358 
 
 
 359 
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Appendix V: Sample of DDC and WUC Agreement 
 361 
 362 
 (Nepali Version) 
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Appendix VI:  Sample of DDC and SP Contract 
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 (Nepali Version) 
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Appendix VI:  Sample of DDC and SP Contract 
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 365 
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 367 
 368 
 369 
 370 
  
 371 
 372 
  
 373 
  
 374 
  
 375 
 
 376 
 377 
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 (Nepali Version) 
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Appendix VI:  Sample of DDC and SP Contract 
 
 364 
 365 
 366 
 367 
 
  
 368 
 369 
 370 
 
  
 371 
  
 372 
 373 
 374 
  
 373 
  
 374 
  
 375 
 375 
 
 376 
  
 378 
 379 
 380 
 381 
Appendix VII: SP Contract Assessment Table 
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!/!NGO
!Feb
510!
17!
1,524,
171!A
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Appendix VIII: List of District Development Plans 
 
1.  Nawalparasi DDC: 
1.1 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2065/66 approved by the 16th District 
Council, District Development Committee Office Nawalparasi 
1.2 Policy, Budget and Programme of Fiscal Year 2066/067 approved by the 17th 
District Development Council, District Development Committee Office, Nawalparasi 
1.3 Policy, Budget and Programme of Fiscal Year 2067/068 approved by the 18th 
District Development Council, District Development Committee Office, Nawalparasi  
1.4 Policy, Programme and Budget of Fiscal Year 2068/069 approved by the 19th 
District Development Council, District Development Committee Office, Nawalparasi 
1.5 Policy, Programme and Budget of Fiscal Year 2069/070 approved by the 20th 
District Development Council, District Development Committee Office, Nawalparasi 
2. Parbat DDC: 
2.1 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2065/66 approved by the District Council, 
Budget, Policy and Programme (30 Jestha 2065), District Development Council 
Office, Parbat 
2.2 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2066/67 approved by the District Council, 
Budget, Policy and Programme (7 Baisakh 2066), District Development Council 
Office, Parbat 
2.3 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2067/68 approved by the District Council, 
Budget, Policy and Programme (21 Jestha 2067), District Development Council 
Office, Parbat, Information and Record Centre, DDC Parbat Ashar 20671  
2.4 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2068/69 approved by the District Council, 
Budget, Policy and Programme (29Falgun 2067), District Development Council 
Office, Parbat 
3. Syangja DDC: 
3.1 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2066/67, Policy, Programme and Budget 
approved by the 18th District Council. District Development Committee, 
Information, Publication and Record Centre, Syangja, 2066. 
3.2 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2067/68, Policy, Programme and Budget 
approved by the 19th District Council. District Development Committee, 
Information, Publication and Record Centre, Syangja, 2067. 
3.3 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2068/69, Policy, Programme and Budget 
approved by the 20th District Council. District Development Committee, 
Information, Publication and Record Centre, Syangja, 2068. 
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3.4 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2069/70, Policy, Programme and Budget 
approved by the 21th District Council. District Development Committee, 
Information, Publication and Record Centre, Syangja, 2069. 
4. Pyuthan DDC: 
4.1 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2068/69 approved by 18th District Council, 
District Development Committee, Khalanga, Pyuthan 
4.2 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2069/70 approved by 19th District Council, 
District Development Committee, Khalanga, Pyuthan  
5. Tanahun DDC: 
5.1 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2065/66, Approved Policy, Programme and 
Budget, District Development Committee Office, Information Centre, Tanahun  
5.2 District Development Plan Fiscal Year 2067/68, Approved Policy, Programme and 
Budget, District Development Committee Office, Information and Record Centre, 
Tanahun 
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Appexdix IX: Descriptive analysis and correlation 
Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive analysis and correlation in this research have been carried out with two 
objectives. The first of these is to understand the statistical significance of their 
“compactness”137 (WB, 2004) – that is, the compactness of accountability features and 
their intensity – in the service delivery relationship between the DDCs and WUCs, and 
between the DDCs and SPs. The second is to find out what kinds of relationships are 
being established between these actors (organizations), deriving from the compactness of 
their accountability features. In other words, how they show their compacting 
associational behaviour, and whether it is a loose ‘agreement’ type or a legal binding 
formal ‘contractual’ type in service delivery transaction.  
The descriptive analysis (Table 14) shows that the ‘agreements’ between DDCs and 
WUCs, as perceived by DDCs, have low mean value (µ=17.43), compared to the DDCs’ 
perception of the ‘contracts’ between DDCs and SPs (µ =20.14), and the ‘contract’ 
perceived by SPs between SP and DDC (µ =18.86). This indicates that on average the 
‘contracts’ are better off in terms of their compactness in accountability features. Even 
within the category of the perception of ‘contracts’, the perception of DDCs (µ =20.14) is 
better than the perception of SPs (µ =18.86).  
If one examines how uniformly these features are distributed (dispersed), the contracts 
have again performed better than the agreements. However, the SPs’ perceptions of their 
contracts with DDCs (SP>DDC) have shown narrow dispersion of accountability features 
(𝜎𝑥 =2.116) compared with the DDCs’ perceptions of their contracts with SPs (DDC>SP) 
( 𝜎𝑥 = 3.33) and the DDCs perceptions of agreements with WUCs (DDC>WUC) 
(𝜎𝑥 =4.467) respectively.  
Where, 
• DDC>WUC = DDCs made agreement with WUCs as perceived by DDCs 
• DDC>SP = DDCs made contract with SPs as perceived by DDCs 
• SP>DDC = DDCs made contract with SPs as perceived by SPs 
                                                
137  World Bank – World Development Report 2004 defined compacts as “The broad, long-term relationship of 
accountability connecting policymakers to organizational providers. This is usually not as specific or legally 
enforceable as a contract. But an explicit, verifiable contract can be one form of a compact”. 
 385 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics of relationship (agreements and contracts) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean (µ) Std. 
Deviation (𝝈𝒙) 
DDC>WUC (agreement) 7 10 24 17.43 4.467 
DDC>SP (contract) 7 14 24 20.14 3.338 
SP>DDC (contract) 7 16 21 18.86 2.116 
Valid N (list wise) 7     
 
Interpretation: 
The ‘agreements’ made by DDCs with WUCs (DDCs’ perception) and the ‘contracts’ 
made with SPs (both DDCs and SPs’ perception) have demonstrated different levels of, 
and variation in, accountability features. From DDCs’ perception, the ‘agreements’ made 
by DDCs with WUCs have a low level of intensity of accountability features with greater 
variation whereas the ‘contracts’ made by DDCs with SPs have a higher intensity of 
accountability features with less variation.  
Taking service delivery compactness as the function of the mean value (µ) and the 
standard deviation (𝜎𝑥) of the accountability features, one sees that the higher the mean 
value and the lower the standard deviation the greater compactness in the service 
transaction relationship. 
 
This can be expressed by the equation: 
 Compactness (C) = Mean Value (µ) and Standard Deviation (𝝈𝒙) 
 
If this is so, then it can be concluded that the ‘contract’ service transaction (DDC>SP) 
(SP>DDC) offers a better accountability prospect than the ‘agreement’ ((DDC>WUC) type 
of service transaction. Refer to Table 14 for the level of the intensity of the accountability 
features, their mean value (µ) and variation in consistency (𝜎𝑥) in the service transaction 
relationships.  
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Correlations 
Correlation is used to see whether the perceived service delivery transaction between 
DDCs, WUCs and SPs show a strong and significant association in their relationship from 
the accountability feature point of view, or not. The correlations of these perceptions are 
the view as perceived by DDC towards WUC and SP, and SP towards DDC only. These 
three relations have produced three correlations.  
These are: 
Correlation (r) between  
i. Relationship A and B [Accountability (DDC-WUC) & Accountability (DDC-SP)] 
ii. Relationship A and C [Accountability (DDC-WUC) & Accountability (SP-DDC)] 
iii. Relationship B and C [Accountability (DDC-SP) & Accountability (SP-DDC)] 
 
In this case, the associational predictions as observed regarding the relationships 
between DDCs and WUCs, and between DDCs and SPs, both as perceived by DDCs 
towards WUCs and SPs; and then by SPs towards DDCs (Table 20) are as follows. 
1. DDC>WUC (agreement) and DDC>SP (contract) = r (0.722) (DDCs’ perception) 
2. DDC>SP (contract) and SP>DDC (contract) = r (0.782*) (both DDCs and SPs’ 
perception) 
Table 20: Correlation of Perceptions 
 DDC>WUC DDC>SP SP>DDC 
DDC>WUC 
Pearson Correlation  .722  
Sig. (2-tailed)  .067  
N  7  
DDC>SP 
Pearson Correlation .722  .782* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .067  .038 
N 7  7 
SP>DDC 
Pearson Correlation  .782*  
Sig. (2-tailed)  .036  
N  7  
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* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
DDCs’ perception regarding relationship with WUCs and SPs 
This relationship is observed to see whether there is any difference or similarities in the 
prediction of the perception behaviour concerning the ‘agreements’ made by DDCs with 
WUCs, and the ‘contracts’ made by DDCs with SPs. The relationship, which is defined by 
the accountability features, has established an insignificant relationship (r = 0.722) 
between the ‘agreements’ made by DDCs with WUCs and the ‘contracts’ made by DDCs 
with SPs. This means that this relationship cannot be predicted as positively significant, 
which further suggests that the accountability features of both relationships i.e. 
‘agreement’ and ‘contract’ differ significantly from each other.  
DDCs and SPs’ perception regarding relationship to each other 
It was found that the relationships between DDCs and SPs as perceived by both DDCs 
and SPs, under contractual arrangement, positively reciprocated each other, which means 
that the positive correlation is established (r = 0.782*) in this relationship. Both DDCs and 
SPs held similar perceptions regarding the features of contracts. It therefore, can be 
concluded that both DDCs and SPs have perceived similar (or close to similar) 
accountability features, which means that better compactness in service provision can be 
observed for predictive purposes compared to the relationship under the agreement-type 
relationships between DDCs and WUCs. 
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Appendix X: Letter of Introduction 
 
